

The Journal of Historical Review

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Oswald Mosley Reconsidered

In the five years and twenty issues of its existence, this journal of contemporary history, devoted to the unusual and the unsung—to histories untold or told generally from only one point of view, to people and ideas, movements and events and interpretations not often given (so we from our perspective suppose) a fair hearing—has never touched on the subject of Oswald Mosley and the tumultuous, though unsuccessful, political movements he led in Britain during the middle third of this century. All historical study entails not only the consideration of events transpired, but of alternatives untried; for “revisionary” history, the kind whose students and practitioners for one reason or another carry a predisposition to look and think twice, the draw to the latter, to imagination and reconstruction, must be especially powerful. And for history considered *as politics*, creator through sheer power-wield of what we like or don't like about the world around us, all the more compelling must be that draw—particularly if it transcends “what if” speculation and involves consciously the desire to glean useful lessons from the past, quite as much from failures as from successes, what didn't as from what did happen.

Oswald Mosley's strange, spectacular, and absolutely unique career within the broad polity of an entrenched liberal-democratic society of our time touched, in its long course, on virtually every great public issue and theme that faced and still faces such a society in this age of continuing turmoil and change. Peace and war, the division of the world, European union, colonialism, government, empire, democracy, communism, socialism, fascism, corporatism, syndicalism, trade unionism, protectionism, capitalism, Keynesianism, public works, militarism, technocracy, managerialism, violence, race, treason, free speech, coercion, philosophy, culture—all these met their treatment in earnest study and debate, and impassioned advocacy, at the hands of Mosley and his various followers and opponents, at various times. And while it would be wrong to suggest that, excepting the two fiery decades of his meteoric political ascendancy after World War I, Mosley and “Mosleyism” were at or even very near the center of all these discussions in Britain, nevertheless his approaches to the problems of the twentieth century have left their mark on events and ideas. With passions of former years subsiding, old combatants mellowing (or just dying), and inevitable curiosity piquing at what is, after all, a most interesting and instructive political story, recent years have seen the emergence in his own country of a profound reawakening of interest in just who Mosley was, what he stood for, what led him to stand for it—and how all or some of it might have made a difference. For decades he was kept quite out of “serious” discussion, though never really out of the public eye. The revival of interest in him is serious, and it is hardly unnatural that much of it takes the form, mild yet, of a reaction against the longstanding former “consensus” interpretation of the man as the very epitome of political evil. Mosley is being revised—and the revisionist process truly to be such need only amount to a gradual reconsideration of his ideas and proposals simply on their

merits. The persistence into the present of the problems Mosley addressed, often in studious detail and with an eloquence conceded even by his worst enemies and since unmatched, makes for his relevance to the contemporary political discussion. As in Britain, so this discussion would bear hearing in America—though on these shores the “reconsideration” of Mosley is really his consideration in the first place; not too much has been said of him here, perhaps naturally enough. But for American students of Fascism, indeed of the clash of political ideas in this century generally, there must be an especial usefulness in considering the British case since, of all countries with Fascist movements successful or unsuccessful, that one does bear the closest resemblance to our own in terms of political and cultural structure and tradition, the degree of development and modernization—and it is, of course, the most readily accessible to understanding because of a shared language. The lessons of Mosley for Britain are not necessarily restricted to Britain. Nor need be simple interest.

To the end of introducing Oswald Mosley to American readers we present as our lead article this issue Robert Row’s “Sir Oswald Mosley: Briton, Fascist, European,” followed by an extensive, though not exhaustive, bibliography for those who might care to pursue their interest. Nothing like either has ever appeared in an American publication. About Mr. Row’s contribution two points should be made. First, it is not an objective historical study, but an appreciation by a longtime political associate and partisan; it introduces Mosley from the frank Mosleyite perspective of the present day, and as such—a “political” treatment—tends to give his post-1945 ideas and proposals as much attention as those of the prewar Fascist period—a rare, and valuable, thing. (Those seeking other perspectives are referred to the bibliography, where will be found anti-Mosleyana in magnificent abundance.) Second, it speaks in some degree—with several rather interesting quotations, considering from whom they come—to the current phenomenon of a “new objectivity” in approaching Mosley. Though already mentioned here, it is to this point that some further few words might yet with profit be addressed.

It indeed became fashionable toward the end of, and after, Mosley’s life for even the British intellectual Establishment, whose members by-and-large had waged alternately hot and cold wars against him for decades, to praise Mosley—or at least to raise him up somewhat from the “out of sight, out of mind” political and moral dustbin to which he had been consigned. Mosley himself contributed in great measure to his (partial) rehabilitation with the publication by a major house in 1968 of his autobiography, *My Life*. (The final chapter of this book, incidentally, should be read intently by anyone seeking to understand the fundamental difference in outlook on life between a Fascist and a Marxist.) The trend of looking at Mosley in a new, less jaundiced way was heralded by Colin Cross’s rancor-bereft historical study *The Fascists in Britain*, of 1961. By the time of its appearance Mosley had already been gaining some sympathy of a kind because of heavy-handed, often violent, attempts to curb his and Union Movement’s rights of free speech in public places. Robert Skidelsky’s magisterial and controversial 1975 biography, *Oswald Mosley*, marked the real milestone in revising “standard” interpretations of the

man. After it no one could look at its subject in quite the same way; this included the work's many strident critics, who demonstrated the fact by sole virtue of adopting some countering lines of argument that they had not, theretofore, felt it necessary to raise, probably even to consider. So by the time of his death in 1980 at the age of 84, a new way of looking at Mosley, more respectful and quite respectable, had developed into being. It was manifest in many of the hundreds of mainstream-press obituary articles and broadcasts that papered and sounded over Britain and caused the people of that land—at least those with memories—to pause of a day and reflect on the loss of one who, variously adored or hated, praised or reviled, looked to enthusiastically as likely Labour Prime Minister or feared as would-be Fascist dictator, stirring and shaking huge crowds in monster auditoriums or pacing in a tiny Brixton Prison cell, putting forth policy in the highest councils of national government or standing against charges of planned violent subversion, had been a part of their political tradition and consciousness for more than four decades.

But a slightly specious note may be discovered in many of the good words of recent years that have been said about Mosley. (Said especially since his death; if it is bad to criticize a dead man on the grounds that he can't reply, is it any better to reserve the full flowering of relative kindness and fairness for the time when he can't benefit?) This note sounds in the one basic qualification generally attached to those words, lending a resounding "Yes, but . . ." effect. The line goes something like this: "Ah, Mosley . . . tsk, what a tragedy. He could have accomplished great things with all that talent and some of those modern ideas of his. If it just weren't for that fall into extremism and Fascism; must have been a character flaw there. Well, the major parties lost a great one, for sure. Could have used him. Yes, too bad about that Fascist thing, too bad . . ." Thus the "tragedy of Mosley"—that a man of such high station, so full of early influence and exalted promise, could "succumb" (to something or other) and take himself down "the wrong path" (or "the twisted path"), leading only to the pale and beyond. Here we have Mosley considered not really on his own terms but, as usual, on the terms, from the singular perspective, of the Establishment. For a long time criticized and condemned on those terms, lately praised and lamented *on those terms*: the tragedy of how Mosley was lost to the use of the old ways—not of how possible new, radically new, ways were lost to the use of Britain.

Surely this lament for "the lost Mosley" does not amount finally to the lament that, oh, what a shame, Labour in the '40s could have had a much more dynamic and photogenic leader than Clement Atlee! Mosley would laugh in his grave. He could not but have left Labour eventually (at least any Labour Party likely ever to have been constituted), precisely as he did leave it in 1931. He was made for more than that, and his cause—which came to him gradually—was far greater than that; he finally knew it, he tried for more, and he failed. He failed right at the vigorous prime, not at all toward the enfeebling end, of his life, still a young man with much ahead of him. The times, the situation, had determined when he would make his gamble for "The Greater Britain." (They determined also—and this is very important—that and *how* he would make the gamble.) He never regretted his course, though he had decades in the political wilderness to help persuade him to do so. Rather he kept on, with a new

movement suited, he said, to the post-1945 world realities. New vehicle notwithstanding, the guiding cause was really the same, with the difference now that it was a greater one, not just Britain's. As Mosley put it: "Europe a Nation." But no regret—and certainly no apology. For Mosley, surveying the course of Britain and Europe since the Second World War, there could only be regret that the cause to which he had sacrificed his career, and which had promised a far, far different future for his nation, its continent and culture, had not succeeded. Hardly could there be any other regret, certainly not on fundamentals, when the very evidences—massive, innumerable, overwhelming—of *vindication*, the what-is compared with the what-could-have-been, stared back unblinking, like Nietzsche's abyss, into the souls of all who cared to look, and had a European soul so to be affrighted.

Just who had taken "the wrong path"—Mosley in turning to Fascism, or those who rejected and condemned him and it? That can only be answered after it has been asked, and the Establishment, for all its "new objectivity" in treating Mosley, has not yet got around to asking *that*. When it does, as it will one day, we will see finally considered with all due seriousness (and that is no little seriousness) the ideas and program of, yes, Mosley *the Fascist and European unionist*. Nevermore just Mosley the "lost leader" of Labour (or, for that matter, of the Tories), not just the Mosley who "could have been another Lloyd George if he'd played his cards right," but as well the Mosley who could utterly renounce the old parties and the old philosophies to provide his countrymen with the great and revolutionary alternative of a new philosophy and synthesis. The Mosley of the British Union Peace Programme of 1939, of the Declaration of Venice of 1962, not just of the rejected Labour "Memorandum" of 1930. Only when *this* Mosley is considered in wide and serious measure will objectivity have run its course, to do which it must pass through the pale itself, using as a guide precisely that "wrong" path Mosley was alleged to have taken. To where that path, in time, leads will also be found the answer to the question of just whose real and great tragedy the Mosley story, the brilliant Mosley failure, described. For those who have already ventured in their hearts down that path, reaching the precipice that is also a lookout, the answer stands clear: more than a man's; more than a nation's; Europe's.

—Keith Stimely



Oswald Mosley in Blackshirt uniform, before British Union of Fascists mass march in East London, 4 October 1936.

Sir Oswald Mosley: *Briton, Fascist, European*

ROBERT ROW

Late in 1932, about a year after the financial crisis that rocked Britain to its foundations and heralded the great depression of the thirties, George Bernard Shaw said at a Fabian meeting in London: "You may remember the eloquence with which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald begged the nation to defend the gold standard. They all rallied 'round the gold standard and gave Mr. MacDonald a big majority. They were told that as long as they stuck to the gold standard the trade of England was safe." Yet "Mr. MacDonald, who had been hailed as the man who saved the nation by keeping it on the gold standard, was then hailed as the man who saved the nation by taking it off the gold standard."

Thus the ironic Shaw on that extraordinary sleight-of-hand by which the old political order faced the crisis of 1931.

He then turned to MacDonald's leading critic who had warned, in vain, that the crisis was coming. "You will hear more of Sir Oswald Mosley before you are very much older. I know you dislike him, because he looks like a man who has some physical courage and is going to do something, and that is a terrible thing. You instinctively hate him, because you do not know where he will land you. Instead of talking 'round and 'round political subjects, and obscuring them with bunk verbiage without even touching them and without understanding them . . . he keeps hard down to the actual situation."

So much for what Shaw really thought of his Fabian friends, many of whom were to rise to the very heights of "the Establishment," those rulers who have run Britain down-hill since 1931, Mosley's entrenched opponents all his life.

Others, too, were to recognize the same attitude in high places. Richard Crossman wrote in 1961 that "Mosley was spurned by Whitehall, Fleet Street and every party leader at Westminster simply and solely because he was right." No doubt, as Crossman added, he was spurned because he "was prepared to discard the orthodoxies of democratic politics and to break with the bankers of high finance in order to conquer unemployment," a terrible thing in the view of Shaw, ironic as ever. Dazzled by Mosley's "brightly shining star," as Michael Foot observed in 1968, the men of the Establishment decided they preferred, after all, "mediocrity and safety first which consigned political genius to the wilderness and the nation to the valley of the shadow of death" and to much suffering in large parts of Britain during the unemployment of the thirties.

Mosley, in the opinion of Lord Boothby and others, could have been "a very great Prime Minister" leading either a Labour or a Conservative government. That was not to be. Mediocrity ruled in Britain instead.

Who was this man Mosley? The noted historian A.J.P. Taylor wrote in 1965 that "his proposals were more creative than those of Lloyd George and offered a blueprint for most of the constructive advances in economic policy to the present day . . . evidence of a superlative talent." David Lloyd George himself saw Mosley as a man of "remarkable lucidity and force." John Wheatley, M.P. of "Red" Clydeside, said in 1926 that he was "one of the greatest and most hopeful figures the socialist movement has thrown up." Colonel Joseph Wedgwood of the Labour Party, later a Father of the House, said after Mosley's speech of resignation from government in 1930: "I watched the Liberal Party. I watched the Conservative Party. Man after man was saying to himself: 'That is our leader.'"

Such were the views of leading historians and parliamentarians. Great audiences thought likewise, when they heard his policies. During the stormy General Election of 1931, as New Party meetings up and down the country were being wrecked by organized mobs, Mosley held one remarkable meeting in Manchester's Free Trade Hall about which the Manchester Guardian was to say: "In his thirty-fifth year Oswald Mosley is already encrusted with legend. . . . Who could doubt when he sat down after his speech on Saturday, and the audience, stirred as an audience rarely is, rose and swept a storm of applause towards

the platform—who could doubt that here was one of those root-and-branch men who have been thrown up from time to time in the religious, political and business story of England? His ideas swept a great audience off its feet and the scene at the end was matter for thought to any ‘elder statesman.’ ”

In the world of letters Beverley Nichols was later to write in his *News of England* in 1938, the time of the British Union of Fascists (BUF): “For Mosley, whether you regard him as a limb of Satan or a potential saviour of this nation, is one of the three most dynamic personalities in the Empire today. And the men he has inspired are animated by something akin to a religious faith.”

How did the man regard himself? He wished to be known to posterity as “the man of synthesis,” and in a recent criticism in the *Times Higher Education Supplement*, Richard Thurlow conceded he had “a brilliant synthesising mind. . . . He synthesised many of the best ideas of his time: Keynes’s critique of the Establishment’s deflationary policies, Lloyd George’s great public works to soak up unemployment, Joseph Chamberlain’s demand for an insulated home market and protection for the British Empire, and C.H. Douglas’s proposals of consumer credits to raise the purchasing power of the poorer sections of the community.”

There was also guild socialism. Mosley wrote in his autobiography, *My Life*: “My inclination in British politics was always towards the guild socialists—then represented by such thinkers and writers as [G.D.H.] Cole, [J.A.] Hobson and [A.R.] Orage—rather than to state socialism, whose exponents were the Webbs and the Fabians. The tradition of the mediaeval guilds in England, of the Hanseatic League and the syndicalism of the Latin countries was much nearer to my thinking.” At the same time he could appreciate the power of the Federal Reserve System and what he saw of American mass production methods during his visit to the United States in the twenties, reaching yet another synthesis for Britain by combining what he learned in America, the most advanced capitalist state, and the thinking of British guild socialists and European syndicalists.

Yet he was more. He achieved his own personal ideal of the “complete man” of politics, economic thinking, war service in 1914-18, a man of culture with a deep interest in philosophy, the true aristocrat who was “the friend of the people.” And there was his sport. Descended from a family long connected with the land of England, including a grandfather famous for his pedigree cattle and the very model for England’s “John Bull,” Mosley’s early interest in sport turned to boxing, “The Fancy” of his ancestors in a more robust age. He also represented his country in international fencing contests in his thirties.

"He is very English," wrote James Drennan of the Mosley of that time, "as it were, a composite ghost of English history, yet his enemies complain he is so 'un-English.' Perhaps they mean that he lacks that bourgeois stamp which has moulded to its flaccid type the generations of English politicians who have grown up since the Industrial Revolution. There is something of the Elizabethan in his gallant, rather arrogant air. He is the Englishman of the Carolean tennis court, of the duelling ground rather than of the Pall Mall club. Then again, with his boxing and fencing, he has walked in the tradition of the Regency 'buck' in a time when people have got into the habit of expecting younger politicians to have horn-rimmed spectacles and soft white hands. He is a big man of blood and bone, of strong tones, no feeble creature of grey shadings. He is a personality, with all his individual qualities and faults, no self-complacent bladder of conventions."

A certain hard seriousness and a natural chivalry were indeed his hallmarks. Several times in later life he was in a position to destroy an opponent by exposing personal scandal. "We must confine our attacks on these people to their public lapses and not to their private lives, however disgusting" was his invariable response.

The Mosley story began in the waterlogged trenches of Flanders, red with poppies and the life blood of a slaughtered British generation, and in the Royal Flying Corps where he learned to respect his opponents, the young German airmen of 1914-18, feeling a kinship with them higher than his regard for "the old politicians who sent both of us there, to fight." Many years later he saw a film of the Verdun battles when he experienced an immediate spiritual comradeship with one French soldier silent and stark amid that enormous suffering.

Out of these deep impressions of what G.K. Chesterton described as "that awful depopulation" of Europe, there sprang his lasting faith in an ultimate union of the nations of Europe to end all conflicts of brother peoples.

And so, with the limp which was his own personal legacy from the trenches, he went into Parliament with a hatred of world wars to raise his great voice for "the missing generation," his mission that never again should there be another such bloodbath. Winning Harrow for the Conservatives in the "Khaki Election" of 1918, he was asked to explain his policies. His reply, in the tradition of Joseph Chamberlain, was "socialist imperialism"; he had fought on a platform of high wages and shorter hours, housing schemes carried out by the nation, the abolition of slums, and health and child welfare policies.

But when he reached Parliament, as he later said, "the first

shock was the sight of my colleagues. The young men were in a minority and the 'hardfaced men' were in a great majority. The profiteer outnumbered the fighter." Thus when those "hard-faced men" who then led the Conservatives betrayed the war-time pledge that a land for heroes would be built after so much sacrifice, while disgracing themselves during the Black and Tan period in Ireland, he left that party.

For a time he sat in Parliament as an Independent, holding Harrow against the attacks of Conservative press and party machine in two further elections, and there he was spotted as a coming man by the bright eye of the Labour leader, Ramsay MacDonald, to be invited to join that "peoples' party" which MacDonald in turn was to betray, in 1931. In 1924, when Mosley joined Labour, Britain was in the grip of a merciless deflation. Other hard-faced men in high places, the Cunliffe Committee of City bankers and Treasury officials, had met in conclave before the killing was over in 1918 and there decreed that deflation was the essential road "back to normality" after the war. This was accepted widely. By 1925 Stanley Baldwin, Tory leader, was stating bluntly that "all the workers in this country have got to face a reduction in wages." The Liberals were split on the question, but they were the declining party. Even Labour, the rising party, no matter how much it denounced deflation in opposition, was led by men who tugged their forelocks to the bankers in office. Prominent among them was the mercantilist Philip Snowden. He announced shortly after becoming Chancellor in the first Labour government of 1924 that he was "much guided" by the findings of the Cunliffe Committee. As Chancellor again in the second Labour government he was to say in 1931 that "the City would not stand for" Mosley's proposals for solving unemployment.

The latter did not join a party widely proclaiming its "socialist" goal in order to grovel in this way before the power of high finance. All his sympathies lay with the guild socialist tradition in that party, all his ideas were opposed to the deflation demanded by the Establishment of the day. His years of synthesizing then began, seeing much of Keynes—at that time the leading rebel against the Cunliffe Committee's dictates—and inevitably coming into growing conflict with the Snowdenites; for such leaders, cast in an older mold, Mosley had far too many ideas and most of them dangerous.

By 1925 he had written *Revolution by Reason*, a book revolutionary in the sense that it cut across the current orthodoxy and proposed the deliberate raising of living standards through consumer credits, injecting purchasing power wherever it was needed most in order to match the greater power of industry to

produce. And in these proposals lay the origins of that later breach with Labour leaders.

For, while Mosley campaigned for higher living standards at public meetings where he was increasingly in demand, a Conservative government took measures to depress those standards through a more rigorous deflation than Mrs. Thatcher recently has attempted—and there on the Labour front bench in Parliament the Snowdenites bowed in deepest reverence to the financial gods sacred to Stanley Baldwin, Tory leader. The men of like minds occupied both front benches. The men who wanted change sat behind, with Mosley.

Incredible though it may seem to much opinion in the 1980s, Mosley did not turn to Fascism because of "arrogance" or "ambition" but simply because he soon came to realize that socialism would not be built under the old leadership; the logic of his ideas drew him ever more towards a form of proto-fascism but for the word itself. For him this arose from the memory of comradeship in the trenches, uniting all classes in face of the machine-guns which struck down all irrespective of social class. It arose from his "socialist imperialism"; its dynamic thrust came from his synthesis of economic ideas; its method of government was inspired by Lloyd George's inner cabinet, a government of action which had won the war of 1914-18 and which Mosley would transform into "a machinery of government" to solve the problems left by that war.

First among those problems was unemployment. This continued to rise rapidly despite the election of a Labour government in 1929 to solve it. Seeing that MacDonald's speeches on the subject were having no effect, Mosley compiled his own policies of action in the famous "Mosley Memorandum" of early 1930; a government determined to solve unemployment, equipped with the machinery to do it, was the vital part of his proposals.

Yet when placed before the men of the Cabinet, these proposals aroused their pious horror, for the men were paragons of inaction, dedicated to muddling through. Close contact with their woolly minds had no doubt made a parting of the ways likely in any event: this was made inevitable by their limp response to the approaching crisis and the inertia with which they answered Mosley's dynamism. When they rejected the Memorandum, while refusing to produce something better themselves, he resigned from the Labour government in May 1930.

Father Brocard Sewell of the Carmellites, replying to an obituary in Mosley's old school magazine, *The Wykehamist*, wrote that "when the dust has settled" Mosley may be remembered most for his rejected Memorandum, which would have solved unemployment, and for his advocacy of a united Europe. Prophetic words.

Much has been written about the failure of Mosley's New Party, hastily formed under the storm cloud of crisis, lacking a press but attacked by the national press, accused of the blackest treachery by former allies, its meetings smashed by the Labour mobs and the communists. Its electoral organization was rudimentary and in the panic conditions of the General Election of 1931 it was swept away.

Those panic conditions, with the workless queues lengthening ominously, set the scene for one of the great confidence tricks of British history. Assisted by some Liberals, the Labour and Conservative leaders united to stampede the country into giving them office again—although they were the men most responsible for the crisis! They had the support of a servile press which both whipped up the crisis and bamboozled the public. The first step in the charade was taken by MacDonald when his coalition was arranged. "All my friends are with me tonight," declared the erstwhile revolutionary as he faced the House of Commons, proudly surveying his former class enemies, the leading Tories sitting poker-faced at his side. The men of like minds were together at last.

A further step was that trick derided by Shaw before the dumbfounded Fabians, the trick of panicking the country into defense of the gold standard to be duly followed by the abandoning of the gold standard, yet still to the applause of the servile press.

Hence the bitterness of Mosley, who had striven to arouse a Labour government to action long before the crisis arose, at the one-time visionaries of "socialism" joining in the trickery which thus resuscitated the economic system they had spent their lives in denouncing. The defeated New Party had offered a real alternative to that system and had been at least an attempt to save Britain from the mass unemployment that followed in the thirties, and in the last issue of its paper, *Action*, Mosley flung his defiance at his triumphant opponents: "Better far the great adventure, better the great attempt for England's sake, better defeat, disaster, better far the end of that trivial thing called a political career than stifling in a uniform of Blue and Gold, strutting and posturing on the stage of Little England, amid the scenery of decadence. . . ."

And for those who stood fast, unlike those who had broken at the sight of the mobs or had chosen "safety first" in the ranks of the old parties after all, he reaffirmed the original faith which had taken him into politics: "Before we go we will do something great for England. Through and beyond the failure of men and parties, we of the war generation are marching on, and we shall march on until our end is achieved and our sacrifice atoned." It was to be a stormy road.

Oswald Mosley was bitterly condemned when he took the road to Fascism. Critics were as outraged then as they have been since. Suddenly they began to notice certain flaws of character which had not been apparent when they praised his abilities.

Yet this recoil from men who dare to cross Rubicons and defy the fates has occurred again and again in history.

History also shows that all new ideas, as Fascism was new in Britain in 1932, have met with strong opposition in that country from their inception. Parliament itself was not a British invention but was imported from France by Simon de Montfort in the very teeth of opposition from the mediaeval crown. Democracy in classical times originated in Athens, and in modern times again in France: great thunderings greeted it from the great landed interests when its early crude form emerged during the French Revolution. England went to war with democracy then, a conflict intensified when Napoleon Bonaparte, its military champion, reached power in France. And England and Prussia, defenders of the older order, defeated Napoleon and democracy at Waterloo in 1815. Nevertheless democracy was to triumph in the end in England, through a series of political changes beginning with the first Reform Act of 1832, eleven years after the great Napoleon died, and to such an extent that in the more spacious Victorian age English statesmen came to pride themselves as the very paladins of democracy. Read their speeches.

Thus just a hundred years after the passing of the Reform Act, when Britain was long settled in democratic ways, the founding of the British Union of Fascists aroused another storm in 1932.

What was Fascism? Serious critics now agree that it took several very different forms between the two world wars. Fascism was an intensely national idea and differing national characters and conditions produced different forms of it. Certainly this was true of Mosley's BUF. As he patiently explained to his raging critics, all the political ideas of history had come to Britain from abroad, but it was the true genius of the British people which created the finest examples of those ideas here in this country. So it was with Fascism.

Mosley's Fascism was unique, above all, because of the fact that its main policies rested upon the concept of a united British Empire, and many of its older members had seen service in that Empire. All other Fascist ideas lacked such a wide living space. Again, its national ideology sprang from native British roots, as Mosley's slogan "Britain First" emphasized, and mainly those roots were the earlier ideas of Joseph Chamberlain, Keynes, and Lloyd George, and the guild socialists led by Hobson, Cole and Orage, British every one. What had happened was that Mosley had synthesized their ideas into the British policies of the BUF. He was pre-eminently "the man of synthesis."

Yet patient explanation and the sheer logic of his standpoint only drew uproar from the critics, chief of whom were in the Labour Party. How ironic it was, therefore, that many of the ideas in *The Greater Britain*, Mosley's book which launched the BUF, had won him huge support while he was in that party. So popular were these that his vote at the Labour annual conference at Llandudno in 1930 came near to dethroning MacDonald, that grand old man of straw. A few weeks later the same proposals formed a manifesto signed by 17 Labour M.P.s, from Oswald and Cynthia Mosley to Aneurin Bevan and John McGovern, and the famous miners' leader A.J. Cook.

Was there, perhaps, a deep guilt complex at work in the tirades of Labour leaders when the BUF arose?

What, however, of the "political uniform" which most enraged them? As far as Mosley himself was concerned the black shirt was adopted for reasons of a hard necessity. It was the means of keeping order at the early meetings when Red violence was mobilized again in a fresh bid to drive him right out of political life. His New Party meetings had been wrecked when the stewards wore no uniform (for instance at the Rag Market in Birmingham), but BUF meetings were not wrecked because the stewards wore the distinctive black shirt; that was the acid test.

Let it be stated clearly that it was the violence of the Left which created the black shirt uniform. Of all the political forces of the time, the violence was mainly responsible for the black shirt's appearance on British streets.

However, what Mosley called "the great negation" of the Left brought forth in reply the great positivism of the BUF through the clash of ideas, a nation-wide movement which wore its political symbol with pride and with heroism in many hard battles to secure freedom of speech for a new idea, uniting all classes in a creed "akin to a religious faith," as Beverley Nichols wrote. Until the old parties, alarmed at this phenomenon which had arisen out of the streets scarred with poverty and depression in the thirties to challenge the corruption of their failure and misrule, used the pretext of yet another wave of Red violence to ban all political uniforms under the grotesquely mis-styled Public Order Act.

Yet the whole question of political ideas has been distorted to an hilarious extent. Almost all political ideas went into uniform during the thirties. Some Social Crediters wore a green shirt uniform. The communists sported the red shirt, seen in London and Red Madrid alike during the decade. Even the democratic parties affected an easily recognized uniform of sorts, the top hat and morning suit of Mr. Baldwin, at least on ceremonial occasions. This became the accepted garb of plump veterans or aspiring younger politicians. From the assembled top hats who

had signed the Versailles Treaty down to the British Chancellor on Budget Day they invariably appeared in their own political uniform. It was to be seen in its greatest glory when the League of Nations assembled at Geneva, all dressed like Baldwin no matter what their nationality.

The fact of the matter between the two world wars was that it was the age of political uniforms. Mosley's black shirt was one of many. He had a political uniform, and so had the others.

Yet still the myths persist, and one of the most ludicrous is that the BUF, after a promising start, began to fail in the mid-thirties.

A critic like R.C. Thurlow, for example, traces this to "the relative success of the national government in partially reconstructing the economy" after the crisis of 1931. Here a comparison with the National Socialists in Germany can be drawn. They came to power, it is widely agreed, because unemployment in that country *more than doubled* between 1930 and 1933. Would Hitler have become the Chancellor of Germany but for economic catastrophe? In Britain, on the other hand, unemployment was *halved* between 1932 and 1939, and yet in those seven years the BUF advanced in strength from fifty members at the beginning to the 30,000 enthusiastic people who packed the Earls Court exhibition hall for Mosley's greatest meeting, just six weeks before war began in 1939.

This was the largest indoor political rally then held anywhere in the world. Nor did any rival organization in Britain attempt such a meeting. And Mosley had been speaking to capacity meetings elsewhere in Britain during the previous two years, notably in Manchester's Free Trade Hall. The ban on the black shirt made no difference, except that his meetings were bigger.

Social collapse brought the National Socialists to power in Germany. Social improvement, "partial reconstruction," the creation of jobs with belated rearmament and a rising war fever against Fascism abroad failed to stop the advance of the BUF in Britain.

But in September 1939 the iron door of war clanged down again monstrously and the second world conflict Mosley had striven to avert tore Europe apart.

This time there would be fifty million corpses piled across the earth, to stare at the "peace makers" of twenty years before at Versailles, and from democracy's laboratories would emerge a new devil's weapon, the nuclear bomb, to raise a hideous question mark high above the earth. If Mosley's struggle for peace ended in 1939, if indeed he was then the "brilliant failure" of the obituary notices, he did not have to run the gauntlet of those fifty million unnecessary dead when his time came to leave this earth

and face another verdict beyond. But what of the politicians who took Britain to war?

For three years before the war, and again at Earls Court, Mosley had advanced the way of averting a conflict. *The World Alternative*, published in 1936, urged a reconciliation of the rising war camps through a settlement of territorial problems created at Versailles. Each of the main nations of Europe would have had a clearly defined political area, with adequate space to solve its problems. For Britain this would have brought freedom from non-British quarrels, enabling the country to devote its statesmanship, effort and wealth to its true interest, the development of the British Empire, whose immense and untapped resources made possible far higher living standards for its peoples.

The official De La Warr Report of early 1939 stated that there were then 100 million people in the Empire suffering from "malnutrition" (i.e., semi-starvation), quite apart from the same problem among hundreds of thousands of the long-term unemployed in Britain. A world slump created this problem. Mosley's policies would have solved it. Britain went to war instead.

Further, the ideas in *The World Alternative* would have led to a very different union of Europe from that of the postwar (1957) Treaty of Rome, a union into which Britain could have entered much stronger, at the head of the Empire. It was above all a plan for preserving world peace, inspired by the ideals of 1918. Mosley wrote then: "We must return to the fundamental concept of European union which animated the war generation of 1918," and he looked forward to "the union of Europe within the universalism of the Modern Movement."

Was it thus so strange that, after a disastrous war—that great clash between Fascism and a democracy allied with communism—he declared in 1948 for the future "Europe a Nation" to achieve a European universalism at a higher level and (ever "the man of synthesis," rising above that clash) turned to "the idea which is beyond both fascism and democracy"?

Meanwhile, during the thirties, his policy was "mind Britain's business," and Britain's business was the preservation of peace and the security of Empire. To secure the Empire he called, in *The Greater Britain* of 1932 and at the Olympia meeting in 1934, for adequate defenses. He was thus several years ahead of Churchill in demanding rearmament, but with a difference.

While Mosley stood for rearmament to mind Britain's business, Churchill wanted rearmament to interfere in other countries' business.

Churchill was full of the doctrine of the balance of power, which had ruled British attitudes for centuries. His ancestor

Marlborough had fought the French over the balance of power, and Churchill fought Germans for the same reason. Though a prolific writer of history, he failed to appreciate that the world had changed since the days of Queen Anne. Certainly Marlborough understood his own age: his battles restored the balance of power in Europe and his genius had made Britain a first-rate power of the day. Churchill's war policy, on the other hand, reduced Britain to a second-rate power and replaced the former European balance of power with a more ominous balance of nuclear terror in the world. This he did by pursuing his demand for the unconditional surrender of Germany, ignoring the postwar consequences of that defeat. Further, he prolonged and enlarged the war to the stage where two extra-European superpowers, the U.S.A. and the USSR, began to dominate the whole course of the war and indeed changed the very shape of the postwar world. Once Roosevelt and Stalin, in command of bigger resources of manpower and material than Churchill, assumed the direction of the war for their own objectives, which were not Britain's, Churchill's voice in their higher councils counted for less and less.

The fact is that Churchill destroyed Britain as a first-rate power, and no amount of nostalgia which surrounds his name can alter that fact.

The point where Britain became a second-rate power in effect (not realized, however, at the time) can be fixed. It was during the Teheran conference of 1943. Churchill discovered at Teheran that his allies were "ganging up on him" and moreover possessed the power to enforce their demands. It happened again at Yalta in 1945, when Stalin was even more powerful and Roosevelt was a dying man.

It was quite true that Churchill realized in later years what his years of war-time vigor had wrought; nevertheless it was then far too late. The war had brought Russian power half-way across Europe, in the hands of those Bolsheviks whom Churchill had spent much of his life denouncing as the most detestable tyrants. Poland, for whose freedom Britain had declared war, had been swept by Red armies into the sphere of the USSR—that new version of the monolithic Eurasian empire first set up in the Middle Ages under the Mongol conqueror Genghiz Khan. It seems to be lost on most war historians that Stalin's "iron curtain" of 1945 corresponded roughly with the furthest conquests of the old Mongol centuries before: his horde from Eurasia also watered its horses in the river Oder. Lenin, and more particularly Stalin, simply restored that empire and called it the USSR, and Churchill helped to establish it on formal lines at Yalta. While the original empire broke up when Genghiz Khan died and his sons quarreled over the booty, the sons of Lenin remained united. Today, as

This special issue of *THE JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL REVIEW* includes issues Two, Three and Four of Volume Five, 1984. There is a reason for this. At approximately midnight on the Fourth of July last, the business office and warehouse of the publisher were burned to the ground by arson. Lost in the gutted ruins were the manuscripts and galley proofs destined to be the regular 1984 quarterly issues. These issues thus had to be produced all over again, essentially from scratch—a formidable task that ultimately took more than six months.

What you see before you could be called the “Phoenix” issue of *THE JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL REVIEW* as it has quite literally risen from the ashes. Regrettably, more than \$300,000 worth of historical books, documents, files and equipment were not so fortunate.

This effort to incinerate the assets of the world’s leading publisher of revisionist historical literature was largely successful.

The attempt to break the spirits of those who staff and serve this organization and its goals, however, was not.

Normal issuance of *THE JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL REVIEW* on a quarterly basis will resume with the Spring 1985 issue (Volume Six, Number One).

We appreciate your forbearance and look forward enthusiastically to serving you through this publication in the months and years to come.

The Publisher

Stalin's successors, they possess the most formidable military machine on earth.

It is grimly ironic that the Churchill of the twenties who likened the Bolsheviks to "the heirs of Genghis Khan" was the same Churchill of the forties whose war policies brought the Red armies to the river Oder.

As for Western Europe in 1945, shattered by six years of conflict, faced with a Stalin crushing all opposition behind his sealed-off "Iron Curtain," Churchill was to warn in four major speeches between 1948 and 1955 that its continued independence rested solely on American nuclear weaponry. "Nothing," he told the Conservative annual conference of 1948, "nothing stands today between Europe and complete subjugation to communist tyranny but the atomic bomb in American hands." This situation was the logical outcome of the policies of Churchill himself—the policies which prolonged a world war until Germany surrendered unconditionally and which extended the new-style Mongol empire to central Europe.

Against such madness Mosley had stood out from September 1939, urging strongly the negotiation of peace in Europe, with Britain and the Empire intact. But when Churchill reached the premiership, one of his first acts was the silencing of Mosley.

It is claimed that Britain went to war for "freedom." Not only Polish freedom but British freedom. "Your freedom is in peril, defend it with all your might" shouted the posters in 1939. What did the word really mean when those like Mosley, who stood for an honorable peace, lost their freedom within nine months of the declaration of war?

Lady Mosley described in the *Times* of November 1981 what happened under Regulation 18B which gave the government power of arrest without charge or trial, and denied to those arrested any recourse to the Habeas Corpus Act, supposedly one of the historic pillars of British freedom. "My husband and I were arrested in the summer of 1940 at a moment of general panic. All our possessions were searched, safes broken open and so forth. I welcomed this at the time, as I thought it would ensure our early release. . . . Months and then years went by and we remained in prison. As we had not been charged with an offense we were denied the luxury of a trial."

Instead of a trial, Lady Mosley continued, "there was an advisory committee, whose chairman was Norman Birkett, K.C. It was held in camera. He questioned Mosley for sixteen hours, and at the end Mosley asked if he might put a question. It was: 'Is it suggested that if the Germans invaded we should help them in some way?,' to which Birkett replied, 'Sir Oswald, you can put any

such idea right out of your head.' 'In other words I am in prison for having advocated a negotiated peace while Britain and the Empire are intact?' 'Yes' was the reply."

That was the entire point of war-time detention without charge or trial.

How indeed could Mosley be accused of conspiring to help German invaders when he had fought the Germans in the first war, he had called for adequate air defenses in his maiden speech in Parliament in 1919 (at a time when government was cutting Britain's air defenses), he had demanded a well-armed Britain in 1932 on founding the BUF, he had called on BUF members in September 1939 to do their duty if called up for military service, and on 9 May 1940, just fourteen days before his arrest, he had stated in his paper *Action*: "Stories concerning the invasion of Britain are being circulated. In such an event every member of British Union would be at the disposal of the nation. Every one of us would resist the foreign invader with all that is in us. In such a situation no doubt exists concerning the attitude of British Union."

Considering such a long and patriotic record—a record better than that of some Labour Ministers in the government which arrested him—clearly Mosley could not be charged with any treasonable intention to help any invaders, German or otherwise.

The sole reason for his arrest and detention was his political opposition to the war, as Birkett admitted. Yet political opposition to wars had long been an honorable British tradition. Lord Chatham opposed war with the Americans in the eighteenth century. Lloyd George opposed war with the Boers in the nineteenth century. Labour leaders like MacDonald, George Lansbury, Herbert Morrison and Bernard Shaw opposed the first world war, all on political grounds. None of these was imprisoned without charge or trial, but Mosley was.

And such was the malice in high places that he and Lady Mosley might have stayed in prison to the end of the war, but for the rapid deterioration in his health. Deprived of vigorous exercise by confinement, the injured leg which had invalidated him out of the Army in the First World War now developed a dangerous phlebitis. Under pressure from an uneasy Churchill, Mr. Home Secretary Morrison (a conscientious objector of 1914-18, the jailer of British ex-soldiers in 1939-45) released him and Lady Mosley towards the end of 1943.

Oswald Mosley came out of prison to a very different Britain from that of 1940. Politicians who had refused to unite the nation for construction in peace-time had now done that to wage a destructive war. He regained some measure of his freedom to see

his claims for what a united Britain could do fulfilled—but to wage war, not peace.

Unemployment had vanished. Huge armies in the field had replaced the queues of the workless, and with the rising tempo of American war production (some of which had gone to Russia to aid its turn-around after the Stalingrad battle) these armies spelled the end of Nazi Germany.

Another end could be foreseen. The days of the British Empire were numbered. The old imperial spirit had been submerged beneath a wave of propaganda for worldwide democracy. Something called "trusteeship" for the overseas territories was in high fashion, the preliminary to pushing even the cannibal islands into Westminster-style democracies in that brave, bright postwar world when Hitler and imperialism were dead. Facing the spread of this doctrine, growing ever more luxurious in the war propaganda hot-house, it is true that the old imperialist Churchill was to growl out his defiance at the Mansion House in November 1942: "I did not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." Yet he had already sold the pass.

Had he not signed in 1941 President Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter, which in real terms meant the break-up of the Empire? Had not the President told his son Elliot that he "meant to make Winston live up to it"? Had not Sir Stafford Cripps been sent to India by Churchill eight months before the Mansion House speech with an offer of independence after the war? In the event the offer was rejected. Indian Congress leaders preferred to wait and see if they could get better terms when the war was over. They got what they wanted from a Labour government in 1947 and the liquidation of the British Empire began.

Thus the war left a world in flux and dissolution. Every nationalist leader in the Empire was to demand the same independence. And peace brought a Britain divided again under strident party banners: the unity of the nation was the first casualty of peace. Two main facts stood out clearly then.

First was the fact of Britain's new second-rate status. It showed in many signs of weakness. Britain went to war as a creditor nation and came out a debtor. Huge assets were sold to pay for the war, yet Britain owed billions to the world at the end of it, mainly as the "sterling balances." American Lend-Lease was cut off abruptly with the defeat of Japan. A big dollar loan was advanced instead, under humiliating conditions despite all the efforts of Keynes. The money was spent by a Labour government in about two years, and the loan's repayment was added to the general indebtedness which has bedeviled Britain's position to this day. Further, inflation gained its first real grip on the nation during the

war: the cost of living index doubled between 1939 and 1945. Rationing of essential foodstuffs like sugar lasted as long after the war as during it. And in 1945 the electorate's revulsion against Churchill's war-time rule swept a Labour government into power, ushering in the age of rampant bureaucracy and industrial nationalization. Look at the plight of British Railways today.

The same dismal story was told by A.J.P. Taylor in his *English History 1914-1945*: "The legacy of the war seemed almost beyond bearing. Great Britain had drawn on the rest of the world to the extent of 4198 million pounds. . . . The British mercantile marine was 30 per cent smaller in June 1945 than it had been at the beginning of the war. Exports were little more than 40 per cent of the pre-war figure. On top of this government expenditure abroad . . . remained five times as great as pre-war. In 1946, it was calculated, Great Britain would spend abroad 750 million pounds more than she earned. . . . Something like 10 per cent of our pre-war national wealth at home had been destroyed, some by physical destruction, the rest by running down capital assets."

Was it really worth fighting the war which Mosley opposed to produce these lamentable results at home and turn Britain into a second-rate power abroad?

And this second-rate Britain was now compelled to earn its living on uncertain world markets, in place of that first-rate Britain which had enjoyed a measure of Imperial Preference before the war. Labour, triumphant in office, saw the end of the Imperial Preference it had always detested, but now was to issue an urgent official exhortation: "Export—or die!"

In the event Britain did struggle through, or muddle through, but much less due to Labour's boasted "planning" than to the effect of America's Marshall Plan. World markets revived, thanks to lavish American aid. British exports rose, and for a short time it seemed as if this country would rise on the wave of a favorable position in an otherwise devastated world. Much complacency reigned in Whitehall as they looked across the Channel towards the ruins of the Ruhr, the "knocked-out" German trade rival. This would not last, warned Mosley in his first book written after the war, *The Alternative* of 1947. Once the former enemy countries Germany and Japan began to compete again on world markets, then Britain's favorable position would decline. Indeed it would soon be a case of "all nations will want to send more exports abroad than before."

He pointed to Japan, which was not a competitor in 1947. When Japan joined in the struggle to export, "the experiences of Lancashire and Yorkshire from Japanese competition in the decade of 1930 will be negligible in comparison." The truth of that warning can be seen today. Not only Britain and the rest of Europe but also America are fulminating over the Japanese export success.

The second main fact for Britain in the postwar world was the heavily armed Soviet power less than 500 miles east of London, which space modern tank armies could cover in a matter of days, and the existence of large communist parties in Western Europe led by men like Pollitt, Thorez and Togliatti, who openly stated that their loyalty to Russia came first in any clash.

American military strength offset the first danger, and the Marshall Plan revived the economic life of Europe, reducing the second. But for that aid both France and Italy might have been overwhelmed by communism.

Mosley paid a warm tribute to the Americans for their aid, but asserted that Europe could not remain a pensioner under their protection. Nor had Britain a real future as Europe's off-shore island "going it alone" as the Empire broke up. The war had changed the whole position too drastically. Dean Acheson, America's elder statesman, who from a lofty position in Washington had seen the world change, said about this time that "Britain had lost its old role in the world and had not found another." That was true and Mosley, closer to events, now advanced that new role for Britain, through European union. Before the war he had stood for "Britain first." Now he advocated "Britain first in Europe." Britain must take the leadership of Europe for its role, and by its own example unite the war-torn continent as a political entity as great as America. Europe must unite to shoulder most of its own defense in face of a menacing Russia and to solve its many economic problems.

Yet he went further than those urgent questions. While others looked no further than the Council of Europe (little more than a debating club), Mosley launched the Union Movement early in 1948, to be inspired by the "idea which is beyond both fascism and democracy." He called for "the extension of patriotism" to achieve union in the fullest sense, imbued with an idea higher than fascism and democracy, both of which had become obsolete as the result of the war.

In those years he reached new heights as "the man of synthesis." To the challenge of the ruin of old ideas he returned the answer of a new one. And he saw it as part of an organic process which was part of British history. In Britain, England had been the first to unite under the Saxon heptarchy of the eighth century. Wales was then joined to England, and the United Kingdom rose to a brilliant peak under the half-Welsh House of Tudor. Scotland then joined, to make Great Britain. Now it was time to go further, under the pressure of great dangers, and extend patriotism to the whole of Europe in a continuing organic union.

In October 1948—the dangerous year of Stalin's blockade of Berlin—Mosley spoke to an enthusiastic meeting of East London

workers and called for "the making of Europe a Nation." Yet, as he said in later years, making Europe into a nation with its own common government did not make him feel any less an Englishman, and an Englishman of Staffordshire where he was born. All other Europeans, Normans and Bretons, Bavarians and Prussians, Neapolitans and Milanese, would through his idea remain Frenchmen, Germans and Italians, as would Britons remain Britons, *yet they would all think and act together as Europeans.*

In those later years he also proposed a three-tier order of governments in Europe, each with a different function. In fact this was taking the best part of the old fascism, the corporate state, and the best of the old democracy, creating something higher and finer than either, through yet another synthesis. The corporate state had envisaged the nation like a human body, having a head, with a brain, with all members of the body working together in political harmony. Thus in Mosley's vision of the future nation of Europe the first tier, the head, would be a common government—freely elected by all Europeans—for Europe's defense and to organize a single continental economy. The second tier would be national governments for all national questions—elected as today—and at the third level many local governments for the regions and small nations like Wales and Scotland. They would have the special task of preserving the wide diversity of Europe's cultural life: regional democracy with a new meaning.

Mosley's concept of Europe thus went much further than the present "European Community" and was a direct contrast with it, replacing the national jealousies and economic rivalry of today's "common market" with an essential harmony. "Europe a Nation" included the whole life of the continent from the head organizing a single economy down to the many cultures of Europe. It was perhaps his greatest concept: a new order of governments giving a new meaning to democracy, to be achieved through a synthesis of those two old opponents, prewar fascism and prewar democracy.

The turbulent year 1950 advanced Mosley's thinking again. The communist threat to Europe had lessened as the Marshall Plan put industry on its feet, Stalin's blockade of Berlin had failed and, in 1949, the NATO alliance had been formed. Yet if communism had been checked in the West it was sweeping everything before it in the East. China fell to Mao Tse-tung in 1949; events in Vietnam were moving towards the fateful battle of Dien Bien Phu; by 1950 the Korean war had erupted. And the military struggle in Korea had two momentous economic effects.

Japan, forbidden at the Potsdam conference ever to become a military power again, now experienced a huge industrial boom by supplying the United Nations forces fighting the communists in

Korea. The war gave the Japanese the beginning of their post-war revival and a take-off for their "export miracle." From that point they did not look back.

However, the other effect was a crisis for Britain's Labour government, still trying hard to build "socialism" in this island while completely at the mercy of the capitalist world outside. The war sent a shock wave of rising commodity prices through that world, to which a social democratic government had tied Britain for doctrinaire reasons, and thus right into the island economy. They had learned nothing from the fall of MacDonald in 1931. Britain, weakened by the war, now suffered a serious payments crisis and an upward spin in the spiral of inflation. Lord Attlee blamed certain "external factors" for his government's problems. He was right—but they served to show that all such governments remain at the mercy of international forces they cannot control.

None of this surprised Mosley. He had shown where Labour's Achilles heel lay twenty years before in his speech of resignation from the MacDonald government.

His reaction to such events was always to give a constructive solution, and this time the solution was so far-reaching that all contemporary figures have utterly rejected it; in any case it challenged the whole structure of their international system of trade and finance established five years before at Bretton Woods under such glittering edifices as GATT, the IMF, and the World Bank. (They are not quite so splendid today, as their international system groans beneath world-wide recession and immense debts.)

What Mosley proposed, at another great East London meeting in December 1950, was the "division of the world" into several separate systems, each with a very large part of the world.

Each of these economic blocs, he explained in later speeches and writing, would have a big population as its market, adequate raw materials for its industry, and sufficient food. By insulating itself against the shocks of sudden movements in prices (what he called "the world cost system") its internal economy would be impervious to such shocks. Each economic bloc should concentrate on solving its own problems; it would be freed from the need to export, or import, since it would have all it needed within its own "borders." Within those borders a high standard of life could be built for its own people.

Mosley proposed that one such area, or bloc, should be formed from a fully united Europe, including Britain and the former Dominions; America should form another; a third should be formed in Asia around Japan. Had this idea of several "continental systems" been acted upon thirty years or so ago, today's problem of Japanese "laser beam" import drives into our markets would not exist: Japan's market would be in Asia. Nor would

America be talking of a trade war with Europe. Europe, America, and Japan would be living at peace with each other in separate systems with economic areas big enough for all their needs. One might call this *autarkic*, not interdependent, "trilateralism."

The danger today is indeed trade war and for the obvious reason: nothing effectively had been done to avert it. Mosley's proposal would have ruled out trade wars; since governments failed to adopt it we can expect the consequences of this failure to act. More importantly, however, the same proposal of creating several large blocs in the world would make more unlikely a shooting war with either of the two communist powers, Russia and China, for Mosley emphasized from the start that no such bloc should interfere with any other, non-communist or communist.

What, though, of the men in the Kremlin who are still possessed by the messianic dream of communizing Europe as a step towards their world utopia?

True to its character as the restored empire of Ghenghiz Khan, the USSR always looks to further expansion, and a still badly-divided Western Europe is prone to a gradual take-over by the "splitting" tactics in which the Kremlin excels. Again, anything which weakens NATO or "splits" America and Europe only strengthens their hand. Further east, their occupation of Afghanistan is undoubtedly a stage for future inroads into Pakistan and India, when the time becomes ripe, or into Iran and the oil-rich Gulf—always, however, under the guise of peaceful intentions. Churchill, in his days of barnstorming against early Bolshevism, used to speak of containing it by "a *cordon sanitaire* garnished with German bayonets," but matters have gone beyond those simplicities.

What is needed to contain the relentless Soviet expansion are Mosley's continental blocs, adequately armed to prevent Red Army incursions, with truly reinvigorated economies and social systems in which the appeal of communism withers, and above all imbued with a political idea far superior to communism.

The existence of just three such strong blocs in the world—Europe, America, and Japan—would bring the men in the Kremlin hard up against a new reality, sharply reducing the danger of new adventures, even in the stormy Middle East. And then real discussions could be held at the highest level between the leaders of the communist and non-communist powers, to secure an effective peace.

Mosley's was not a policy for war against Russia, but the very opposite. He showed this clearly in 1956 when he urged the reduction of tension between the Soviets and the West by taking up Khrushchev's offer, repeated several times, of Russian troop

withdrawals from Eastern Europe if the Americans also withdrew from Western Europe. Whether the Soviet leader's offer was genuine or not should have been put to the test through hard and searching probing in direct negotiations. Mosley's answer to all such offers was "Get into the ring with the Russians."

He would take the same line today over Soviet proposals for cutting East-West missile strengths: hard and continual negotiations to reduce the danger of a nuclear holocaust. In his last, short, speech before he died in 1980 he called for such action to "stop the world being blown up."

He was thus following an old road in the fifties, but now going further. He had seen the high ideals of 1918 dashed as the war camps arose in the thirties, and in *The World Alternative* of 1936 proposed their reconciliation through a new settlement in Europe. Now, from 1950 onwards, he urged another and greater settlement of world problems, by the creation of several self-contained blocs, the purpose of which was both to abolish trade war and reduce the dangers of a nuclear conflagration.

It was in those years that Mosley took on his final historic roles as the man of world peace and as the forward-thinking economic European. If his ideals of 1918 carried him through to the end of his life on the quest for peace, a similar straight line can be traced through his economic ideas. His main goal here was so to organize society that the people would be enabled to consume what their industry produced.

Power of industry to produce had always been greater than the power of the people to consume, and Mosley thus advanced policies to redress the balance.

Thus, shortly after joining the Labour Party, he wrote *Revolution by Reason*, which propounded the idea of raising the living standard of poorer sections of the community by means of consumer credits, injecting purchasing power where it was needed most. Extra ability to consume in the hands of millions would raise demand until production was equated with consumption. Naturally, the government issuing the credits would take care not to inflate.

Again, in his Fascist period from 1932, he sought the same end by building up the home market through a higher wage policy within the corporate state. His basic reasoning remained that of his Labour days. "In organizing production we have to think, not so much of maximum output, as of maximum consumption," he wrote in *The Greater Britain*. British industry would not suffer from undercutting by cheaper imports when it paid higher wages, because each industry would be protected on the home market, on condition that the industry modernized itself. This he called "scientific protection."

After 1945, however, the problem became more complex. In winning the war many scientific advances were made, and when applied to industry after the war these advanced greatly the power to produce. Yet there was no advance towards a new-style consumption policy. On the contrary, weak governments turned to an old-style inflation. This brought its own evils: a decline in the power of the pound, a rising cost of living, and strong sectional power in the hands of trade unions. The devaluation trick only made matters worse. All imports then cost more, the cost of living rose again and wage-inflation duly followed, with the result that any export advantages from a depreciated pound were wiped out. For a Britain living by exporting this was a deadly drug.

Yet long before the opposite policies of deflation and the strong pound were tried, the march of science and technology was preparing an entirely new phenomenon in the power of industry to produce. It was known as "automation."

Mosley had long been familiar with the mass production methods he had seen on his visit to America in the twenties. During the thirties, rationalization was taking place, the displacement of men's labor by better machines. By the fifties automation was on the horizon and this, he wrote in an essay in 1955, threatened "not merely displacement but the virtual elimination of men's labor, because its machines will require only the services of a few specialists."

The danger to the whole of industrial society was that "under the old economics these few specialists would draw enormous wages and the rest would be unemployed. No market would then exist for the ever-increasing products of the machines, which would pile up in the midst of a surrounding waste of poverty." This was "the logical reduction to absurdity of a system which had never devised any effective means of distributing the wealth which modern science can produce." It was precisely the same problem which had led him to write *Revolution by Reason*—but now much graver.

Thus in his 1955 essay, and in greater detail in *Europe: Faith and Plan* three years later, he outlined his solution: the "wage-price mechanism."

This was a policy for the deliberate raising of wages and salaries in the primary industries and the multiplying services in order to create an adequate market for manufacturing industry as it turned to automation. Two other things would be required: a new type of government in charge of the policy, working with the unions and the managers throughout, and "the insulated self-contained area freed from the world cost system." The large self-contained area was needed to provide a really big market for the immense potential of the automation age.

Half-measures under the old economics could not cope. If government at present attempted to raise railwaymen's wages, for instance, this would "throw the whole system out of gear because additional transport charges would be added to the price of export goods." On the other hand, under new economics of the self-contained continental system which did not need to export, "it would be quite possible to raise wages far above the present level in all primary industry and services—in agriculture, mining, power, building, banking, insurance and the Civil Service—provided that automation in manufacturing industry had suddenly increased the power to produce; naturally, only on that condition."

As a variation of this great increase in wages there could be a planned shortening of hours, a three- or four-day week in work-sharing schemes, creating many jobs for the unemployed. Or there could be *both* higher wages and shorter hours.

Once automation spread to all manufacturing, with greater volume of output balanced by higher wages and shorter hours, the whole expansion taking place within an insulated continental system, Mosley foresaw greater possibilities still. Governments operating his wage-price mechanism could then draw workers to any industry or service short of manpower. If more miners were needed, raise their pay. If more food was required, raise the farmer's reward, to take on more labor or to buy better agricultural machines. If education was short of teachers, then increase their salaries. And if some branch of science or technology needed extra personnel to advance it, once proved to be beneficial after thorough tests, rewards should be raised. Indeed, he continually stressed that science and technology should always come high in the scale of rewards; skilled workers should come before the unskilled in industry.

"We will not direct men to do what is necessary in the common interest, but we will pay them to do it so effectively that, in fact, they will do it, and the increased productive power of automation will give us the means to pay them," wrote Mosley in 1958.

Yet could the wage-price mechanism be introduced in a small island like Britain before the great area of a united Europe was formed? Would it work in a Britain faced with high unemployment and serious inflation? It could, Mosley wrote: it would then "also be necessary to fix prices over a wide field." This second form of the wage-price mechanism is needed indeed in the Britain of 1984. Shortening hours to a three- or four-day week in work-sharing schemes would mop up unemployment; direct action for fixing prices over a wide field would curb inflation, and these measures would be strengthened when wider use of automation in Britain would cut prices anyway.

If the present work force in manufacturing worked half the working week, another work force of about the same size could be recruited from the unemployed to operate the same machines for the other half of the week. That is the way to get unemployment right down and raise output. The market to consume the bigger output would be provided by raising wages generally throughout the whole economy. That could be done in Britain alone, with government, unions and managers acting as a team to organize the policy; yet how much more effective it would be if the same policy was in operation throughout Europe, as Mosley emphasized.

This was his wage-price policy long before Mr. Heath tried a "pay freeze" in the early seventies and Mr. Wilson experimented with his "social contract" a few years later. Mosley's policy was positive; theirs were negative. His wage-price mechanism was to be a permanent instrument of economic management while theirs were merely short-term expedients, soon abandoned. There could be no comparison whatever.

Thus it is nonsense for Mrs. Thatcher to say that "all" wages policies have failed. Certainly all *negative* policies have been tried, and they failed. What has never been attempted is the wage-price mechanism of Oswald Mosley.

Above all other questions, however, is that of the type of government needed to make these changes. Mosley was deeply concerned with this question in his Labour days, being much impressed with Lloyd George's inner cabinet of five men with wide powers which had won the First World War, and in his Memorandum proposed a "machinery of government" to modernize industry and solve unemployment. Lloyd George had overcome huge wartime problems in 1917, but a Labour government collapsed in 1931 when faced with lesser problems of peace.

When founding the British Union of Fascists, Mosley addressed himself to the paradox of a British democracy which could fight world wars with governments of action yet failed before the test of economic crisis in peacetime. He pointed out in *The Greater Britain* that the system of government was a century out of date in 1932 while the country had changed beyond recognition during those hundred years.

Nevertheless, no attempt was made by the ruling politicians of the thirties to remedy the situation, and the paradox was seen again in another world war when Churchill copied, to some extent, the methods of Lloyd George. And again, with 1945, the habits of peacetime returned. Party rivalries reasserted themselves; the time-wasting procedure of Parliament was treasured once more like some precious national heirloom. Brit-

ain's problems were worse than ever, yet Parliament, far from becoming an efficient workshop to face a more serious age, resembled on some days a slumbering museum and on others a beer-garden. And all the world stood amazed at that ancient ritual of M.P.s dragging a new Speaker to his seat!

Little wonder that Britain has gone down-hill ever since under the vast weight of innumerable points-of-order and obstructionisms.

By 1966, Mosley could say without any fear of contradiction that the old party system was, to all intents, bankrupt. In *Action* he wrote: "Labour and the Tories have failed equally; the Liberals have no answer at all. No matter which is in office they cannot cope. The only way is to go above and beyond the parties to a national union of the best of our people" and to form "a government of true national union drawn from the most vigorous parts of the whole nation." A government drawn from "the professions, from science, from the unions and the managers, from businessmen, the housewives, from the services, from the universities, and even from the best of the politicians."

It would be a new-style government of action with "hard centre" ideas and not an old-style coalition of soft center politics, elected for one term of office with the specific task of putting Britain on its feet. It should gain from Parliament the power of rapid action under an Enabling Act, so that the time-wasting obstructionism of present procedure would be removed.

Parliament would always retain the power to dismiss it by vote of censure if its policies failed or if it attempted to override basic British freedoms.

This would make for the utmost action within the constitution, and it was precisely how British governments functioned during the emergencies of two world wars, except that such a government would be drawn from the whole nation instead of merely from the parties. In Mosley's phrase, this was "using the methods of wartime to solve the problems of peace," bringing to an end that paradox of government of well over a century in Britain.

It is said that Oswald Mosley was a man before his time, and there is some truth in this. His life was spent in a Britain where big parties occupied the arena and held the devotion of millions, no matter how many their failures. Those parties had become the political armies of the class system, and the Mosley who placed nation before party and valued the individual for his abilities, not his class background, was in that sense a man before his time, the time when the parties would decline through their own shortcomings and corruptions.

To turn his back on the party system when the faith of millions

in it was still unshaken, to go "out into the political wilderness," was therefore regarded as effective suicide. For the millions who took their opinions from the party leaders, those politicians represented public opinion, whether Stanley Baldwin with his pipe and his pigs and his limpet-like philosophy of "safety first"; or Harold Macmillan, who was also trusted because Britain had "never had it so good" and could have it better with the Tories; or Harold Wilson, who was trusted less but knew how to "keep his options open."

Mosley was of another world to these. He stood for action (that word so uncomfortable when things looked good and would get better). He advanced policies which would be needed when the spell of the parties had been broken in a nemesis brought by their failure to change. When Britain faced reality at last, that second great crisis he had long predicted came with a vengeance.

Now it remains, but much has broken down in Britain since 1930, from the loss of faith in politicians to the ominous decline in law and order.

The dangers in such a long decline were seen more than fifty years ago by Mosley himself. "What I fear," he warned in his Resignation Speech of 1930, "what I fear much more than a sudden crisis is a long, slow crumbling over the years, a gradual paralysis beneath which all the vigour and energy of this country will succumb. That is a far more dangerous thing, and far more likely to happen unless some effort is made. If the effort is made, how relatively easily can disaster be averted. . . ."

That call for effort made him less a man before his time than a man of the moment, devising policies to meet an immediate situation, which he did again at several moments in his life.

To get Mosley into true perspective: he was both a man of the present and of the future. But Britain has lived in the past increasingly, lured by those siren songs from the Palace of Westminster, those delusions of grandeur which alone remained after the sun of Empire set, those voices of the media constantly invoking the name of Churchill while silent over the destruction brought about by Britain's most disastrous leader.

Hence the gap between Mosley and his countrymen. The latter are left with the crumbling and paralysis against which he warned.

Yet there was more to it than that. There was the deep-seated hostility of those in authority collectively known as the Establishment and who, as Richard Crossman wrote, spurned Mosley because he was right. What was there about him which so much alarmed them? Was it, as the caustic Bernard Shaw remarked, that he "looked like a man who has some physical courage and is going to do something, and that is a terrible thing"? Did he have too


much driving force for the men of lethargy in high places—had he too much of the air of Sir Walter Raleigh for the smooth prototypes of late- 20th century British authority, the mandarin and the pundit?

Was he altogether too disturbing a personality for those who preferred a "safe" career and easy weekends in the Indian summer of national greatness, crowned by a place in the Honors List? Was it, as Drennan noticed, that he was a man "of strong tones, no self-complacent bladder of conventions," whereas conventional politicians were easier meat, posturing amid growing decadence according to long-established rules?


And what of his policies? It has become fashionable to praise them. For instance, A.J.P. Taylor acclaimed the Memorandum as offering "a blueprint for most of the constructive advances in economic thinking to the present day." High praise; why was that thinking not carried into effect? If Mosley himself was too unorthodox to be entrusted with accomplishing his own ideas, why was not some other figure entrusted with them, one of those "safe" politicians whom the Establishment trusted?

The fact was, as Michael Foot observed, that "mediocrity and safety first" stood in the way not only of the man but also of the policies. Yet failure to act never solves problems. Avoiding early effort only makes the effort more strenuous if the problems, now grown huge, are not to overwhelm society. A long run of good luck and the peculiar delusion that the Almighty is really an Englishman have encouraged the national vice of "muddling through." The luck is running out now, and the problems stand there in gigantic proportions.

What next? How soon will there be a murmur rising higher for a man like Mosley, his dynamic approach to life at last forgiven? But men like Mosley are rare. Will one emerge, as the great voice still echoes down the years, calling "Britain awake"?



British Fascists parade in London, after the ban on the Blackshirt uniform: 7 May 1939.



The largest indoor political meeting in British history. Mosley speaks to 30,000 British Fascists in the Earl's Court Exhibition Hall, London, 16 July 1939.

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Sir Oswald Mosley speaks at Union Movement meeting,
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*This collection contains first-publications of the following essays on Mosley's Fascism: Paul Hayes, "The Contribution of British Intellectuals to Fascism"; Colin Holmes, "Anti-Semitism and the BUF"; Neill Nugent, "Post-War Fascism?"; Stuart Rawnsley, "The Membership of the British Union of Fascists"; Philip Rees, "Changing Interpretations of British Fascism"; Robert Skidelsky, "Reflections on Mosley and British Fascism"; John Stevenson, "The BUF, the Metropolitan Police and Public Order"; Richard C. Thurlow, "The Return of Jeremiah: The Rejected Knowledge of Sir Oswald Mosley in the 1930s."

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Readers interested in hearing a 45-minute cassette tape recording of Sir Oswald Mosley speaking to several hundred of his followers at Kensington Town Hall, London, in November 1963, may order "Mosley Speaks" for \$6.95 postpaid from: Oakleaf Records, P.O. Box 999, Westfield, N.J. 07091.

The 'Atlantic Charter' Smokescreen

HISTORY AS A PRESS RELEASE

CHARLES LUTTON

Good words are a mask for evil deeds.
—attributed to Joseph Stalin

During both the First and Second World Wars, the nations warring against Germany and her allies portrayed their fight as a "world war for humanity." Despite the opening of hitherto closed government archives and the testimony of political participants, the general public, with rare exceptions, still believes in these wartime propaganda images of "the good guys" versus "the bad guys." Textbooks aimed at college students also perpetuate the old stereotypes. One example of this is the treatment afforded the August 1941 Argentia, Newfoundland conference between United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, and their staffs, at which time the famous Atlantic Charter was released. Over forty years after the event, many American history texts portray the Atlantic conference and Charter as authentically representing the wartime aspirations of Roosevelt and Churchill.¹

The First World War

As mentioned, in both world wars the Western Allies claimed that they were fighting for democratic rights. In the Middle East, for instance, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, conducted negotiations with Hussein, Sherif of Mecca. In a letter dated 24 October 1915, McMahon promised the in-

dependence of all Arab-populated areas of the Turkish Empire (then allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary), with the exception of "the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus," etc. As we know, the Arabs came to fulfill their part of the bargain. The British, and their French and Italian allies, did not.²

The impression that the Allies were fighting for universal democratic rights was reinforced by statements made by President Woodrow Wilson after the United States was brought into the war. On 8 January 1918, Wilson unveiled his blueprint for peace, the "Fourteen Points." Point Five called for "a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of colonial claims, based upon strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined."

Wilson expanded on this topic when he told the U.S. Congress on 11 February 1918 "That peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power, but that every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival states and that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world."

With the collapse of the Central Powers, it quickly became clear that "national sovereignty" did not apply to the colonial possessions of the Western Allies or to territories they coveted. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations "provisionally recognized" the independence of "all former Turkish provinces." But in 1916, the British and French, without informing the Arabs, divided up much of the Middle East, and in 1917 the British introduced another foreign influence into that part of the world when they issued the Balfour Declaration supporting Zionist aspirations for the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine.

After the war, President Wilson confirmed that the war had not been born out of a fight to save democracy against the forces of tyranny, as the public had been led to believe. Speaking in St. Louis on 11 September 1918, Wilson remarked that, "This war, in its inception, was a commercial and industrial war. It was not a political war." John Maynard Keynes likewise observed in his book, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, that "The poli-

tics of power are inevitable, and there is nothing very new to learn about this war or the end it was fought for; England had destroyed, as in each preceding century, a trade rival. . . ."

The post-war period saw no change of policy on the part of the victorious powers. The possessions of the former Central Powers were divided up among the Western Allies and Japan, while these countries retained control of their own colonies. For example, the people of India had been led to expect a move toward independence after the Great War. But in 1934, the former Colonial Secretary and future Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, told a Joint Select Committee of Parliament: "No member of the Cabinet meant, contemplated, or wished to suggest the establishment of a Dominion Constitution for India for any period which human beings ought to take into account."

The Second World War

On 3 September 1939, Britain declared war against Germany. The Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow, declared that India, too, was now at war against Germany; this was similarly the case for other elements of the British Empire. This action certainly underlined the fact that effective power still lay with the British and that their colonial subjects, even in matters of life and death, did not count for very much and were not to be consulted in matters affecting their future.

The Indian people, as well as those of other British colonies, were reluctant to believe Allied propaganda claims that the Axis powers were virtually monsters hell-bent on world conquest. The Allied crusade against fascism hardly seemed relevant to colonial peoples struggling in their own movements for independence from the British. Indeed, the precarious military situation the British found themselves in in the Spring and Summer of 1940, and well into 1941, brought hope to Indian nationalists, and various Arabs such as the Egyptians and Iraqis, that their struggles for freedom had a greater chance of fruition if the Axis won. More than one foreign observer in India noted the evident jubilation there when news that Dunkirk had fallen was announced. Each of the German advances against British positions reinforced the belief of Indians, and others, that their freedom was nearer.

This is not the place to go into a detailed review of President Roosevelt's foreign policy maneuverings in the period before formal U.S. participation in the Second World War. American involvement in a Pacific war against Japan had long been under study in U.S. military circles and Henry L. Stimson, who served as President Hoover's Secretary of State and later became Roosevelt's Secretary of War, had been calling for war against Japan

since the 1920s. Many historians have long felt that the economic failure of the New Deal led FDR to distract public attention by focusing on alleged foreign threats.³

In any event, the Roosevelt Administration did gradually withdraw from a position of neutrality to one of "co-belligerency" without a formal declaration of war against the Axis powers. In the weeks preceding the Argentia Conference after which the Atlantic Charter was released, the Americans, British, Dutch, Australians, and New Zealanders held joint military discussions for Pacific operations. Roosevelt had been assured that economic embargoes would goad Japan into declaring war, and on 25 July 1941 his Administration announced that Japanese funds in the U.S. would be frozen. The British and Dutch followed suit. On 31 July Roosevelt forbade the export to Japan of aviation fuel and machine tools. An economic war was thus underway against the Japanese.

With British possessions around the globe threatened, Churchill quite naturally worked to bring the U.S. into the war with the least possible delay. Although long in covert communication with each other, it was not until August 1941 that Churchill and Roosevelt had their first personal meeting in some 23 years.⁴ They met between 8 and 13 August aboard ship in Argentia Bay, off Newfoundland. While Roosevelt and Churchill discussed broad policy questions, their respective military advisers outlined strategy. Full details of the discussions held by Generals Marshall and Arnold and Admirals Stark and King of the United States with their British counterparts General Dill, Admiral Pound, and Vice Air Chief Freeman have yet to be released. It is known that they discussed the possibility of sending a U.S. expeditionary force to seize the Azores and an Anglo-American operation to take the Canary and Cape Verde Islands. As John Costello revealed in his recent book, *The Pacific War*, agreement was reached for the U.S. to build up the Philippines as a base for operations directed against Japan. It was believed that the new long-range American B-17 bombers would permit crippling strikes to be launched from the Philippines against Japanese targets. This would allow the British to retain more naval units in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The British promised to operate major naval units out of the Philippines in coordination with the U.S. Navy. As Costello explains: "This went far beyond the limited defense envisioned by the RAINBOW 5 War Plan, or even Churchill's hope in April that 'modest arrangements' could be made to increase Anglo-American strength in the Far East." The British historian points out that Churchill was disappointed that he was unable to persuade the U.S. Navy to send warships into the Mediterranean and to begin convoying British ships

across the Atlantic, but that "when it came to the Far East, it was apparent that there had been a significant revision of American planning toward the strong deterrent strategy in the Far East that the British had failed to achieve during the spring [1941] staff talks."⁵

On the day the conference concluded, the U.S. House of Representatives passed by only one vote the bill to continue the draft and to federalize the National Guard units. Public opinion polls indicated that 75 percent of American adults were still opposed to going to war against Germany. In light of his domestic political situation, Roosevelt informed Churchill that he could not formally declare war at this time: "I may never declare war; I may make war. If I were to ask Congress to declare war they might argue about it for three months." By the Fall of 1941, the U.S. Navy was already in a state of undeclared war with Germany and the pressure was being increased against Japan.⁶

The commitments made at the Argentia Conference could not be revealed, so for public consumption the Atlantic Charter (or Declaration) was issued. Although it was, and still is, portrayed as a serious, historic statement of policy, it took the form of a publicity hand-out, merely mimeographed and released to the press.

The Charter had eight articles:

Article I stated that the two powers "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other."

Article II stated that "They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." This was a reiteration of the principle of self-determination of nations brought over from the era of Woodrow Wilson.

Article III said: "They respect the rights of all peoples to choose the forms of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereignty and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."

Article IV promised equal access on equal terms to the trade and raw materials of the world needed for economic prosperity.

Article V was another pledge to collaborate with all nations economically "with the object of securing for all improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security."

Article VI said that after the destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hoped to see established a peace "which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries and which will afford assurance that all men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

Article VII dealt with freedom of the seas, and

Article VIII advocated general disarmament and a "wider permanent system of general security."⁷

It is understandable that expectations were thus raised among people within the Western colonial sphere of control, as well as in Axis-occupied portions of Europe. At the time it was handed to the press, Roosevelt said that the Charter meant "the ending of special privileges for the few and the preservation of civil liberties for all." On 24 August, Churchill made a radio speech broadcast worldwide, in which he stated: "This was a meeting which marks for ever in the pages of history the taking up by the English-speaking nations amid all this peril, tumult, and confusion, of the guidance of the fortunes of the broad toiling masses in all the continents, and our loyal effort, without any clog of selfish interest, to lead them forward out of the miseries into which they have been plunged, back to the broad high road of freedom and justice." In this same broadcast, the British warlord explained that "We had the idea when we met there—the President and I—that without attempting to draw final formal peace aims and war aims, it was necessary to give *all peoples, and especially the oppressed and conquered peoples* a simple rough and ready war-time statement of the goal towards which the British Commonwealth and the United States mean to make their way and thus make a way for others to march with them upon a road which will certainly be painful and may be long."⁸

Clement Atlee, chief of the British Labour Party and Lord Privy Seal in the Churchill government, stated a few days after the release of the Charter: "Thursday's declaration will be equally applicable to all races, including Asiatics and Africans." U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull said that it was "the statement of basic ideas of policies that are universal in their application." At a press conference held aboard the presidential yacht *Potomac*, Roosevelt pointed out that "not a single continent went undiscussed at the conference at sea."

Of course, such wonderful liberal sentiments had been bandied about before. They were an essential part of the founding and continuing rhetoric of the League of Nations. But the history of the League was in fact full of special "reservations" as well as outright repudiations of promises, where the interests of the established Great Powers were directly involved. It should be recalled that at its peak in 1933, the British Empire covered some 12.2 million square miles—23.85 percent of the earth's land surface—with a population of nearly 502 million, nearly a quarter of the world population. As D.K. Fieldhouse remarked, "This immense agglomeration was the product of three centuries of expansion during which every place the British had occasion to annex, apart from the United States, had been preserved in the imperial museum. As a whole it had no unity of character or function. . . . Such a multiplicity of possessions had nothing in common but their subjection."⁹

In the United States, the Atlantic Charter was reviewed by Robert M. Hutchins, Chancellor of the University of Chicago. Referring to the demand for the restoration of the *status quo* in European countries that had been victims of aggression during the war, he asked, "... and what do we do about the countries which were victims of aggression before 1939? What do we do about Hong Kong, the Malaya States, the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China, Africa, and above all, India?" He went on to charge that the Atlantic Charter provisions should be unhesitatingly applied throughout the world and that hopes "held out to India during the last war, disappointed after it, and now held out again, must be fulfilled."¹⁰

One of Roosevelt's staunchest supporters, Senator Reynolds, asked: "Why don't Britain and the U.S. start imposing the Four Freedoms in India straight away?" This theme was taken up by Wendell Willkie and was the subject of numerous newspaper editorials across America. Even the president's wife Eleanor sent her husband a report sharply critical of Britain's India policy in particular and colonial policy in general, and asked for Franklin's comment. The President replied, "I can have no thoughts about India."¹¹

Any notion that the provisions of the Atlantic Charter might apply to India and other British colonial possessions were quickly dashed. The British government's position was clarified when on 9 September 1941, Churchill told the House of Commons:

The Joint Declaration does not try to explain how the broad principles proclaimed by it are to be applied to each and every case which will have to be dealt with when the war comes to an end. It would not be wise for us, at this moment, to be drawn into laborious discussions on how it is to fit all the manifold problems with which we shall be faced after the war.

The Joint Declaration does not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which have been made from time to time about the developments of constitutional government in India, Burma, and other parts of the British Empire... At the Atlantic meeting we have had in mind, primarily, the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government, and natural life of the States and nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke... so that is quite a separate problem from progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown.¹²

The Secretary of State for India, L.S. Amery, reported that the Government did not consider the Atlantic Charter to be relevant to India and other parts of the Empire. Speaking at Manchester on 20 November 1941, Amery declared that while the Indian Congress "has demanded that India's future constitution should

be settled by a Constituent Assembly, this is an impossible demand," and went on to deplore "the clamour for the application of the Atlantic Charter to India," which he described as "a typical example of loose thinking."¹³

The *London News Chronicle* pointed out that "What the British Government will gladly concede to Yugoslavia, it will withhold from the jewel of the British Empire." The paper went on to characterize the Atlantic Charter as a "symbol of hypocrisy."

A Member of Parliament, Reginald Sorensen, said that "The Charter does need bold, unequivocal interpretation effectively to prevent suspicion and distrust. Unfortunately, there has already been cause for distrust and discouragement." On another occasion, Sorensen remarked that "the position should have been clearly stated as the right of all peoples, if not at present under the British flag, to choose their form of government."¹⁴

Another of the British Prime Minister's Parliamentary critics, Mr. MacGovern, called Churchill "a self-confessed advocate of aggression." He went on to say that in his estimation "the Atlantic Charter was one of the grossest pieces of deceit in modern times," because Churchill was prepared to apply it to countries overrun by Hitler "while the independent government which it proposes to give them is denied to territories that have been overrun in the past by Britain herself."¹⁵

The refusal of the British government to apply the Atlantic Charter to its colonies underlined the hypocrisy of demanding that the people of India and other areas participate in the war to regain the freedom of some parts of the world, yet at the same time denying those rights to the subjects of countries ruled by members of the Western Alliance. Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru, addressing a meeting of the United Provinces Liberal Association, voiced the feelings of many in the Empire when he said: "We must make it clear that we cannot allow ourselves to be used as tools of imperialism. We cannot, while helping other nations in attaining their freedom, be oblivious of our duty to enable our own country to achieve freedom." Sir Sarvapali of India declared that "this war is an Imperialist war for the defense of this struggling ramshackle system of domination, finance, trade, and tradition: the British Empire."

The failure to implement the Atlantic Charter goes far to explain why many nationalists in the areas controlled by Western powers, such as Indian leader Subhas Chandra Bose, looked to the Axis, especially Germany and Japan, for assistance in the liberation of their lands.¹⁶ The view of these nationals, who ended up cooperating with the Axis Powers, was well summarized in the journal *Azad Hind* [*Free India*]:

The British Empire is an institution of slavery. It has caused utter destitution, degradation and humiliation to millions of people. It has instituted the most vicious system of exploitation the world has ever seen. It has caused innumerable wars between nations during the last two centuries. No demagogy, no chicanery, can alter these essential facts. And no reform measure can improve the miserable and inhuman conditions that exist in the colonies. British imperialists, who have invested there a large amount of capital and derive from that a huge profit every year, are not, and never will be inspired by any philanthropic motive, whatever their Labour valets may say. The only salvation of the colonial people, and as a matter of fact, of the entire world, can come only when this slave institution, called the British Empire, is completely destroyed. And it will be destroyed only when India, the pivot on which the Empire rests, strikes hard. Once India goes, the Empire also goes. Indian people are conscious of their great mission. And the final hour of British imperialism approaches nearer every day.¹⁷

Although the Allies, including Stalin's Russia, continued throughout the war to invoke the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter, those principles were in practice ignored as the Allies issued their "Unconditional Surrender" policy in February 1943, and later as the United States and Britain consented to the Soviet seizure of the Baltic states and portions of Poland. William Henry Chamberlin, in his still-useful survey of this chapter of modern history, commented that with the Yalta accords "The leaders of the Axis could scarcely have surpassed the cynicism of Roosevelt and Churchill in throwing over allies like Poland and China." Chamberlin further noted that "when the Atlantic Charter pledges of self-determination and equality of economic opportunity were most obviously and crudely violated voices of protest were few and timid."¹⁸

As for the British Empire, its end was brought about not by the application of war-time promises about self-determination and an end to tyranny, but rather by the enervating consequences of Britain's second war against Germany within the first half of the twentieth century.¹⁹ Britain, as well as France, paid an especially high price for having participated in the two world wars. Far from "winning" anything other than illusory victories in two phony wars, the British and French were chief among the real losers of the real wars. Today, nearly forty years after the end of the crusade to fight fascism, they are but a shadow of what they were before the war began.

Notes

1. American history professors and textbooks taking the Atlantic Charter seriously include H. Stuart Hughes (of Harvard), *Contemporary Europe: A History* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971); Wallace K. Ferguson and Geoffrey Bruun, *A Survey of European Civilization* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961 and later editions); Joseph R. Strayer (Princeton), Hans W. Gatzke (Yale) and E. Harris Harbison (Princeton), *The Mainstream of Civilization* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1974 and later editions). On the other hand, Carl N. Degler in his widely-used text *Out of Our Past: The Forces That Shaped Modern America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969, 1970), remarks on p. 448 that "Roosevelt's meeting in August 1941, with Churchill at Argentia Bay, Newfoundland, to write the Atlantic Charter and to agree on postwar aims, was undoubtedly the most unneutral act ever committed by a professed neutral. Yet the Atlantic meeting aroused surprisingly little hostile sentiment except among a small group of die hard isolationists." The brilliant British military strategist and historian, Maj. Gen. J.F.C. Fuller, characterized the Atlantic Charter as "first-class propaganda, and probably the biggest hoax in history," in his *A Military History of the Western World*, Vol. 3 (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1955), p. 453.
2. For a concise review of this history, see David Hirst, *The Gun & the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East* (London: Farber & Farber, 1977), reprinted 1983 by Futura Books, and available in the United States for \$2.75 from Americans for Middle East Understanding, Room 771, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y. 10115. AMEU also publishes a useful newsletter on Middle Eastern political developments, *The Link*.
3. Historian Charles A. Beard was among those at the time who concluded that FDR was going to take this course of action. On Beard's views, James J. Martin writes: "In February 1935 *Scribner's Magazine* had published an essay by Charles A. Beard titled, 'National Politics and War.' Beard had predicted in this that the political fortunes of Roosevelt would decline steadily until 1940, when, faced by stupendous domestic problems and serious splits in his own party, and unable to develop a 'strong' workable domestic program, he would adopt a 'strong' foreign policy instead, and cause the country to 'stumble' onto war. It was of significance that a book by Mauritz Hallgren, a critical study of Roosevelt titled *The Gay Reformer*, should be published at this moment, restating this thesis once more." Martin, *American Liberalism and World Politics, 1931-1941* Vol. 2 (New York: Devin-Adair, 1964), p. 859. For more on Beard's prescience, see Martin's "Charles A. Beard: A Tribute," *The Journal of Historical Review* Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 1982), pp. 239-58. On the economic failure of the New Deal, see Broadus Mitchell's chapter "War to the Rescue" in his *The Depression Decade*; also John T. Flynn, *The Roosevelt Myth* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1948 and later editions). For a concise review of Roosevelt's foreign policy maneuverings, see William L. Neumann, "Roosevelt's Options and

Evasions in Foreign Policy Decisions, 1940-1945," in Leonard Liggio and James J. Martin (eds.), *Watershed of Empire: Essays in New Deal Foreign Policy* (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1976).

4. President Roosevelt was secretly communicating with Churchill even before the latter assumed the Prime Ministership in May 1940—that is, when Churchill was merely First Lord of the Admiralty in Neville Chamberlain's war cabinet. Such an end-run in official communication around a counterpart head of state was virtually unprecedented. An isolationist code-clerk at the American embassy in London, Tyler Gatewood Kent, saw these communications and began to make copies and abstracts—with a view toward bringing Roosevelt's secret to the attention of certain non-interventionist U.S. Senators, and through them the American press and people. He was caught with the contraband documents before he could put his plan into effect. His diplomatic immunity waived by Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy, Kent spent 1940-45 in British detention. See John Howland Snow, *The Case of Tyler Kent* (New York: Domestic and Foreign Affairs, 1946; New Canaan, Conn.: The Long House, 1962); also Richard Whalen, "The Strange Case of Tyler Kent," *Diplomat* (November 1965), pp. 16-19, 62-64. A recent examination of the Kent case which concludes that the evidence against Roosevelt collected by Kent was not really so damning is Bruce Bartlett and Warren F. Kimball, "Roosevelt and Prewar Commitments to Churchill: The Tyler Kent Affair," *Diplomatic History* Vol. 5, No. 4 (Fall 1981), pp. 291-312. The opposite point of view may be found in Tyler Kent's own exposition, "The Roosevelt Legacy and The Kent Case," *The Journal of Historical Review* Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 1983), pp. 173-203. In his Introduction to this essay, historian Mark Weber examines several of the Roosevelt-Churchill communications from the "Kent Documents" and concludes that the American President was indeed guilty of conspiring with Churchill to violate not only American, but international, law—and that had Kent's plan to release the documents succeeded, and Roosevelt been "caught out," the course of world history might well have been drastically altered. The other essays in the Summer 1983 issue of the *JHR*—a special issue entitled *Roosevelt and War in Europe, 1938-40: Origins and Interventions*—also bear reading: Weber's "President Roosevelt's Campaign to Incite War in Europe: The Secret Polish Documents," pp. 135-72, and David L. Hoggan's "President Roosevelt and The Origins of The 1939 War," pp. 205-56.
5. John Costello, *The Pacific War* (New York: Rawson, Wade, 1981), pp. 95-96. Costello points out that relevant portions of the Prime Minister's papers housed at the Public Records Office in Kew, PREM 3 file, group 252, section 5, dealing with events through November 1941 are unavailable to researchers and marked "closed for 75 years."
6. The release of 950 volumes of British War Cabinet documents on 1 January 1972 has done much to shed light on Roosevelt's schemes to draw the United States into the war. See Colin Cross (*London Observer*), "British Papers Indicate FDR Sought War With Hitler," *Washington Post* (Sunday, 2 January 1972) p. A-16; also Associ-

- ated Press dispatch (London), "War-Entry Plans Laid to Roosevelt: Britain Releases Her Data on Talks With Churchill," *New York Times* (Sunday, 2 January 1972), p. 7.
7. Joel H. Wiener (ed.), *Great Britain: Foreign Policy and the Span of Empire 1689-1971: A Documentary History*, Vol. 2 (New York: Chelsea House/McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 1192-93.
 8. *Ibid.*, pp. 1193-96, emphasis added.
 9. D.K. Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1966), p. 242.
 10. Anup Chand, *India and the Atlantic Charter* (Lahore: Hero Publications, 1945).
 11. During the course of a Fireside Chat in May 1941, Roosevelt discussed the Four Freedoms: "freedom of speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship his God in his own way, freedom from want, freedom from terror." The exchange between Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt is mentioned in Theodore A. Wilson, *The First Summit* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969).
 12. *Atlantic Charter: Declarations by Members of the War Cabinet*, National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations (UK), 1942.
 13. *Ibid.*
 14. Reginald Sorensen, M.P., *India and the Atlantic Charter* (London: The India League, February 1942), pp. 4-5.
 15. Chand.
 16. See the informative essay by the late Ranjan Borra, "Subhas Chandra Bose, The Indian National Army, and The War of India's Liberation," *Journal of Historical Review* Vol. 3, No. 4 (Winter 1982), pp. 407-39.
 17. Promode Sengupta, "British Colonies and India," *Azad Hind* No. 1 (Berlin: Eigenverlag Zentrale Freies Indien, 1944) p. 25.
 18. William Henry Chamberlin, *America's Second Crusade* (Chicago: Regnery, 1950 and later editions), pp. 216, 240.
 19. See James J. Martin, "The Consequences of World War II to Great Britain: Twenty Years of Decline, 1939-1959," in his *The Saga of Hog Island and Other Essays in Inconvenient History* (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1977), pp. 42-87.

The 'Holocaust' and the Failure of Allied and Jewish Responses

THE LOGIC OF DISBELIEF

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Over the past several years, there has emerged with increasing frequency the charge that because it failed to bomb the Germans' concentration camps, the United States bears a significant share of the blame for the Holocaust. There are even those who insist that American officials were well aware of Hitler's crimes during World War Two, yet chose purposely not to stop them.¹

Documentation made available only during the past decade, however, amply demonstrates that the volatile accusations of American indifference—even collusion—are unwarranted. That the Roosevelt administration (and, it is also charged, American Jews) did not act with dispatch to effect the rescue of European Jewry, shows essentially that the tales of extermination were not believed.

This study will examine what was known of allegations of a German policy of mass murder in Europe, and whether the many war-time reports about such allegations were credible. I contend that the mass murder reports were, in the main, of such a patternless character that their key elements are thrown into doubt.

Consequently, with few exceptions the information as received in the West was dismissed as atrocity propaganda. It was not treated seriously by the Allied leadership, nor by Allied intelligence; not by the American public nor the English; not by American Jewry nor even European Jews. Who could accept the

fantastic allegation that Hitler would exterminate a vital manpower source late in the war, while engaged in ferocious battles on three fronts and desperate for every available hand?

Because the Allied response to the sporadic accounts of mass killings was conditioned mainly on intelligence data, it is appropriate that the study begin here. Records of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America's chief wartime intelligence agency, are currently being declassified and to date show a startling paucity of data on "exterminations." By themselves the OSS documents challenge the notion that Allied leaders "knew" what was happening to the Jews under German occupation. Not only is the information given in them remarkably scant, it is often mutually contradictory and sometimes bizarre.

One document quotes a "Polish underground source" as saying during the Spring of 1944 that Auschwitz was metamorphosizing from a death camp into a massive "forced labor camp."² This was ostensibly taking place during the alleged time of greatest killing at the Birkenau facility, when 700,000 Hungarian Jews were presumably being murdered. This report directly contradicts all that has been claimed about that period since the end of the war.

Another document, distributed by OSS headquarters in Washington in March 1944, refers to Belzek, Sobibor and Treblinka as the best-known death camps. Some 20 others are mentioned as well—yet Auschwitz, sometimes called "the kingdom of death," is nowhere discussed.³ This document is significant because, as Walter Laqueur notes in his book *The Terrible Secret*, Auschwitz had been open since 1940. Thus, any report failing to point to Auschwitz as the Nazis' key extermination plant would be puzzling. There are, however, many reports which do not connect Auschwitz with exterminations.

In the same period, June 1944, a captured SS man told his Allied interrogators that his brother had witnessed an extermination of Jews in special "gas barracks." After the murders, the OSS report says, he told his captors that the corpses were "sticking together; it was one block of dead which could not be separated. Apparently the gas destroyed the skin and therefore the bodies melted together."⁴ Few other accounts, contemporaneous or postwar, have described such queer and doubtful effects.

Another story, sent in early January 1944 from the American Consulate-General in Istanbul to the State Department in Washington, discusses Jewish underground activities at length. But while prisoner-smuggling techniques and other issues are bandied about, nothing in this internal memo relates to the Nazis' killing of Jews.⁵

A high-ranking OSS official, William L. Langer, received a report apparently composed in August 1943. In it Auschwitz is

described in some detail. Among other claims made for the camp is the immediate gassing of 98% of all Jewish arrivees, "mostly young and healthy individuals." These, the report alleges, were "gassed and then burned half-alive." Women and children were gassed, then "thrown out through an apperture and cremated on a stake." Langer was asked by a horrified subordinate to give this information "maximum publicity" in the United States. In the post-war era, of course, most of the extensive body of Holocaust lore insists that healthy persons were not killed outright, but worked to death. Since then, "stakes" have not seriously been associated with Auschwitz. (For unexplained reasons this document adds that "only a German could have perpetrated such destruction.")⁶

Still another late-war dispatch (made also at the supposed time of greatest killing) rejects news of gas as a murder agent, in favor of steam. At Treblinka, it says, "men and women were separated and driven into hermetically-sealed baths, in which instead of water steam was introduced through the faucets. The victims [at Treblinka] are in general killed by steam, and not by gas as had been first suspected."⁷

One of the most nettlesome and persistent tales, accepted by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, involved the manufacture of soap from Jewish bodies. While no one was convicted of such loathesome business by the war crimes courts (nor any reliable evidence produced for it), the soap story continues to enjoy widespread currency. This despite occasional debunking by scholars like Walter Laqueur,⁸ and the dismissal several years ago by a German court in Flensburg of "soap recipes" presented by Holocaust survivors. (The former inmates had claimed that a "soap factory" had existed at the Stutthof concentration camp in Germany.⁹)

Certainly one of the most significant events bearing on the question of the Allies' knowledge of German extermination preparations or operations occurred in 1979. Owing to research by two CIA photo-analysts, Dino A. Brugioni and Robert Poirier (who said they were moved by the original NBC Network telecast of *Holocaust*), the National Archives and the CIA released dozens of aerial photographs taken by Allied warplanes over Auschwitz in the Spring and Fall of 1944.¹⁰

The two CIA men, who apparently worked in their spare time, said they wondered whether any actual "photo-imagery" existed of the camp's extermination annex, Birkenau. They began an exhaustive search of government photographic holdings from this period, finally locating many images of Auschwitz I (the main camp), Auschwitz III (the primary industrial sector), and Auschwitz II—Birkenau.

The unusual photos, made sharper by advanced computer-

enhancement techniques, are often cited by critics of the U.S. government as proof of a callous disregard for the fate of the Jews. Author Konnilyn Feig, for example, contends that since the photos were available to the American military, there can be no doubt that this country "knew" about Hitler's "death camps." Feig says that the American explanation that it had inadequate information was now proven to be "a clear lie." Here, finally, were photos bearing "clear . . . topographical information."¹¹ According to Feig and other contemporary writers, for the American government to have had this evidence and not concluded what today seems obvious is somehow incriminating.

These accusations, however, have the classic hallmarks of "20-20 hindsight." At the original press conference announcing the release of the photos (a conference that Feig appears to have missed), CIA analyst Brugioni said that when the photos were first viewed they indeed seemed inconsequential. There was nothing in them to suggest anything besides a conventional prison camp—or even army camp—of the sort which dotted the Silesian landscape at that time.¹²

Brugioni also explained that when he served as a young Army Corps photo-interpreter in Europe, there were no reports in *Yank*, *Stars and Stripes*, or other publications referring to Polish camps as the locus of Nazi murder programs.¹³ Moreover, the two intelligence analysts (along with Robert Wolfe, curator of the National Archives' Modern Military Branch) stressed that the current means of minutely examining the photos were unavailable to the armed forces of 40 years ago.¹⁴

The real significance of the CIA/Archives photos lies not in what they show, however, but in what they *fail to show*. That is: evidence to sustain "ground accounts" of mass murder of Jews at Auschwitz in the Spring of 1944. Whereas the great majority of the extensive descriptions of Auschwitz speak of between ten and thirty thousand victims gassed and cremated *daily* at this time, in none of the hundreds of aerial photos examined by the CIA officials is found any hint of the smoke and flame said to blanket the entire Auschwitz region.¹⁵

The great and infamous "burning pits" meant to accomodate the overflow of Hungarian Jews are absent as well. Only one shallow pit—perhaps 15 by 20 feet—is visible in any of the photos. And even with the benefit of computer-enhancement it shows no evidence of the revolting purpose ascribed to it.

The CIA analysts and the National Archives (which in 1979 supplied for the photos such labels as "possible cremation pit," "Jews on the way to gas chambers," "gas chambers," etc.), were unable to reconcile this anomaly. A footnote accompanying the monograph observes only that the photos did not conform to "cor-

ollary ground accounts" of the purported events at Birkenau.¹⁶ In light of this, declarations by writers such as Otto Friedrich that the "remarkably clear" photos show "the essential evidence—the gas chambers, the crematoria, the prisoners standing in line"¹⁷ are without foundation. They are, in fact, utterly ridiculous.

The keys to understanding these important photographs, are, rather, that 1) Auschwitz was not "reliably" reported by Allied authorities as a death camp until the Fall of 1944, and 2) *the photos' seemingly-authoritative captions were not applied until 34 years after the war ended.*

Robert Wolfe—under whose aegis the Birkenau pictures were released by the National Archives—is concerned lest people today use them as weapons against various government agencies or officials. Yes, he says, the U.S. did receive scattered atrocity reports, but "if you don't know or suspect something like [gassing at Auschwitz], you wouldn't look for evidence like chimneys." Besides, the custodian of the Archives' vast Modern Military Branch added, "the truth was intermingled with all sorts of rumors and stories. . . . The U.S. didn't put [the information] together correctly."¹⁸

Wolfe, who is Jewish, says that investigations of this sort are difficult for him, but that as a professional archivist he must rely on "contemporary textual and documentary evidence." In the realm of extermination data, this evidence is largely absent. According to Wolfe, the rules governing the acceptance of mass-murder intelligence data were and are the same as those impinging on other areas.

"You have to evaluate [the information]," he said intently. "How good is the source? Where does the data come from? How does it fit in with something else?" He offered as an analogy the Battle of the Bulge in 1944. In that instance Allied commanders possessed information that, assembled in a cogent way, would have thwarted the unpleasant surprise of the Germans' sweep through American lines in Belgium.

In marked contrast to critics who insist that the Allies had obtained good information on exterminations of Jews as early as 1942, Wolfe would prefer not to characterize inaction as indifference. "The main questions involve when and to what extent, and which part of the Allies [knew about the extermination], and what could they do about it. All of that is pretty hard to boil down."¹⁹

Author Edward T. Chase is similarly aware of the need for probity about the CIA/Archives photos and other evidence. In assessing the role of former Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy in the American failure to bomb Auschwitz, Chase said: "You've got to be enormously careful . . . before you start throwing bricks

around; you have to really look at [the question of responsibility]. You can't just impose hindsight on events that took place then."

To Chase, the information of the period—as well as post-war "revelations" of Allied culpability for not rescuing European Jews—"has to be examined with more responsibility."²⁰ Chase's views reflect the experience gained from his service as a Naval Intelligence officer during World War Two.

It appears that the treatment of intelligence data received throughout the war was, in the main, distinguished by such rigorous evaluation. Even analysts in the British ENIGMA program, which decrypted nearly all German intelligence ciphers from 1942 on, possessed nothing of sufficient moment with which to frame a conclusion of a German extermination policy. Thus, although the Allies had, through the possession of a captured ENIGMA coding machine, decoded the messages of the SS, the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe and other organizations, a highly respected authority on the ENIGMA program has little to say on the subject of extermination. In the nearly 1000 pages of *Bodyguard of Lies*, Anthony Cave Brown refers to the Nazi concentration camps primarily as adjuncts of German industry.

In this seminal study, Cave Brown also cites standard intelligence sources which failed to establish a relationship between deportation and mass murder. "... [British] MI-6 and [American] OSS," he writes, "had gained considerable success discovering Hitler's secrets through conventional ... channels—the reports of spies and informants throughout Nazi-occupied Europe and in the satellite and neutral countries; the censorship of foreign mail; the interrogation of POWs."²¹

A "massively-detailed" but "little read" study of Britain's war-time intelligence published in 1981, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, strongly bolsters the notion that the British did not associate what appeared to be random shootings of Jews with a policy of mass murder. In fact, from 1942 on there were no references in the SS and Police decrypts to gassing. Underscoring a seeming disbelief in the reports, mention of German concentration camps in any connection became increasingly scant as the war progressed. The British did, however, "carefully log" the return of prisoners—presumably from work details—to Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau and seven other camps.²²

In both the massive British intelligence study and in SS records at the National Archives there are, to be sure, field reports alluding to "executions" of Jewish partisans and civilians in Russia. "Field reports" of this sort are hardly persuasive evidence of an extermination program, however. Nor were they taken as such by analysts of the time.

Another recent book on Allied intelligence, Joseph Persico's

Piercing the Reich (dealing specifically with American agent penetration of Germany), devotes only four pages to what was known of the activities of camps like Auschwitz. This is curious, inasmuch as the author's preface states that "the U.S. reaped an abundant harvest of intelligence in the operations of the wartime OSS."²³ And a former OSS operative who served in Europe made this observation recently: "... the OSS learned in advance about the development of German jet aircraft, the Nazi effort to develop a nuclear weapon, secrets of the V-1s and V-2s, and the plot against Hitler."²⁴ These were some of the most highly secret goings-on in the entire Third Reich. Had even verbal information about a projected slaughter of the Jews been gleaned by the OSS, knowledge of this ought to appear in study after study of wartime European intelligence. It does not. Rather, it is fairly clear that American agents' reports directly from Germany itself expressed no knowledge about—or belief in—accounts of Jewish exterminations in Europe.

As the previously-cited British study indicates, Allied planners in the U.S. and England did calculate the size of concentration camp populations through the years; the linkage between manpower capabilities and industrial output clearly interested them.

Investigating the manufacture of ersatz fuel at Auschwitz, for example, was deemed a vital mission by Allied intelligence because the hydrogenation works were a key to Germany's capacity for future military operations. It is virtually certain that information concerning Jews at Auschwitz—who were employed in many of the three dozen enterprises located there—was both obtained by American agents inside Germany and published in manpower or demographic studies.

Had the rumors of extermination, with which the camps were reportedly rife, been credible, the agents' reports ought to have conveyed shock and anxiety. This because a sudden diminution of available laborers in the camp would logically have prompted questions about their disposition. To date (although there remains much classified data on the subject) indications are that intelligence analysts viewed the waxing and waning of inmate populations as no more ominous than intra-camp transfers, which occurred on a regular basis depending upon which prisoners had which skills.²⁵ (Auschwitz, for example, had an artillery fuse plant and cement works; Dachau a clothing factory for the Waffen SS; Neuengamme a research and development facility for V-2 missiles. All were staffed largely by Jews.)

Some students of the period, such as American University professor Allen Kraut, contradict Persico's contention that the OSS was well-informed on concentration camp matters. To Kraut, the "OSS was just a bunch of amateurs beginning to learn profes-

sional methods." Moreover, "the plight of the Jews was really a very secondary matter. What the OSS wanted was military intelligence." Yet the OSS received vast assemblages of data on the role of concentration camps in the German war effort; it in effect concluded that the evidence for charging Germany with an extermination program was insufficient.

Kraut is similarly hard-put to explain the lack of plausible extermination information on the part of the British, who largely taught America its intelligence craft. "They weren't looking for [evidence]," he contends. "They were getting some about the executions of Jews; many times they were ignoring it. And other times they saw it, they read it, and they didn't believe it. But there's a difference between that and simply not having any information."²⁶ It might be added that there is a difference between having an unconsolidated mass of raw intelligence about the killings of Jewish civilians, and knowing which reports were more reliable than the discredited "Belgian baby"-type allegations of the previous war, which members of the British Parliament later admitted fabricating.

It appears, then, that in the intelligence sphere the accounts of mass killings lacked credibility. Even if some analysts suspected that Germans randomly shot Jews, Slavs, Poles and others considered racially inferior by the Reich government, a quantum leap of faith was required to accept tales of Europe-wide extermination.

If the reports had at that time been accorded the respect and credibility they have acquired since the war, some attempt to warn Europe's Jews would almost certainly have been inaugurated. Yet those agencies (the OSS, MI-6, and others) privy to the most secret communications throughout the far-flung Reich failed to attempt even rudimentary leaflet campaigns for this purpose.²⁷

Even American officials like Roswell McClelland, who found the term "deportation" pregnant with evil meaning, kept their suspicions mostly to themselves. "One wonders why. . . . It's something I've never entirely explained to myself," McClelland says in answer to the question of why he didn't mobilize others to act on his "gut feelings."²⁸

McClelland was stationed in Switzerland during the war as War Refugee Board (WRB) representative at the American Consulate in Bern. In addition to his work on behalf of war refugees, including Jews, he often communicated, he says, with the Switzerland-based OSS chief, Allen Dulles. McClelland is widely acclaimed for having transmitted to Washington from his post in Bern the report of two Slovakian Jewish escapees from Auschwitz. (This report was later to gain notoriety as the main

evidentiary feature of the "WRB Report.") His remarks to this writer on his failure to propose the obvious—a massive warning campaign for the Jews—are all the more puzzling for it. They underscore that fact that although some people in rumor-choked Switzerland had a "gut" suspicion that extermination was taking place, their actual behavior did not reflect such concerns. Pressed on his inaction, McClelland offers little. "You had intimations," he recalled rather weakly. "But then you were swept on, and there was a lot of [other] work to do. [The extermination allegations] sort of faded to the background."²⁹

There was another, earlier, report which sparked a great deal of controversy, because it appeared more authoritative and complete than the notably brief and usually unattributed fillers that the *New York Times* and other U.S. papers started publishing in mid-1942.³⁰

Like Roswell McClelland, the World Jewish Congress (WJC) representative in Switzerland, Gerhard Riegner, was apparently a man who "could not believe, yet did believe" information on exterminations. He made many protestations to Allied governments on the basis of a report he allegedly obtained from an anti-Nazi German industrialist in the Summer of 1942.

In that report, Riegner was quoted recently as saying, were somber warnings that Hitler had prepared for the total physical annihilation of European Jews. Authorities in the U.S. and Britain were asked to believe that the industrialist (who owned factories employing 30,000 workers) had access to the highest counsels of the German government, and was invited to a secret meeting at which the Nazi extermination plan was laid out.

In the first of several messages to American and British diplomatic representatives in Switzerland, Riegner asked that the data be transmitted to their governments and to key Jewish leaders. As is now well known, the information was dismissed as fantasy by the foreign service establishments of both countries. A typical reaction was that these allegations were merely "the opinion of one Jew in Geneva."³¹ As Riegner himself told the *Washington Post*: "No one really believed it. Not even the Jews who knew it [?]. . . . I counted 4 million Jews as dead." (How they were counted is not indicated.) "My own World Jewish Congress office in New York—where I sent all my reports—published the figure of only 1.5 million."³²

While he has reportedly "struggled" long and hard with the reasons his industrialist's—and by extension, others'—reports were suspect, Riegner concludes that the human mind simply could not accept claims of such magnitude.

There are, of course, less metaphysical reasons why Riegner's claims were viewed as little more than rumor. The most obvious is

their unsubstantiated character. As Martin Gilbert made plain in his 1981 book *Auschwitz and the Allies*, Washington and London were "disinclined" to believe Riegner's "fantastic" tales, in part because no others had been as strikingly grandiose. Although Riegner spoke of interrogating the mysterious industrialist (it was two full days before he believed the man's accounts himself), authorities in the West remained dubious. Much of this attitude appears to have hinged on the phrase "at one blow exterminated," found in Riegner's first urgent telegram, of 8 August 1942.³³ To be sure, some officials, including the American Vice-Consul in Geneva, Howard Elting, considered the 30-year-old lawyer "a serious and balanced individual," but inside the State Department skepticism prevailed.

Against Vice-Consul Elting's view that Riegner would not have asked to see him had Riegner "lacked confidence in his informant," must be weighed the questions of Elting's colleagues about the messenger. Riegner was, in fact, an entirely unknown quantity either in Foggy Bottom or in Whitehall. When the Riegner correspondence was forwarded from Switzerland to London, the response of Richard Law, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was to ask: "What do we know of Mr. Riegner?"³⁴ After pouring over refugee files and consulting with British Zionists, the answer was: nothing. As Gilbert notes, "the Foreign Office drew a blank."³⁵

Owing to such official reservations the Riegner report was not made public. On 17 August the U.S. Minister in Bern, Leland Harrison, was told by Washington that the report also had not been delivered—as requested by Riegner—to World Jewish Congress President Rabbi Stephen Wise. The reason, according to U.S. documents quoted extensively in Gilbert's book, was "the unsubstantiated nature of the information."

The American Consul in Geneva, Paul Squire, bluntly echoed this language in communicating to Riegner a week later. Until "corroboratory information" on the extermination of the Jews was received, Squire told a frustrated Riegner, the State Department was "disinclined to deliver the message in question in view of the apparently unsubstantiated character in the information that forms its main theme."

There was another reason for this disinclination. The report repeated some of the most gruesome atrocity canards of the First World War.³⁶ Some stories retained the discredited charges intact, others dropped certain elements and replaced them with ones which may have had a plausible basis. The result was an incomprehensible hash of fact and fancy.

A typical illustration: Quoting on authority of an "anti-Nazi" German officer attached to German Army Headquarters, Riegner

contended that Nazi factories were rendering Jewish bodies into fertilizer, glue and lubricants. This part of his story was similar to other dreadful tales circulating around Europe at the time—tales whose authors were, of course, anonymous. Recalling the propaganda of the previous war, one British diplomat remarked: "The facts are quite bad enough without the addition of such an old story as the use of bodies for the manufacture of soap."³⁷

Just as the contents of intelligence reports on the Jews' misfortunes were disjointed in *extremis*, so did poorly-sourced news accounts about people like Riegner help to undermine public confidence in them. The content of many stories circulating in Geneva tended, in fact, to make all "extermination" information suspect in the eyes of Allied officialdom. In addition to the "soap and glue" tales, there were even accounts alleging that Hitler sought the elimination of Jews because European food supplies were dwindling.³⁸

Nor did reports from nations bordering on Germany or Poland give credence to charges by Riegner and his fellow messengers of the unthinkable. For example, Eduard Benes, the exiled but well-informed President of Czechoslovakia, wrote to the World Jewish Congress in late 1942 to say that Riegner's claims were false.³⁹ This statesman hardly regarded himself as a friend of the Germans; he was, however, convinced that they had drawn up no plans to murder the Jews.

The Swiss government reacted in a similar vein, declaring (after the poorly-detailed Allied atrocity declaration of 17 December 1942) that such claims were "foreign rumor propaganda of the worst type."⁴⁰ Roswell McClelland found the Swiss view reflected in an October 1942 interview with Heinrich Rothmann, head of the Swiss Federal Police. McClelland says that the extermination charges against Germany were judged patently untrue.⁴¹ This was not the case with various reports of sporadic killings, brutality, and general abuse of Jews and others by German occupation forces. Yet, as disturbing as these reports were to many people, few were prepared to extrapolate the likelihood that the extermination of a race was in the offing.

American and European Jews, too (for emotional, logical, or other reasons) largely dismissed as rumor the tales of massive killing. The connection between the two Jewish communities is important. Contrary to a popular postwar impression, the flow of information from one to the other was far from totally circumscribed.

Information on numerous topics flowed freely between Germany and neighboring Switzerland, transmitted by phone, telegram, postcard, word-of-mouth and other methods. Remarkably, German censors even passed data of intelligence

value from Nazi-occupied areas—including messages about Jewish suffering. Historian Walter Laqueur describes, for example, cards sent from Jews in Europe to relatives in Allied nations. Had fear of imminent death been endemic or palpable, surely this would have been communicated. Had the extermination accounts been accepted by European Jewry in a serious way, concerted efforts to bring them to the attention of Jews everywhere would have been made.

Rather than merely one or two examples of data transmitted by the mails containing, for example, "coded" messages about exterminations to fellow Jews outside Nazi control, one would expect to find hundreds or thousands in Jewish archives. Laqueur knows of only two extant.⁴² This is not to say that other "coded" letters or phone-call transcripts might not exist. They would certainly be considered of immense value to historians and thus publicized, if indeed they were preserved and known.⁴³

The foreign press stationed in Germany also succeeded in passing a great deal more information in their dispatches to "the outside world" than is generally believed. Often these accounts were uncensored, though critical of the Nazi regime. Others from countries occupied by Germany were similarly uncensored for the most part; reporters from neutral powers in these nations sent "a steady stream" of material to their home offices.⁴⁴ On occasion, the foreign press coverage focused on tales of Jewish civilian deaths, sometimes even describing them as the product of extermination. Surely some people believed the tales, Gentiles as well as Jews; most did not.

On 6 June 1943, the secret Polish radio station SWIT was quoted by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency on the subject of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of two months before. Jewish survivors of the fighting, said SWIT, were "deported to an unknown destination." After the war it was learned that the destination was Auschwitz. By 1943 the camp had supposedly become a household word throughout occupied Europe, as the most notorious camp in the Nazi "kingdom of death."⁴⁵

It is thus surprising that the SWIT report did not mention the "destination" in any context suggesting a grisly fate for the ghetto soldiers. Rumors were rife at this time, of course; SWIT broadcasters were no strangers to them. Yet the failure to mention death camps implied that captivity was the Warsaw survivors' lot. Moreover, the World Jewish Congress even omitted mention of the important uprising in the "Resistance" column of its newsletter, *Jewish Comment*, for 11 June 1943.⁴⁶

The fact that this portentous event was overlooked by a major Jewish organization (although covered in some detail by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency on successive days thereafter) amply il-

illustrates the crisis of credibility engendered by mass-murder stories. And it foreshadowed the bitter infighting and recriminations that attend the current debate on Jewish behavior during the war.

The *Judenraete*, or Jewish councils of the occupied towns and cities of Europe, similarly had no inkling of any German plans for the complete physical annihilation of their people. These organizations have been severely lambasted over the years by writers who have found in them "Nazi collaborationists." While this collaboration may in some instances have occurred out of fear for individuals' lives, it is only through the optic of hindsight that the elders of the *Judenraete* are so disparaged. Of the views of such writers as the late Hannah Arendt, National Archives official Robert Wolfe says exasperatedly: "Those poor [*Judenraete*] bastards. It wasn't their idea to exterminate their fellow Jews." He maintains that "hope" led them to believe in resettlement (not extermination), and that the end of the war would save them "from whatever the fate was—resettlement or death; whatever they happened to know or believe."⁴⁷

Clearly, what most of the elders and their flocks knew was less unsettling than the fears they are now criticized for not giving rein to. The councils' actions seem best reflected in examples like the following. In early 1943 the elders of Amsterdam were disturbed at the lack of postcards from two categories of Dutch deportees: the elderly and mothers with children. But the source of their concern was not the one that now leaps quickly to mind, i.e., extermination. The Amsterdam Jewish Council was, rather, angered because the Germans had broken their promise to keep Jewish families united on their journeys to various camps.⁴⁸ There was what has been called "an unbridgeable gulf" between what was ultimately concluded about the fate of the deported Jews, and the remarkable dearth of information as to where this killing was taking place. It bears repeating that the great majority of Jewish officials did not mentally associate trains with gas chambers.⁴⁹

One highly-respected elder, Berlin Rabbi Leo Baeck, reportedly rejected as rumor claims of mass murder eight months into 1943. He had been told of large-scale gassing at Auschwitz by a fellow inmate at Theresienstadt camp, and decided against informing the camp elders' council about it. "... this death was not certain at all," he reasoned. "... There was selection for slave labor; perhaps not all transports went to Auschwitz. So I came to the grave decision to tell no one."⁵⁰ Why Baeck's informant did not then himself communicate this urgent information to everyone, may never be known.

French Jewry apparently refused to believe in the deportation-means-death theory until the end of the war. The increasing

reports of the putative fate of Europe's Jews were generally chalked up to British propaganda; few paid any attention. It was not merely the blasé rejection of the genocide information as propaganda that led the French Jews to their conclusions; its disjointed character made rejection a virtual certainty. And so it went throughout Nazi-occupied Europe. The French, Dutch, Danish, Greek, Hungarian and other Jews behaved in a manner that bespoke disbelief in the fantastic gossip of the time.

The most dramatic evidence—even proof—that the claims were generally dismissed, however, is the simple fact that throughout the war Jews passively boarded the “resettlement” trains. Certainly there were cases of panic, and the odd suicide—but there was little resistance to speak of. Roswell McClelland recalls having a “gut knowledge” that the Jews of France—some of whom he aided after they had fled the war zone in 1940—would be murdered. Yet he confined expressions of his fears to a 10-minute chat with the Vichy President, Pierre Laval. Laval told the American relief worker that he was a victim of “atrocities propaganda”; no such killings were taking place.⁵¹ Granted that Laval was not the most authoritative source, his remarks nevertheless could only have reinforced McClelland's own experience. Resistance by French Jews? “There wasn't any, besides some infrequent hysteria,” he agrees.⁵² Instead, entire Jewish populations of cities, towns and hamlets throughout Europe, numbering in the millions, grudgingly accepted the journey to “labor assignment in the East.”

Jewish organizations in America and in other Allied nations betrayed a similar disinclination to honor the stories emanating from “the old country.” Yes, most people had seen the press reports of the cruelties being inflicted upon the Jews by the Nazis, and yes, the word from relatives under occupation confirmed that conditions for the Jews were harsh. Nonetheless, at no time did American or British Jews mount an all-out, sustained, unified mobilization for rescue or even protest.⁵³ In view of this lack of visible attempts on the part of Jewish leaders themselves, it seems tendentious now to heap blame on British or American statesmen for “complacency.”

The concern over exaggerations was by no means limited to suspicious officials in the U.S. State Department and the British Foreign Office, however. Such was the wide and wild variety of extermination stories from occupied Europe that even the Zionist press often warned against “padding” them. Thus, while the organ of the World Zionist movement, *Ha'olem*, published up to June 1942 no news concerning Nazi massacres, it did contain a feature by a Polish Jewish leader claiming that the propaganda uses of Jewish suffering had been discovered and the truth “actually exaggerated two-fold and more.” (This, and the following

citations quoting Jewish newspapers *Ha'olem*, *Davar*, and *Hatzofe* are from Laqueur, *The Terrible Secret*, pp. 184-85.)

Another Hebrew-language newspaper, *Davar*, cautioned all of its reporters (and readers) that great care should be taken in evaluating tales of, for example, soldiers returning from the front. Some people had accepted claims in the Soviet Army tabloid, *Red Star*, that most of those killed by the Germans at Babi Yar (Kiev) were Jews. Laqueur writes that *Davar* admonished readers not to accept such reports because the Soviet paper had not adequately supported its claims.

Even the information from Warsaw Ghetto leader Schmuel Zygelboim (whose report constituted key evidence of extermination after the war) was discredited when it appeared. Another Hebrew paper, *Hatzofe*, commented about Zygelboim: "The irresponsible informants . . . absorb every rumor, they desperately look for every piece of bad news, every enormous figure and present it in a way that makes the blood curdle in one's veins." This organ scolded careless correspondents and informants, comparing their inaccurate stories to those about the Palestine riots of 1936-39. These, the paper recalled, "were spread all over the world and . . . were so much exaggerated." (In the earlier case, Zionist press accounts dealt falsely with the degree of Arab violence towards the increasing numbers of Jewish refugees in Palestine.)⁵⁴

Perhaps more than any single document, the detailed physical description of Auschwitz given in the *War Refugee Board [WRB] Report* convinced some that the rumors of extermination were based on fact. The information, carried by two young Slovakian Jewish escapees from Auschwitz, was published by the U.S. War Refugee Board in November 1944. The late date is significant for the purposes of this study. The Roosevelt administration, reacting to the two Slovakian Jews' report as it had to earlier data alleging a Nazi extermination campaign, "sat on" the Auschwitz news for four months before authorizing the WRB to release it.⁵⁵

Again the believability issue had surfaced. While more detailed than previous questionable reports, this one by escapees Alfred Wetzler and Rudolf Vrba contained similar data. One element, however, distinguished it: for the first time Auschwitz was mentioned primarily as an "extermination camp." The introduction of this new term—new at least in connection with "genocide"—probably undergirded the widespread suspicions among Allied leaders. When the Auschwitz claims reached Washington via OSS London representative Arthur Goldberg, officials at the State Department remained unimpressed. Remember, one said privately: ". . . stuff like this has been coming out of Bern since 1942 . . . this is a Jew telling about other Jews."⁵⁶

Although some Jews may have begun to accept the claims by this time (having read similar material in the past), Jewish organizations in Hungary apparently steadfastly rejected them. Instead of a dramatic rescue plan for Jewish camp inmates, a laborious barter arrangement was established. Gilbert describes in some detail the talks between SS-*Standartenfuehrer* Adolf Eichmann and Hungarian Zionist authorities, in which Eichmann offered Jews their freedom in exchange for food, trucks and other commodities needed by the struggling German military.⁵⁷

As impressive a document as the Vrba/Wetzler report is supposed to have been, the desperate warnings it contained about the endangered Hungarian Jews were somehow shunted aside in favor of an inherently time-consuming approach. To this day, Vrba is said to be convinced that had the facts brought to Bratislava been circulated immediately throughout Hungary, many of the 450,000 Jews scheduled for deportation would have resisted, evaded or otherwise obstructed their transfer to concentration camps. As it happened, the two young Jewish messengers sparked the same lukewarm response as had Gerhard Riegner.

Some people, however, still do not accept the logical notion that masses of panicked Jews in the middle of a war could have wrought havoc among the Nazi authorities. Among these are former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, National Archives curator Robert Wolfe, and Holocaust scholar David Weinberg. The first two argue that any resistance to the Germans would have been futile, and that the Jews were conscious of their fate.

Weinberg (a member of an interdisciplinary Holocaust research team) agrees that awareness of impending doom was widespread among the deportees, but he describes a kind of "moral resistance." It was "not necessarily a passive acceptance" that the trains' occupants expressed, says Weinberg, but "a pattern of resistance that manifested itself in a commitment to Jewish identity and a will to survive as witnesses to Nazi brutality." This explanation is untenable, however, if only because of the emphatically "survivalist" mentality evolved in the Jews through centuries of bitter experience. How Weinberg expected the doomed Jews to have "survived as witnesses"—if they believed they were to die—is nowhere explained in his writings about the behavior of Jewish prisoners.⁵⁸

One final report on the Jews' response to information about mass killings deserves examination. It is one which, considering its background and sponsors, seems surprisingly to have been quoted only rarely in the post-war period. *The Displacement of Population in Europe*, published in late 1943 by the International Labor Office in Montreal, contains heavily annotated data on the

far-ranging movements of civilians during the war. But despite having been prepared and sanctioned by an impressive coalition of Jewish organizations, the Red Cross, and others concerned with refugee work, *Displacement* echoes the Nazi line on deportation.⁵⁹ The rule, this 100-page document found, was that following concentration in ghettos, European Jews (along with other civilians) were transferred from their homes to make room for "repatriated Germans."

"At the same time, however," the report continues, "another factor, perceptible since the end of 1940 and now assuming growing importance, is strongly operating in a contradictory direction—namely, the needs of the German war economy. As a result, Germany's Jewish policy may be described as a compromise between the extermination of the Jews and their utilization in the war economy." It is difficult to understand whether the term "extermination" in this context refers to physical murder, or to the elimination of all vestiges of Jewish unity and cultural heritage.⁶⁰ But because the report proceeds at length concerning the manner in which Jews were being forced to labor for Germany (and only rarely refers to "extermination" in other contexts) it seems clear that many Jewish organizations accepted the Nazis' explanation of the word "deportation." In addition to the surprising and conspicuous absence from the population report of the "extermination camp" category from its list of labor and other camps, there is the interesting observation that Jews were "permitted to return home" following a day's work.⁶¹

There is, certainly, a complicated matrix of elements involved in the attitudes of the Allied governments accused of failure to destroy the Nazi "extermination" camps. Some relate to concerns that heavy rescue efforts on behalf of Jews would be construed as preferential treatment for their Jewish civilians by nations seeking help from the major powers. A related issue was apparently the belief that responding to the sporadic pressures from Jewish leaders would make the conflict appear to be a "Jewish war," causing latent anti-Semitism to rise in the U.S. and Britain and playing into the hands of Nazi propagandists. Another element involves the wisdom of diverting military resources for humanitarian purposes.

But such concerns—now the subjects of many books and articles—are dependent upon, and rightly subordinated to, the question of what was known *factually*, and believed, about Nazi atrocities. Highly-charged debate over questions like the Allied failure to bomb Auschwitz becomes moot when viewed in light of the absence of evidence supporting allegations of mass murder.

Whether or not greater rescue efforts by the Allies or Western Jewish groups could have prevented Jewish deaths is highly

speculative. What is far clearer and, I believe, amply demonstrated by the foregoing, is that neither the Allied powers nor world Jewry had adequate knowledge from which convincingly to argue a case that the extermination of the Jews was occurring.

The "bottom line," perhaps, is this: with the Goldberg Commission (to investigate Jewish behavior during the war) now —Summer 1984—aswirl in charge and countercharge—accusations about who helped and who did not, who had the resources and who did not, who "knew" about the atrocities and kept silent, and so on *ad infinitum*—it is unjust for the seemingly growing numbers of Jewish leaders now to accuse the Allied governments of indifference. What appears to be taking place is a dangerous scapegoating, aided by an entirely misplaced and inappropriate guilt among those Gentile leaders who associate with this school of thought. Among these are President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President George Bush, and other government officials endorsing the goals of the semi-official "President's Commission on the Holocaust."

Because the fruit of the Commission's work will be the opening of a "Holocaust Museum" in Washington, in which Allied "indifference" will reportedly be highlighted, the *Mea culpas* of present-day administration figures have the effect of aligning them with only one (albeit the loudest) faction in a dispute that has yet to be resolved.

It is hoped that this study may help to illuminate those darker corners of the dispute that some have preferred to shun.

Notes

Full References for Sources Cited in the Notes Are Given in the Bibliography

1. *Washington Post* (19 May 1983), p. B1. Columnist Richard Cohen called "a disgrace" the conferring of an honorary degree by Harvard University upon John McCloy (Assistant Secretary of War under Franklin Roosevelt). Cohen, like other writers of late, finds fault with the decision by the Allies not to bomb Auschwitz. McCloy himself has said that the decision was not his to make. The *Washington Times* of 8 April 1983 (p. 2-B) quotes the President of the Gathering of Jewish Holocaust Survivors: "Why wasn't the world telling what was happening to [European Jews]? . . . These are the questions, not why did we go like sheep." In *Hitler's Death Camps: The Sanity of Madness*, historian Konnilyn Feig cites the "extensive topographical information" in the aerial photos of Auschwitz in 1978 as proof that the Allies "knew" what was occurring there; in

an interview with this writer Arthur Goldberg claimed bluntly that "the Allied governments . . . did not exercise . . . these powers . . . of deterrence . . . to the fullest. This is to their everlasting shame." Yet Goldberg (with the OSS Labor Section in London during the war, and currently Chairman of the American Jewish Commission on the Holocaust) concedes that "there was great difficulty . . . to accept what was going on." One reason cited: the Belgian-babies-being-eaten-by-the-Germans falsehoods of the First World War.

2. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Record Group RG 226, National Archives and Records Service, Washington D.C. Document Number 81854-C, June 13, 1944.
3. *Ibid.*, Doc. 61701, September 27, 1944.
4. *Ibid.*, Doc. 80227, June 1, 1944.
5. *Ibid.*, Doc. 56166, January 8, 1944.
6. *Ibid.*, Doc. 66059, August 12, 1943.
7. *Ibid.*, Doc. 67231, April 13, 1944.
8. Walter Laqueur, *The Terrible Secret: Suppression of the Truth About Hitler's Final Solution*, p. 82. The soap story was very reminiscent of stories which surfaced in the previous conflict, and was equally suspect in the minds of the (by-then) somewhat more sophisticated public in America and abroad. In the "war to end all war," it was recalled, Germany—so it had been said by Allied propagandists—established "corpse factories" for rendering civilians into various lubricants, glue, and so forth. The ever-popular soap allegation was freely repeated at Washington's 1983 gathering of Holocaust survivors from around the world.
9. Erich Kern, *Meineid Gegen Deutschland*, p. 152-63.
10. Dino A. Brugioni and Robert Poirier, *The Holocaust Revisited: A Retrospective Analysis of the Auschwitz/Birkenau Extermination Complex*.
11. Konnilyn G. Feig, *Hitler's Death Camps: The Sanity of Madness*, p. 368.
12. See Gilbert, generally, and press conference cited below.
13. Press conference, National Archives, Washington, D.C., 23 February 1979.
14. *Ibid.*, and author's interview with Robert Wolfe, April 1983, on the intelligence value of the photos: "That was 1978, and nobody had ever looked at those things since the war. And when they looked at them during the war . . . they had no idea that Birkenau was a murder mill. . . . How good was the [information on extermination] being evaluated? After all, it was coming from behind enemy lines."
15. Brugioni and Poirier, p. 11
16. *Ibid.*, note p. 11.
17. Otto Friedrich, "The Kingdom of Auschwitz," *Atlantic* (September 1981), p. 54.
18. Author's interview with Robert Wolfe.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Author's interview with Edward T. Chase, May 1983. Chase said that four factors "conspired to ruin" the Jews' case for sparking

Allied rescue and bombing efforts: 1) Roosevelt's "lack of imagination"; 2) "the degree of divisiveness and hostility among the American Jewish groups themselves . . . and between upper-class German Jews and the Russian and lower-class Jews," which was "immense"; 3) the [related] impatience this squabbling caused among the non-Jews and State Department and other officials, who "wondered who the hell they were going to deal with"; and 4) the question of "what's true, what's false about the extermination stories."

21. Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies*, p. 5. Cave Brown also makes an interesting observation on the uses by modern nations in wartime of what is generally termed "black propaganda." Quoting Sir Garnet Wolseley, former Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, in his 1869 *Soldier's Handbook*: "We are brought up to feel it a disgrace ever to succeed by falsehood . . . that honesty is the best policy. . . . These pretty little sentiments do well for a child's copybook, but a man who acts on them had better be prepared to sheathe his sword forever." The Allies in both world wars certainly did heed these words on occasion, fabricating some data about Nazi atrocities to discredit the Germans and to encourage greater efforts against the "barbaric enemy." Such propaganda has become a standard fixture of modern warfare, on all sides.
22. "British Intelligence and the Holocaust," *Baltimore Jewish Week* (15 April 1983), "News" section, p. 30, quoting F.H. Hinsley, et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*.
23. Joseph Persico, *Piercing the Reich*, p. xi
24. Richard Dunlop, "The Wartime OSS," *American Legion* (June 1984), p. 15.
25. In *The Terrible Secret* (p. 86), Laqueur claims that "studies about what, if anything, was produced at Auschwitz . . . were probably undertaken [by Allied intelligence], but they have not been declassified." While it is true that some records remain classified—involving as they do intelligence sources and methods—a large body of material on Auschwitz industries has been, or is in the process of being, declassified. See, for example, OSS RG 226 at the Modern Military Branch of the National Archives, and archivist John Taylor. Some 36 sub-camps at Auschwitz produced goods for the German war machine as diverse as cement and electrical fuses.
26. Author's interview with Professor Allen Kraut, May 1983. Kraut is co-author of a work-in-progress entitled *American Refugee Policy, 1933-1945*.
27. *Ibid.*, and Laqueur, p. 85. Laqueur makes the valuable observation that highly-classified Nazi *Sicherheitsdienst* (SS Security Service or "SD") codes could be read in London by late 1941, thanks to British Intelligence's acquisition of a German ENIGMA coding machine. Although much in the ENIGMA files remains classified, what is presently known (from Anthony Cave Brown and others) makes patently evident that even in the covert communications of those German agencies most often associated with extermination of the Jews, the subject of Jewish killings rarely arises.

28. Author's interview with Roswell McClelland, April 1983. McClelland acted as the WRP representative in Switzerland from 1942 on. From 1940 until that time he and his Quaker wife travelled through unoccupied France aiding war refugees.
29. *Ibid.* Laqueur (p. 99) says that OSS spy-master Allen Dulles was "profoundly shocked" at the report of the two Auschwitz escapees in 1944, saying: "one has to do something immediately." What Laqueur fails to explain is why Dulles should have expressed surprise at the information, considering that he occupied the best listening post in Europe, had an efficient and elaborate agent network which extended across Europe, and regularly received vital intelligence from such high-ranking anti-Nazi German leaders as Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (head of the *Abwehr*, or military intelligence). Laqueur suspects that such professionals as Dulles may have inhabited a twilight zone "between knowing and not knowing" the truth about the Holocaust, or knew "and kept their knowledge to themselves." Dulles, whether or not his "shock" was genuine (it may more likely have been affected for the benefit of the British newsman who brought him the Auschwitz report), confined his only known reaction to writing a cable to the State Department the next day.
30. A selection of items from the *New York Times* from 1943 reflects the low order of priority assigned to charges of extermination by America's "newspaper of record"—despite the magnitude of the charges. Note the page numbers: 14 February, p. 37: "Mass executions of Jews in Poland on an accelerated tempo was reported by [European Jewish leaders]. . . . In one place 6000 Jews are killed daily, according to reports"; 16 February, p. 7: "All the aged and feeble [from Czystachowa, Poland] were sent to Rawa-Russka, in Galicia, for execution by the Nazis, sources inside Poland said"; 10 March, p. 10: "40 thousand persons listened and watched . . . last night to two performances of 'We Shall Never Die,' a dramatic mass memorial to the two million Jews killed in Europe. . . . The narrator said, 'There will be no more Jews left in Europe for representation when peace comes. The four million left to be killed are being killed, according to plan'"; 20 April, p. 11: "Two million Jews have been wiped out since the Nazis began their march through Europe in 1939 and five million more are in immediate danger of execution. . . . The report said lethal gas and shooting are among the methods being used to exterminate the Jews."
31. Josiah E. DuBois, Jr. *The Devil's Chemists*, pp. 184, 188.
32. "The Nazi Secret No One Believed," *Washington Post* (5 February 1983), pp. C-1, C-4.
33. Arthur B. Morse, *While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathy*, p. 57. Riegner's telegram read: "Received alarming report stating that, in Fuehrer's headquarter, a plan has been discussed and is under consideration, according to which all Jews . . . numbering 3½ million to 4 million should be . . . at one blow exterminated. . . . Action reported planned for autumn. Methods under discussion include prussic acid."
34. *Washington Post* (5 February 1983), p. C-4

35. Gilbert, pp. 57-59.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 57, and Morse, p. 4
37. Laqueur, p. 82, quoting Frank Roberts, Central Department official in the British Foreign Ministry.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 98. Also expressing an incredulity that seemed widespread was the U.S. Ambassador to Sweden, Hershel Johnson. Johnson had heard a story from a "German eyewitness" about a document alleging that of 450,000 Jews in Warsaw only 50,000 remained. Although he sent the report on to his superiors in Washington in April 1943, he noted that "so fantastic is the story . . . that I hesitate to make it the subject of an official report." Bernard Wasserstein, in *Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1945*, pp. 295-96, delves into very similar attitudes of British government officials toward the reports. He quotes a member of the Propaganda Directorate who said after the war that "Exaggeration, excitement, threats and extravagance in all forms were avoided." Concerning the Foreign Office's consideration of further declarations against German mass killings of Jews and others, similar to a previous declaration of December 1942 (in which Jews were not singled out as victims), Wasserstein explains that "officials agreed that evidence for the use of gas chambers was untrustworthy and inconclusive." The Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, moreover, commented irritably: "The Poles, and to a far greater extent the Jews, tend to exaggerate German atrocities in order to stoke us up."
39. Laqueur, pp. 162-64.
40. Yehuda Bauer, *American Jewry and the Holocaust*, p. 229.
41. Author's interview with Roswell McClelland, April 1983.
42. Laqueur, pp. 130-31.
43. Gilbert, p. 340. Between May 1942 and June 1944, Gilbert notes, almost none of the messages reaching the West referred to Auschwitz as the destination of Jewish deportees or as a killing center. "Nor had Auschwitz made any impression on those who were building what they believed to be an increasingly comprehensive picture of the fate of the Jews." Bauer (note p. 325) and Gilbert (p. 121) both indicate that Jewish records confirm what is suggested by the postcards cited by Laqueur. Jewish organizations in Europe were "diligent record-keepers," yet despite what Bauer says is a good amount of documentation that survived the war, there is "an absence of vital [i.e., extermination-related] subjects from the records." Gerhard Riegner, whose report from the anonymous German industrialist made believers of some (since the man supposedly had access to the killing chemicals), strangely mentioned only "eastern camps" in his reports. Had his informant truly been aware of any "secret talks" at Hitler's headquarters—or actually attended them, as Riegner claims—surely Auschwitz would have received high priority. Further straining the credibility of such stories is the fact, noted by Laqueur, for example (pp. 22-25), that notwithstanding Auschwitz's top-secret status, any serious suspicions would have spread quickly. This, he says, is because "Auschwitz inmates were dispersed all over Silesia, and . . . met with thousands of people. Hundreds of civilian employees worked at Auschwitz, and

journalists travelled regularly in the Government-General (Poland) and were bound to hear." Obviously, what was heard was written off as propaganda or gross exaggeration.

44. Laqueur, p. 215.
45. *Jewish Week*, Washington, D.C. (7-13 April 1983), p. 10.
46. *Ibid.*
47. Author's interview with Robert Wolfe, April 1983.
48. Gilbert, p. 121.
49. If the Jews in close proximity to the Germans failed to appreciate an ominous "deportation-equals-extermination" formulation, the Allied leadership thousands of miles away can hardly be faulted for not seeing the connection.
50. Laqueur, p. 148; Bauer, pp. 56, 58. Bolstering Leo Baeck's essentially "upbeat" view is the fact that there were many deportations from Theresienstadt; apparently no credible information existed there to alter the venerated rabbi's position.
51. Author's interview with Roswell McClelland, April 1983.
52. *Ibid.*
53. Gilbert, p. 5.
54. Laqueur, pp. 184-85.
55. Allied officials can only have wondered why they did not hear earlier about the "extermination" activities of Auschwitz. My own conclusions are manifest.
56. DuBois, pp. 184-88.
57. Gilbert, pp. 204-05.
58. David Weinberg, "The Holocaust in Historical Perspective," in Byron L. Sherwin and Susan G. Ament (eds.), *Encountering the Holocaust: An Interdisciplinary Survey*, pp. 61-62. After speaking of the "heroic resistance" in the Treblinka concentration camp and the Warsaw Ghetto, Weinberg concedes that "the overwhelming majority of Jews did not actively resist their slaughter." That is presumably because "it was impossible for a powerless and unarmed people to mount an effective defense against the most powerful military and political force in Europe." Aside from the fact that Jews were not entirely "unarmed" (and, with stolen and airdropped arms, engaged the Germans in battle much as the Afghan "freedom fighters" do against the Soviets today), Weinberg's logic is open to question. If the annihilation of Europe's Jews was the certainty that he sees 40 years later, uprisings like the one in Warsaw should have attained a far greater fury and been more numerous than they were. Jews have no lesser instinctive desire to live than do other peoples. The scale of their resistance actions against the Germans occurred in direct proportion to their fears.
59. Eugene M. Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population in Europe*. A partial list of contributors to the report: The American Joint Distribution Committee, the American National Red Cross, the American Jewish Committee Research Institute, the Institute of Jewish Affairs, the Board of Economic Warfare (Washington, D.C.), the Central and Eastern European Planning Board (New York), the Office of Population Research (Princeton University).

60. Bernard Wasserstein, "Jewish Silence," *Midstream* (August-September 1980), p. 13. Wasserstein quotes Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann in a May 1940 letter to aide Meyer Weisgal: "European Jewry, with very few exceptions, has been practically blotted out." The fact that the term "blotted out" is as strongly connotative of physical murder as "extermination" illustrates the problems that arise from rhetorical license and faulty translation. Few, certainly, would argue that most German Jews before or during the early period of the war—to say nothing of Jews in Eastern Europe—were overcome with a foreboding that tragedy would befall them several years later. Weizmann's declaration is, therefore, both inflammatory and grossly misleading. In 1940, the European Jewish community was intact and its members quite alive.
61. Kulischer, pp. 109-110.

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American Policy Toward Europe: The Fateful Change

NOTES ON THE LEGACY OF
WOODROW WILSON AND FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT

KARL OTTO BRAUN

Following the final defeat of Napoleonic France, the leaders of Europe gathered for the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to reorganize the war-torn continent. European recovery from the consequences of Napoleon's downfall was considerably aided by the decent and magnanimous treatment of defeated France by the victorious powers. Henry Kissinger aptly entitled his study of the Congress of Vienna *A World Restored*.¹

In contrast, the leaders of the victorious coalition that defeated Germany in 1945 imposed a virtual Carthaginian peace upon the vanquished nation. Germany and Europe itself was split into two hostile camps: American-style democracy was imposed in the West and Soviet-style socialism was established in the East. The peace settlement of 1945 prevented European recovery from the consequences of Hitler's downfall. Princeton professor Martin Sherwin gave his scholarly study of the consequences of the Second World War the appropriate title *A World Destroyed*.²

Hitler's primary aim in the Second World War was the eradication of the world threat of Soviet Bolshevism. By halting General Eisenhower, Roosevelt enabled Stalin to conquer Berlin and thus establish an Asian presence in the middle of Europe. When Roosevelt and Churchill met off Newfoundland in August 1941 to plan their common war strategy, they sang "Onward Christian Soldiers" before the cameras. Their exhortation later became, in

practice, support for the anti-Christian Red Army in its subjugation of half of Europe. In 1945 the German commander invited U.S. General George Patton to seize Prague, but Patton's superior, General Eisenhower, forbade it.

The peace established in 1945 by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin laid the foundation for a long-term conflict which has regularly broken out in crisis: the West Berlin blockade of 1948, the East Berlin uprising of 1953, the Budapest uprising of 1956, the Prague uprising of 1968, and the recent worker's uprising in Poland, a country sacrificed by Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin's rule. No less than ten countries found themselves under Moscow's rule in 1945, an ominous development with foreboding for the future of Western civilization as a whole. It is not surprising that after nearly forty years, there is still no peace treaty between defeated Germany and the victorious powers. Instead, Germany and Europe remain divided, plagued with turmoil and facing the threat of annihilation in a new war. Historical failures of this magnitude have always had a deep and lasting impact.

In his 1961 historical study, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin*, diplomat and historian George F. Kennan wrote:

The pattern of the events that led the Western world to new disaster in 1939 was laid down in its entirety by the Allied governments in 1918 and 1919. What we shall have to observe from here on in the relations between Russia, Germany, and the West follows a logic as inexorable as that of any Greek tragedy . . .

In 1917, the Western powers, in their determination to inflict total defeat on a Germany far less dangerous to them than that of Hitler, had pressed so unwisely for the continuation of Russia's help that they had consigned her to the arms of the Communists. Now, in 1939, they were paying the price for this folly.

The First World War, Kennan has correctly noted, was "the great seminal catastrophe of this century, excepting only perhaps the discovery of nuclear weaponry."³

The career of William C. Bullitt, whom Roosevelt appointed as America's first ambassador to the Soviet Union, strikingly exemplifies the contradictory nature of U.S. policy toward the Kremlin over the years.

President Wilson's close advisor and alter ego, Colonel Edward M. House, encouraged young Bullitt to visit the fledgling, civil war-racked Soviet state and its leader, Lenin, in 1919. Bullitt returned to the Versailles conference with a sensational proposal from the Bolshevik government. In return for an immediate cease fire on all fronts, an end to the Allied blockade, establishment of normal relations, and Soviet access to the railways and ports of the former Russian empire, the Soviets would agree to accept the loss of all territories then under *de facto* non-Soviet control.

Bolshevik rule would be confined to central Russia (including Moscow and Petrograd), while relinquishing Finland, Murmansk-Archangel, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, western Byelorussia, Bessarabia, western Ukraine, Crimea, Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the whole of the Urals and Siberia.⁴ Wilson tabled this unique offer until it expired on 10 April 1919. Sigmund Freud, who co-authored a psychological biography of Wilson with Bullitt, considered this "the most important single decision that he [Wilson] made in Paris."⁵

This fumbled opportunity deeply disappointed Bullitt, and he resigned from the foreign service. In his resignation letter to Wilson of 17 May 1919, Bullitt denounced the Versailles Treaty which the Allies had imposed on defeated Germany as unjust and prophesied that the unresolved issues of Danzig and (detached) East Prussia would "make new international conflicts certain."⁶ In his youthful idealism, Bullitt did not foresee that one day, as Roosevelt's ambassador to France in 1938-39, he himself would energetically promote uncompromising Polish opposition to any revision of the Versailles settlement. Twenty years later Bullitt helped to implement his own fateful prophecy! This was the first great historical irony of Bullitt's life.

In the 1930s it was trendy for American intellectuals to idealize the Bolshevik revolution and the new Soviet regime, although the Red reign of terror had already claimed many times more victims than the guillotines of the French revolution. Bullitt shared that fashionable enthusiasm. He married Louise Bryant Reed, widow of American Communist leader John Reed, who had authored the flattering portrait of the Bolshevik revolution, *Ten Days that Shook the World*.

Roosevelt called Bullitt back to the diplomatic service in 1933 and appropriately sent him to Moscow as America's first envoy to the USSR. When he arrived, he laid a wreath at the tomb of John Reed by the Kremlin wall. He was honored by the Soviet dictator in extraordinary fashion: "Stalin took my head in his two hands and gave me a large kiss! I swallowed my astonishment and when he turned up his face for a return kiss, I delivered it."⁷ But Bullitt's sincere enthusiasm for the Soviet regime "ended in frustration."⁸ The Ambassador's confidential dispatches to the President on the terror of the Soviet Commissars became as critical as the articles appearing in German newspapers of the time. His reports to Washington echoed the speeches of German propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels. He thus became an obstacle for Roosevelt, who sought friendship with Stalin. Bullitt was transferred to Paris in 1936.

After America and the Soviet Union became allies in the Second World War, the latent friction between Bullitt and Roosevelt sur-

faced and finally led to a complete break between them. (The break was hastened by Bullitt's circulation of stories about the sexual peccadillos of a rival and Roosevelt favorite, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles. For this Roosevelt never forgave him.) According to Kennan, in early 1943 "Bullitt predicted with startling accuracy the situation to which the war would lead. . . . He urged the President to use the great influence he still had with a view to bringing Stalin to a specific renunciation of all conquests and annexation in Europe." Bullitt was "remarkably prophetic on what would happen in Europe, if the Russians were allowed to reach Berlin."⁹ He told Roosevelt: "This is not the old British policy of the Balance of Power in Europe, but a new one of the Balance of Impotence . . ."¹⁰ His brother Orville remarked: "In retrospect it would appear that had Bullitt accompanied Roosevelt and later Truman, the meetings with Stalin might have been on a more realistic basis and might have saved the world untold misery."¹¹ But Roosevelt remained totally deaf to Bullitt's many realistic warnings. This was the second great historical irony of Bullitt's life.

Bullitt left a valuable book to posterity. Together with the renowned Sigmund Freud he wrote a fascinating psychological study of President Wilson.¹² This analysis of Wilson's character was so devastating that its publication had to be postponed until 1967, following the death of Wilson's widow. Bullitt and Freud explain that Wilson was psychologically *unable* properly to carry out his duties at the Versailles Peace Conference. On 8 April 1919 he even suffered what Bullitt and Freud called a "moral collapse" in relinquishing his highly touted "Fourteen Points" peace plan on the promises of which Germany had laid down its arms.¹³

The German Social Democratic party had welcomed returning German soldiers to the homeland in 1918 with the words: "Welcome back, brave soldiers. God and Wilson will help us from now on." By abandoning his peace pledges, Wilson squandered his enormous popularity in Germany and paved the way for the sham peace which, in Kennan's words, was "forced upon the loser" and "had to be accepted in humiliation under duress."¹⁴ Versailles gave birth to Hitler, just as the Polish "Solidarity" movement is the child of Yalta.

Yet another irony of history is the fact that at a second crucial international conference after a world war, an American president was physically incapable of fully understanding the awesome issues which were decided and which affect us still today. President Roosevelt was a visibly dying man. Churchill's personal physician, Lord Moran, noted in his diary at Yalta on 9 February 1945: "Everyone was shocked by his [Roosevelt's] appearance and gabbled about it afterwards. The President looked old and thin and drawn. He sat looking straight ahead with his

mouth open, as if he were not taking things in."¹⁵ In his critical study of Roosevelt's foreign policy, Hamilton Fish deals extensively with the great cover-up about the President's mental and physical deterioration in 1944 and 1945. "This tragic deception over the status of his health . . . was one of the most unjustifiable, cruelest and most dangerous of all the political tricks and stratagems ever used to deceive the American people."¹⁶

Fish came to the same devastating conclusion about Roosevelt's health in 1945 as Freud and Bullit had about Wilson's condition in 1919. These are two of the most appalling cases of failure in American leadership during critical periods of world history. In each of its "crusades" in Europe, America failed to reach the "Holy Land" of a world made safe for Democracy! On the contrary, the present "Great Wall of Europe" (or "Iron Curtain") which divides the continent down the middle with barbed wire, explosive mines, baying dogs, and killer guards, is the real legacy of the last crusade. It is the most shameful monument of our age.

In light of all this, one must admit that the voice of the sober historian is often drowned out in the noise of rough power politics. Human passions prevail in history. Both President Wilson and President Roosevelt were imbued with blind hatred. In Wilson's view, the French and British Allies were fighting in September 1915 with their backs to the wall against "wild beasts." Roosevelt, in turn, went so far as to tell the Senate military affairs committee in May 1939 that it would be a good thing if Hitler and Mussolini were to be murdered.¹⁷

In 1943 Roosevelt laid the basis for the destruction of Germany by unexpectedly demanding *unconditional* surrender, thereby surpassing the blunders of the Versailles conference. The destruction of the sovereignty of the German Reich had the effect of unilaterally promoting Soviet expansion. The intense hatred fomented by subversive pressure groups in America changed the course of U.S. foreign policy in a direction detrimental to the nation's welfare. But hatred and vengeance have always been the most awesome tools of politicians.

The crucial turning point in American foreign policy dates from President Wilson's fateful rejection of Washington's admonition in his Farewell Address. George Washington and Thomas Jefferson warned against any U.S. entanglements in European disputes and called for strict neutrality in the Western hemisphere. For Jefferson, England was always the enemy. In 1776, when the thirteen colonies were still ruled from London, Thomas Paine prophetically wrote in *Common Sense*: "It is the true interest of America to steer clear of European contentions, which she can never do, while, by her dependence on Britain she is made the makeweight in the scale of British politics."

Backed by his intimate pro-Marxist advisor, Colonel House, Wilson proclaimed a hazy internationalism as the new foundation of U.S. foreign policy. The adoption of Marxist principles under a smokescreen of liberal rhetoric contributed tremendously to the decline of American national strength. Sixty years later, the full working-out of this progressive decline was made dramatically manifest in the humiliating, chaotic fall of Saigon in April 1975.

In 1913 President Wilson signed the law which established the Federal Reserve system. In contradiction to the U.S. Constitution, *private* enterprise was thereby authorized to print and circulate money, outside of the control of Congress. Under Roosevelt the term of office of the System's governors was extended from seven to fourteen years, thus putting the governing Board's membership beyond the reach of any president. During the debate on the proposed System, Representative Charles Lindbergh, Sr. (father of the famous aviator) warned in February 1912 that "the great special financial interests" of America would use the System to try "to control absolutely by law as well as by environment and manipulation the finances of this country, and eventually, I believe, the markets of the world to form a world trust." The System "would practically put the people of this government and the government itself into a receivership. It would place within the control of a few the means of commercial exchange by the use of which they would control the rest of us to eat out of their hands on such terms as they fixed."¹⁸ After the financial association was established, he wrote: "The Federal Reserve Act panics are scientifically created."¹⁹ With the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, Wall Street finally triumphed over the White House.

In his 1979 study of Bismarck, George Kennan meticulously exposed the way in which international finance began promoting the Franco-Russian military alliance beginning in 1888.²⁰ Later, Wall Street financing of Britain's war program between 1914 and 1917 virtually insured America's eventual entry into the First World War on the British side. In 1939 Britain had still not repaid her war debt of 1918 to the United States and could not dare engage in a new conflagration without assurances of U.S. financial backing from the outset. With crucial help from Henry Morgenthau, head of the U.S. Treasury Department, and from Wall Street banking houses, Britain received the (then) staggering sum of 30.75 billion dollars in Lend-Lease aid during the course of the Second World War. The Soviet Union received aid amounting to 11.4 billion dollars.²¹ These figures prove—better than could a thousand documents—America's prime responsibility for the intensity and duration of the Second World War. The results of the enormous American sacrifices in money, materiel, and lives are utterly disappointing. George Kennan was right when he spoke at

the end of the war of the "wreckage of FDR's policy with relation to Russia and Poland."²²

It was Wilson and, above all, Roosevelt, who were responsible for abandoning an independent, national and American foreign policy. Instead, American interests were twice subordinated to British interests in support of the antiquated British "balance of power" policy in Europe. Americans have been encouraged to forget that it was only after Napoleon's fall that the British occupied Washington and burned the Capitol and White House (in 1814).

George Kennan was filled with "horror and shame" when he suddenly learned in Moscow from British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden of the secret Yalta agreement to "repatriate" all Russian, Cossack, and Ukrainian prisoners held by the Germans. The result was a Soviet-made holocaust. Britain induced America to participate in the crime. Between 1943 and 1947, 2.27 million Soviet citizens—many of whom had fought on the Axis side—were forcibly delivered to Stalin's revenge by the British and Americans.²³

The U.S. government similarly betrayed the traditional hemispheric principles of President Monroe and its Pan-American commitments when it sided with Britain in the recent tragi-comic colonial war over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. (The forcible removal of the Argentine Governor of the Islands by a British military force in 1833 was a clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine proclaimed in 1823.) America's support for (divergent) British interests may drag the United States into the abyss unless financial sovereignty is restored to Congress and the White House. In short, the "Paradise Lost" with Wilson's abandonment of a sovereign foreign policy must be regained.

When this writer was a teenage student in Munich in 1927 he had to write a composition, "Germany, the Heart of Europe." Until 1945, the German Reich was the heart and defender of Europe. The Reich defended Europe against Hungarians, Mongols, and Turks, and enabled Western culture to develop from the Middle Ages onwards. In this century, British envy attacked this continental heart without considering the consequences. America blindly followed the British slogans. America has paid for it. Bismarck once said: "Whoever rules Bohemia is master of Europe." German culture and influence prevailed there for more than 900 years. A German emperor built Prague.

In 1945 German power was crushed. Consistent with the geopolitical principle that power abhors a vacuum, Soviet Russian influence filled the void. The Western-minded Czech Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk was thrown from a Prague window in 1948 as a prelude to complete Soviet rule, another consequence of Roosevelt's lack of geopolitical awareness.

How did America come to war against Germany, the heart of Europe? Could not Roosevelt have acted as a great peacemaker by mediating the Danzig conflict in 1939, instead of instigating the Poles against Germany? Roosevelt knew full well that war between Germany and Poland would mean the end of Poland. Just a week before the outbreak of war, a traitor in the German embassy in Moscow informed the U.S. government that Germany and the Soviet Union had agreed to divide Poland between them.²⁴ Roosevelt knew this but refrained from telling the hapless Poles. Veteran *New York Times* correspondent Harrison Salisbury reports in his memoirs that Roosevelt knew in advance of the German-Soviet pact of August 1939 and could have delayed (or prevented?) war had he leaked this information to the press.²⁵ The American President could very possibly have saved the peace in 1939. Instead, he fed the American people inventions about a hypothetical German plot to take over the United States and the whole world. Of course, a Germany which was incapable of crossing the English Channel to conquer Britain had not the slightest ability (or intention) of conquering America from across the Atlantic ocean. Roosevelt and Truman should have easily realized that Churchill's 1934 dream of finally destroying Germany for all time and subjecting her to a new super-Versailles would end in global chaos.²⁶ Bullitt's prophecy became reality.

After dispatching his declaration of war to Berlin on 4 August 1914, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey said: "The lamps are going out all over Europe. We shall not see them lit again in our lifetime." In his book on Roosevelt, Hamilton Fish commented: "That remark was only partly true then but it does describe the aftermath of World War II. With communism dominating half the world and nuclear missiles threatening us all, the lights are dimmer. An overt act of aggression might unleash a nuclear war that would extinguish lights everywhere."²⁷

Notes

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4. Orville H. Bullitt (ed.) *For the President—Personal and Secret: Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), pp. 5-6; Sigmund Freud and William C. Bullitt, *Thomas Woodrow Wilson, Twenty-Eighth President of the United States* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), p. 253.

5. Freud/Bullitt, pp. 253-54. ("Incidentally, Lenin had also offered to recognize Soviet responsibility for the debts of the Russian Empire." p. 253)
6. *Ibid.*, p. 271.
7. Orville H. Bullitt (ed.), p. 69.
8. *Ibid.*, Introduction by George F. Kennan, p. vi.
9. *Ibid.*, p. xiv.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 583.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 572.
12. See note 4.
13. Freud/Bullitt, pp. 255, 260.
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15. Charles M.W. (Lord) Moran, *Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival 1940-1965* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 234.
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23. Nikolai Tolstoy, *Victims of Yalta* (London: Corgi, 1979), p. 468. See also: Charles Lutton, "Stalin's War: Victims and Accomplices," *Journal of Historical Review* Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 84-94.
24. Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973), pp. 69-87. Confirmed in telegram 465 of 24 August 1939 from Steinhardt in Moscow to Washington.
25. Robert Sherill, review of Harrison Salisbury, *A Journey for Our Times*, in *Washington Post* (29 May 1983), "Book World" section, p. 14.
26. Heinrich Bruening, *Briefe und Gespraechе 1934-1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974), p. 31. See also pp. 29, 206, 211, 220, 223.
27. Fish, p. 178.

On Contemporary History and Historiography

DAVID IRVING

Remarks Delivered at the 1983 International Revisionist Conference

Ladies and Gentlemen, this is my first public speaking engagement in America except, I think, for an after-luncheon speech in Kansas to a Kansas City ladies guild of some kind. This, I think, is because of language problems. I am a master of many languages but the American tongue is one that eludes me. I realized that this was going to be a problem many years ago when my elder brother came to the United States long before the rest of our family. He came here as a stoker—what you would call an engineer—in the *Queen Mary*, which is that battleship parked some way down the coast here, which was still afloat; he came over as a stoker and he came back to London and regaled our family with the stories of how he immigrated into the United States. It was still Ellis Island in those days, and the man in front of him in the immigration line was asked by the immigration officer what his profession was, and this Englishman answered and said “I’m a clock” and the immigration officer said “You’re a what?” and he said “I’m a clock” and the immigration officer said “You’re a what?” and this Englishman repeated “I’m a clock” and the immigration officer said “What do you mean, you’re a clock, you go tick, tock, tick, tock?” The Englishman, of course, was a clerk.

Let me go one stage further and explain the kind of problems we have with words, not just with pronunciation. In the National Archives in Washington, which is my second home—I do a great deal

of work and have many friends there—one of the department heads is a Dr. Wolfe, and I had lunch with him one day and he brought out his wallet and showed me a photograph of his wife and children. Now, I said to him: "Is that Mrs. Wolfe?" and he said "Yes" and I said "She looks very homely." He said "She looks what?" and I said "She looks very homely indeed, your wife," and he said, "Did you say homely?" and I said, "Yes, she looks extremely homely, your wife, I mean, one of the most homely women I've seen all week," and I went through various progressions from one of the most homely women to an exceptionally homely woman to a woman who is so homely that . . . until gradually the penny dropped and I realized that in America "homely" means something different. It is not a compliment.

Now this has a bearing on the books I write. I end up writing books that are presented in a kind of Mid-Atlantic English. For example, in my book *Hitler's War*, there's one dramatic episode after the attack on Hitler's life where he sits on the edge of his bed, after the bomb attempt on his life, and feels his pulse. He's very proud of it, because his pulse is still only ticking away at 72. I describe this about Adolf Hitler sitting on the edge of his bed, in his shirt sleeves and braces, . . . and you've got it. The editor, Stan Hockman, a very distinguished American Jewish editor who said he had nightmares editing my book afterwards, cut out Hitler sitting on the edge of the bed in his shirt sleeves and braces and made it "Hitler sitting on the edge of his bed in his shirt sleeves and suspenders." But in England suspenders are what women hold up their stockings with, you see, so the idea of Hitler sitting on the edge of his bed wearing a garter belt (I think that is what you call it) is, well . . . Once again this book fell to the dictatorship of the editor's knife!

Again, with Ribbentrop: Ribbentrop, I said, had a skeleton in the cupboard. The editor changed it to: Ribbentrop had a skeleton in the closet. Now in England a closet is what you call a john or a bathroom, and the idea of a skeleton in the john—well, that also went out. So, bit by bit, the book was emaciated. The problems of writing in the English language.

I'm sometimes questioned as to why it is that my books always seem to arouse controversy. *Private Eye*, which is a rather scurrilous but deeply revered magazine in England, a lithograph magazine with a circulation of about a quarter of a million (though still managing to maintain a kind of schoolboy look), ran a big exposé of me a couple of years ago in which they suggested that my books are 95% true with 5% consisting of such abominable lies that no one can disprove them.

Now, that is not the secret. But to explain the secret of my success—and I am still successful—let me tell a parable. I had dinner

a few weeks ago with a member of the English aristocracy—Lady Stutterheim, we'll call her. We had dinner and after a while the door opened and a pig came trotting in or rather limping in, as it had a wooden leg. A pig with a wooden leg. I looked at this pig with a wooden leg and I said "It's got a wooden leg," and she said, "Oh, you mean Fido," and I said, "Never mind the name, it's a pig with a wooden leg, how do you explain that?" She said, "Well, if you've got a minute, what happened was this. A couple of years ago my husband and I went out for a drive and we went out in the Land Rover and hit this icy patch and the car skidded, the Land Rover landed on its roof, the doors were buckled in, we couldn't get out, and this pig came trotting 'round with its nose and pressed the button, opened the door and we were able to get out. Saved our lives, that pig has."

"What about the wooden leg?" I repeated. She said, "Wait a minute, Mr. Irving, wait a minute. A year later, in this very house, a room caught fire. I was absolutely petrified, the room caught fire, I couldn't get out, all the windows jammed, door locked, then the pig came 'round to the outside and with his snout, lifted the window, and I was able to get out through the window. Saved my life, first my husband's life, then my life."

So I said, "Lady Stutterheim, you haven't explained to me the wooden leg." And she said, "Mr. Irving, I thought I had made it perfectly plain: if you have a pig as valuable as that you don't eat it all at once!"

Now, there may be some people to whom the idea of eating pork is offensive. If so, I deeply apologize.

The moral of this story is that I have at home, rather like the case of that pig, a filing cabinet full of documents which I *don't issue all at once*. I keep them; I issue them a bit at a time. When I think my name hasn't been in the newspapers for several weeks, well, then I ring them up and I phone them and I say: "What about this one, then?" And that poor old pig has to go limping on two legs. So this is the secret of my success. They aren't lies, what I publish: they are true, at any rate the truth as I perceive it. And thereby hangs a tale, of course, because—what is the truth? Even the most erudite and hard-working historian is never going to obtain one hundred percent truth; he is only going to approximate it, and what militates against that approximation is your desire for the truth, your financial circumstances and above all, whether you've got a publisher who's prepared to publish the truth once you've found it out. Now, I spend a great deal of time and a great deal of money doing research all 'round the world, particularly over here in the United States. I tend to pick subjects which give me a chance to come to California, go up to Stanford, work in the archives of the United States as often as I can. I rather like this country and I think it's a great shame, a great scandal, that we lost it.

In the course of my researches, and because I spread my net very widely with the material that the other historians don't get, I do sometimes come up with material that's a fake, and I'm unhappy about it. Sometimes I get the suspicion that people are deliberately putting fakes in front of me in the hope eventually of tripping me up. There is one gentleman here in California who fed to me three years ago a document which I think is without doubt a fake. A document with which, I think, he hoped I was going to rush into print. It was a document from Himmler to the chief of the concentration camp inspectorate, Oswald Pohl, dated the 23rd of October, 1943, which tended to suggest that my theory was correct. Himmler ostensibly writing to Pohl saying: We mustn't let Martin Bormann come near our concentration camp at Oranienburg because as you know the Degussa operation is running there—that's the German gold and silver company—and as you know, Martin Bormann is very close to the Fuehrer and the Fuehrer has no idea of the way we're interpreting the Final Solution.

My immediate instinct when I first heard of this document was: Eureka! My secondary instinct was still Eureka!, I've got to admit. The tertiary instinct was then to say: this is too good to be true, let's have a look at it. I eventually persuaded the gentleman to let me have a copy of the document which he said was very difficult because the Himmler signature on it was in green crayon. You've got to realize that Ribbentrop, Himmler, and a number of other senior Nazi officials did write their signatures in green crayon, they had various typical characteristics, and so, in fact, this suggested to me that it might be a genuine document. But then when I saw the document I knew it had to be fake. There were too many typing errors in it, spelling errors in German and, above all, the crucial clincher was the date on it. On all the Himmler documents which I had meanwhile assembled in the interim, from the archives of the same week or two of October 1943, you could actually do a typewriter comparison, and on all the Himmler documents the date was always written like this—the year and the month were typed in, and the date, the 23rd in this case, would be written in, in ink by Himmler himself. On the document the gentleman gave me, the whole thing was typed in; it was also the wrong size paper, and the heading was wrong, and so on.

So for some reason that document was a fake, and was fed to me by this man in California. I suspect that possibly he's not a million miles away from our friends at the ADL, the Anti-Defamation League, the people who go around defaming the Antis, which include people like me. I may be wrong, but after a time you realize that you've nearly come a cropper. My instinct initially was immediately to publish the document as gloating, triumphant proof that I was right. Fortunately I didn't; the odd thing is that the

background information the man gave me about how the document came into his possession was all true: I checked it out. He said the document had been de-accessioned by a crooked archivist at West Point; it was one of a batch of documents that had been removed from the files at Nuremberg, he said, because it didn't fit in with the Allied case and instead of destroying this batch of documents the archivists at Nuremberg had then shipped the stuff back to America, and it had ended up at West Point in New York State, the military academy. And an archivist there, a crook, had de-accessioned it (in the language of the document collectors and autograph hunters), and taken it to the autograph-hunting fraternity here in the United States. So I checked up with General Goodpaster, who at the time was commandant of West Point, and he said: Yes, it was true, as your man says, there was an archivist here at West Point who, as your man said, did commit suicide when he was caught stealing documents from the archives. So that part of the story is all true.

I've got in my filing cabinet at home not only collections of genuine documents but a large number of fake documents. Some of you may have seen me in April or May of this year, the time of the Hitler diaries scandal, when these Hitler diaries were first offered to the market by a large number of gullible newspapers: in England, the *Sunday Times*; Germany's *Der Stern*, and some in the United States as well, all these rich and powerful publishing houses. Now I, because of my researching back in October of last year, managed to get hold of about 800 pages of various of those Hitler documents from the same source, I was convinced, as had provided the Hitler diaries to *Der Stern*. I brought along a few pages with me today to show you, that you may see how clumsy the forgeries are. This is a page of the apparent diary of Adolf Hitler, in his handwriting, signed at the bottom and dated 3rd of June 1935. Of course this made my mouth water when I first saw it, because your initial instinct is to believe it must be genuine, you want it to be genuine, because you've got it—I mean, believe me, ladies and gentlemen, all human greed is there when you get documents like this in your hands and you want it to be genuine and all your instincts cry out for it not to be a fake. But then when you start reading the documents a third or fourth time, as I did, well . . . I first rushed them back to England, of course, and I contacted my publisher, Macmillan's, a very famous publishing house, and I said: I've got these Hitler documents and we're going to do a deal this morning; I'll come 'round at 11:00 and we'll sign a contract. And from 9:00 a.m. until 11:00 a.m. I sat at my equipment going through these documents, working out a catalog of them because I wanted to have a catalog or a general overview of the Hitler documents that I thought I'd bought, and by 11:00 a.m. I

was beginning to have an uneasy feeling. I telephoned the editor at Macmillan's, and I said: Listen Alan, it's five to eleven now, let's cancel today's meeting this morning; I'll come 'round at 4:00 instead. He asked what the problem was, and I said: I won't explain now, I'll tell you when I see you at 4:00.

I still wanted them to be genuine, wanted to find explanations. You couldn't at that moment put your finger on the reason why these documents were probably a fake; it was just a bit too pretty. Any of you historians, ladies and gentlemen, who've worked in an archive, will know that you spend a lot of your time wading through garbage: you wade through tons and tons of molding, crumbling, yellowing paper which is completely and totally irrelevant to any subject that you're researching, and you wonder why it's ended up in the archives. But every now and then you come across a nugget. Perhaps one or two nuggets a day, of varying sizes. This Adolf Hitler collection which I found in Munich was *all* nugget. It was all big names, and having dealt with the American autograph-hunting fraternity I know that they are always interested in big names. It isn't the historical content of a document that they like so much as the fact that it's got to be signed by Hermann Goering, addressed to Adolf Hitler, and possibly mention Rudolf Hess in the middle somewhere. So everyone rings up a few more numbers on the till in an autograph. It was this kind of collection. That's what didn't quite ring true. I mean, there was a letter, for example, from Hitler to Martin Bormann mentioning not Rudolf Hess but Rudolf Hoess who later on became the commandant of Auschwitz. But this was a letter dated back in 1922, ostensibly. Well, I thought: that was a strange turn-up for the book, that's a bit of coincidence, a bit of good fortune for the autograph hunters. But by four o' clock that afternoon it was quite plain that the whole collection was fake. I turned up several pages, for example; the most graphic, I think the real clincher, being this one, after the bomb attempt on Hitler's life: Hermann Goering sent out an order to all the German Armed Forces that they had in future to replace the military salute with the German salute, the "Heil Hitler!" with the raised right arm. This is a famous order which everyone knows about, from the 23rd of July 1944. Here is the actual document, signed ostensibly by Hermann Goering, by Doenitz and by Keitel. And at the heading: "Der Reichsmarschall Oberkommando der Luftwaffe." Except that the guy who printed this headed notepaper for Hermann Goering spelled his title wrong. Der Reichsmarschall—if you look at it closely, you'll see that he's left out the "c" in the middle, in the printed heading of Hermann Goering: it should be "Reichsmarschall." Now, I don't know much about Hermann Goering, but I don't think he would put up with that kind of carelessness in his headed notepaper. Of

course, once you've got one spurious document in a collection, then the whole thing begins to stink of rotten fish. And you begin to go back through the collection and there, on the day of the bomb attempt on Hitler's life, he sends a pathetic letter to Eva Braun apparently telling her that he's OK and that he's torn his trouser leg a bit and he's just waiting for Martin Bormann. Here's the letter, and I think the letter heading was probably done by a printer on Sunset Boulevard, by the look of the print style. You'll see the letterhead in there, "Adolf Hitler"; I think, yes, a Sunset Boulevard printer for one of the young ladies on the street who would have turned out a promising starlet. I think the Fuehrer, the head of the great German Reich, would have chosen something more gothic by way of a type style.

So you get these fakes thrust at you from every side. But part of the joy of being a writer, and being an *independent* historian, is that you've got an open mind. Only yesterday I had the very great pleasure of listening to Dr. James J. Martin talking about Francis Neilsen, about Neilsen's writings. The name rang a bell and I went through my papers back in the hotel, and I see that one of the things I've instructed myself to look for in the Library of Congress is a book, mentioned in a letter from Charles Douglas Home who wrote to me, oh, four years ago (that's how long it takes to follow these things up) saying that as far as Churchill goes—I'm writing a book about Winston Churchill now, that'll please you, but rather scandalize his family to hear—I have just been reading some interesting comments on him in Allen Brook's diaries which no doubt you have seen, and I imagine you have also read Neilsen's book which a friend of mine told me about the other day. Now, Charles Douglas Home is a very respected English historian and it shows that even though that book by Neilsen on Churchill was printed by himself at his own expense and published I think in 500 or 1,000 copies, according to what Dr. Martin told us yesterday, it nevertheless begins to seep through. It's had its impact. A friend has told this man about a book by a chap called Neilsen which apparently gives all the lowdown on Churchill; he says this friend also interested in Churchill says there's some unexplained material about the large loans Churchill received from various financiers.

Well, that's a particular aspect I'm following up on the life of Winston Churchill. I'm very interested to know how he financed himself in the ten years that he was in the wilderness. We're beginning to get some clues; we know that *his clique was very heavily in the pay of the Czechoslovakian president, Dr. Benes*. I know this because the telephone conversations concerning this ran across German territory and the Germans—the Nazis, as we know, were very wicked people—weren't above listening to other people's

telephone conversations, and Adolf Hitler was so shocked to find out what Benes was doing that he had a complete set of transcripts made of the telephone conversations between Benes in Prague and Jan Masaryk, the ambassador in London. In fact, Hitler at the time of the Munich crisis made a present of all these transcripts to the British Ambassador in Berlin! And if you look in the British Public Records Office, you can actually find these transcripts there, printed on the familiar brown paper of the Forschungsamt, which was Goering's telephone wire tapping agency. You see the brown paper and you see the initials "FA" occasionally scattered through the transcripts; you know who did it, you know what it is, you know what these are transcripts of, all the evidence is in there. You have great fun finding documents like this, you never know when first finding the documents what you've turned up. About four years ago, when I was half-way through writing the Winston Churchill project, I paid five thousand pounds, which was a large sum of money in those days (about seven, eight thousand dollars), for a set of appointment cards which Churchill kept on his desk, thinking: you never know when it will come in handy. Admittedly, I didn't buy them from the person who offered them to me; he wanted to sell them to me but I said: They're hot aren't they?, because obviously there's no way these would be outside the Churchill family archives—they're Churchill's diaries, his desk diary throughout the entire war period. And I happened to know that this young man's father had been Churchill's security chief and the father had obviously lifted them off Churchill's desk or had actually stolen them at the end of the war and had taken them home. A long legal battle was fought, in fact, between the Churchill family and this young man, but the Churchill family couldn't establish that they had title to these appointment cards. But he couldn't sell them, they were in a kind of limbo and I wasn't going to buy them and face them being confiscated by the Churchill family and so on. So I rented them from him; I did a renting deal—went to him rather like Avis or Hertz or Budget, and said: I'll pay you five thousand pounds to rent these cards for the duration of writing my book. I did it, and I've got beautiful photographic copies of them at home now. You never know when they're going to come in handy.

In fact, they have come in handy already once. I'm half-way through writing the Churchill manuscript now and if you will bear with me, I will tell you one episode showing how you can use a tool like this, which is absolutely dynamite, in order to illuminate the character of somebody who was as genial, jovial, friendly, upright, forthright, courageous, decent as Winston Churchill was.

The day concerned is November 14, 1940. Let us first look at the version of this day given by Martin Gilbert, the official Churchill

family-appointed biographer of Winston Churchill. It is the day, namely, when Coventry is bombed, the first massive air raid of the war, conducted by the Germans against Coventry resulting in the killing of 554 Coventry civilians. Some of you may remember that about three or four years ago there was a controversy over that air raid: did Churchill know about it in advance? The answer is: yes, he did, but I will say straightaway that he didn't know about it long enough in advance so as to be able to undertake really worthwhile countermeasures and steps. He knew about it long enough in advance to enable him to take certain *personal* steps, but not in order to do anything that would save the town of Coventry as such. He thought that the air raid was going to be on London that night, and hearing this, according to Martin Gilbert's version, he hurried back to London telling his staff: It isn't right that I should leave London, leave the metropolis, and leave the citizens of my metropolis to suffer this appalling air raid while I go to the safety of some shelter out in the countryside. Thus this brave man hurried back to London to take the medicine—or so we read in the Martin Gilbert biography.

What is the truth? Here we turn up the appointment cards. Let us first of all go two days further back, to November 12, 1940. In the official files we find that the British Intelligence Service decoded certain Luftwaffe messages which indicate that Hermann Goering is planning the biggest air raid of the war. The entire German air force on the Western Front, two air fleets, Luftflotten II and III, are going to be thrown against a target, and in the intercepts, the decoded messages, the target is identified as Central London. One thousand eight hundred bombers, that means, are going to be thrown against Central London on a night in the very near future. They always come by full moon and, in fact, this is confirmed by the fact that this particular operation is given the code name, in the intercepts, "Moonlight Sonata." Winston Churchill has ordered that these intercepts are to be shown to him exclusively and to very few other people. For example, he finds out that the American military attaché is getting copies of digests of these intercepts, and he is very indignant indeed and says that on no account are the Americans to be shown these intercepts. Limited to a very, very small handful of people around him, these ULTRA messages. And so Winston Churchill knows, therefore, on November 12 that in a few days' time, Goering is going to attack London, Central London, with 1,800 bombers. Full moon. Operation Moonlight Sonata. Churchill takes his appointment card—the appointment card that I've mentioned—looks at the next full moon date and sees that it is November 15. He takes his pencil and he draws a bracket beginning on the evening of November 14, the day before, all the way

down to November 17, and rubs out all the appointments. *He doesn't want to be in London during those three days.* So, the intercepts have done some good already. In other words, they've insured that Winston Churchill won't be in London on those days when the 1,800 bombers come and get him. However, the bracket starts on the evening of the 14th of November, which is the day before full moon. On that day, looking at the appointment card, we see that at 12:45 he is going to be in Westminster Abbey for the funeral of Neville Chamberlain, we see that he has a defense committee meeting, we see that at 2:45 he has an appointment with Lord Halifax, the foreign secretary, and at 3:00 he has an appointment with Clement Atlee, the leader of the British Opposition. (Atlee was a small rabbit-like figure of complete impotence, whom Winston Churchill himself categorized on one occasion as a sheep in sheep's clothing, and on another occasion said that he was a man of immense modesty with everything to be modest about.) Atlee had this appointment with Churchill at 3:00. Now, Churchill had no reason on this morning to believe that the air raid was coming that night; he thought the air raid was going to come the following night and by that time he would be safe out in the country, in a country house of a friend of his out in Ditchely, Oxfordshire. So he goes through the morning's appointments with relative phlegm and equanimity until at 1:00 the Air Ministry contacts him and says it looks like the air raid is going to be *tonight*, Prime Minister, because the Germans have already sent out the reconnaissance plane they always send out in advance of an air raid to check the weather conditions over the target. And we've monitored the radio traffic of that plane, so the air raid's being laid on today. However, the Air Ministry follows in a message. They say: we believe the attack is going to be on Central London tonight therefore. However, a prisoner taken a few days ago has been overheard by a hidden microphone in his cell, talking of Coventry or Birmingham instead. But we think, says the Air Ministry, that the air raid is going to be on Central London tonight. We will know for certain by 3 o'clock this afternoon when the Germans switch on their blind bombing radio beams. The town at which these beams intersect is going to be the target. We will find that out at 3 o'clock this afternoon. We will tell you immediately.

Churchill goes to the funeral ceremony for Neville Chamberlain, comes back to Downing Street, has the appointments with Lord Halifax and Atlee at 2:45 and at 3:00, and he gets into his car in a hurry at 4:00 because it's beginning to get dark and he doesn't want to be there when the bombers come. As he's at the garden gate just stepping into his big Humber sedan, a secretary, John Martin (now Sir John Martin), comes running down the path and

says: "Prime Minister, a message has just come." It's now four o'clock and a message from the Air Ministry in a sealed envelope is handed to Winston Churchill. He gets in the car and drives off. Martin says that as he and Churchill drove off the Prime Minister read the message. By the time he reached Hyde Park he knocked on the glass partition and told the driver to stop, turn around, go back to Downing Street. As he gets out at No. 10 Downing Street he turns to his rather curious secretary (none of his secretaries were in on the ULTRA secret, and none knew anything about the decrypting) and says: "We have had a message, the beams are on London tonight and it would not be right for me to leave my capital and the citizens of this metropolis to suffer the raid alone." In fact, the message that he had received *told him that the raid was on Coventry and so it was safe to come back to London*. And the giveaway is the appointment card, of course. Martin Gilbert, the official Churchill biographer, has concealed the fact that there are two afternoon appointments in that appointment card which kept Churchill there until the second message came, namely, the Coventry message. Gilbert has tried to pretend that the one that Churchill got in the car was the first message, saying that we still think the raid is going to be on London tonight but we'll know at three o'clock, when they switch on the beams. Gilbert might say to me, "Mr. Irving, the fact that there are two appointments written down on the appointment card, the 2:45 and 3:00, doesn't mean to say that Churchill actually attended those appointments." But even there I've got him because I've got the private diary of Hugh Dalton, who was Minister of Economic Warfare and who on that afternoon had a long conversation with Lord Halifax which begins with Halifax saying "I've just had a very tedious hour long session with the Prime Minister." So that's the absolute giveaway, and Martin Gilbert, who is of a certain persuasion, Martin Gilbert, who is funded by the Jaffa Foundation to write the Churchill biography, now has to explain to us, the radical cranky historians, why it is that he gives the alternative version and why he deliberately suppresses the fact that Churchill had two afternoon appointments. Because it makes the difference between an act of great heroism by Winston Churchill in deliberately returning to the city which he knows is going to be attacked by 1,800 bombers that night, or an act of supreme hypocrisy, of simulated heroism in the eyes of his junior staff when he says it wouldn't be right for him to leave. In fact, Churchill goes even further that night. His private secretary John Colville writes that that evening he went up on to the roof of the Air Ministry to wait for the oncoming bombers: he wanted to see the raid begin. *What a hypocrite*. This is no surprise for us, ladies and gentlemen, but it's a surprise for the world at large, I think.

You never know what you are going to find out, that's the lesson; you never know what you're going to find out when you buy such important documents as a table top desk calendar of Winston Churchill. I've been writing a Winston Churchill biography now for several years, but I'm not going to deal with that any more in this part of the talk. I just wanted to give a hint of the goodies that are to come when that book is finally published. I still have very worthwhile publishers in the world to publish that book, but I ought to emphasize the fact that I am beginning to come under fire; the fact that the ADL has now seen fit to put out this defamatory leaflet attacking me (and who knows whom it's going to) means that the boycott is beginning to start on my person. But the Winston Churchill book is going to be published in this country by Doubleday, and in England by Macmillan, and will be published all 'round the world by very, very notable publishers. In each case you have to cross your fingers and hope that you've got an editor who still has the courage to publish what you have satisfied him is true.

You see, even on the Adolf Hitler biography I took a very independent line, a line which had my agent Max Becker very alarmed when I published that book. He said: You realize you are going to lose a lot of money by claiming that Adolf Hitler didn't know what was going on, in short, that Adolf Hitler didn't know about Auschwitz and so on. He said, well, the first thing is that you're going to lose the Book-of-the-Month Club, the Readers Digest, the *Sunday Times* in England is going to cancel, you'll lose the Military History Club, and so on. And he was right: all the way down the line, we lost every single one of those contracts, every single one of those publishers cancelled the deal. So when people come to me and say: "David Irving, you write controversial books in order to make money," they are talking from sheer ignorance. They don't realize that in fact by writing a book like that, in taking a dedicated line which you yourself believe in and which in fact has not been disproved in all the years since that book was published, you are losing not just tens of thousands but hundreds of thousands of dollars. It hurt me a great deal and it hurt my agent, Max Becker, one-tenth as much.

You see, I took this controversial line that Adolf Hitler was a man of a certain amount of intellectual honesty. I remember arguing this point at a debate in Dublin University a few years ago and when the students rather howled me down and said: How can you call that man honest?, I read to them this passage out of the private diary of one of his staff, Walther Hewel. Hewel was the diplomatic liaison officer attached to Hitler's staff by Ribbentrop, which meant that he traveled around with Hitler. He had known Hitler as a student and, in fact, he committed suicide with Hitler on the

same day and in the same fashion. There was that kind of bond between the two men. (I got this diary of Hewel from Hewel's widow, in fact. I had to break it to the widow that she was a widow; she had at that time no final confirmation that her husband was dead, and I had to tell her that I knew the whole story.) Right at the end, on the 2nd of June, 1941, Walther Hewel writes down (I'll translate it here): "The Fuehrer says this evening: As a private man I would never break my word, as a politician for Germany, if necessary, I'd do it a thousand times." Honesty. Hitler tells his staff that he's prepared to break his word if it's necessary for Germany's sake. All politicians do that, all statesmen do that, all statesmen lie when they have to for the sake of their country, right or wrong, their country. *Hitler had the intellectual honesty to admit it quite frankly to his staff*, and it was this kind of line in my book *Hitler's War* which I think upset a lot of critics. Before I get on to the subject of the general outline of the Hitler biography which I wrote and which is a major part of my life (it took 15 years to write), I ought to explain that I'm always running into problems with my critics of a certain persuasion. It's not a battle of my choosing. I am not anti-Jewish, I am not anti-Semitic. I have employed Jewish staff: my lawyer, my attorney in London for the last 26 years has been the firm of Michael Rubinstein; they've lost every case they've fought for me but I've still stood loyal to them. I should add straight away—and I ought to tell the ADL—that in this country, of course, your laws of libel are very lax and people can say what they like about other people. That may or may not be right; I'm not sure. In England and in Germany the laws of libel are much stricter: you can't go 'round defaming people, and get away with it, just because they happen to be on the public stage. In Germany we have several libel actions running now against people who've said precisely the same things as the ADL has said in its report about me; one case is against a Communist who's been handing out leaflets attacking me in Germany. (That's now gone to the Court of Appeal and he's going to lose because the Court of Appeal Judge already indicated which way he's going to find.) It's just unfortunate that in this country you cannot proceed against well-funded, well-organized smear campaigns of the kind that we've seen there, particularly when they are concealed smear campaigns. I don't know who that ADL report has gone to. I can only suspect. I can suspect from the facts above all in the case of my book on the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, *Uprising*, which was to be published in many countries around the world. It was published in England by Hodder and Stoughton, a very respectable and old company, was going to be published in the United States by Putnam's, was published in Germany and in Italy and France and many other countries. In the United States two weeks

before publication date, Putnam's cancelled the contract. They gave no explanation, they just quite simply swallowed the losses that they had sustained, and Peter Israel, the managing director of Putnam's, telephoned me to say that the deal was off: they weren't going to publish. Now we don't know what kind of pressure, if any, was put on Putnam's. It is something very close to a boycott, and I think that any organization that starts a boycott has to watch its onions. Because the knife can very rapidly turn. A boycott is the cruelest and most dishonest weapon to use. The Nazis used it against the Jews in the 1930s and if the Jews now start themselves, through the ADL or Anti-Defamation League, to try to use the same weapon against historians like myself who are only interested in establishing the truth, *I think they will long live to regret it*. This book, on Hungary, is an attempt to fill a gap, as I perceived it. I considered when I was writing it, ten years ago, that there had been no proper investigation of the anti-Communist uprising of 1956 in Soviet-occupied Hungary. There had been a number of lurid newspaper articles; it was probably the first historical event that I myself remember living through (I was at the university at the time)—and it was immediately masked of course by the fact that we British in connivance and conspiracy with the Israelis and the French attacked Egypt and the Suez Canal. This indeed masked the tragedy of Hungary effectively from the world's view.

In writing this book, I was able to obtain a lot of assistance and a lot of access to not only British and American records but also records behind the Iron Curtain. I think if the ADL wants to suggest that I'm kind of a Nazi or Fascist sympathizer, they had better reflect on this: Is it likely that the KGB would have allowed me into Moscow and is it likely that the successors of the Hungarian Secret Police would have allowed me into Budapest as often as they did when I was researching this book, if they thought that the names attached to me by the ADL in its report were even remotely true? Because we have seen, haven't we, the way the Soviets now operate against people they regard as inimical to their cause. I flew into Moscow when I was researching this book; the chairman of the John Birch Society had only to fly 100 miles away from the Soviet shores and they shot down his plane. And, by the way, I'm convinced myself that that is the reason why that particular plane was shot down. I dare go further: I suggest that there's a very close link between that operation and the operation when the Korean airliner was shot down near Leningrad in 1978. (In fact, it was two days after I flew into Moscow myself.) I think that the Russians have found some way of manipulating the beams of radio navigation devices so that they can lure planes over their air space. We did exactly the same with the German bombers in 1940. The German bombers had their blind bombing beams—I was just talking

about the Coventry episode—and in order to prevent cities like Coventry being attacked in future, we found ways of bending the German beams so that the Germans thought they were bombing Birmingham but in fact they were dropping their bombs in the open sea. And I am convinced that the Russians have found precisely the same means of doing things with the navigation systems employed by the airline systems. I think they shot down that plane on purpose and I think it was probably because they knew MacDonald was on the plane. We don't have to foster illusions among ourselves, ladies and gentlemen; we are on the right side of the fence, we know what kind of people we are dealing with over there, and I was investigating that in my book *Uprising*, on which I spent so much of my time.

I questioned many hundreds of Hungarians, I got access to the interrogation records of the Hungarians who escaped—interrogations conducted by the CIA, and by psychiatrists operating for the CIA, and by the Oral History Project of Columbia University, in New York. Altogether, I suppose I have read through the contemporary questionings of perhaps 2,000 Hungarians, conducted by people who are far more expert at questioning than I. And it was the conclusion of these questioners that upset my critics. Because the conclusion of these questioners was that the uprising of 1956 in Hungary was primarily an anti-Jewish uprising. The Hungarians are anti-Jewish, they are a race in which anti-Semitism goes back almost as far as the nation of Hungary itself, 1,000 years. You go to Hungary now and you talk to the Hungarians and within half an hour they are telling you anti-Jewish jokes, although they have very few Jews left there to be anti-Jewish about. They are an anti-Jewish race compared with whom the Nazis are as pure as the driven snow.

At the end of the Second World War, when the Red Army marched back into Hungary, all the Jewish emigrés who had sought refuge in Moscow were brought back on the Russian tanks, so to speak, and installed in positions of power—some of them with and some of them without the party card. I mention here four names, the names of Révai, who is the Dr. Goebbels of the postwar Hungarian era (he was the propaganda minister—I suppose that is the best way you could describe him—a very clever man, very brilliant, vicious); Farkas (his name means “wolf”; he subsequently became Minister of Defense, and was a very cruel man on whose hands lie the blood of many innocent Hungarians); Rákosi the dictator (a man with a head like a bald potato, a man hideously ugly who had married a Mongolian ballet dancer from Central Siberia, I think), and finally Csero, a man who died only a year and a half ago, I think, in Hungary, and who by that time had fallen into such disgrace that he was afforded only three lines of an

obituary, although at one time he had been the most powerful man in Hungary, the first secretary of the party. This Jewish camarilla, this four-headed monster which descended on the Hungarian people, bore down on them from Moscow, had been in Moscow throughout the war years and was imposed upon them as the post-war government, obtaining power by quite illegal and undemocratic means, and exercising that power with brutality and ruthlessness. Its primary executive arm was the secret police, initially called the Államvédelmi Osztály (AVO), the State Security Office, and subsequently the ABH. Now it is necessary to know that *the officer corps of that secret police was almost entirely Jewish*—and from the Russian point of view you can understand this. They needed people on whom they could rely 100% to be their officer corps, their secret police.

I'm trying to explain to you why this book is anathema to the critics. In England it was greeted with great respect and reverence and a certain amount of shock. The things I brought out in the book were not my opinions; I had no idea that this was going to emerge from the research. These were the opinions of the interrogators appointed by the CIA, and of the psychiatrists appointed by Rutgers University, some of whom are still operating at Rutgers, and of the Oral History Project at Columbia University. When they came to write their summaries, they concluded that nearly all the refugees they had questioned were motivated by a hideous anti-Jewish malice and spite. They made anti-Jewish remarks throughout the interrogations. The Government that they had been trying to topple was perceived by the Hungarian people as being Jewish, before it was perceived as being Bolshevik. What happened in 1956 had the closest possible analogy to a pogrom. And I had to spell this out in fact, because at the beginning of the book, at the request of the English publishers, I included a listing of all the personalities of any importance to follow in the pages of the book—and, at the request of the publishers, I also identified which ones were Jewish and which ones were Calvinist and which ones were Catholic, and so on. Because this is an important factor, not in my eyes, the eyes of David Irving the writer, but in the eyes of the rebellious mass of ten million Hungarians. The population regarded their own regime in that light.

So the revolution took place. The secret police, the AVO and the ABH, who were perceived by the people as being largely Jewish officers (although the other ranks of the secret police were nearly all recruits from the regular forces in Hungary), were regarded and alleged to be using the most incredible torture machinery. On the one hand, some of these allegations were true: they were using concentration camps with great brutality. I need only mention the stone quarry at Recsk as an example; there's a whole chapter

about it in this book. On the other hand, some of the allegations which were attached to these secret police were almost certainly without any kind of foundation—allegations, for example, that in the secret police headquarters in the center of Budapest on the banks of the River Danube there was a dungeon with a large meat-mincing machine into which the bodies were placed and minced and then the garbage thrown into the river. I only mention this because that particular meat-mincing machine of the secret police is referred to in about five or ten interrogation reports. It does show the extent to which even the most absurd stories can rapidly gain credence among an oppressed population. They were prepared to believe even the most absurd stories. So that is one lesson that one could draw from that particular story.

It wasn't an economic revolution, I found out. People wanted to believe that the Hungarians were seeking freedom. They weren't seeking freedom. People wanted to believe that the Hungarians were seeking a better economic existence in the way that one imagines they wanted also to have a refrigerator and a color television set and a better standard of living. It wasn't that either. What the Hungarians were rebelling against in 1956 was the fact that they knew that they were in a blind alley, nearly all of them; if they didn't have the right background they had no future. They were making an uprising in order to find a future for themselves. Let me explain to you that if you were a Hungarian and your father happened to have been an officer in any Army or any Armed Services, or happened to have been a landowner either small or large, then you were given a *carda*, which is a kind of party personality dossier, with an "x" on it; that "x" meant that you could never hold any kind of worthwhile job for the rest of your life. You were doomed. Doomed to be a lorry driver or truck driver, or whatever, for the rest of your life. You couldn't have a university education, you couldn't move into one of the higher professions; those jobs were reserved for the party officials, for the *funktionarios*, the *funkies* of the Communist party, one million strong, and for their progeny and offspring and friends. And this kind of oppression is what engendered the revolution of 1956. The hopelessness of the average Hungarian's situation, living 16 to a room in the middle of Budapest because of the absurdness of the socialist system which made it impossible for the profit motive to operate. If you look at the actual statistics of 1956, one quarter of the entire Hungarian population had at some time in its life been in prison, put there by the Communist party officials, usually on trumped-up charges. One of the current jokes in Hungary is that there are only three categories of Hungarians: those who have been in prison, those who are in prison, and those who are going to prison. Take as an example a builder who's got a little building construction com-

pany which is taken over by the State; he takes two bags of cement back to himself because in future he may want to build a garden wall or something. He's found out, and accused of stealing from the State. A complete reversion of the truth, a perversion of the truth. The State has *stolen his company from him*, he has retained two bags of cement which were his property, and he's accused of stealing from the State—and can think himself lucky he didn't go before the firing squad for it.

There are heroes in this story, quite unusual heroes. The hero of whom I'm particularly fond is a man who had, in fact, been part of the Armistice delegation that was sent by Admiral Horthy to Moscow in 1944. A man called Joseph Dudás. He was subsequently hanged after the uprising and his name has almost vanished into oblivion. If you go to Budapest now and you speak to the citizens and ask them what they know of Joseph Dudás, they know absolutely nothing about him. And yet he is a man who emerged from nowhere in the middle of the uprising. (I suspect that he was possibly CIA-backed, because some stories are beginning to emerge from people who knew him, which do indicate that there were connections between him and the American Embassy. I would like to think so.) Dudás emerged from nowhere when the uprising began, organized a street army, a rabble of people, marched on the Communist newspaper headquarters, the *Free People* building in downtown Budapest, took over the party newspaper building which is still there, evicted nearly all the staff, and used it as his revolutionary headquarters for an army which he very rapidly built. He found to his delight that the Communists' secret telephone system, the *kisbúgó* or red K-line system, was still operating, and he thus used the Communists' own telephone network in order to obtain intelligence from all over the country about the Soviet troop movements. He built up such a vast following, and so fast, from his own newspaper which he published called *Magyar Függetlenség* (*Hungarian Independence*) that in no time at all his name had become a byword in Soviet-occupied Hungary. When the Russian tanks moved back in at the beginning of November 1956, he went underground but János Kádár, the present prime minister and first secretary of Hungary, realizing that he couldn't get ahead without negotiating with Joseph Dudás, sent for Dudás to come and see him in the Parliament building. Like a fool, Dudás went. Kidnapped, arrested, deported, hanged. That was the future of many, many scores of the people who were involved in the Hungarian uprising.

I suppose another hero is a man who is still in Budapest now, Nicholas Vásárhelyi, who had been the press officer of Imri Nagy at the time of Imri Nagy's first prime ministership in 1953, and then was called in by Nagy again when the uprising began.

Nagy—the revolutionary prime minister, this great big fat pot-bellied man whom the people demanded should become the new prime minister after the uprising began. I asked Nicholas Vásárhelyi, who still lives in Budapest: What had been the turning point for you in the months prior to the uprising, the point that made you decide to start becoming a revolutionary? And he said: Somebody in France sent me a copy of George Orwell's book *Animal Farm*, and I began reading that and I realized I had been on the wrong side all my life.

It's the power of the pen. George Orwell, I suppose, would also be defamed now by the ADL as being revisionist or a dissident. These are titles we don't need to be ashamed of, I think, when we realize that a man like George Orwell wrote a book called *Animal Farm* and that this book inspired one man, Nicholas Vásárhelyi in Budapest, a young man with a wife and three children, to become a revolutionary and risk his life in a fight in which many of his comrades were subsequently hanged (including Imri Nagy, the prime minister himself). *You realize that the power of the pen is a power that cannot be scorned.*

As a small closing humorous note on perceptions in the Soviet bloc, I would mention the fact that I sent to Vásárhelyi several chapters of my book on the Hungarian uprising, and he took umbrage at my description of Imri Nagy. Now, Imri Nagy was the prime minister of Hungary who was installed by the revolutionaries into his second prime ministership. He bumbled, waffled his way around, missed the opportunity, missed the bus, went into hiding in the Yugoslavian Embassy, was tricked out of that, kidnapped by János Kádár, sent to exile, brought back and hanged two years later. Rather a tragic life; but it couldn't have happened to a nicer guy—so you realize when you read some of his earlier speeches. He was a dyed-in-the-wool Marxist, like the rest of them, and he deserved the fate he subsequently got. And I did describe him in my book rather unpleasantly. I want readers to know that I don't like him, that he was a rather porky figure, wearing dark three-button suits and silk shirts of a quality not often seen on representatives of the proletariat, and with a face rather like a bunch of hemorrhoids wearing a Josef Stalin mustache.

Now, I sent that chapter of the book to Nicholas Vásárhelyi to read, without realizing that I had not omitted those rather unpleasant words. And when I saw him in Budapest, driving up in my Rolls and parking outside his door, he said: "Mr. Irving, this description of Uncle Imri is not very nice, is it?" So I said: "What do you mean?" He says: "Here you describe him as this—'three-button silk shirts,' and here, this line here, 'a face like a bunch of hemorrhoids wearing a Josef Stalin mustache.' *It wasn't a Stalin mustache, we would say a walrus mustache.*"

And this is indicative for the present Hungarians. In particular, the Communists are completely wrapped up in their own Communist history. I think that a passage of my book which I like most is the passage where I describe how the revolution began—how the people, the students, meet, pour out onto the banks of the river, across the bridges towards Parliament Square, not really knowing quite what's going to happen. October 23rd: it was the students who started it and then the workers joined in. The intellectuals, of course, subsequently claimed that they were right out there in front, but the intellectuals—we know who they all were—were the ones who had been the editors, people of a certain persuasion, for the last four or five years of all the party newspapers and all the literary journals and so on, throughout Hungary. They were the ones who had kept the lid firmly screwed down on all the popular unrest that was swelling up over this lack of freedom, lack of a future, in their country. But now, of course, they realized that the lid was about to blow off and none of them wanted to be the actual ones to unscrew it; they wanted to be out there in the front of the revolution, so they could claim later on—as in fact they subsequently did—that they were in the very vanguard. We've all heard the Hungarian intellectuals claiming that they were the ones who touched off the revolution. They weren't. It was the workers, the Hungarian workers and the Hungarian students. The workers poured out of the factories and they got the guns, handed to them by the soldiers. They grabbed the guns off the secret policemen and by 9:00 that evening, in fact, the revolutionaries had got arms—and *that's* the difference between what happened in Hungary then and what's happening in Poland now. (These Poles can march and countermarch and hold their strikes and demonstrations but unless they get guns in their hands the government always has the last laugh.)

And these were the hours leading up to that moment when the rioting outside the radio building in Budapest ended up with the rioters getting demonstrations together. It was a mob—we can be quite frank about it—it was a mob that began to roam the streets in Hungary; as they came across the bridges, the people realized that they were talking to each other for the first time. The Hungarians had previously been frightened to talk—rather as, yesterday, your deputy of the Institute for Historical Review mentioned how interesting it is for us all to meet here and be able to talk freely with people of the same views. These people were finding that they were meeting people in the demonstration, standing next to them and for the first time they could talk freely: nobody says it, but nobody doubts it, it's been a 12-year nightmare but now it's coming to an end. This regime and all that it stood for—the screams, the whines from the next-door torture cells, the boulders falling

from the rock face of the Recsk stone quarry, the *Fraznapoch* (that means the "nightmare of deportation"), the drug injections, the hallucinations of General Bielkin's whirring lion's tale, the Russians working at that time with hallucinogenic drug injections in prisoners, the forced Russian language lessons, the work norms, the Communist doctors too lazy to come to a child birth, the fathers teaching their children how to lie at school, the gypsy transfer gang centers, bailiffs into the peasant's homes, the workers galloping like rats on a speeding treadmill, the raped woman treating herself with disinfectant, the body grinder (that legend), the endless queues for rotten quality, the interminable drone of Marxist jargon, the class war, the Korean war, the war against the Gulags, and all the voices echoing down from the past, marking this regime and its twisted brand of Socialist legality.

And so the revolution then takes place, the uprising: they pour onto Parliament Square, October 23. Nobody knows what size of mob actually becomes a fissile mass, how big a mob has to be before it explodes; ten people standing in a square aren't enough—it's got to be ten thousand, perhaps. This fissile, ungovernable, seething crowd is beginning to radiate a power of its own: twenty, fifty, seventy thousand, still. Still the critical mass hasn't been reached, the dazzling explosion hasn't occurred, nobody knows just where that point will lie. They are still waiting on Parliament Square for Imri Nagy to appear, rather like Batman who swoops down from the building to liberate them. We've no real plans, we've no definite leadership, is how one marcher describes this moment. In every little group, the leader of the movement seems to be the man with the loudest voice. We are moving, and we know one thing—we can't go home, something must happen here; we don't know what but we can't go home any more.

That's the kind of feeling that happens in the middle of an uprising. Very difficult to try and put your finger on it, but if you read enough of the interrogation reports, you get to the bottom of what causes a mass movement like that, against the Soviet occupation forces in a country like Hungary.

When I came out with the truth—this book was published two years ago in England—it provoked a howl of outrage in England. Arthur Koestler, who's now gone to his maker (he was one of the Hungarian emigrés to whom the *Sunday Times* gave this book to review), produced a half-page attack on it; other reviewers called it obsessively anti-Semitic. This is the kind of problem you have if you try to get to the root of a problem. The root of this problem turns out to have been a nation's own anti-Semitism, and so you are accused of being an anti-Semite for drawing attention to this fact.

Well, Arthur Koestler's now gone to his maker. We know in fact that Arthur Koestler the Hungarian was a Communist agent for most of his life, directly controlled by Moscow. In the 1930s and 1940s he was operating in Paris under Willi Muenzenberg, the famous Communist propagandist, and I think it's a fitting epitaph on his life that now that he's died, it turns out in his published will that he's left his very considerable fortune of a couple of million dollars to a University to found a chair of psychical research, research into extra-sensory phenomena. And it turns out that, in fact, in the basement of his home there was a bed fitted with all sorts of acute, precise devices for measuring the weight of the bed, and on this bed were conducted levitational experiments of some kind—and the chair which he has endowed with the two million dollars is going to be a chair for carrying out investigations into thought-induced fluctuations in body weight. Arthur Koestler, so I suggested in my little magazine *Focal Point*, should in fact, in view of his Communist past and his association with known Communist terrorist regimes, have donated the money for investigations of rope-induced fluctuations of body weight. Perhaps that's being a little bit too cruel.

My most recently published book was *The Secret Diaries of Hitler's Doctor*. Nobody knew they existed, though I won't say it took any great feat of research investigation to obtain them; they happened to flop under my nose one day when I was in the archives in Washington. They had just turned up from Bethesda, the National Institute of Health, where they had been misfiled, and I spent a year and a half of my life transcribing the handwritten diaries of a doctor (you can imagine how unpleasant they are to transcribe), and they turned out to be very largely concerned with Adolf Hitler's gastrointestinal tract. I published them, that is, Macmillan published them in this country simultaneously with the appearance in Europe of those fake Hitler diaries. Of interest in our context is only the fact that an American magazine—I think it was *Newsday* or *People* or *Us*—telephoned me in London and said: "Mr. Irving, is it true that you're publishing the diaries of Hitler's doctor?" So I said: "Yes," and they said: "Are the Jews going to like this book?" So I said: "I don't think so, no." So he said: "What's the reason for that?" and I said: "Well, they're not mentioned in it."

It is very difficult; we cannot please them. I do my hardest to please them, ladies and gentlemen, believe me, I try very hard to please them. If you do mention them in a book they are mortally offended, if you don't mention them in a book they are equally offended.

The biggest problem, of course—and with this I come to the final part of my lecture this evening—is the problem caused by the so-

called Holocaust. I say so-called because it's a phrase that they themselves started using several years ago, whereas previously "Holocaust" seemed to be more aptly applied to something like Hiroshima, or Dresden—because to my mind, as a classicist, the word "Holocaust" implies somebody perishing by flames or fire. God knows, there was enough of that in the Second World War.

When I wrote my now-famous book *Hitler's War*, I tried to write it from behind that man's desk. I spent a very great deal of time assembling documentation which I was certain had passed through his hands: intelligence reports, orders, documents, and so forth. At a secondary level, I had also tried to obtain the private diaries of people who had dealt with him—his private secretaries, colonels, the adjutants, the people who had been on his staff, even people like Governor Hans Frank, Goebbels, Himmler, anybody like that. I spent a very great deal of time doing the research for the book. And the result was that I came up with a lot of documents that a lot of these so-called experts, on whom the ADL and other worthy establishments rely, had not found. We need only mention Lucy Dawidowicz, who has written a book on the plight of European Jewry. We see that it is quite evident from her own background work that she did for the Anti-Defamation League's defamatory report on myself, that until my book was published, neither she nor any of her colleagues had had the slightest idea that in the archives, *reposing all these years, has been a big folder containing all Heinrich Himmler's handwritten notes of his telephone conversations.*

Perhaps the key word there is *handwritten*. You all know how lazy historians are, and I'm as lazy as the rest of them. A lot of us, when we see something in handwriting, well, we hurriedly flip to another folder where it's all neatly typed out. And even better, we hurriedly flip to a book where it's neatly printed with an index at the back. In other words, we do tend to steer clear of handwritten documents. But I've trained myself to take the line of most resistance and I go for the handwriting. And I spent, I suppose, four months transcribing every single line of those Himmler handwritten documents, his notes on his telephone conversations. I've got a page of them here which I can show you, so you can see what we're talking about. He would have on the desk in front of him just a pad of paper at the top of which he would write—it would either be typed or handwritten—"telephone conversations." There we are. I won't plague you to read the handwriting but if you see the handwriting, that may give you an idea why people like Ms. Dawidowicz can't read it—it's Gothic handwriting. German, old German handwriting. I can read it; my secretary can't, and she was born in Germany. At the top it says "Telefon"—telephone conversation, 30 November 1941. The first line after that says

"Aus"—that is, from the train: Himmler's making some telephone conversation from his train. In the left hand column, he writes the name and the time of the person he's calling and in the right hand column he jots down a few words about the subjects that he's talked about. General is the first one. Then in the next one down, he's telephoned Berlin and then here, where my finger is, the next line is "from the bunker"—he's telephoned from the Fuehrerhauptquartier, which is Hitler's headquarters; he's now making a phone call from Hitler's bunker.

13.30: Telephoned Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich in Prague. These four lines here on the right are the four points that he discusses with Heydrich. The first one is: "Arrest of Doktor Jakelius." The next one is, apparently: "Son of Molotov." The next one is: "Jewish [Juden] transport Berlin." (Transport of Jews from Berlin.) *Full stop.* The final line is: "Keine liquidierung"—no liquidation.

Now this, of course—as some of you may know—had been reproduced in my book as a photograph, creating a great furor among the other historians who had never before seen these lines. They tried to make out that this is the *only* evidence I have for my suggestion that if there was any kind of liquidation program going on, then Adolf Hitler didn't know about it. Well, this is typical of the kind of methods that these people use: they set up a line of argument and then they knock it down and say: There you are, he's got no case.

There is a *whole chain* of evidence from 1938 right through to October 1943, possibly even later, indicating that Hitler was completely in the dark about anything that may have been going on. And I use these words very closely. I am sure you realize that I take a slightly different line from several people here. I would specify as follows: I would say I am satisfied in my own mind that in various locations Nazi criminals, acting probably without direct orders from above, did carry out liquidations of groups of people including Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, mentally incurable people and the rest. I am quite plain about that in my own mind. I can't prove it, I haven't gone into that, I haven't investigated that particular aspect of history but from the documents I have seen, I've got the kind of gut feeling which suggests to me that that is probably accurate.

But when I was writing about Adolf Hitler, I had to look specifically about what he knew or didn't know; that's why documents like those phone conversations became important.

I spoke of an unbroken chain of evidence. Let's start looking at it.

The first one is in November 1938. This evidence all goes to support my theory that probably the biggest friend the Jews had in the

Third Reich, certainly when the war broke out, was Adolf Hitler. He was the one who was doing everything he could to prevent things nasty happening to them.

But he'd let the genie out of the bottle; he'd uncorked the bottle and the demon was there and he couldn't get the genie to go back in.

The first time we see that happening is in November 1938. The Night of Broken Glass. The German diplomat Vom Rath has been assassinated by a deranged Jew in Paris; the Nazis took their revenge on the night of November 9-10, the Night of Broken Glass. On that night Hitler is in Munich, with his adjutants and staff. He is in his private home in Prinzregentenstrasse. One of the adjutants, his air force adjutant Von Below (who's just died), told me: Mr. Irving, the first thing that Hitler knew about the night of broken glass throughout the pogrom that evening was when the phone rang at 2:00 in the morning in our adjutants' apartment, which was one floor lower down beneath his apartment at Prinzregentenstrasse. The Four Seasons Hotel telephoned us adjutants and asked if we would please come to the hotel and pick up our baggage, because there was a synagogue on fire next door and they couldn't be certain the hotel wasn't going to get caught in the flames as well. And, Von Below says: I thought there was something funny going on, and I telephoned the Fuehrer and I told him this. And he said I had to spend the rest of the night with the Fuehrer, making the necessary telephone calls to try and stop this.

Hitler in his apartment sent for Goebbels, the chief of the propaganda ministry—who in my view is the one who touched off this particular outrage. He also sent for Himmler and through the telephone lines of the propaganda ministry network, and the Gestapo network, and the party organization, were sent out telephone calls, telegrams and telexes the whole night long trying to stop what had already started.

And one example of that is this rather bad photocopy of a document I got from the American-controlled Berlin Document Center in Berlin. (It's run by the American Embassy in Berlin—some of you may have heard of it—a top secret document center, which controls the records of about 15 million Nazis and is classified as top secret; historians can't get access to it now but at the time I got it; the chief of the document center was a personal friend of mine and he used to let me go and do research there among the files.)

And this document is dated the 10th of November, 1938. It's a directive issued on the headed notepaper of Rudolf Hess's office, the office of the Deputy Fuehrer. It is a directive which goes out to all the party offices throughout Germany, to all the Gauleiters, for immediate communication. Directive No. 174/38. Repetition of telegram which had already gone out 10th of November 1938. "On express orders issued at the very highest level, there are to be no

kind of acts of arson or outrages against Jewish property or the like on any account and under any circumstances whatsoever." It's rather bad German, rather bad grammar in the German, but I've done a literal translation of those three lines.

Now, if the Deputy Fuehrer issues an order on express instructions from the very highest level, this can only mean that *Adolf Hitler himself has ordered that all this outrage has got to stop forthwith*. I remember speaking to a mass audience of students in the University of Bonn two years ago, and they'd been a bit unruly to start with, 800 students. It was a Saturday evening—that in itself is quite interesting, to see that you can pack 800 students into a university hall to come and hear you at 8:00 on a Saturday evening. On the top three ranks were all young Socialists, all waiting for a moment to start causing trouble, when I said to them: I don't want applause but I will expect, some time in the next hour and a half that I am talking, that occasionally you will all be hushed to silence by something I tell you. And when I read this one out, that hush began. And I said: You see, I told you you would hush. And the reason you are hushing is this. You are asking why it is that I, an Englishman, come and read out a document to you forty years afterwards, about something that is deeply scarred into the German national conscience, which gives a completely different interpretation on what you've been told, *and yet your own history professors haven't told you this*. There are only two explanations, I say. Either they didn't know about this document—in which case they're not fit to be your professors of history. Or, what is far more likely, they *do* know about this document but *they choose not to mention it*. In which case they are also not fit to be your professors of history. And all the professors, of course, are lined up in the front rows right in front of me.

People then begin saying: What about Hitler when he makes his speeches? That he's going to "ausrottung" the Jews from Europe. The trouble, our dilemma, is that we have to translate. Even modern Germans don't understand what these words meant then. And I have tried to din it into the heads of the German historians now that the word "ausrottung" did not mean then what it means now because of what the historians have been writing for the last 20 years. And they cannot get it into their heads.

So I said, let me explain to you: when Hitler says in a speech, for example on the 30th of January 1939, that if international finance Jewry succeeds once again in starting a world war, then it will end with the "ausrottung" of the Jews from Europe (which I think are the words he uses), then this doesn't mean to say that he's saying they are going to be liquidated; it means rather that it will be the end of the Jewish influence as a closed entity. And people boo and jeer and start sniggering when I say this. And I say: All right, well,

let's take an example where we do know that Hitler used the word and we can look at the context.

I made a card index of every instance where he used that word in the 1930s. About 15 documented instances. Look at his memorandum on the Four Year Plan of August 1936. He sits down and he dictates to his secretary, Christa Schroeder (who's still alive, a dear old lady in Munich), a long memorandum on the Four Year Plan. Roughly saying: I want the German economy to be ready inside four years to fight a war. I mean, he takes a lot of pages saying that. And in that document is the following phrase: The Wehrmacht has got to be ready in four years to fight the Soviet Union (which is significant, because he's only ever looking eastwards) because if the Soviet Union should ever succeed in invading and conquering Germany it will end with the "ausrottung" of the German people, of the German Volk. And I say to the historians: Is Hitler really saying here that if the Soviet Union succeeds in invading all Germany and conquering them, it's going to end up with the liquidation, the murder, of 80 million Germans? Or course he's not: he's just saying it means the end of Germany. The end of Germany as a power, the power factor.

And it's the same when Czech President Hacha comes to see him in March 1939 and has to sign on the dotted line, handing over Czechoslovakia to Hitler. Hitler says afterwards: It's a good thing you signed because otherwise it would have led to the "ausrottung" of the Czech people. The same word—"ausrottung." Hitler is not saying it's a good thing you signed because otherwise I would have had to put ten million of you through the gas chambers; he's just saying that it would have been the end of Czechoslovakia as a national entity, as a power factor.

So we begin to get a different picture. When Hitler talks about the "ausrottung" of the Jews—and I go into this in some detail, because this is the only kind of evidence the historians use against me—they say that Hitler himself spoke about what he was going to do. The answer is that he's not saying that at all, he's saying something quite different: he's saying that there's going to be the end of the Jewish influence in future. (An influence which, I hasten to add, even Winston Churchill got alarmed about in an article in the 1920s. So it's not just this rather cranky David Irving saying this.)

Thus it's important that we know precisely the terms that Adolf Hitler is using in his speeches. If we now accept, however, that these atrocities did occur, on whatever scale, then how did they start?

I can summarize my own feelings, having read all the documentation, quite simply by saying that whatever happened gained its own momentum deriving from atrocities which the Nazis did

commit. For example, the euthanasia program—an operation which interestingly enough is documented in every detail including even the order given by Hitler with his own handwritten signature on it. So people can't say that an operation like this would be kept so secret that of course no paper would be generated. The euthanasia program, the killing of the mentally incurable who occupied the hospital beds that wartime Germany needed—this was an operation that was carried out on Hitler's written instructions. And this generated a certain amount of expertise in killing, there's no question about it.

And there's no question in my mind that some of the personnel who were operating on that program, the T-4 operation, the Tiergartenstrasse (the office from which it was conducted), were then automatically injected into the killing operations that a number of local police officials in my view on the Eastern front in Germany carried out against Jews and other people who just got in their way.

I use the phrase "got in their way" because coming out of the Polish archives is a document which may or may not be genuine—let's be quite frank, we've all seen quite a lot of fakes in our time—and this is a document from a man called Rolf Heinz Hupner, written to a man called Adolf Eichmann. July 16, 1941. Eichmann at that time was very busily involved at SS headquarters with retraining the Jews. Eichmann was involved with all sorts of agricultural schemes to retrain the Jews for when they were transported overseas to Madagascar or whatever other territory Adolf Hitler allocated to them. Eichmann found himself involved in all sorts of strange agricultural schemes. And out of the blue he gets sent to him this letter from a man called Hupner, reading: Dear Comrade Eichmann: Attached I am sending you a memorandum which is summarizing a number of conversations which have taken place here in the Nazi Reichstathauterei, which is the kind of Nazi headquarters out here in Poznan. (Poznan was the area where several of the major concentration camps which were involved were located.) I won't read it all to you. What he does say in the 16 July 1941 document, in paragraph four, is that in this winter there's great danger that the Jews won't, we can't continue to nourish them. (You see, all the Jews who are being displaced from Western Europe to the East are landing up in this kind of region. And they're causing a major health, food and accommodation problem for the local Party officials in Poland.) And he says: There's going to be a big risk in this winter that we can't continue to nourish all these Jews who are coming here. We seriously ought to consider whether it is not, whether it would not be the most humane solution, to finish off the Jews, insofar as we can't make use of them as labor, by some kind of fast-working

method, means which implies some kind of chemical. In any case, it would be far more pleasant than to allow them just to starve to death.

Now, this fits in with the image that I have built in my own mind that such atrocities that did occur, in these territories, occurred at the initiative of the people on the spot. They found themselves put on the spot by Berlin. Berlin didn't really bother about what happened to the trainloads of Jews and others who were sent out there. Berlin just left it to them to make up their own mind. In fact, there is at the end of this year 1941 a verbatim record of a conference, in the records of Hans Frank, where one of the local police chiefs says: What does Berlin imagine we are doing with these people? They are sending out trainloads of the people to us; does Berlin imagine that we are housing them in neat housing estates along the Baltic somewhere? We can't do that. We're just bumping them off as and when they arrive.

We have of course to accept the possibilities that that document, too, may be fake. But it's sufficient to make me suspect that there was some kind of major crime going on at the initiative of the local criminals on the spot. This I think is the line that dissident historians should take.

We should investigate how it is that in a dictatorship actions can be taken by criminals at the local level without the supreme authority's knowing about it. Rather like Sabra and Chattila, I suppose; it's a direct comparison we have to make there. It isn't right for Tel Aviv to claim now that David Irving is talking nonsense and of course Adolf Hitler must have known about what was going on in Auschwitz and Treblinka, and then in the same breath to claim that, of course, our beloved Mr. Begin didn't know what was going on in Sabra and Chattila. You can't have one without the other; rather like a horse and carriage.

But about the documents which exist in the files of the SS. (I'm one of these incurable people who attaches a great deal of importance to the documents.) You don't have to read between the lines if you get enough paper actually in your hands. The documents which exist show quite clearly that Adolf Hitler ordained a massive transportation program, sweeping all the Jews out of Western Europe into Eastern Europe. This was a program that began after the attack on the Soviet Union. In fact, later on, in February 1942, you find him actually saying that now that we've got the territories in Eastern Europe, we don't have to consider the Madagascar program any more because these Eastern Europe territories have given us a completely different possibility of solving it. (I can't actually find it in this sheaf of documents but it is there, believe me.)

Every reference and every remark that Hitler makes, even in the

most intimate circles, even at lunchtime conversations where just Martin Bormann and Heinrich Himmler are present, or Reinhard Heydrich, Hitler says precisely the same thing: It's a good thing that I am sweeping the Jews back out of Europe to where they belong. It's a good thing that I'm making them do good, sound, healthy work in the East. He's not just saying this to a mass audience, he's not saying this in the Sportpalast, he's not writing an article in the *Volkischer Beobachter*—no, he's saying this rather to the people who are actually doing the dirty deed. Or who certainly know it's going on.

So this in my mind strongly suggests that *he doesn't know what's going on*. On October 6, for example, he says at a luncheon in his headquarters—and I found these records in the private possession of a man—he says all the Jews have got to be shipped out of the protectorate, out of Czechoslovakia, and not into the General-gouvernement [of Poland]—not into Poland first of all, let's just send them immediately further East. He says the problem is he can't quite do this at present, immediately, because we've got a severe shortage of transport for military reasons.

This in itself gives cause for doubt. We know that in the Winter of 1941 there was a massive transport shortage caused by the crisis on the Eastern Front. If you've got a transport crisis, you are not going to start soaking up transport space which is scarce on the railways by shipping tens of thousands of Jews eastwards, if all you're going to do at the other end is liquidate them. These are the big questions which the Lucy Dawidowicz's of this world haven't bothered to ask or answer. This transport movement only fits in with my thesis that the transportation program was ordered by Hitler, that whatever happened at the other end, if anything happened at the other end, was carried out on the initiative of the local officials to whom the transport crisis was a matter of supreme academic disinterest.

There is more than enough evidence of that.

10th of October, 1941. There's a letter from Himmler to Uberlohre [?], in which Himmler reacts to complaints made by him about the fact that Jews have been dumped in his territory by the tens of thousands. And Himmler writes: Well, of course, it's not very nice if all these Jews have been dumped on you, but may I please beg you from the bottom of my heart to find the necessary understanding, as your Gauleiter has also done. It's in accordance with the will of the Fuehrer that the Jews are shipped from West to East, stage by stage. *Full stop, period.*

The will of the Fuehrer that the Jews are shipped stage by stage from West to East: again and again and again—even in his table talk. You've all heard of Hitler's table talk or *Tischgesprache*, written down by Heinrich Heim, Martin Bormann's secretary; long

before anybody got these things, I got the actual transcripts from the Swiss lawyer who controls these documents. Here you see the actual wording used by Hitler in German, which is completely different from the published English translation. In fact, in the English translation, sentences have been interposed which don't exist in the original German at all. In that original, you see Hitler saying things like: It's a good thing that this legend is being spread about that the Jews are perishing, it's a good thing that this terror story is being spread about us. He regards it altogether as being a legend. And then later, he says what a scandal it is that we should be accused of maltreating the Jews. These statements are in the private. Here is one from 25th January 1942. Wolf's Lair, mid-day, luncheon guests: Dr. Lammers, the Reichsfuehrer-SS Himmler, and Colonel Zeitzler. The Chief (that is, Hitler), spoke as follows, in the following sense: If I take the Jews now out of our society then our bourgeoisie is very unhappy. But what are we doing with them? Did the same people show the slightest sympathy with our people, with the Germans, when they had to emigrate? . . . One must act radically. When one pulls out a tooth, one does it with a single tug, and the pain quickly goes away. . . . at the time of Papal rule in Rome, the Jews were being mistreated. Until 1830, eight Jews every year were driven through the town of Rome on asses, and I only say that they have to leave us.

So that shows in his mind what he thought was happening to the Jews. Something rather mild indeed was happening to them. He says again, two days later on the 27th January: The Jews have got to leave Europe. The best thing is to go to Russia. I've got no sympathy at all with the Jews. They will always be an element that winds up one nation against another. They do it in national politics just as much as they do it in their own private existence.

Finally, I think the most cardinal piece of proof in this entire story of what Hitler knew about what was going on is a document that mysteriously vanished from the Nuremberg files in 1945. It is clear that it was in the files in August 1945, when they were sighted by the Americans in Berlin and cataloged, because it appears as Item Four of a five-item list. It then vanished from the files by the time they reached Nuremberg for the Nuremberg trials—and so it couldn't be produced there as evidence—and then reappeared now in the files of the Federal Archives in Coblenz. That is the file that it's in: Reich Minister of Justice. The heading is: The Treatment of the Jews, and it's a document, a memo on a telephone conversation inside the Ministry of Justice. From its placing in the file we know that this conversation is about March 1942—two months after the notorious Wannsee conference when all is supposed to have been put in train by Adolf Hitler. The Reich Minister, Hans Lammers, was the chief of the German Civil Ser-

vice; he would be rather like the Prime Minister in a normal society. The memo says: "Reich Minister Lammers informs me that the Fuehrer has repeatedly told him that he wants the solution of the Jewish problem postponed until after the war is over." And it goes on about the fact that for this reason, all this talk, all this jaw that's going on at present is completely superfluous.

Hitler has repeatedly said he wants the solution to the Jewish problem postponed until after the war is over.

Again, this is a document which is of extreme embarrassment for the rival school of history. They can't talk their way around it, they can't talk their way out of it, they close their eyes and when they open them it is still there. It refuses to go away. Believe me: from this moment on, right through to 1943, there are further documents showing Hitler interceding, acting, trying to stop, preventing. There's another telephone conversation from Himmler to Heydrich on 20th April, 1942, again from Hitler's headquarters. Himmler telephoned Heydrich, the chief of the SD, or *Sicherheitsdienst* of the SS: No destruction of the gypsies, the gypsies aren't to be liquidated either. But it was still done. Himmler telephoned Ribbentrop from Hitler's headquarters in October 1943, saying that he has discussed a certain matter with Hitler, namely whether the Jews from Rome are to be rounded up and sent to Northern Italy and liquidated as the SS has ordered, or, as Hitler has ordered quite to the contrary, that the Jews in Rome had got to be sent instead to Mauthausen and kept alive there—which didn't prevent them from being rounded up and shipped off to Auschwitz, according to what we read in history books.

So all this builds up in my mind, as a Hitler biographer, a picture of a rather weak boss, who was so busy being a general, being a soldier—and I think I've adequately established that he was a very good soldier indeed, who repeatedly outwitted Winston Churchill, which isn't too difficult, even in that famous man's sober moments—he was so busy being a soldier that he didn't really pay too much attention to what crimes may or may not have been going on in various far-flung parts of the Reich.

I'm not going to go into the controversy here about the actual goings-on inside Auschwitz, or the other extermination camps or concentration camps. We do know in the meantime that Dachau is a legend, that everything that people found in Dachau was in fact installed there by the Americans after the war—rather like Disneyland—for their local people to go and be impressed by German *Schrecklichkeit*.

I must say that I have been deeply impressed by Mr. Friedrich Berg's lecture earlier this afternoon; I have found a great deal in his lecture which was greatly impressive.

It's not going to be an easy path for us dissident historians to

follow. We are going to be boycotted, we are going to find life getting very nasty. It's not quite as difficult yet here in America as it is in Europe, where frequently when I arrive to address a meeting in Germany, or in England, I find sticky situations. In Germany, for example, when I last arrived at Stuttgart to speak and there were 300 mounted police with water cannon and riot shields to protect the building I was going to speak in, and the audience sitting in front there with blood-stained shirts and their noses broken and their shirts torn . . . well. It's not quite as bad as that here; I suppose in Germany the stakes are higher. In Germany the Left is on the march, the Left is rampant, the strings to Moscow are that much shorter. We can talk here at greater peace, but I have to be quite plain about one thing: I am an independent historian. I have no academic chair which finances me, I have no family fortune to rely on; I depend entirely on my own readership. Above all, I depend on publishers to keep on publishing me. Every time I make an open statement that I make in front of people like yourselves, ladies and gentlemen, it's one step closer to a total boycott by Madison Avenue. Which is a risk that I have to contemplate with great earnestness. So I am right out near the end of that gang plank, I am right out in the front line. The artillery fire is beginning and the shot and shell are falling all 'round me. I have built various rear lines on which I can fall back if necessary, but so far I haven't been disproved.

This is what makes me believe that in my ambition to write total truth, I am succeeding.

Questions and Answers

Q. The current translation of *Mein Kampf* which is in distribution here is the Ralph Manheim translation, published by Houghton Mifflin. It differs so greatly from the James Murphy translation, published originally by Hurst and Blackett in London, that I'm wondering to what extent it can in fact be considered a completely fraudulent translation, totally misrepresenting the original document?

A. I have to make an admission: like I suppose 99.9% of the German population, I never read *Mein Kampf*—because as soon as I realized that it was largely written in collusion with Rudolf Hess, I thought it would probably be useless for my own

purposes to try and get inside that man's [Hitler's] mind. Far more valuable, incidentally, for an understanding of Hitler's early thinking is his "Second Book," which was written entirely by him, but never published by him. It has only recently been published in Germany by the Institute for Contemporary History, and there you will get a far more accurate insight into his mind. The trouble with any kind of translation is that you can translate a word malevolently, or benevolently, and I'm sure that that is at the root of a lot of the differences you've noticed between the two translations. Incidentally, my own magazine *Focal Point*—the particular issue at the back of the room here which I brought with me from England—contains a very unusual document of 1920, in fact predating *Mein Kampf*. It is a record of a conversation between Hitler and a financier who was offering to put up a lot of money for the Nazi Party. Hitler set out his entire program to him, and the financier's secretary was present and made a shorthand note of their conversation; I obtained a copy of that shorthand note and we published it for the first time, in an English translation. It's a most unusual document. So if you're interested in *Mein Kampf* then you should certainly look at that edition of *Focal Point*. (You see, I'm shamelessly advertising my own products.)

Q: You used the term *Poznan*. What language do you use? Did the documents you cite spell out *Posen* or *Poznan*?

A: *Poznan* would be the present Polish location of the German town of *Posen*. This comes under the heading of editing problems. Believe me, editing problems are the problems that I steer very clear of, and I allow myself to be guided entirely by trained, professional editors. In this case they would probably look at a *Times Atlas*, and the *Times Atlas* would probably say the town is *Poznan*, and we would have therefore to use the present designation of the town. In the German edition of my book it is down as *Posen*, which is the correct German translation of the town *Poznan*.

Q: Do you foresee any set of circumstances whereby Rudolf Hess will be let out of prison once and for all?

A: I don't think so. I think that the British government and the other three powers involved have got themselves into such a cul-de-sac, into such a blind alley, that not one of them is prepared to show the moral courage which in my view is all it takes to let that poor, decrepit old man out. I think also that on the English side there are guilty consciences involved, because we know that we tricked the man into coming over as part of a secret

service operation, a secret service war game; we tricked him into coming over in the belief that he would be coming over to start genuine negotiations. In fact, a party of secret service officials was waiting for him at an airfield, where it was believed he would land. So I think that we've just got guilty consciences on the British side, and unless the Americans can find the necessary moral courage to let him out next time they're in charge at Spandau, I think he will eventually die there.

Q: As to the wording of Hitler's 30 January 1939 Reichstag speech which you mentioned, the phrase Hitler uses—and I get this from Dr. Wilhelm Staeglich's book—is "*Vernichtung der jüdischen Rasse*"—*vernichtung* not *ausrottung*. I think that point should be made. But I mainly wanted to ask you about the famous Wannsee-Protokoll. Dr. Staeglich has pointed out the fact that in the so-called document occurs the double-S for "SS" written in Roman letters, not runic letters. Now, if that had been done by a typical German service typewriter of the time, it in all probability would have used the runic "SS" characters that were on many service typewriters. Generally speaking, I would like to get your reaction to the question of the authenticity of the Wannsee-Protokoll, the famous copy no. 16. To what extent is it a genuine document?

A: Well, I've looked at the actual Wannsee-Protokoll in the original file, which is in the political archives of the German Foreign Ministry now. It isn't just one lone document; it's part of a complete file of documents of the German Foreign Ministry, which has on the cardboard cover of the file—rather like that one I just showed you, the "Treatment of the Jews"—this one has on the cardboard cover "German Foreign Ministry," and underneath, in handwriting: "Final Solution to the Jewish Question." The file starts in about 1935—which shows that the actual designation goes back to 1935, an interesting example of how a completely harmless designation gradually adopts a different significance as the war progresses. Halfway through that file is the Wannsee-Protokoll. You can look at it—and you very rapidly get a "feeling" when you look at an original document, as to whether it's the same kind of quality and texture as the other documents in the folder. I hear what you say about the fact that it doesn't contain the two lightning-flash symbols for the "SS" every time the term "SS" is used. But I don't think that that's as significant as the fact that the actual document says almost nothing. We've heard a great deal about the Wannsee-Protokoll. It was a meeting of German secretaries of state (undersecretaries, you would call them here in this country), very low-level in the ministries, to discuss various administrative problems. Nowhere

in the entire document is there any explicit reference to murdering Jews. If you want that "sense," you've got to read between the lines, or rather you've got to read-between-reading-between-the-lines, if you can imagine that—kind of like deductions to the second power. And I don't think one is entitled to do that in a matter of this magnitude. I've always said, with my famous \$1,000 offer—I always carry \$1,000 with me in case anybody actually has the proof that I'm wrong—I always say that if anybody can produce one wartime document, one *wartime document*, proving that Adolf Hitler knew about Auschwitz, even (and I'm not asking for the order with his signature on it, I'm just asking for proof he even knew about it), then I'll give that person \$1,000. I've said that on television, on radio, all over the world, and various people have huffed and puffed, and some have actually done a lot of legwork. They've gone to archives in Riga and Moscow and Warsaw and all sorts of other dangerous places, trying to find the documentary evidence that I'm wrong, and it *just isn't there*. It's an *explicit* document I want. I don't want one which talks about "getting rid of," or "pushing them out of Europe," or "destroying the race," or something like that. I want one which makes it quite plain that Adolf Hitler knew what he was talking about and knew that people were being physically murdered, knew that a race was being biologically exterminated. Because documents like that *should be in the files*. I'm not saying that we're going to find the actual order, but there should be *something*. The Germans are such cowards; if they are civil servants, they're going to be absolutely certain to get it down in writing somewhere that what they're doing with this trainload is being done on the Fuehrer's orders, because that gives them backing, that's a covering-letter, and it's down there in black-and-white that it wasn't at their own initiative. But nowhere in the entire files is there one diary, or one telegram, or one letter—nor anywhere in our British files is there one intercept of a decoded message between SS headquarters in Berlin and Auschwitz, or somewhere, indicating that this was going on, or that Hitler knew about it. And this is very embarrassing for all the historians—that they can't find the evidence that I'm wrong. Indeed, Hugh Trevor-Roper wrote a big article in the *Sunday Times* saying that the opinion of all the historians is that David Irving is wrong. So I wrote a letter to the *Sunday Times* saying that Hugh Trevor-Roper can set the opinion of all the historians to music and have it played by the massed bands of the Coldstream Guards, and that *still doesn't make it evidence*.

Q. Mr. Irving, if I may refer to the Night of the Broken Glass—the so-called *Reichskristallnacht* of 9-10 November 1938—I believe you mentioned that you attributed its instigation to

Dr. Goebbels. That may well be. I have read the book of Wilfred von Oven (*Finale Furioso*), who was his adjutant until his death, which says that Goebbels was just as shocked as was Hitler when he heard about the action, and that it is reasonable to assume that a man as intelligent as Goebbels and as conscious of the effect of propaganda would not participate in so vulgar and useless an action. Moreover, it has been written elsewhere that *Reichskristallnacht* could be attributable to the same mysterious source, at that time, as today is engaged in painting swastikas on Jewish graveyards and that sort of *provocateur* action.

A: Oh, yes, I don't underestimate the powers of Mossad. In fact, you may remember this unfortunate Israeli ambassador Mr. Argov, who was gunned down in London—nearly assassinated—which provided a very useful pretext for the invasion of Southern Lebanon in 1982. This is almost exactly what Adolf Hitler was planning to do as a cover to provide a pretext to invade Czechoslovakia in 1938. In fact, he actually said: We'll find a pretext when the moment comes, something will happen to the German ambassador in Prague. So there are certain kinds of minds—very, very clever, farsighted minds—which are capable of planning and plotting two or three leaps ahead, reaction and counter-reaction, and counter-counter-reaction. But in this particular case of Joseph Goebbels, the documentary evidence is very, very clear, I'm afraid. I know he was deeply shocked afterwards, but he wasn't shocked at what had happened, he was shocked at Hitler's reaction to it. Goebbels was in trouble, because he had started a scandalous affair with Lida Barova, a Czechoslovakian ballet dancer, and this had attracted Hitler's disfavor. Her boyfriend had come 'round and punched Goebbels on the nose, and this kind of scandal you couldn't have going on. Goebbels had been looking for a way to get back into Hitler's favor ever since—for two weeks—and he thought this was the way to do it. In other words, he misinterpreted what Hitler's real will was—which was a significant thing to happen; people thought that Hitler would have liked it and they acted accordingly. In this it was Goebbels, and to his horror he found out that Hitler wanted something completely different, and so Goebbels with sweat pouring down his brow had to spend the entire night on the telephone trying to call off what his speech that evening, in Munich, had started. I know Wilfried von Oven's replies, and I like Wilfried von Oven, he's a good writer—but in this particular case I think he's wrong.

Q: Could you give your reaction to the recent book by Gerald Fleming, *Hitler und die Endloesung*?

A. Yes. Gerald Fleming, frightfully nice: he and I were face-to-face once on the David Frost program for an hour and a half in England on television. He wasn't able to prove me wrong then. He's ever since felt mortally wounded by the fact that he wasn't able to prove me wrong in front of 16 million English television viewers, and he's the gentleman who's been to Riga and all these other places—he's actually talked to Gauleiter Koch and all the other Nazi dignitaries and notables—and he's tried very hard to obtain the evidence that I'm wrong. The reviewers admit, in reviewing his book, that he has not found the evidence that I'm wrong, that he hasn't found documentary proof. His book, in fact, is a lie. Because the book's title is *Hitler and the Final Solution*, and then underneath is a subtitle, in quotes: "It is the Fuehrer's Wish . . ." dot-dot-dot, as though this is from some document! In fact, it isn't: this is just what some Nazi bigwig after the war, sweating and pleading for his life in the dock in Nuremberg or somewhere else, tried to claim—that it was the Fuehrer's wish that this should be done. This is precisely the kind of evidence which I'm not prepared to accept. It's a well-written book, he's done a lot of research, but he constantly mixes first-, second-, and third-order evidence in a completely reprehensible way. And this is such a serious subject, in my view. If what they are saying is true, it's the murder of millions and millions of people. If what we are saying is true, it's the biggest hoax of the century. This is such a big subject, that I think it should have been properly researched *twenty years ago*; the documents have been there. And yet it takes me—a "quack," a "charlatan"—to come along and find even that Himmler wrote handwritten notes on his telephone conversations. None of them knew it until that moment. Let me tell you: Lucy Dawidowicz talks about the famous Himmler quotation of Mr. Irving's, 30 November 1941, about "Arrest Dr. Jakelius. The apparent son of Molotov. Transport of Jews from Berlin. No liquidation."—in other words he's got to be spared. But of course if they're prepared to believe that, they must overlook all the full-stops [in the page of Himmler's handwriting], and the fact is that in *all* the other notes in that file every line is quite clearly a different topic and *not* a continuation of the same topic. But of course she's never seen that *file*. Which doesn't prevent them from defaming me and slandering me, and doesn't prevent the ADL from broadcasting their defamation broadcasts through all their insidious channels to the media.

A Challenge to David Irving

ROBERT FAURISSON

At the time of the fifth international Revisionist Conference sponsored by the Institute for Historical Review, held in Los Angeles on 3-5 September 1983, I had the pleasure of meeting David Irving for the first time. Unfortunately, our meeting was too short. We had a brief conversation, and then I listened to his presentation. At the conclusion of his presentation, some of us were able to ask him questions or share with him our comments. There again the time was too short for me to bring up to him all that was on my mind. On the following day, before beginning my own paper, I briefly shared with the audience the questions and comments that I would have directed to David Irving. I expand upon them here. It will come as no surprise that they concern what is called the problem of genocide and the gas chambers.

Karl Wolff's "Seventy Men"

In my brief conversation with him, I asked Irving who the approximately "seventy men" were who, in his opinion, knew about the existence of the extermination camps. I reminded him of the following passage from his *Hitler's War*:

By August 1942 the massacre machinery was gathering momentum— of such refinement and devilish ingenuity that from Himmler

down to the ex-lawyers who ran the extermination camps perhaps only seventy men were aware of the truth. (*Hitler's War* [New York: Viking Press, 1977], p. 393.)

Irving told me that it was General Karl Wolff, former SS-Obergruppenfuehrer, who had mentioned that figure of approximately seventy men. Wolff had mentioned that figure in a study that can be found today at the Institut fuer Zeitgeschichte in Munich. I then asked Irving if there wasn't something strange about that. In point of fact, Karl Wolff, Himmler's Chief of Staff and liaison officer with Hitler, had never, during the entire length of the war, been informed of any such extermination program. It was only in April 1945 that he had heard it mentioned in Switzerland, over the radio, at the time of his negotiations over the surrender of the German troops in Italy. Irving stated his agreement with me on this point. Then our conversation was interrupted. I would like further to have asked him the following questions:

1.) Karl Wolff, according to David Irving, made a very serious accusation against some seventy persons. One-by-one: *who are those seventy-some persons "down to the ex-lawyers"?* Did Karl Wolff undertake an investigation regarding each case? Did he even so much as inquire in any sense? When and how? Had he detailed evidence to support his accusations? If so, what is it? Can we verify that evidence?

2.) Has David Irving examined that evidence, if it exists, and has he found it convincing? Why has the Institut fuer Zeitgeschichte in Munich not published it? Are David Irving and Martin Broszat, the director of the Institut, prepared today to publish the documents it has relating to this, which must have been compiled prior to 1977 (the date of publication of Irving's book)?

3.) In order to understand Irving's remarks about "such refinement and devilish ingenuity," I need concrete details of all kinds. I want to know first what that "refinement" consisted of, as well as that "ingenuity" (a "devilish" ingenuity at that). I want to know about the material reality which must lie behind those words. What was the nature of those realities? What were their dimensions? Where were they located? How did they function? Who conceived of them? Who drew up the plans? Who had them carried out? With what manpower and materials? *Most of all, with what kind of budget?* How did they succeed in hiding the creation and operation of such machinery from Hitler and from the entire world for a period of three or four years? How is it that, except for perhaps seventy men, all of the personnel of the military, police, and economic organizations could not see that millions of people were disappearing in that way into horrible slaughterhouses

whose operation must have demanded considerable supplies of raw materials (hard to obtain in a time of total war) and a no less considerable labor force (at a time when it was precisely the lack of manpower that was causing such terrible problems for Germany)?

Some Seventy Supermen!

Borrowing a comparison from David Irving, I can certainly believe that Menachem Begin could have been unaware of the massacre at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon at the time it was taking place. Over a period of several hours several hundred civilians were massacred. I do not know when Begin learned of the massacre, but I do know that, like everyone else in the world, he learned about it very quickly. If, however, instead of several hundred men, women, and children being massacred in a few hours, we were considering the massacre of millions of men, women, and children over a period of three or four years in the very heart of Europe, by what miracle could that heinous crime have been hidden from Hitler, Stalin, Churchill, Roosevelt, as well as Germany and all of Europe, except for perhaps only seventy men? Those seventy-some men must have been supermen. For myself, a person who has studied the problem so much, I further state that those supermen, not content with clandestinely carrying out such a fantastic massacre, succeeded also in wiping out all traces of their heinous crime. *Because there does not exist, for example, any proof of the existence of a single homicidal gas chamber which could have been built and used by the Germans.* What does exist is a superabundance of alleged evidence which, when subjected to the elementary and routine methods of historical research, is demonstrated to be false. We have thousands of *solid proofs* of the existence in certain German camps of shower facilities, disinfection facilities, facilities for preserving bodies in mortuaries before burning them in crematory ovens; we know when, where, by whom, according to what plans, and *with how much money* all that was done. But about the gigantic homicidal gas chambers, we have nothing. That is magic.

David Irving: Only "Some Feelings" About the Extermination Story

Now I come to David Irving's presentation at the Revisionist Conference. The impression of magic persists there again. Irving has the honesty to advise us that, in fact, he has not studied the particular aspect of the history of the Second World War that some call the "Holocaust." With some insistence he repeated that

about the "Holocaust" specifically he only has some "feelings." He said that in his mind there has been formed a certain impression of what "probably" took place. He does not for a moment attack the revisionist authors. He does not act like those persons who issue denunciations of the revisionists that are more and more categorical in proportion to the extent that they have not studied the question. However, even a David Irving sometimes gives in to the temptation to maintain opinions that, from his own point of view, he ought not to maintain since he has not studied the question. The errors that he makes here and there prove by themselves that he is a layman on this subject.

According to the manuscript transcription of his presentation taken from the tape recording, David Irving uses the following words (p. 42):

... my suggestion that, if there was any kind of liquidation program going on, then Hitler did not know about it.

Setting aside for the moment the question of Hitler himself, let us deal only with the question whether or not, according to Irving, there was a program for the physical liquidation of the Jews. The words that I have just quoted show me a David Irving who answers my questions neither with a yes nor a no. However, by this very fact alone he takes, in my opinion, a courageous position, which must prompt his readers to some reflection since here Irving does not place himself among those who assume the extermination as an established fact. He speaks about it in the conditional mood ("if"). That skepticism or that refusal to commit himself is encountered elsewhere on the same subject in his same presentation. Here are some quotations in which I have added emphasis to certain words.

(p. 42): Hitler was completely in the dark about anything that may have been going on. *And I use these words very closely.*

(p. 53): ... whatever happened at the other end [of this transport movement] *if anything happened at the other end.*...

(p. 57): ... what crimes may or may not have been going on ...

On several occasions David Irving, instead of talking with the degree of certainty that one can obtain from an investigation, prefers to talk about a "feeling" or about "feelings" that one can simply have in "mind":

(p. 42): I would say I am satisfied in my own mind ... I am quite plain about that in my own mind ... I've got the kind of gut *feeling* which suggests to me that that is probably accurate.

(p. 49): And there's no question in my *mind* that ... in my view ...

(p. 50): Now, this fits in with the image that I have built in my own *mind* that ...

I am now going to reproduce in its entirety a passage in which Irving tried to define his position. I emphasize the words in it which seem to me especially worthy of note—either because they frankly show the lack of certainty of the author, or because they call for explanations that are not forthcoming; from this comes the general impression that David Irving is making some accusations which are very serious, and yet about which he himself is not entirely sure, at least at this time. He says, as a matter of fact:

(p. 42): I would say I am satisfied in my own mind that in *various locations* [?], *Nazi criminals* [?] acting *probably* [?] without *direct* [?] orders from above, did carry out liquidations of groups [?] of people including Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, mentally incurable people and the rest. I am quite plain about that in my own mind. I can't prove it, I haven't got into that, I haven't investigated that particular aspect of history but from the documents I've seen, I've got the kind of gut feeling which suggests to me that that is *probably* accurate.

We would love to learn from Irving the facts about precisely how many such "locations" there were and at what geographical points? How many "Nazi criminals" in this matter were there, and what were the specific responsibilities of each? If they acted "probably without direct orders from above," does that mean that they perhaps acted with *indirect* orders or perhaps even without orders at all? What does "from above" mean? About which level(s) of the hierarchy is Irving thinking here, if he is not alluding to Adolf Hitler alone? What were the processes of physical liquidation that were used? How large were those groups of victims? If, on the one hand, Irving has the honesty—rare among historians—to tell us: "I can't prove it, I haven't got into that, I haven't investigated that particular aspect of history" and if, on the other hand, he mentions "the documents I have seen," I can allow myself to deduce the following: David Irving has studied some documents which are not the ones that he would have studied if his research had dealt with the exterminations. In that case, not having carried out research on that aspect, he is not able to say very much about it. He can simply express his "feelings." When he declared to his audience at the Revisionist Conference:

(p. 42): . . . I am sure you realize that I take a slightly different line from several people here. . . .

he is certainly correct, considering that the revisionist researchers have carried out their investigations in a specific area which is not Irving's specific area. Logically speaking, if Irving had been invited to a conference of exterminationist believers (that is, those who uphold the standard "Holocaust" story), he would have been obliged to exercise the same care—the care of the scholarly investigator who knows that he can talk only about what he thinks he has studied.

Elsewhere in his presentation, Irving takes the risk of giving some details about the history, according to him, of the extermination. It is remarkable that his introductory sentence begins this way:

(p. 48): I can summarize my own feelings, having read all the documentation, quite simply by saying that . . .

Here the word "documentation" must, according to Irving's own revelations about his research, be taken in the sense of "non-specific documentation" or "documentation not bearing specifically on the history of the extermination." Since the documentation studied by Irving did not allow him to end up with *proof* ("I can't prove"), it is understandable that he once more uses the word "feelings."

David Irving's Account of the Extermination: Too Much Metaphysics, Not Enough Materialism

Toward the latter part of his presentation Irving offered his version of the history of the extermination. Here are some extracts from his words (I have removed what seemed to me to be irrelevant commentary or digression, and I have emphasized certain words):

(pp. 48-49): . . . *whatever happened gained its own momentum deriving from atrocities which the Nazis did commit, for example, the euthanasia program . . . the killing of the mentally incurable, who occup[ied] the hospital beds that wartime Germany needed—this was an operation that was carried out on Hitler's written instructions. And this generated a certain amount of expertise in killing, there's no question. And there is no question in my mind that some of the personnel who were operating on that program, the T-4 operation, the "Tiergartenstrasse" (the office from which it was conducted), were then automatically injected into the killing operations that a number of local police officials in my view on the Eastern Front in Germany, carried out against Jews and other people who just got in their way.*

What Irving says is in agreement with the exterminationists' narrative. At one end of the chain we have the euthanasia program and, at the other end of the chain, we have a program for the extermination of the Jews and of other categories of possible victims. The object is to demonstrate that there is a sort of logical progression in it. That is hard to believe. To begin with, is a euthanasia program an atrocity or even a crime? I do not believe that one can say that. I notice that today people advocate euthanasia the way others advocate free abortion. The Germans' euthanasia program was back-dated to begin on the very same day (1 September 1939)

on which broke out a terrible conflict that was going to cause horrible physical wounds. Therefore, perhaps it was an acute remembrance of the horrible spectacle of certain seriously wounded men from the First World War deprived of hospital beds that caused Hitler and his men to establish the possibility of putting an end to the intolerable or incurable sufferings not only of those who, just for a vegetable existence or worse, were taking up the valuable hospital space, but in some cases of the most severely, hopelessly wounded returning soldiers themselves. In any event, the matter was serious enough for Hitler personally to sign such an order. Certainly no secret about that could be maintained. The churches protested and the program was abandoned under their pressure and that of German public opinion. This is enough to let us say that when there was a decision of that kind to make, Hitler did not leave the responsibility to others, but took it himself. Moreover, he did so in writing—he signed a document which then served as a point of reference for a mass of orders and measures to be taken as a result. I would add that when decisions were made, after a demanding medical and bureaucratic investigatory process, to put an incurable person out of his misery, the means of death was lethal injection. To convince oneself that there were never any homicidal gas chambers in German hospitals, it is sufficient to refer to the “testimonies” of those who claim that there were such gas chambers in such places. The narratives, uniformly idiotic, can be read, for example, in the recent work by Kogon, Langbein, Rueckerl, et. al., *NS-Massentötungen durch Giftgas: eine Dokumentation* (Nazi Mass Killings by Poison Gas: A Documentation [Frankfurt a/M: S. Fischer Verlag, 1983], 350pp.). Besides, can we imagine the bed-ridden, people at death’s door, some lacking arms or legs, gathering submissively at the entrance to a room where they would have then been left alone with one wash cloth each and a piece of soap (“Seife und Handtuecher,” Kogon, et al., p. 48)—this room that supposedly had been camouflaged as a shower (no doubt for the benefit of the blind)?

I do not know how the act of administering a euthanasiac injection to such persons could have “generated a certain amount of expertise in killing.” I do not see how the existence of an order from Hitler regarding euthanasia would explain the absence of an order from the same Hitler regarding a gigantic undertaking of collective killings. I do not see how Hitler, recoiling before the consequences of his euthanasia order amongst the churches and in German public opinion, could have undertaken a program that would have been outrageously criminal and sure to alienate him from all the churches and all the people on earth, including his own. And, in the case of the Irving thesis (that the immense crime of the “Holocaust” was perpetrated without Hitler knowing about

it), I can understand even less how Germans could have been found who would believe themselves to be so many times stronger and more authority-laden than their Fuehrer as to allow them to carry out the following feat: serving their Fuehrer without his knowledge or that of his police, without the knowledge of the public (beginning with those civilians in arms whom we call military men), without the knowledge of their hierarchical superiors as a whole; undertaking the most demented human effort that one could ever have imagined. Where Hitler had given up or feared to tread, these underlings would triumph on all levels? Does David Irving really expect anyone to believe this? Has Irving made an investigation that would allow him to state that "some of the personnel [from the euthanasia operation] were then automatically injected into the killing operations . . . on the Eastern Front in Germany"? What does "automatically injected" mean? Is there one piece of evidence, one service document, showing that "automatic injection"? What does "some" mean—does it mean a significant number? What was the wording of the assignment-orders of those persons? To what exact area(s) did each of those persons go on that Eastern Front where nearly all the Germans of an age to serve the German armed forces or the German administration were already going? How would competence in handling a syringe provide competence in the handling of homicidal gas—a job which, in the United States today, even requires experts who have at their disposal very sophisticated special installations, and must have very special and extensive training, this just in order to kill one single condemned man at a time? Would Irving refer back to Kriminaloberkommissar Christian Wirth and to the confused "confessions" of Kurt Gerstein? He is too wise, I think, to give any credence, even for a minute, to the content of such confessions.

On p. 49, Irving tries to explain to us the end of his sentence thus: ". . . against the Jews and other people who just got in their [the local police officials'] way." He must sense that this morsel is one of the most difficult to swallow. We were already struggling with vague generalizations in sentences like:

(p. 48): . . . whatever happened . . . gained its own momentum deriving from . . .

or

(p. 49): . . . this generated a certain amount of . . .

or

(p. 49): . . . automatically injected . . .

In those phrases, I seem to see the God of Spinoza in action. As a matter of fact, the extermination is presented to us as a phenomenon which somehow must result from the natural course

of things and must manifest itself one day or another! Here, the act of the Jews and the others meeting their butchers and going to their atrocious deaths seems to be of an immanent character. Let me say in passing—this does not relate to David Irving—that I am struck by the hugely-important place occupied in exterminationist literature by things like metaphysics—the preference, indeed, for the non-material in evidence, for the abstract character of the documentation used, for the stereotyped mythical narrative. Here there seems to exist a holy horror of the exact sciences and what these might tell us.

Why?

The Jews Sent to the East

David Irving says that Berlin sent the Jews to the East without pre-occupying itself too much about their fate. So it was that the Germans who received excessive numbers of them did not know what to do with them. Thus there must have been planted in the minds of certain Germans the idea of undertaking a liquidation of the Jews on a large scale. In support of that thesis, Irving quotes a letter written to Adolf Eichmann on 16 July 1941. The author of that letter wrote that in Posen (Poznan) the German authorities were complaining about the influx of Jews and were asking themselves how to feed them all. The letter in particular is supposed to have contained the following sentences:

(p. 50): We seriously ought to consider whether it is not, whether it would not be the most humane solution, to finish off the Jews, insofar as we can't make use of them as labor, by some kind of fast working method, means which implies some kind of chemical. In any case, it would be far more pleasant than to allow them just to starve to death. [I assume that Irving was here paraphrasing the words of the letter.]

Personally, I cannot make a judgment about that letter until I have re-read it in the German original. I say "re-read" because it seems to me that I have already read it somewhere. Let us suppose that the letter is genuine and that it is correctly translated. (Is the phrase "which implies some kind of chemical" Irving's own interjection within his paraphrase?) Even in that case I see in this letter only the reaction of a man overwhelmed by a serious problem which was already evident in Poland in 1939 and which was going to become the problem of all Europe at war, suffering from a progressive blockade. The author of the letter, and those with him, curse Berlin. As far as they are concerned, Berlin is sending those Jews without bothering about the difficulties in the realms of health, lodging, and feeding which they are going to cause for everyone, beginning with the Jews themselves. It would be more

humane to kill those Jews, by whatever means: by means of work which would hasten their deaths, or by some chemical poison. If that consideration proves anything, it proves precisely that such a method apparently did not exist on 16 July 1941, so far as Eichmann's correspondent knew. Did such a method exist later? Ah, well, it is necessary to engage in serious research in order to know that. This could be the point of departure for an historical investigation. It cannot be a stopping-point or a conclusion.

David Irving compares that letter to Eichmann with the word-for-word transcription of a meeting held at the end of 1941 by Hans Frank, Governor General of Poland, a meeting at which one of the chiefs of the local police complained to Berlin in the following terms:

(pp. 50-51): They are sending out trainloads of people to us. Does Berlin imagine that we are housing them in neat housing estates along the Baltic somewhere? We can't do that. We're just bumping them off as and when they arrive. [This is a free rendering by Irving of a portion of Nuremberg document PS-2233, dated 16 December 1941.]

The Good Faith of Governor Hans Frank, When Confronted by the Infamous Propaganda

I hope that Irving will allow me to quote here a passage from the transcripts of the sessions of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg regarding defendant Hans Frank. To begin with, I will quote Document PS-2233. It consists of excerpts from Hans Frank's official diary as head of the Generalgouvernement of Poland. That diary in its complete version would be 10,000 or 12,000 pages in length. For the Nuremberg tribunal, the excerpts represent only 269 printed pages. You can trust those who chose the excerpts for the IMT; you can trust that they chose everything that could crush Frank. But, in that mountain of various papers, they have not discovered a single page supporting the theory of the extermination and the gas chambers. The page numbered 503 in Vol. XXIX of the blue series (*Trial of the Major War Criminals* [=IMT]) of Nuremberg documents contains the most violent rhetoric against the Jews. In it are these words:

Wir muessen die Juden vernichten, wo immer wir sie treffen . . .
(We must annihilate the Jews wherever [or -always] we encounter them . . .)

But, if we put those words back into their context and into the time in which they were spoken (Cracow, 16 December 1941), we see that they are part of that warrior pathos that one encounters among all political men in a country at war. In his own presentation, Irving has shown very well how it is necessary to put the

words of Hitler back into their context. The same goes for Hans Frank. And when a political figure sees placed before him such and such a word that he spoke at such a moment of great national or international tension, he can in all justice respond in the very same way that Frank responded to his accusers at Nuremberg on 18 April 1946:

One has to take the diary as a whole. You can not go through 43 volumes and pick out single sentences and separate them from their context. I would like to say here that I do not want to argue or quibble about individual phrases. It was a wild and stormy period filled with terrible passions, and when a whole country is on fire and a life and death struggle is going on, such words may easily be used. . . . Some of the words are terrible. I myself must admit that I was shocked at many of the words which I had used. (TMWC, XII, p. 20)

Hans Frank's sincerity cannot be doubted by anyone, I think. He at first pleaded "not guilty." Then, he suddenly began to believe in the worst inventions of Allied war propaganda about the gas chambers and the rest. He was utterly crushed by it. He accused himself of blindness. He thought that Hitler had shamefully deceived him. He sank into Judeo-Christian repentance. During the war, on the basis of rumors of atrocities at Belzec, he had immediately visited that camp. He had met General Globocnik (spelled "Globocznik," TMWC, Vol. XII, p. 18) and he had simply seen some Jews from the Reich and France digging an immense ditch as a protective enclosure; he spoke to some of them and his investigation ended there. At the trial, defense counsel Alfred Seidl ended by asking him, on 18 April 1946: "Did you ever participate in the annihilation of Jews?" Here is Hans Frank's reply. It is pathetic since it shows the man's good faith and the infamous character of the propaganda that had led him to make such a self-accusation:

I say "yes," and the reason why I say "yes" is because, having lived through the 5 months of this trial, and particularly after having heard the testimony of the witness Hoess [three days before] my conscience does not allow me to throw the responsibility solely on these minor people. . . . A thousand years will pass and still this guilt of Germany will not have been erased. (TMWC, Vol. XII, p. 13)

So it was that Frank was duped by the false testimony of Hoess, one of the former commandants of Auschwitz, who had signed his written deposition (document NO-1210 of 14 March 1946; he later signed another deposition, document PS-3868 of 5 April 1946—on which he was interrogated at the IMT) without even knowing what it contained, since he had been beaten so much by his British guards. (Rudolf Hoess, *Kommandant in Auschwitz* [Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1958], p. 145.)

David Irving is Not Certain

On p. 52 of his presentation, David Irving reminds us that even in his private conversations, taken down by a stenographer, Hitler had expressed opinions about the Jews that prove he was completely unaware of a program for exterminating the Jews. And Irving said that those opinions were expressed in the presence of people like Martin Bormann, Reinhard Heydrich, or Heinrich Himmler, who themselves "certainly" knew that there was such a program and such an extermination going on. Irving said:

... he's [Hitler is] saying this to the people who are actually doing the dirty deed. Or who certainly know it's going on.

Here I would like to take the liberty of making an observation. When David Irving says "certainly," that is when he is least certain. This kind of adverb is often used to give weight to what one is not certain of being able to demonstrate. According to Hans Frank and the other defendants at the Nuremberg trial, Hitler was playing a double game. According to David Irving, it was Hitler's entourage that was playing the double game. In reality, the double game never existed. Neither Hitler nor the others were concealing a terrible secret: the one about the program for the extermination of the Jews. That program quite simply did not exist.

How Does David Irving Know That Gypsies Were Exterminated?

On p. 56, Irving presents the physical liquidation of the Gypsies as an established fact. I do not know—he doesn't tell us—what evidence he has for that. Some Gypsies certainly were put into concentration camps, but there were still some troupes of Gypsies giving theatrical and circus performances in Germany even up to the very end. And above all I do not have the impression that the Gypsies are a race that has disappeared from continental Europe, or that by the end of the war they were a race on the way to extinction.

A Mistake About Majdanek

On p. 718 of his *Hitler's War*, David Irving talks about "Majdanek near Treblinka". As a matter of fact, as the crow flies there is a distance of about 110 miles (180 kilometers) between Majdanek, which is located in the vicinity of Lublin, and Treblinka, which is located east of Warsaw. I mentioned Majdanek as one of the six places where exterminationists still persist in saying that there were gas chambers, although Martin Broszat of the Institut

fuer Zeitgeschichte does not mention that camp in his famous letter published by *Die Zeit* on 19 August 1960, and Gerald Reitlinger does not at all seem to believe in the existence of gas chambers in the camp where, he writes, "Es war keine Todesfabrik in der Art von Auschwitz." ("There was no death factory of the kind at Auschwitz." Reitlinger, *Die Endloesung* [Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 4th ed. 1961], p. 332).

Could David Irving Find Those Plans?

On p. 49, Irving makes a remark in passing about Posen (Poznan). He says:

Poznan was the area where several of the major concentration camps which were involved were located.

If he means to say "involved in the extermination," he is in error. The official historians have gradually reduced to five or six the number of so-called extermination camps: Auschwitz (which is in the extreme south of Poland), then Treblinka, Sobibor, Majdanek, and Belzec (all located to the east toward the Russian border), and finally, the closest, Chelmno-on-the-Ner, located about 80 miles to the east of Poznan in the Konin district. The legend claims the presence at Chelmno of some "Stationierte Gaswagen," that is, some "gas-wagons [or -vans] parked there"—some immaterial and magic vans whose appearance the legend's scribes take great care not to show us, except through some children's drawings. I would be very grateful to an excellent investigator like Irving if he could find me a construction plan for one of those gas vans and, at the same time, a plan for Treblinka, a plan for Sobibor, and a plan for Belzec; I do mean a plan—not some kind of "reconstruction from memory by a prosecution witness" in which, quite innocently, so as to make us believe in the existence of homicidal gas chambers in those camps, the designer has drawn in a small rectangle just as innocently labeled "gas chamber[s]." The general public is unaware that people have brought baseless suits against German staff personnel from those camps by making do with imaginary presentations of the locations of the crimes. Some "historians" like Gitta Sereny-Honeyman and Adalbert Rueckerl have had the nerve to publish works about those camps either without showing us any plan, or showing us plans "reconstructed according to the memory of a witness" for the prosecution. Germaine Tillion has done better than that for Ravensbrueck. She provides a plan but discreetly refrains from mentioning to us the *location* of the homicidal gas chamber. Those gas chambers are certainly magic.

The grand prize goes to the camp at Treblinka. In 1945-46, at the main Nuremberg trial, the official truth was held to be that the

camp had had some "steam filled chambers," thirteen in number. With these, the Treblinka Jews were exterminated by means of water vapor. (See Document PS-3311, Charge No. 6 against Hans Frank, Governor General of Poland, TMWC, Vol. XXXII, pp. 154-58.) At a postwar time that I have not yet been able to determine, those *steam* chambers were (magically?) transformed into, and have officially remained, *gas* chambers.

It is Time for David Irving to Begin at the Beginning

Most certainly, every historian—precisely as every person—has the right to change his views, to discard or modify in any way or enlarge upon them. The exercise of this right, which in some persons faced with some situations may also be called a duty, is in fact the foundation-stone of our revisionist history. David Irving has his right; it is up to him alone to determine whether he has also a duty—to his many readers who recognize in him a master historian of World War II with a generally superb command of its sources, and who expect from him precisely what he has stated he is after: the "total truth"; to his peers in historiography—some supportive, some indignant, some just perplexed—who must, as they go about their own tasks, know exactly what they are confronting in him, so that they can compare it with their own lines of inquiry and conclusions, all toward the end of illuminating the problem; ultimately to the world and to history at large.

I will now present a final sentence from David Irving's presentation. On p. 51, after quoting the person who wrote to Eichmann on 16 July 1941, along with a comment from Hans Frank, he addresses himself to the revisionist historians. Using a word that I find very appropriate, he calls them the "dissident" historians. He says:

... it's sufficient to make me suspect that there was some kind of major crime going on at the initiative of the local criminals on the spot. This, I think, is the line that dissident historians should take.

Here is my response to David Irving:

"You are right to be suspicious. In historical investigation, suspicion is the beginning of wisdom. But what you consider to be in some sense a finish line, a line which must be maintained in order to continue the inquiry, I consider to be the starting line. Start with that suspicion if you wish, but do not stop there. Let that suspicion be a stimulus for an investigator like you. Do not hesitate to question it when you need to. You yourself frankly say that you 'haven't investigated that particular aspect of history.' You even say that you 'haven't got into that.' Let someone like me, who has gotten into that subject for many long years and who has

conducted some investigations which few others have conducted, investigations as materialist in character as possible, let me tell you that the moment has come for a historian of your importance to get into the subject and to study it for yourself in your own fashion."

David Irving Should Expand His \$1,000 Offer

I have some other things to say to David Irving:

"I congratulate you for the vigorous terms that you have used in opposing those who persecute free research. In this area I have, unfortunately, a certain advantage over you. If there is one lesson that I have drawn from my experiences in the struggle against that intolerance, it is that one must be inflexible. One must never fear to stand up for what one believes to be true, for the results to which his researches have inexorably pointed, in the face of such an enemy. One must provoke him, flush him out of hiding, and force him into battle. You already have easily provoked him by saying in public that you were ready to offer \$1,000 if someone could bring you wartime documentary proof, for example, that Hitler knew something about a program for the extermination of the Jews. I say this to you: *EXPAND YOUR \$1,000 OFFER. Expand it beyond Hitler. Expand it to cover the other members of the Nazi hierarchy and administration, as high or as low as you want to go: Himmler, Goering, Goebbels, Bormann, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Frank, Heydrich, Kaltenbrunner, Eichmann, Heinrich Mueller, Richard Gluecks, and so on. Do this, and do not fear: You will not lose your \$1,000.*

Raul Hilberg Himself Could Show the Way to David Irving

"For a long time, Raul Hilberg, a sort of scholarly 'Pope' among the exterminationists, the only one for whom I have any sort of intellectual respect (what value is there to sad specimens like Eugen Kogon or Simon Wiesenthal, Adalbert Rueckerl or Martin Gray, Martin Broszat or Filip Mueller, Georges Wellers or Leon Poliakov?) has gone much further than you have. His confusion is not that of a pitiful cheat caught red-handed, *a la* Poliakov. His confusion resembles that of a man who has done an enormous amount of work throughout much of his adult life, only to discover in the final analysis that he had failed to see at the start what a child is capable of seeing: before launching oneself into the realms of theories about events, one must take care to establish the physical realities of the events. *What, concretely, took place?* That is the first question which the historian must do his utmost to answer. Unless he answers that, as definitively as can possibly be

done, then a house of cards—or, to use a term that should be familiar to students of the exterminationist Gerald Reitlinger, a 'house built on sand'—will result. The truth is not easy to find, to be sure, but the truth about actual, physical events is already something more limited, more precise, more accessible. And then, if many people still do not know what the truth is, they might at least know what a lie is. To try to flush the lie out of hiding helps the truth about the events to appear. Raul Hilberg has realized late in life that he did not begin at the beginning and that he was all along too cerebral, too theoretical—and not enough the materialist. I advise you, David Irving, to read the long interview that Hilberg gave to Guy Sitbon, permanent correspondent in the United States for *Le Nouvel Observateur*, published in that paper's issue of 3-9 July 1982 (pp. 70-73, 75, 76). But perhaps it would be easier for you to read the article by George DeWan that appeared in the Long Island, New York, newspaper *Newsday* on 23 February 1983 (p. II-3) under the title 'The Holocaust in Perspective.' Here is a sampling of what Hilberg said about what he calls 'the destruction of the European Jews':

But what began in 1941 was a process of destruction not planned in advance, not organized centrally by any agency. There was no blueprint and there was no budget for destructive measures. They were taken step by step, one step at a time. Thus came about not so much a plan being carried out, but an incredible meeting of minds, a consensus—mind-reading by a far-flung bureaucracy.

One of the Revisionist Conference participants, Dr. Robert John, was present at the presentation given by Hilberg in Lincoln Center's Avery Fisher Hall, on which the *Newsday* article was reporting. He confirmed to me that those statements were in fact made by Hilberg, and that he was surprised by them. For my part, those statements come as no surprise. Hilberg knows very well that if tomorrow you, David Irving, would study the cases of Himmler, Heydrich, Bormann, Frank, Globocnik, and so on, right on down to the case of First Sergeant Otto Moll (gardener in civilian life) who was in charge of the crematories at Birkenau, you would reach the same conclusions as you did about Hitler. Furthermore, Hilberg, restricted by the requirements of a thesis that he has maintained for more than twenty years and now in despair about his case and his cause, is obliged to look for an explanation of a magical kind: the inter-bureaucratic transmission ('mind-reading') of thought. ('Mind-reading.' This is exquisite. And could Hilberg not have paused to consider the associative consequences when, along with this term in the quote given above, he used the word 'incredible'?) You, however, are freer than that. Your hypothesis—which you presented at the Revisionist Con-

ference—has some similarities in form to Hilberg's. But Hilberg has already carried out all of the investigations that you could propose now to make. And we see the result of it: a quasi-metaphysical explanation of the alleged physical extermination of the Jews."

Encountering the Revisionists

AN OUTSIDE-INSIDE REPORT ON THE
1983 INTERNATIONAL REVISIONIST CONFERENCE

ELISABETH KUESTERS

Nazism is dead, and good riddance, with its Fuehrer. What remains today is the truth. Let us dare to proclaim it. The nonexistence of the gas chambers is good news for poor mankind—good news which one would be wrong to suppress any longer.

—Robert Faurisson

For the fifth time since 1979, the Institute for Historical Review held a conference to present and discuss papers on various aspects of twentieth century history—the Holocaust, Hitler's military strategy and war aims, the Nuremberg tribunals, Britain and the partition of Palestine, Zionist political influence, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, and, as a background motif, the various legal problems caused by the publication of their heterodox views on all these subjects and more. In 1979 about 75 people attended the first IHR convention; this year it was up to 150, and I too was in attendance. I had never been to a "revisionist" confab before, and one might well wonder what I was doing there, but this can be explained. First, as a historian I was intrigued by the sheer gall of the most controversial revisionist hypothesis: that the Third Reich had pursued no mass physical extermination policy against the Jews (i.e., there had been few or no gassings in "death" camps). Second, as a collector of prime conspiracy theories, I knew as soon as I heard about this aspect of World War II revisionism that it took the cake and ate it too. Third, as a student, like everyone, of a human nature that grows increasingly slippery, I was drawn to comprehend the logic involved, a logic I felt sure must boil down to the self-serving neo-Nazi reasoning: "Hitler would never have done such thing—but he should have!" or "The Holocaust never happened—let's have a holocaust!"

Fourth, as a journalist I had a story to get. Who were these people and why were they saying these outrageous things? Fifth, finally and most disturbingly, as a postwar citizen I became more and more shocked, the deeper I delved into the questions thrown out by revisionist partisans, by how little I really knew about the era that commands such blind, heated emotional allegiance from us all.

Thus it was that I commuted from Hollywood to Anaheim daily in order to see for myself what was going on here.

Everything in the vicinity of Disneyland has a fantasy theme; I was expecting no less of this conference being held in the hotel directly across from "The Happiest Place in the World." For that matter the whole of Orange County is notorious for its proliferation of fantastic sects, cults and holy warriors, its tax rebels and its survivalists, its bloody born-again bizzaros and its Immortalists, its Armenian terrorists and its Chicano *burguesia*, its UFO contactees and its private space academies. Orange is heresy's home county; no surprise to find the Institute meeting here.

As I entered the conference room, late, a middle-aged gentleman was reading a historical paper on the 1945 British Military Tribunal trial of Dr. Bruno Tesch for supplying Zyklon B to the SS administration of the concentration camps. Zyklon B, in the form of prussic acid crystals, was used as an insecticide in the U.S. in the '20s and by the Germany army from 1924 until the advent of DDT in 1944. It is also the agent claimed to be the gas used in specially-constructed chambers adjoining crematoria in camps like Auschwitz, where up to 2,000 people at a time, day and night, were herded together to die—according to "eyewitnesses."

Many revisionists have devoted themselves to picking apart these "eyewitness" testimonies, and this provides some background to Dr. William B. Lindsey's remarks about the Tesch trial. Arthur Butz in *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century* (1976), and Paul Rassinier in *Le Passage de la Ligne* (1949), *Le Mensonge d'Ulysse* (1950), *Le Drame des Juifs Européens* (1964), *Ulysse Trahi par les Siens* (1961), and *Le véritable proces Eichmann* (1962)—the first three translated and collated into *Debunking the Genocide Myth* (1978), the last one translated as *The Real Eichmann Trial* (1979)—have pointed out not only contradictions tending to weaken or invalidate the testimonies, but on broader grounds have questioned whether Zyklon B could have been used to gas people at all. Most complete on the latter angle is Robert Faurisson in various articles published in 1980-82 in *The Journal of Historical Review*. Revisionists think that Zyklon B's use against typhus-bearing lice in the camps was the genesis of the rumor, later to become mass hysteria, that it was actually for killing people. The symbolism of shaving heads to get rid of lice-infested

hair only heightened the prisoners'—and the postwar writers'—sense of doom. The clothes hangers in the 10-cubic-meter fumigation chambers for clothing and bedding were transmogrified into "meathooks," and so forth.

Zyklon B released cyanide gas on contact with water vapor (or air) and was very persistent—that is, it would condense on the walls of the fumigation chambers unless the internal temperature of these was kept quite high, and 24 hours was required for safe ventilation. Yet many sworn accounts portray the SS or prisoner *Sonderkommandos* entering gas chambers without masks to extract bodies a mere half to one hour after all victims were certifiably dead. Zyklon B was also flammable and could not be used near open flame. Furthermore, any chamber that could hold a few hundred people, much less the 1,000-2,000 often claimed, would have had to be immense, constructed of steel, and airtight—or else the killers would have killed themselves as well. The ramshackle wooden "bunkers" at Auschwitz-Birkenau could not have done the job, and the much-photographed gas chamber at Dachau, toured by U.S. Congressmen and Nuremberg prosecutors, was actually installed by the Americans for propaganda purposes after the camp's liberation. It is now agreed from Tel Aviv to Washington and even Moscow that there were no death camps or gas chambers in Germany proper. But this did not prevent witnesses from coming forth to testify that there were. Paul Rassinier remarked "that a whole is composed of details, and that an error of detail, whether made in good or bad faith . . . must logically make the observer doubt the reliability of the whole; and if there are many errors in detail . . . ?"

This entire "undertaking" to refute the dead seems macabre, and I can't do more than touch on a few of the objections here; one can imagine the overall effect. What of these dead, the mute six million—or is it six million? The living all disagree on the numbers involved; it is a matter of conjecture and not of record. Even Holocaust proponents (those who uphold the standard Holocaust story) have offered differing figures, ranging from one million to eleven million. Revisionists agree on one thing: if one begins with the Jewish population of Western and Eastern Europe before the war, and then subtracts survivors, emigres, refugees, and those left unmolested, the remainder is not six million. Of the remainder (dead) they do admit, revisionists estimate that the majority died of typhus and other diseases, from "executions" due to subversive activities, from Allied bombings, and in the horrific chaos of the German collapse.

Arthur Butz is an associate professor of electrical engineering and computer sciences at Northwestern University, and Paul Rassinier was a French geographer and socialist interned by the

Nazis at Buchenwald and Dora from 1943 to 1945, who upon returning home made it his mission to expose what he called "résistantialisme": the extravagantly exaggerated and vengeful stories of deportees—and collaborators as well—about what they had suffered and done in the name of La Libération. For instance, rumor in the camps had it that if you were "selected" for a "transport" to another area, this was code for "going to be gassed." But Rassinier wrote that he met men after the war who had been "selected" and *had* in fact been transported to other camps, where their labor was more needed or their illnesses could be treated. Rassinier also contributed his own working model of the concentration camps: the *Haftlingsfuehrung*, composed largely of German communist prisoners (some inherited from Weimar Republic jails), essentially ran the camps with little SS supervision. Without these "trusties," Rassinier contended, the camps would have been ungovernable. They made sure their own comrades were well fed and taken care of; "the miserable mass of the prisoners" made do with whatever was left over. Hundreds of sick inmates died in the typhus blocks because the *Haftlingsfuehrung* was so eager to preserve a "precious nucleus" of politically-correct individuals to inherit the postwar order. More on Butz, Rassinier, "false witness" and lethal gases below.

Dr. William B. Lindsey was basically following the objections raised by these two revisionist authors in his defense of Tesch. It is difficult to take notes on such readings; for the exact texts of exactly who said what, one must look up the issues of *The Journal of Historical Review* where the papers are published. In addition I was scanning the room through the cigar smoke to see just who was on the scene. A preponderance of older white males, a handful of old Germans, some Canadians, not many women, some very WASP-type younger people. The crowd greeted mention of some of the wider discrepancies between the Nuremberg testimony and their own beliefs with low laughter, but there was an awkwardness in the air—typical, I thought, of reserved middle-class WASPs. Later the atmosphere grew more convivial but at first I spoke to no one, feeling awkward myself, lacking the killer instinct of the true Total Journalist—and also a bit scared off the scent by what the conference organizer told me. "We don't want the press in here," Tom Marcellus said. "They might harass our speakers and then just write some dumb sensational piece calling us a bunch of Nazis. We've got no use for that." I promised not to start a riot (but Nazi is as Nazi does, and Nazism is in the eye of the beholder, so I made no promises on that score). To avoid riotousness, I simply shut up.

A considerable amount of reading, re-reading, historical re-orientation, suspension of disbelief and sheer heretical élan is

called for in thinking about this stuff. I've already summarized in a rudimentary way two of the underlying revisionist themes Lindsey touched on—the “physical and chemical impossibility” of gas chambers using Zyklon B, and Rassinier's insight into how the indisputable horror of *l'enfer organisé* (the organized hell) of the camps was actually administered. A third theme which may help break the mass down into more manageable quanta is the contention that the Nuremberg trials were rigged and riddled with illegal procedures. Butz's book attempts at length and in detail to prove irregularities, from the treatment (including torture) of defendants, to the determination and admission of evidence, to the selection of witnesses, prosecutors and defense attorneys, to the overall political object of the trials: the crushing of Germany as a nation among nations, and of National Socialism as a political philosophy among political philosophies. He investigates the backgrounds of War Crimes Branch figures such as David Marcus and Robert M.W. Kempner and concludes that the various tribunals were mere kangaroo courts run on a predetermined verdict: the Third Reich was guilty, period, of mass crimes against humanity. Any defendant who wished to mitigate his own sentence had to testify to the existence of these intentional crimes; those who didn't were simply hung out to dry. Before his suicide Goering told an American interrogator: “I doubt if it was six million, but as I've always said, it is sufficient if only five percent of it is true . . .”

(Naturally, I thought, the judgments rendered at Nuremberg have to be impugned if the Germans are to be “rehabilitated”; how else could the special horror we reserve for them be undermined? After all, our entire postwar consensus on Good and Evil is based upon the evidence presented at these trials. If the judgments hold up, so must our horror. And if I found myself listening carefully to the revisionists, it was not so much doubt as my own ignorance that made me hold my breath.)

A mobile mike was produced to catch questions from the floor between speakers. After Lindsey's speech the dean of French revisionists, Robert Faurisson, who was due to deliver his own talk the next day, noted that the only ones who could have defended Tesch at Nuremberg were people in the metal products industry who knew the properties of Zyklon B, and none of them was called to the stand. Faurisson gave an example of testimony that was allowed due to the vindictive anti-German atmosphere. A witness who'd sworn to “17 tons of gold” extracted from camp inmates' teeth, when questioned on this surprising figure, retorted: “When it is done by *German science*, I am never surprised!”

OK, so far: thought-provoking. A couple of times, though, “people of a certain persuasion” were mentioned, causing a light rip-

pling chuckle. In-jokes, I thought: easy means of making people feel camaraderie, of creating a bond among them. (Like on the Left, where my first act of integration with the sect I came briefly to call home was to start laughing at its crude caricatures of rival sects.) Not being Jewish, I didn't feel cut to the quick by them, but I noted them, and weighed them. I wondered how many others in the room were wary of snide anti-Semitic asides. "None dare call it Aryan" ran through my mind, and although I eventually found that most of the crowd could not be bothered about such ephemera as "Aryan" or "Semitic," these ephemera nonetheless have some substance, and due care must be exercised. On the other hand, Roald Dahl criticized the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in a recent interview, and now his TV programs have been banned from Israeli television as "anti-Semitic." So "due care" need not mean "Lie down and play dead every time someone decides to call you names."

Actually the background to the snide asides is concrete as well as metaphysical: the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) of B'nai B'rith has put the word out on the Institute, and the Jewish Defense League has made life physically unpleasant for more than one revisionist. Considerable secrecy was maintained about the conference site lest the JDL decide to send a commando squad to raid it. So behind the scenes there rages a small guerrilla war whose skirmishes—thus far—have been petty and rather absurd.* In fact I myself was put on the spot at one point because the door-watcher didn't catch sight of my badge as I exited—off to call in the commandos, no doubt. Uncool of him, but not entirely off the mark; to any True Believer I might well qualify as a Mole or a Stooge.

The next speaker was historian Dr. Robert John, co-author of *The Palestine Diary* (for which Arnold Toynbee wrote the foreword). His topic was how the Balfour Declaration of 1917 came about, whereby Britain pledged to partition Palestine between Arabs and Zionists. The first international congress of Zionism, called by Theodore Herzl in 1897, dedicated itself to "strengthening Jewish national sentiment and consciousness" against the trend toward assimilation. Herzl was willing to negotiate with any power—Papacy, Sultanate, British Crown, Kaiser, Czar—to gain a Jewish homeland. The Jews would win Palestine, he felt, "not from goodwill, but from the jealousy of the powers." (Emphasis mine—and Robert John's.) American Zionist financiers, by backing various loans, had got the Germans to promise them Palestine; with the Balfour Declaration they shifted

*Since this was written, the offices of the Institute for Historical Review in Torrance, California were destroyed in an arson blaze that was set in the early-morning hours of 4 July 1984. Damage was estimated by police at \$400,000. No suspects have as yet been apprehended.—Ed.

their support to the British—a maneuver Hitler exploited as a *Dolchstoß*, “stab in the back.”

John's discussion, I thought, raised a point fatal to any conspiracy theory of “world Jewish domination”: If Jews really wanted to run the world, why should they agitate for a homeland? This contradiction is so obvious it inspired the young Surrealist Robert Desnos to the rather comic extreme of his *Pamphlet contre Jerusalem* (1925): “Judas's 30 pieces of silver were not given in vain. You have saved them to buy back those rare things worthy of salvation. Don't waste them in reclaiming sentimental real estate. . . . It is necessary that the Israelites remain in exile . . . as long as this Latin, Greek, Anglo-Saxon, German spirit is not crushed, this most terrible menace to the Spirit.”

At any rate, what John argued was that Zionists used World War I as they would later (most successfully) use World War II: as a situation or diversion out of which to obtain Palestine over Arab objections. On the second try, the Holocaust both fact and fiction became the “founding myth” of Israel, the old dream of Zion, at once proving the necessity of a Jewish state, silencing any opposition to the dispossession of the Palestinians, and assuring the new state a treasury-full of reparations payments from Germany. John closed his speech with a denunciation of the modern world order, an order which ordains that “\$625 for every Israeli man, woman and child will be transferred from American taxpayers during 1983 alone” in what he called “the game of Israel.” That does seem rather a lot of money but I can't see going to war over it. However dubiously Israel may have been established (see Alfred Lilienthal, *The Zionist Connection*), the Jews of Europe did, after all, need somewhere to go once it had been so spectacularly demonstrated that their fellow Europeans cared very little about their fate. (E.g., during the war the Reich Foreign Office discovered it had “requisitioned” too many Romanian Jews for forced labor, and asked their government if it wanted them sent back. “Oh no, don't bother!” the Romanians blithely replied.)

Next, Friedrich P. (Fritz) Berg, according to his introducer “another scientist who has something to tell the historians,” spoke on “Diesels, Gas Wagons, and Zyklon B.” Berg, who has a strong New Jersey accent, petitioned the National Broadcasting Corporation for equal time after the “Holocaust” television miniseries was broadcast, and lost. His angle of attack on the “crackpot, harebrained contraptions” which “for forty years” have rested unchallenged in the popular horror pantheon as “Nazi Gas Chambers” differed somewhat from that of Butz and others, in that Berg addressed the charge that the *Einsatzgruppen* (roving SS mop-up units behind the lines of the eastern front), as well as the first tentative gassings at the regular death camps, used *diesel* ex-

haust fumes for mass murder. One of the major "witnesses" to diesel gassing was Kurt Gerstein, an SS officer who committed suicide while in Allied custody after the war. (His body was never produced, but his statement, in six different versions and three different languages, was.)

Berg used visual aids drawn from his automotive engineering and environmental-analysis background to make several points. Gerstein had spoken of wooden doors, windows, a period of one half hour (which he timed) for the fumes to induce death, and corpses that had turned *blue*. American studies of carbon monoxide (CO) accumulation in auto tunnels yield a number of base statistics. An accumulation of .06% CO will produce no more than a headache in the course of several hours, but an accumulation of .35% is sufficient to cause death in just under an hour. Following "Henderson's Rule" that for any given toxic effect, if you halve the time you must double the dose, death in half an hour would require a concentration of about .7% CO.

Diesel engines run clean compared to gasoline engines, making the former, in Berg's words, "an inherently ludicrous choice." Idling, diesels cannot produce enough CO to cause a headache in the time described by the Gerstein and other statements, even supposing the structures described were perfectly sealed; at "peak load," as in a heavy vehicle straining uphill, one type of diesel engine available in the '40s *could* have produced sufficient CO—just before the strain burnt it out. Perhaps other gases present in diesel exhaust were lethal—hydrocarbons, aldehydes, carbon dioxide itself? Not possible, said Berg, although they are responsible for the smell which makes diesel exhaust *seem* dangerous. Perhaps the lack of oxygen? Oxygen is also present in diesel exhaust. What could have killed them? Not CO, either: victims of CO poisoning turn "cherry red," not blue, according to Berg.

Why, he went on, did witnesses speak of diesel engines/fumes when a far likelier candidate for "extermination vans" already existed close at hand: "producer gas vehicles," 3,000 of which were in use in Germany prior to World War II? By 1941 150,000 of these "gas wagons," propelled by solid fuel (such as wood chips or coal) consumed in a rear burner and sucked as a gas into the forward engine, were in service throughout German-occupied territory. (General Motors was a major manufacturer of these.) For the autarkic and oil-deficient Reich, synthetic and non-liquid fuels were a top strategic priority. "The intensity of development and widespread use of these vehicles in Nazi-occupied Europe" seems to Berg to indicate "a serious flaw in the Holocaust theory." Gas wagons emitted very dangerous clouds of poisonous gas which were highly explosive, and it took "art and skill" to ignite their burners. Why then do the standard Holocaust accounts describe

"gassings" in ordinary military trucks? Why haven't the gas wagons, the producer gas vehicles—so lethal, in contrast to both regular vehicles and diesels—been implicated in a single Holocaust horror story? Why did Eichmann, the SS transport specialist, or Himmler and other SS commanders itching to implement the Final Solution, not hit upon using these very effective gassing machines?

Another anomaly, Berg continued, is this: Why did the Reich use scarce rail transport to ship its victims from Bucharest, Posen (Poznan) and Budapest, for example, all the way to Auschwitz for gassing, when near Bucharest, Posen and Budapest there already stood enormous fumigation buildings, huge versions of the clothing-decontamination units in use at all the camps and military installations? These buildings could fumigate entire trains that had passed through typhus-infested regions; better candidates for gas chambers would be hard to imagine.

A final anomaly noted by Berg: The shower bath at Dachau, now agreed to have been inoperative for gassing, was eventually "supposed" to be used for that purpose had not the end of the war prematurely intervened. Yet it could easily have been converted into a gas chamber all along by being hooked up with the adjacent clothes-fumigation chamber. The same holds true for the rest of the admitted non-death camps (i.e., the camps in Germany itself). Why was this not done?

It seemed to me initially that Berg had made a breach in the anti-Zyklon B argument here. Was he saying that there *could* have been gas chambers, but there just . . . weren't? Contacted afterward, he replied that the SS certainly knew exactly how to use Zyklon B since they had their own school for pesticide experts. And by speeding up the evaporation of cyanide from the granules with a superior ventilation system, the SS might indeed have been able to devise a safe and foolproof method for killing with it. "The problem is, if you used Zyklon B in the ways *alleged*, it wouldn't have worked. The descriptions in the Holocaust legend are completely different—and fantastic. Maybe someone will come along and change them now, but after 40 years changing the story won't be too believable. You wonder," he laughed, "how all those people like Elie Wiesel and Simon Wiesenthal survived all their years in the camps with the SS trying to kill them off every day! The only explanation is that *no one was trying to kill them.*" And: "the official descriptions are off because the witnesses *did not really see these things.* They heard about them from others, who heard about them from others . . ."

The master of ceremonies next introduced British historian David Irving by reading from a "Special Backgrounder" on him issued by the ADL to its regional offices. God knows how the IHR

got hold of it. The ADL terms Irving "a leading neo-Nazi" due shortly in the States, and instructs: "Should he surface in your region, please notify the fact-finding department and your civil rights coordinator." My own awareness of Irving was not in his capacity as alleged leading neo-Nazi but as a pretty well-known and well-received historian, author of *The Destruction of Dresden*, *Hitler's War*, the recent *Uprising!* (on Hungary 1956), *The Secret Diaries of Hitler's Doctor*, and an upcoming biography of Winston Churchill. Eliot Fremont-Smith, book reviewer for the *Village Voice*, has gone quite soft on Irving lately. I was unaware that the *Voice* had any neo-Nazi leanings.

Looking back on it, I must admit that David Irving's speech appealed directly to the Romantic Historian in me. "My ambition is to write the total truth," he announced—rather splendidly, I felt. He is a man of passion and of scorn, a tall, exceedingly florid man with a dramatic and eloquent delivery. Sort of the two-fisted intellectual, thriving on controversy and fond of making public splashes—most recently during the Hitler Diaries farce in Spring 1983. Evidently he'd bought some fake Hitleriana from the same source as *Der Stern* had, and having determined his were ersatz—"In this business fakes are thrust at one from every side!"—he was one of the first historians to dismiss the "diaries." His new book on Churchill, written in light of what we now know about ULTRA, ENIGMA, and the Allies' clandestine "war of deception"—and also in light of what Irving found in Churchill's desk appointment book, which he "rented" for 5,000 pounds from the thief trying to sell it to him—should prove to be eye-opening. "No surprise to us, but a surprise to the world at large, ladies and gentlemen."

Irving "rambled" in an energetic, thoroughly methodical manner. He clearly was displeased—though at the same time somewhat amused—to be a bugbear of the ADL. "Addressing you today, ladies and gentlemen, brings me one step closer to a boycott by Madison Avenue," he said somberly. Although he is published by Macmillan and Doubleday, his latest book, *Uprising!*, was dropped by Putnams, apparently because of its central treatment of anti-Semitism. That is, Irving had determined that what happened in 1956 bore all the features of a pogrom: "The Hungarians are an anti-Jewish race compared to whom the Nazis were as pure as the driven snow." The four top commissars and much of the secret police and officer corps instated by Moscow after World War II had been communists and hence were trusted by the Soviets. The commissars were all Jewish—a fact mentioned bitterly by many of the escaped revolutionaries when debriefed by CIA interrogators and psychiatrists after the revolt. (Irving's research corroborated those findings.) By 1956 one quarter of the

Hungarian population had been jailed at one time or other; people lived in a state of hopeless desperation. If your father had followed the wrong profession, a mark on your dossier ensured that you got nowhere in the professions, the universities, or politics. Deep in the bowels of Budapest there was, people believed, a "meat-mincing machine" for the corpses of enemies of the State—an example of how "even the most absurd stories" seem credible to the oppressed, observed Irving. (Also a characteristic horror-fantasy Christians recurrently have about the Jews, and vice-versa.) However, there are those who deem anti-Semitic even a discussion of events traceable to anti-Semitism—Putnams, for instance.

I must leave out lots of interesting stuff about how research from primary sources is done ("Go for the handwritten documents the other historians avoid" was one bit of advice) in order to convey the chief convergence and chief divergence Irving's oeuvre has with Holocaust revisionism. His military history, *Hitler's War*, researched for 15 years, concludes that Hitler did not know about or sanction any mass extermination program. No orders, approvals, plans or blueprints for implementation exist to link him with a Final Solution of extermination. There are references to *Ausrottung der Juden* and *dieses Volk umzubringen* (destroying these people) in a speech Himmler is said to have given at Posen in 1943, the text of which was found in Alfred Rosenberg's files, but that's about it. On the other hand, the Reich euthanasia policy was initiated on written orders from Hitler. (It was terminated after concerted protests by German clergymen.) Could the extermination order have been a verbal understanding of the kind Kitchener is said to have employed against Boer prisoners in South Africa? If so, the chain of command must have been breached many times, if the Nuremberg defendants are to be believed; it is difficult to imagine how such a gigantic plan systematically to eliminate millions could have been implemented on so informal a basis.

Nonetheless, Irving admits that Hitler had "uncorked the bottle" and was hard put to recapture the "genie" he'd let loose. *Kristallnacht* 1938 was such a case: a German secretary at the embassy had fallen to a Jewish assassin in Paris and Goebbels gave a rabble-rousing speech that touched off "the night of broken glass." He hoped thereby to be restored to the Fuehrer's good graces, as he was in disfavor owing to a certain scandalous *amour*. To Goebbels' horror, the plan backfired, and he had to stay up all night calling off the "outrage" after Hitler was informed of it.

It is obvious that David Irving is impressed with the man whose career he studied for so many years. He considers Hitler "a rather weak boss" but an excellent military mind who "repeatedly outwitted Churchill." At one point he referred to Hitler as "intellectually honest" and at another as "the Jews' greatest friend in

[Nazi] Germany." My instincts were to deride those remarks, but by this time I felt I could no longer trust my instincts: they weren't well enough informed.

Insofar as Hitler's nonauthorization of a Holocaust is maintained, Irving's view coincides with that of revisionism. But Irving finds it quite possible, even probable, that certain "criminal elements" in the SS did take it upon themselves in various localities in the East to authorize the shooting and/or gassing of prisoners. He says he "can't prove it" but has "a gut feeling," grounded in the principle that where there's smoke there's fire. In other words, the wildfire wartime rumors codified into Established Historical Fact at Nuremberg could not have been concocted out of thin air but must have been based on isolated incidents of "undesirables" being "liquidated."

Either the guilt lay with SS criminals, then, or else—perhaps also—it resulted from a breakdown in the ability of certain camps to support their deportee allotments; here Irving cites a memorandum from the General Government (the Nazi authority in occupied Poland) to Eichmann requesting some "fast-acting means" to finish off deportees "who will otherwise starve." Yet extermination was never the intended goal of the deportations, Irving believes—e.g., the big project to remove Jews to Madagascar was dropped the moment the Eastern territories were seized in 1941, whereupon construction of resettlement and labor camps proceeded apace. Therefore one might conclude that the "banality of evil" was in truth more banality than evil, thus resolving Hannah Arendt's celebrated but unenlightening oxymoron.

Evidently some members of the audience didn't care to hear any concession whatever to the "Holocaust legend," but David Irving received a standing ovation anyway. For the middle-aged rightists in attendance, "exposure" of the Holocaust may be primarily a new, more sophisticated structure from which to fly their old banner of America Betrayed. For the elderly Germans, there doubtless exists a still more immediate self-interest. For others, it represents the amplifying confirmation of a conspiratorial sense of the universe, a universe where even the Sun is conspiring to ditch us eventually. For others, the opportunity to question the givens and the received ideas about this crucial, reverberating period offers a chance to overcome static, dead-end banalities like "the banality of evil." It is far more stimulating to determine for oneself a coherent picture of what happened, to devise for oneself an explanation that better explains this "inexplicable" world war. As for me, someone asked if I were "convinced yet." I answered that I had no intention of becoming "convinced" or of converting to some alternative version of events simply because my faith in the old one had been shaken—that what threw me most was how

vulnerable my dogmatic version had been to a few well-placed kicks; I planned for this reason to take a vacation from "conviction" for some time to come.

Not that there is one single, unitary "alternative version" available from the revisionists, in any case. Opponents of this heresy will be heartened to learn how riven with schisms the young upstart already is. For instance, Robert Faurisson opened his talk with a critical response to David Irving. "Dahveed Earveeng saze, Eatlair deent know wot appen at Auschwitz. I esk Dahveed Earveeng, whot appent at Auschwitz???", he chided in a real "Com wit' me to zee Casbah" French accent. Irving had already departed, but to say that this group is not averse to mutual criticism would be putting it mildly. One exception is the reverence Faurisson reserves for Arthur Butz. (Butz didn't attend this year because "eleven years of Holohoax are too many for somebody who does not have the temperament of an historian.") And they all revere Paul Rassinier, but (or because) he's been dead since 1967.

Following are the highlights of Faurisson's talk, which covered the two civil suits and one penal suit filed against him in France. Faurisson has always been "revisionist," although until the abrupt admission in 1960 by Martin Brozsat, the current director of the Munich Institut fuer Zeitgeschichte, that there had been no death camps on German soil, he had confined his heterodoxy to reconsiderations of Rimbaud and Lautréamont. A bright-eyed, wiry, Celtic-looking man, he seems not to have been bowed by "The Faurisson Affair," which has cost him thousands of francs in legal fees, his position in literature at the University of Lyon-2 (he retains the post but cannot teach), and at times his health.

Most Americans first heard of the Affair when a flap arose over Noam Chomsky having written the introduction to Faurisson's *Mémoire en Défense* (Memory on the Defensive) in 1978. Chomsky defended Faurisson against the charge of anti-Semitism and avowed that he was no worse than a freethinker hounded by zealots. People were shocked that a Jew could condone denial of what M. Hirsh Goldberg has called "one of the touchstones of modern Jewry," the Holocaust. But Chomsky was not alone: soon rallying to Faurisson's side were Jean-Gabriel Cohn-Bendit (Danny the Red's brother) and other Jewish leftists, as well as two Jewish members of France's Centre Nationale de Recherche Scientifique. One of the latter testified that Faurisson was no Nazi, but rather part of "a revolution in historical research." Journalist Gitta Sereny ruefully called them "young, eager, and even attractive acolytes."

In the first suit, nine organizations banded together to accuse *Mémoire en Défense* and *Vérité historique ou Vérité politique*? (co-

authored by Serge Thion) of "racial defamation and incitement to racial hatred." The plaintiffs sent three lawyers to Poland in quest of extermination proof, but they came back empty-handed, according to Faurisson. Eventually he was convicted of "personal injury" but not "falsification of history." This epoch, instructed the court, was still "too sorrowful, too burning." One must "wait for time to calm people's minds." Exclaimed Faurisson: "How long am I supposed to wait?"

The whole Faurisson Affair has been conducted in unique Parisian fashion. Paris is a richly incestuous milieu where resistants and collaborators, existentialists and Catholic humanists, Trotskyites and Stalinists all know, revile, and, often, ultimately forgive one another. Faurisson first convinced his own lawyer of the thesis that gas chambers never existed; the lawyer was then reproached by his friends on the prosecuting side: "How you have changed!" One prosecutor cried out in court, "Monsieur Faurisson, you haunt my nights!" Another burst into tears and had to be helped home by his wife when—upon appeal of his first conviction—Faurisson was found innocent of "lying," "false research," and generally being an impostor. "Faurisson is not a liar," quoth the appeals court. "But he is, perhaps, a troublemaker." The son of Simone Veil, president of the European Parliament in addition to having been listed among those gassed at Birkenau, was one of the prosecuting attorneys; Faurisson came upon him one day at a café, head sunk in his hands, and proceeded to lecture the disconsolate young man on "historical truth." And so on. Quaint personal touches foreign to those of us in anonymous mass societies.

The second civil suit was filed by Léon Poliakov, author of a number of standard Holocaust histories. Faurisson had claimed that Poliakov "manipulated" the Gerstein statement and the Auschwitz diaries of Dr. Johann Paul Kremer, making interpolations and changes in them which amounted to forgery. (Like almost all revisionist revelations, this doubt was first sown by Rassinier, nemesis of "the extermination mystique.") Poliakov sued for libel "under heavy pressure from his friends," we were told. His court strategy centered on proofs that Gerstein—who in death has become a sort of SS saint, a "spy for God"—really existed. This point Faurisson did not contend and considered moot, adding that "Gerstein's grotesque 'revelations' " were not in any case credited by those who heard them during the last years of the war.

The court found Poliakov's interpolations and alterations "annoying but not serious," and convicted Faurisson of libel. At this point the story of the various judgments and appeals began to confuse me. The Poliakov verdict was never published, although the

plaintiff had the right to make Faurisson pay for this to be done; the appeals court on the penal suit, in which Faurisson was also convicted, let stand part of the conviction but eliminated the stipulation that he pay for prime-time TV and radio readings of the verdict (about \$600,000 worth). In April of 1982 Pierre Vidal-Naquet and Poliakov formed a group called ASSAG to assemble all "verifiable data" on killings by gas—this, although they had testified that such evidence is already overwhelmingly available. Simone Veil, in further self-contradiction, announced that "no proof and no witness exist because the Germans suppressed them all." She herself was deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau; was she, too, "suppressed"? "I don't think they are going to sue me any more," Faurisson concluded.

What could make a man give up his career and social position for an idea? Raw, naked anti-Semitism would seem insufficient cause. Vidal-Naquet has likened Faurisson's stance to W. Arens' denial, in *The Man-Eating Myth*, that human cannibalism ever existed; his implications are that one can become addicted to "revising," that denial is one classic method of dealing with complex or troublesome historical problems, and that "the university prestige game" may be a factor. In Faurisson's case the last factor, if it was a factor, would appear to have backfired. In an interview with *Libération* (reported in *Harper's*, December 1981), Faurisson himself explained that "While studying Greek and Latin, I was corrected thousands of times for mistakes in translation, which made an indelible impression on me. I told myself that we have eyes to see and ears to hear, but that we nonetheless keep getting things wrong."

Here perhaps is some insight, at least, into what keeps such "crusaders" going. We have all noticed our remarkable human ability to see things we never saw and hear things we never heard, to fabricate "memories" of things we have been told of and never ourselves experienced. This phenomenon has been explored by Jacques Vallee in *Passport to Magonia* (a universal mythography of UFO sightings), Jan Harold Brunvald's *The Vanishing Hitchhiker: American Urban Legends and Their Meaning*, and other studies. People don't need to lie—they frequently can't help but lie. At times it seems the mind is no "window onto the universe" but a mere self-serving illusion machine designed to keep us blissful in our ignorance. Courtrooms must go to great lengths to check and crosscheck sworn testimony; imagine how much more intense these metaphysical mirages become under wartime conditions.

In any event this is how Faurisson views the problem. If critical re-evaluation arrives at truths which incommode the prevailing views of established Truth, so be it; this cannot be helped and must be faced squarely if History as written by the victors (the "in-

corrigible" victors, as Rassinier called them) does not stand up to scrutiny after time has "calmed people's minds" enough to permit such re-evaluation. He defends himself against the charge that his work "objectively lends itself to neo-Nazism" by declaring: "I take no responsibility for the political views of those who publish [my work]." To the extent that applying a corrective to the human capacity for self-deception is his motive, I don't believe Faurisson's revisionism is a noxious thing. Moreover, censorship in the hope that this heresy will "go away" only acts, and has already acted, to convince the heretics they're onto something big—and perhaps to convince others of the same thing as well.

With that last observation, I will close with a few more comments about what makes revisionists tick. Some just tick along as they always have because they are associated with the Liberty Lobby, a right-wing outfit whose boss, Willis Carto, publishes the weekly *Spotlight* and is the behind-the-scenes counseling voice at the Institute for Historical Review. Other revisionists are Libertarians politically and thus dislike the Far Right. Still others are unaffiliated ex-Marxists. Yet others are a- or antipolitical. I gleaned this at lunch on the last day. Though it's hard to eat and scoff at the same time, my table was manned with dining scoffers scratching each other's surfaces to bare deep differences. Gary Allen, author of *None Dare Call It Conspiracy*, sat to my left; to my right Dr. James J. Martin, venerated as a Libertarian historian (he prefers to call himself "an advanced Stirnerite with anarchist tendencies") expounded his theories straight through to dessert. The Liberty Lobby's Dr. Martin A. Larson discoursed on the "impending great catastrophe" of the money system. "But a rolling loan gathers no loss, does it?" quipped Allen.

Who are these people, I thought? Well, for the most part they seemed rather nice. Regular people, pleasant but low-key. More than one told me they felt that exposure of the Holocaust as "the most astounding mass psychosis in human history" (in the introductory words of the master of ceremonies) would "help Jews most of all" by liberating them from the traumatic burden of paranoid distortions. What I found most often was a sort of taboo-phobia. As one man put it: "I'd rather believe it's possible the earth is flat than believe it's round in the same way I used to 'believe in' the Holocaust."

Cui bono? If the Holocaust story as it stands has benefited Israel financially and the Soviet Union politically (by keeping West Germany hamstrung in Europe), it has certainly not benefited my Jewish friends, who are all to some degree traumatized by its horror. "The real horror is enough," argues Faurisson. "It is useless to add anything to it." Admittedly one motive for hoping Revisionism is "onto something," big or not, is the longing to

disbelieve that humans are capable of such atrocities—"good news for poor mankind," indeed, mankind so cruelly maligned. . . . Several people at the conference told me they believed Revisionism would "help Jews most of all." But in the back of the mind is that longing, that great yearning to be free at last of man's inhumanity to man.

We can all agree with Winston Churchill that "In war-time, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies." Yet we have a right and an obligation to demobilize this bodyguard once the wars are over. If this was not accomplished completely right or shortly after World War II, we are nevertheless going to be "demobed" more and more insistently from now on, either by revisionism or other forces, until the process is complete. The Holocaust is not mythical but it may have been mythologized, perhaps to a considerable extent, and it will become increasingly difficult to quell doubt with dogma in this regard. Grin and bear it, ladies and gentlemen—the repressed has returned.

Ronald Reagan's Political and Cultural Folklore

THE PURITAN AND FRONTIER TRADITIONS
AND THE 'THIRD HALF OF THE PIE'

DARRYL HATTENHAUER

This article focuses on the American dominant culture's world view implicit in Ronald Reagan's politics. Taking a New Left approach to cultural history, it assumes that proletarians, rural people, and "pre-modern" people are not the only social groups who have a folklore; that the American dominant culture also has a folklore; that if New Left history—for example Lawrence Levine's *Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom*—can treat American slave folklore as cultural history, then the New Left can also approach the dominant culture's folklore as cultural history; that in contemporary political history, the power elite's influence is facilitated by the dominant culture's folklore.

The discussion draws on anthropologist Clifford Geertz's theories on world view, as well as folklorist Alan Dundes' concept of the folk idea, the stuff of which world views are made. In Dundes' definition, folk ideas are the building blocks of world views, "the unstated premises [that] underlie the thought and action of a given group of people."¹ The concept of the folk idea is useful because it permits a more precise use of the term "myth" as employed in sociology, anthropology, and American studies. With the term "folk idea," cultural historians can reserve the term "myth" for materials explaining sacred origins, and yet do so without ignoring the findings of allied disciplines on the world

view of America's dominant culture. Dundes' essay suggests a few folk ideas in the world view of America's dominant culture. The present article identifies many more American folk ideas—the articles of America's cultural constitution. The following analysis argues that Reagan's folklore—his world view and folk ideas—stems from the Puritan and frontier traditions in American cultural history.

Rhetorical Reagan

Before examining the folk ideas implicit in Reagan's rhetoric, it is instructive to see how he uses folk themes explicitly. First, he criticizes his opponents by associating them with what his folklore considers negative folk heroes and themes. For example, he told a gathering of businessmen that Ralph Nader is an ersatz white knight: "Little Sir Ralph has become a folk hero taking whacks at you with his wooden sword, and all of a sudden in too many minds, you are the dragon that must be slain."² Similarly, he claims that Jimmy Carter's "view of the world ranks along with belief in the Tooth Fairy."³ Reagan also argues against certain policies by likening them to folk beliefs. For example, he dismisses social security as "the biggest sacred cow in all of the United States."⁴

Reagan posits that his opposition lives in a folkloric world of fantasy and delusion while he himself avoids such traditional thought and conventions, coming instead to unfiltered reality. For example, he speaks of the liberal "mythology which replaced understanding of the free enterprise system."⁵ In other words, his opposition creates delusions while he merely understands the facts. Accordingly, he invites his audience to side with him against those who have not transcended the traditional, pre-modern world: "The Carter Administration lives in a world of make-believe." "But you and I live in a different world . . ."⁶

Although Reagan uses folklore to denigrate his opposition, he also uses it to promote his own views. For example, he often insists that the free market is "magic."⁷ Even his promoters use folklore to present Reagan in a favorable light. Frank Van Der Linden's *The Real Reagan*, ostensibly a biography, explains that "Reagan is like a Knight of the Age of Chivalry scarred by many battles but holding high his sword for one more charge. He was a Lone Crusader for years as the White Knight of the Right."⁸

One folkloric genre Reagan uses to promote his views is the proverb. For example, he advises us that "he who would have nothing to do with thorns must never attempt to gather flowers." And in sanctifying our forefathers, he quotes General Patton: "Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men."⁹

Reagan also uses medicinal folk metaphors for the American economy. In these metaphors, the problem of a sluggish economy starts with the appetitive Democrats, who "still have their hands in the nation's cookie jars."¹⁰ As a result of these uncontrolled appetites, the United States' economy is "swollen"¹¹ from an "economic bellyache."¹² Similarly, he complains of the "economic stew that has turned the national stomach."¹³ The outcome of this national dyspepsia is an "economic mess."¹⁴ The plan "to clean up our economic mess"¹⁵ is ironically twofold. On the one hand, America needs a purge: it needs "relief from over-regulation"¹⁶ in order "to get our economy moving again."¹⁷ On the other hand, it needs to consolidate: it needs more "order."¹⁸ And with this order, the elimination of America's illness "will not come quickly" but "in inches and feet, not in miles."¹⁹ With a "dose" of both the aggressive and retentive "medicine," the "patient"²⁰ will return to "economic health."²¹ In this metaphor of nutritional throughput, Reagan does not forget that the mode of elimination is dependent on the appetite. So he proposes that the patient be put on a "diet"²² because the "federal government is overgrown and overweight."²³

This dieting imagery gives way to more radical methods of reducing. One of Reagan's most widely used figures is "belt-tightening."²⁴ In California, he repeated that each unit of the state government would tighten its belt by ten per cent. His opponents have suggested the analogy is faulty because if one tightens one's belt ten per cent—say three or four inches—one will suffer not only pain but injury and dysfunction. Belt-tightening has since been replaced by more extreme metaphors. The phrase "remove the layers of fat"²⁵ has a clinically neutral sound, but the words suggest surgical removal, especially when Reagan amplifies the metaphor with the image of "cutting the fat."²⁶ In this same vein, Reagan the social physician insists that it is Carter who is "like the witch doctor that gets mad when a good doctor comes along with a cure that'll work."²⁷

The Covenant and the Crusade

Cultural anthropologists Neil Kinsner and Bill Kleinman argue that a culture's world view can be summed up in what they call a "cultural metaphor."²⁸ Perhaps America's cultural metaphor is to be found in Perry Miller's phrase, "the errand into the wilderness."²⁹ For Reagan, America is leading a spiritual crusade out of a desert of Big Government and modern immorality, and into a wilderness Eden of freedom and affluence. This theme, of course, comes to Reagan from the Puritans, and he uses some of their figures of speech. Where John Winthrop, the first Governor

of Massachusetts Bay Colony, announced that his settlement would be "as a city upon a hill," Reagan says that America will be a "shining city upon a hill" and a "beacon of hope."³⁰ Moreover, Reagan continues the Puritans' folk idea that Americans are the chosen people of God and that America's mission is to do God's work. Subscribing to the notion of America as a New World, a divinely inspired second chance, Reagan asks, "Can we doubt that only a Divine Providence placed this land, this island of freedom, here as a refuge for all those people in the world who yearn to breathe free?"³¹ In accordance with this folk idea, Reagan implies that God planned for Europe to fall and for America to buoy up the saving remnant. (But according to Reagan's opponents, this view that God kept the New World secret until the right people were ready to settle it ignores the native populations, reducing them to the status of a natural resource, along with the other fauna and flora.) Similarly, Reagan claims that he believes in "shaping American policy to reflect God's will,"³² adding that God is "waiting for us to do something."³³ Clearly, then, Reagan is committed to upholding a modernized version of the Puritan folk idea of the covenant.

For the Puritan as for Reagan, one of the duties of covenanters is that they should be an example to all mankind. Where Winthrop explained that "the eyes of the world are upon us," Reagan reminds Americans that "the rest of the world is watching America carefully,"³⁴ and, "You have shown a watching world that we are a united people pledged to maintaining a political system which guarantees individual liberty to a greater degree than any other." Reagan even uses the image of eyes: "In the eyes of many in the world, this every-four-year ceremony we accept as normal is nothing less than a miracle."³⁵

As a corollary to America's status as God's favorite nation, Reagan regards America as unique. This folk idea of America's uniqueness creates the attendant misconceptions that other countries can not compare with America. For example, he states, "We are a nation that has a government—not the other way around. And this makes us special among the nations of the earth."³⁶ This folk idea assumes that the other democracies are under some dictatorial thumb, that in Canada, Japan, and Austria, for example, government is beyond popular control while only America is still ruled by the consent of the governed. In this folk idea of America's chosen people and unique status, the Puritan and frontier traditions combine to exaggerate our achievements and ignore the achievements of others: "We have fought harder, paid a higher price for freedom, and done more to advance the dignity of mankind than any people who ever lived."³⁸

This folk idea of American supremacy leads Reagan to express a

corollary folk idea: that the world is declining and only God's favorite nation and the chosen people can save it. Thus he speaks of America as "this last and greatest bastion of freedom" and "the last, best hope of man on earth."³⁹ However, Reagan's opponents would claim that if Americans define freedom as something beyond all-night convenience stores and free choice of video recorders, if they see freedom as including, for example, equal rights and opportunities for advancement for all, then Americans can look to Holland or Denmark or any number of countries. Yet Reagan insists that America's responsibility is "leadership of all that remains of the free world."⁴⁰ Ignoring numerous countries, Reagan insists that "America is still the abiding alternative to tyranny. That is our purpose in the world."⁴¹ Thus Reagan maintains the grandiosity of the original Puritan folk idea of the errand. (However, we might forgive the Puritans for proposing what might have seemed true in the Seventeenth Century.) Moreover, the sense of being surrounded by immoral hordes and the destructive imagination for an apocalypse such as that in *Moby Dick* or *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court* suffuses the folk idea of America as "the last, best hope of man on earth," and of the folk idea that "if freedom is lost here there is no place to escape to."⁴²

Like many of the dominant culture's heroes before him, Reagan calls for a "spiritual revival": "I want my candidacy to unify our country, to renew the American spirit and sense of purpose. I want to carry our message to every American, regardless of party affiliation, who is a member of this community of shared values." "Let us dedicate ourselves to renewing the American compact."⁴³ And he closed his Presidential nomination acceptance speech by calling his campaign a "crusade" and asking for prayers: "Can we begin our crusade joined together in a moment of silent prayer?"⁴⁴ The religious cast to this appeal is explicit. He has declared that inaugural day "should be declared a day of prayer."⁴⁵ And the reason for this prayer is to remind Americans that theirs is a nation not entirely secular, but a nation at least partly transcendent: "Together let us take up the challenge to re-awaken America's religious and moral heart, recognizing that a deep and abiding faith in God is the rock upon which this great nation was founded."⁴⁶ And as if to cite evidence of his nation's godliness, he reminds Americans that "Our pledge of allegiance states that we are one nation under God, and our currency bears the motto, 'In God We Trust'."⁴⁷

Now as Sacvan Bercovitch has detailed, in the ideology of America's dominant culture, secular history continues the mission of Jesus.⁴⁸ And as students of religion such as Robert Bellah have affirmed, the American dominant culture has a "civil religion" in which the line of descendants who have done God's work runs from Christ and Calvin and Winthrop up through its

most deified leaders—Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln—and into the present day.⁴⁹ Reagan affirmed this sacralization of American history during his inaugural address: "At the end of this open mall are those shrines to the giants on whose shoulders we stand."⁵⁰ He then ran through the list of sanctified heroes, beginning with Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln, and continuing with the soldiers of World War One, World War Two, Korea, and Viet Nam. Although Bercovitch only fleetingly extends his analysis into the Twentieth Century, Reagan explicitly continues this traditional folk idea. First, he claims that the Mayflower compact is the model for American life: "This single act—the voluntary binding together of free people to live under the law—set the pattern for what was to come."⁵¹ Exemplifying Bercovitch's argument, Reagan extends the linear continuity of Plymouth colony to the American Revolution and then through Lincoln.

As mentioned, Reagan also includes the military in this line running from God and Adam and Jesus. He told an audience of military personnel that they were links in a "chain, holding back an evil force that would extinguish the light we've been tending here for 6,000 years."⁵² Elsewhere, Reagan treats this theme of the chain of moral command not as horizontal, as stretching back across the United States through Europe to the cradle of civilization. Rather, he treats it as vertical: he uses an image which depicts present Americans as standing on the shoulders of the predecessors. This image of a human ladder of thousands of heroes and demigods, each one perched on the shoulders of his predecessor, Reagan finds indicative of the difference between his imagination and that of 1960s protesters: "Our young rebels saw the generations as horizontal. Each generation separated from others like slices from a sausage. Humankind is vertical. Each generation sees farther than the one before because it is standing on the shoulders of those who have gone before."⁵³ (His *unintended* implications here are twofold. First, the protesters were the most far-sighted of all, since they were on the top, and the most short-sighted was the crew at the bottom: God, Adam, Jesus. And second, the figure also logically implies that progress is like an ever climbing, jack-in-the-beanstalk erection of heroes; but the protesters mistake this tower of greatness for a mutilated wiener.)

As the current head of this tower of perpetual expansion, Reagan believes that he is God's instrument. As Van Der Linden notes, "Reagan . . . felt 'called' to lead the nation, as ministers are 'called' . . . Reagan believes that he is ordained to fill his present role."⁵⁴ This claim for missionary zeal places the agency for Reagan's election—in both senses—in God's hands. His election wasn't Reagan's choice; it was God's. Yet Van Der Linden's promotional treatment unwittingly reveals the truth about Reagan's

ascendancy. Rather than receiving the call, Reagan looked eastward from California "in quest of new worlds to conquer."⁵⁵ The White Knight again.

As Bercovitch has shown in *The Puritan Origins of the American Self*, the individual of the American dominant culture who is becoming another link in the chain of holy progress makes himself a microcosm for the social group. Each individual becomes a metaphor for the community. Each individual can identify with America, can stand for America. This interchangeability of self and group is implicit in Reagan's statement that "the era of self-doubt is over."⁵⁶ In this figure, America is both comparable to an individual with self-doubt, and consists of individuals with self-doubt. And as Perry Miller writes, the dynamic of the Puritan jeremiad was first to doubt, then to expunge doubt with a flurry of covenant renewal.⁵⁷

The sanctity of this American covenant extends to America's international relations. For example, Reagan notes that America's presence in Berlin "is a sacred trust."⁵⁸ Since he and Americans are chosen by God, there is a certain fatalism to America's international relations. The role of the United States "is not a burden we sought."⁵⁹ On the stage of history, God has cast the United States in this heroic role. America has no choice but to accept its role as the world's policeman.

A further aspect of the folk idea of American exceptionalism and mission is the notion that America's problems do not originate there among the elect, but creep in from the devils surrounding the United States. Thus for Reagan, as for many of his predecessors, communism, although in some indigenous tribal forms it predated the Europeans' arrival in the New World, "is not of this hemisphere,"⁶⁰ but rather has to be imported from the Soviet bloc. This folk idea ignores the fact that Christianity and capitalism are not indigenous to the New World.

Another outcome of the folk idea of closeness and mission is that it creates simple us-and-them dichotomies in foreign policy. Thus a recurrent problem for Reagan has been his tendency to view Europe as both a loose federation—an inferior United States—and as America's insubordinate dependent in the struggle against Russia. Similarly, if Europeans who don't want missiles in their neighborhood are confused foreigners, so Americans opposed to militarism are dupes of "them." To illustrate, Reagan claims that the nuclear freeze is not "inspired by . . . sincere, honest people who want peace, but by some who want the weakening of America and so are manipulating many honest and sincere people."⁶¹

An additional foreign policy implication of Reagan's folk idea about American exceptionalism and mission is his notion that

Americans are, as upholders of Christ, the princes of peace: "We always seek to live in peace. We resort to force infrequently and with great reluctance—and only after we've determined that it is absolutely necessary. We are awed—and rightly so—by the forces of destruction at loose in the world."⁶² Now a variety of scholars have agreed that a culture can be paranoid—for example, Richard Hofstadter in *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*. Paranoia is indicated by two traits: delusions of grandeur, and delusions of persecution. Some would agree that Reagan may not qualify here because what he suffers from are delusions of adequacy. But the concept of delusions of persecution, in which a person projects his negative self on to his devil figures in an effort to maintain his grandiose image of himself, may explain why Reagan can still hold to the folk idea of American peacefulness as opposed to all of the warmongering around the world. The history of American belligerence is too well-known to recount here, but some examples of Reagan's projection illustrate the point. First, while American small businesses fail at unprecedented rates at the same time that multinational corporations gobble them up, Reagan chafes that Soviet centralization stifles individual initiative, causing "malaise and resentment" among the citizenry.⁶⁴ He claims that Russian armament is "pre-empting the needs of its people." In addition, he attacks Russia for its militarism in the Third World.⁶⁵ And he avers that the "Soviet Union must make the difficult choices brought on by its military budget and economic shortcomings."⁶⁶ And finally, to charge that the Russians are hypocritical and insincere about peace, he quotes Demosthenes: "What same man would let another man's word rather than his deeds proclaim who is at peace and who is at war with him?"⁶⁷

'The People' and The Others

Another important folk idea that Reagan promotes is indicated in his reverent use of the term "the people." For example, he finds that the folk idea of egalitarianism is the wisest part of the Constitution: "We can remind ourselves and those in government who have lost faith in the simple verities that the most profound words in the Constitution are but three in number—'We the people.'"⁶⁸ As Bercovitch has shown, the founders' understanding of the term "the people" implicitly included only Anglo-Saxon Protestant male property holders.

Who does Reagan imagine comprises "the people"? In his words, "the people" consists of "professionals, industrialists, shopkeepers, clerks, cabbies and truckdrivers. They are in short, 'We the people.' This breed called Americans."⁶⁹ "The people," then, have two traits: they cut across class lines, and they are tan-

tamount to a separate race—a “breed” apart. They are, then, commoners who amount to an elect. Reagan thus affirms both egalitarianism and elitism. He affirms both superiority and equality through consensus, like Jefferson, who said “We are all Federalists; we are all Republicans.” And who are not the people? Reagan states that the rioters in Watts were not of the people but “against the people.”⁷⁰ Similarly, he contrasts “the people” with students protesting tuition increases by saying to those students: “I am going to represent the people.” The demonstrators replied, “We are the people.”⁷¹

In Reagan’s folk idea of “the people,” there can be no serious malaise—except with students and ghetto rioters: “I find no national malaise, I find nothing wrong with the American people. Oh, they are frustrated, even angry, at what has been done to this blessed land. But more than anything they are sturdy and robust as they have always been.”⁷² This happy folk idea of “the people” overlooks rising rates of drug abuse, alcoholism, suicide, divorce, illiteracy, rape, murder, and pollution. Similarly, Reagan glosses over class conflict with his confused folk idea of egalitarianism and elitism. For example, he claims that “in America, our aristocracy is not by accident of birth or royal favor but by virtue of accomplishment.”⁷³ With such statements, Reagan seemingly places egalitarianism over elitism in such a way that the elitism can be denied because egalitarianism has already been affirmed. This confusion allows Reagan to treat the exploited as exploiters by contrasting the people with the “special interests.” For example, speaking of the House of Representatives, he stated that the representatives “get plenty of input from the special interest groups, they’d like to hear from their homefolks.”⁷⁴ And in another speech, he stated that “grassroots support for a balanced budget amendment is out there and will carry the day against the special interests.”⁷⁵ The term “special interests” is conveniently vague, but just as “the people” (or “homefolks” or “grass roots”) excludes ecologists, artists, educators, and social workers, so the term “special interests” implicitly applies to these latter groups.

As was mentioned, the folk idea of the commoner is inherently elitist. It insists that there is an identifiably superior group. For example, we find Reagan claiming that “America is unique in world history because it has a genius for leaders.”⁷⁶ As an example of America’s capacity for turning out leaders, Reagan often cites Lincoln, the man of the people, who was great because he was a commoner, who was brilliant because he lacked a formal education, who was a regular guy because he was a corporate lawyer for the railroad, who was just like the other good Americans who ran miles to return a book and did their lessons on the back of a shovel by firelight.

As one of the people, Reagan conceives of himself in the folklore of the simple, innocent midwesterner. About his entry into politics, he claims: "I came out of the woods an innocent."⁷⁷ And speaking of his childhood, he notes, "My existence turned into one of those rare Huck Finn-Tom Sawyer idylls."⁷⁸ Typifying his aw-shucks manner, this millionaire who associates with millionaires can say: "I don't know about the hierarchy or the upper regions, I only know about the people."⁷⁹

This notion of Reagan as the commoner informs Van Der Linden's biography of Reagan. For example, he calls Reagan "an innocent in Tinseltown" whose conversion to conservatism was a "Pilgrim's progress."⁸⁰ This biography also uses the theme of masculinity as another trait that Reagan shares with Joe Sixpack. Several pages are devoted to accounts of Reagan's athletic prowess as well as appeals to the western image, including the assertion that Reagan "looks like a ranch hand." In addition, the wisdom of folk medicine is employed. Van Der Linden notes that when Reagan was a boy, Reagan's mother was saved by moldy cheese, which contained penicillin, something allegedly unknown to the city doctors with all their book learning.⁸¹ And the appeal of the work ethic is also central. Van Der Linden uses the folklore of persistent effort by claiming that Reagan "tramped from one radio station to another asking for any kind of job—even sweeping floors—just to get started in the business."⁸² Moreover, Van Der Linden compares Reagan to another poor Illinois story teller, Abe Lincoln.⁸³ And to satisfy the modernist impulse, he uses the popular psychology that Reagan is "secure" and a "nice guy."⁸⁴ All of this folklore adds up to one of the most typical characters in American folklore, the man who is beyond folklore, convention, and ideology, whose simplicity puts him in direct contact with reality: "He is an artless, charming man."⁸⁵

As one of "the people," Reagan feels compelled to explain how, if "the people" are the engines of America, their world view and folk ideas have been derailed, necessitating a spiritual revival to get America back on track to its rendezvous with destiny. Reagan answers that the problem is not with the people but with their leaders. Says he: "The crisis we face is not the result of any failure of the American spirit; it is a failure of our leaders to establish rational goals and give our people something to order their lives by."⁸⁶ This statement violates the speaker's belief in the primacy of the people. How is it that the people have chosen irrational leaders? And if, according to the folk idea, American policy reflects the coterminous will of the people and God, how is it the people need leaders to give them goals and principles by which to order their lives? Reagan would answer, perhaps, that the people, while still basically flawless, have renounced their power and

responsibility by abdicating their role to bureaucrats, intellectuals, and others of the "special interests": "The truth is we've let Government take away many things we once considered were really ours to do voluntarily, out of the goodness of our hearts and a sense of community pride and neighborliness."⁸⁷ Unable to explain how "the people" could violate the covenant of their world view and folk ideas and yet remain chosen, Reagan focuses his anger on the government. For example, he contends that "the people," the American boys, could have won in Viet Nam, but the government was "afraid to let them win."⁸⁸

Similarly, Reagan's folklore leads him to contend that forty years of liberalism (and that would have to include Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford) made government "the distributor of gifts and privilege."⁸⁹ Such gifts and privilege presumably consist of welfare, aid to the blind, and scholarships—but not defense contracts. Government spending, in this folk idea, was aimed not at real problems but only at feathering the nests of the "special interests": "The Ruling Party in Washington wants a larger share of the workers' income to spend as it pleases on expanding the federal bureaucracy."⁹⁰ For Reagan, there is an additional problem with this increase in bureaucracy. It is inconsistent with the way the West was won: "They built the West without Federal planners."⁹¹ Those who promote such regulation are untrue to the will of "the people." Thus Reagan claims that Carter's "failure was rooted in his view of the American people."⁹² The solution, according to this folklore, is to restore government to the will of "the people." Accordingly, Reagan announced his new concept of leadership, "one based on faith in the American people, and a firm commitment to see to it that the Federal Government is once more responsive to the people."⁹³ Reagan, then, will restore faith in the people, even though they suspended representative government and free enterprise by turning over the ship of state to un-American elitists.

The folk idea that government and the people are diametrically opposed finds Reagan asserting that he is not of the power structure even when he is in office. For example, in Sacramento, he told his cabinet and staff: "We belong here only so long as we refer to government as 'they' and never think of it as 'we.'"⁹⁴ Reagan's opposition of the people and the government has reified the terms "government" and "bureaucrat" as terms of approbrium. In this regard, some would contend that Reagan has done more to encourage disrespect for his country than have a million protesters. His disrespect for politicians and bureaucrats leads him to fire as many as possible and replace them with amateurs: "There is no better way to bring about effective government than to have its operation scrutinized by citizens dedicated to that principle."⁹⁵

For Reagan, the civil service is not staffed by citizens who are already working for effective government. For Reagan, acting on his folk idea of the people and the government, the accountants, actuaries, purchasers, and managers of the public sector are incompetents with their pockets lined with tax revenues, while the accountants, actuaries, purchasers, and managers in the private sector are vigilant citizens. For Reagan, the bureaucrat at Exxon is suited for cleaning up government, while the bureaucrat at the Department of Energy is not; likewise, the bureaucrat at the Department of Energy has no competence in guiding Exxon, while the bureaucrat at Exxon is inherently capable of managing our natural resources. In sum, the government bureaucrat is one of the special interests; the Exxon bureaucrat is one of the people.

An appurtenance to Reagan's body of folk ideas about "the people" is the folk idea of common sense. Consistent with the folk idea that the people know best, Reagan often calls for more common sense. For example, he says, "We will simply apply to government the common sense that we all use in our daily lives."⁹⁶ He also says that "common sense . . . characterizes the people of this country."⁹⁷ For its proponents, the dominant culture's common sense is not socially constructed; rather, it is the great Them—bureaucrats, liberals, special interests—who suffer from fantasy-ridden thinking. Carter and the tooth fairy, Ralph Nader and the White Knight. Actually, common sense is part of any culture's folklore. Common sense expresses the culture's world view and folk ideas. Common sense, then, is wisdom, or what passes for it, applied to action. It is this common sense that appeals to Reagan's audience. As one fan in Portland put it: "He simply talks common sense."⁹⁸ And speaking of our regeneration, Reagan notes that "all it takes is a little common sense and recognition of our own ability."⁹⁹

That Bad 'Govment'

As was noted, an important folk idea implicit in Reagan's politics is that government is suspect. If the people are inherently good, government is inherently bad, because it interferes with the decisions of the people, decisions which are made in the marketplace. For example, Reagan contends that "the source of our economic problems" is that "the government decides that it knows better than you what should be done with your earnings." "Trust the people. This is the one irrefutable lesson of the entire postwar period contradicting the notion that rigid government controls are essential to economic development."¹⁰⁰ Even Reagan's pronunciation of the word "government" indicates his lack of respect for that institution. Like Huckleberry Finn's father, Reagan complains about the "govment."

Reagan's folklore, to repeat, assumes a split between the private and the public. First of all, the public and private are imagined to be distinct. Thus decisions in the marketplace are not believed to have power; only decisions in government have power. For example, when Exxon decided to quit developing synthetic fuels because it could no longer afford to do so without government help, many people lost their jobs, and their homes near the Colorado research and development center lost their value. In the folk idea that the private sector is and should be relatively free to make decisions which influence hundreds or thousands or millions, such decisions are regarded as natural. But if government restrictions on tourism had similar results, the government's decisions would be regarded as unnatural. Such folk ideas not only set up a double standard for public and private conduct, they also posit a dualism where there is in fact an overlap. For the fact is that so-called "private" industry—even the language reflects the folk idea that business is untouchable—makes decisions that influence not just the marketplace but also private lives.

In Reagan's *laissez-faire* folk ideas, then, the growth of the corporations' power is not intrusive. As a result, the corporations' decision to use sexually oriented advertising to appeal to pre-teens is not seen as an exercise of power, let alone an abuse of power. Similarly, if the marketplace determines that many workers will receive low wages, such an influence on the lives of millions is not seen as resulting from the exercise of power. Yet the government's minimum wage law is called interference. According to this folk belief, people in ghettos are free to prosper because there are no civil laws keeping them down: as Reagan puts it, "There is no law saying the negro has to live in Harlem or Watts."¹⁰¹ In this folk idea, economic laws do not count. Similarly, the Third World has not been exploited by America, because the marketplace just does not exercise power. Workers in Mexico who assemble our clothes and radios for a tenth of the wages of Americans who buy them will not be convinced when Reagan informs them that "there is absolutely no substance to charges that the United States is guilty of imperialism or attempts to impose its will on other countries by use of force."¹⁰² For Reagan, then, economic pressure has no force. From this folk idea, it follows that those who are poor in market economies deserve to be poor. There is no law that says they have to live in the ghetto.

The folk idea of the separation of public and private entities leads to another double standard in the matter of spending. In this folk idea, spending on a state car is a waste, but spending on a company car is not. In addition, government spending on welfare and education is inflationary, but consumer spending on snowmobiles and video games is not. Curiously, however, one

form of public spending is not wasteful and inflationary: the military. That which is deemed necessary can not be wasteful and inflationary. And that which is deemed wasteful, such as federal aid to education, must be unnecessary. So it is that the government can pump money into localities through the conduit of military bases, but not through schools, theaters, museums, or hospitals.

According to the folk idea of the split between the public and private sectors, the public sphere is further reprehensible because its salaries must be paid through tax revenues. This position first ignores the fact that the citizenry pays for both public and private salaries. A person pays the salaries and commissions of sales people, managers, owners, and clerks every time he buys something. But according to Reagan's folk ideas, an employee in the public sector who makes \$13,000 a year is exploiting the employee in the private sector who makes \$30,000.

Taxation is further influenced by the folk idea of the public and private dichotomy. Believing that the private is good and the public is bad, Reagan, as Governor of California, started a private employment program. Although he was acting as the head of the state's public sector, he believed that the program exemplified what American business can do without government. He also contended that such a program does not influence the taxation and spending in the public sector: "Foundations and private citizens have picked up the tab for administrative overhead so it is completely independent of tax revenues."¹⁰³ But the donations of those foundations and individuals consist of money that would have been donated somewhere else. Moreover, the donations were, presumably, tax deductible. Without these deductions, which in effect make the government partially subsidize the charity of choice, the donations would be far smaller or non-existent. Reagan uses the same folk idea for the thousands of dollars that were spent on buying new china for the White House. He claims that because the funds were donated, the people don't have to pay for the china. Again, people have to pay indirectly through tax, and those donations could have been used in churches, schools, and hospitals.

Part of Reagan's anti-government folk idea is the corollary folk idea that taxation is largely destructive and unnatural: "High rates of taxation destroy incentive to earn, to save, to invest. And they cripple productivity, lead to deficit financing and inflation, and create unemployment."¹⁰⁴ But the fact is that nations such as Sweden, Germany, and Japan have higher taxes than America, and the result is a higher per capita GNP. Similarly, the folk idea that taxation impedes saving is also invalid. Many European nations have taxes on consumer items and restrictions on credit that require people to save before they buy. In America, low taxes spur

inflation by creating demand push, and spur higher interest rates by increasing demand for credit. As for high taxes leading to deficit financing, deficits result from too little revenue, not too much. And higher taxes on the upper-middle class do not reduce incentive; higher taxes would require them to work more.

Similarly, Reagan holds to the folk idea that in the public sphere bigness is bad, but in the private sphere it is good. The overhead of big government lowers one's living standard, but the overhead of big business does not. In the end, Reagan promotes the folk idea that that government governs best which governs least. Actually, that government which governs least has the least to govern. Creeping corporatism has created an urban, industrial, technocratic, and egoistic mass society that can not manage with a philosophy that was designed for a rural, agricultural, self-sacrificing, decentralized polity. *The big business Reagan reveres has made impossible the kind of government he envisions.*

Despite all of Reagan's cutbacks in the name of non-interference, he violates that folk idea explicitly. For example, the President interfered with federal laws to subsidize American aluminum corporations in Jamaica. According to Jeff Gerth of the *New York Times*, Reagan wanted to turn Jamaica into the symbol of what free enterprise would do for those who cooperated with the American Way. To that end, Reagan "prompted three federal agencies to waive laws and bend rules, thereby providing more than \$100 million to bolster the Jamaican operations of leading American aluminum companies."¹⁰⁵ Moreover, Reagan used David Rockefeller, who was at that time Chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, to organize a group of businessmen to carry out this venture. In a related development, Reagan directed the General Services Administration to buy \$67 million of Jamaican bauxite, and in the process the administration waived federal laws requiring competitive bidding.

His folk ideas of the "free" market inform Reagan's reading of economic history. He contends that the American economy "is historically revitalized not by government but by people free of government interference."¹⁰⁶ In truth, America was founded on government interference. The Hamiltonian association of business and government was a holdover from the mercantile tradition, which held that business needed government to raise capital and regulate the economy. The folk idea of laissez faire leads Reagan to insist that the last forty years of government regulation, redistribution, and deficit financing brought us to inflation, unemployment, and high interest rates. Actually, it brought us phenomenal material wealth, even after the cost of the Viet Nam War brought inflation starting in 1968, and after the rising energy costs exacerbated the problem beginning in 1974.

Nonetheless, Reagan implies that the policies of the last ten to fifteen years are like those from the New Deal on; thereby he implies that the whole post-World War II era was a failure: "There hasn't been too much opportunity in the last 40 years to see what our philosophy can do. But we know what theirs can do. The longest sustained inflation in history, the highest interest rates in a hundred years, eight recessions since World War Two, and a trillion dollar debt."¹⁰⁷ This statement ignores the fact that the bad guys' philosophy quadrupled the GNP from 1940 to 1960.

Reagan not only overlooks the conditions which created economic successes and failures, but he also insists—since the facts must be there, given his folk ideas—that all other prosperous nations developed without so-called government interference: "The societies which have achieved the most spectacular broad-based economic progress in the shortest period of time [share] their willingness to believe in the magic of the market place."¹⁰⁸ The only magic going on here is the ability of Reagan and his audience to deduce from their folklore that countries like Japan, West Germany, and Norway have subscribed to the *laissez-faire* party line.

But Reagan sticks to his reading of history. His folklore tells him that *laissez-faire* "has worked before and will work again."¹⁰⁹ When has it worked before? After 1929, when the anti-regulatory, anti-intellectual conservatism of Harding and Coolidge did much to create the Great Depression? When the free-market theory of the 1870s and 1880s permitted robber barons on the one hand and literally-starving farmers and laborers on the other? When Andrew Jackson's anti-regulatory anti-intellectualism disestablished the "monster" bank, exacerbating the depression of the 1830s?

Dundes identifies the folk idea of unlimited good as a corollary of the folk idea of progress.¹¹⁰ According to the folk idea of progress, America's wealth and power should increase every year, and if they do not, someone has interfered with the Divine Plan. For believers in these folk ideas, the government has interfered in the good work of the American people if Americans answer no to Reagan's following question: "Are you better off now than you were four years ago?"¹¹¹

The folk idea of unlimited good prevents Reagan and the dominant culture from understanding that natural resources are finite, that increasing scarcity, not income distribution and regulation, are reducing the increase in our standard of consumption. As Dundes claims, the folk idea of unlimited good is tied to the folk idea of dominating nature, of expecting nature always to provide an undiminishing store of energy and raw materials. And so Reagan asserts—against all ecological evidence—that "prosperity is a fundamental part of our environment."¹¹² For Reagan, believ-

ing in the New World'd exceptionalism, natural resources are infinite, and so too is America's ability to increase its standard of consumption: "Our hemisphere has an unlimited potential for economic development and human fulfillment."¹¹³ Where Carter learned that America must conserve resources, use them more slowly so that the United States can change over to non-fossil fuels before they run out, Reagan calls for extracting more energy from fossil fuel, using it faster, as if it will replenish itself: "Those who preside over the worst energy shortage in our history tell us to use less, so that we will run out of oil and gas a little more slowly." "America must get to work producing more energy. The Republican program for solving economic problems is based on growth and productivity."¹¹⁴ When Reagan rejects "an energy policy based on the sharing of scarcity,"¹¹⁵ he rejects reality in favor of his folklore.

The world view shared by Reagan and his audience assumes our ability to sustain growth. The free market is assumed as a given—as if corporations exist in a state of nature. In this world view, there is an ecology of the market, an ecology that produces unending growth from unending resources. If the United States runs short of finite resources, there must be some interference with nature, some interference from—government. And so Reagan's energy policy is to get government out of nature, out of the market, by disestablishing the Department of Energy in much the same way that Andrew Jackson disestablished the National Bank: "We do not need an Energy Department to solve our basic energy problem: as long as we let the forces of the marketplace work without undue interference, the ingenuity of consumers, business, producers, and inventors will do that for us."¹¹⁶ America will overcome the laws of physics just as America will overcome the laws of economics. In this vision of limitlessness, Reagan has posited a third half of the pie.

Now even though he regards Carter's dreams as delusionary, he regards the American dream as still honorable: "We are a people known for dreaming with our eyes open."¹¹⁷ In Reagan's vision, God's promise to America can be redeemed. "This time has come for the American people to reclaim their dream." As special people, "We have every right to dream heroic dreams." Besides, "we are too great a nation to limit ourselves to small dreams."¹¹⁸ Small is ugly.

But Reagan's version of the American dream combines vague intimations of exalted purpose with base lust for material gain; the two go hand in hand: "Most of our forebears came to this hemisphere seeking a better life for themselves; they came in search of opportunity and, yes, in search of God."¹¹⁹ For Reagan, the search for God and moral purpose is quickly passed over in

pursuit of its corollary, "opportunity," which is a convenient code word for acquisitiveness: "There is a spiritual revival going on in this country, a hunger on the part of the public to once again be proud of America, all that it is and all that it can be." "Now the first step . . . must be the rejuvenation of our economy."¹²⁰ With this fortuitous marriage of world redemptive moral purpose and the pursuit of unending affluence, snowmobiles serve God and nature. When Americans seek for themselves, they also do for others. Or as Garry Wills puts it: "selfishness is a duty with us."¹²¹ This folk idea of the morality of immorality also applies to the foreign market—a kind of international trickle-down theory: "A prosperous, growing U.S. economy will mean increased trading opportunities for other nations."¹²²

For Reagan, then, the confusion of high consumption with the good life—even that term sounds materialistic—makes increasing affluence a necessary condition for remaining true to God and nature. Inflation, taxes, high interest rates, and deficits "will put an end to everything we believe in and to our dreams for the future."¹²³ In this analysis, America's mission depends now on restoring "material affluence on a scale unequalled in history."¹²⁴ If affluence is necessary for the good life, how is it that all of those considerably less affluent generations before World War II were good Americans? What can America's national purpose be if it is dependent on the growing wealth that will exhaust its natural resources?

Conclusion

Three hundred years ago, the original Puritan polities failed largely because their means of creating a society consistent with their world view undermined the society that they tried to construct. The unbridled emphasis on work and frugality resulted in the accumulation of goods. As a result, the populace became more worldly, fewer and fewer were concerned with signs of their salvation, and more and more were concerned with signs of their secular salvation—their accumulation of goods and power. In recent years, the value placed on work, the belief in education (as opposed to training), the family, sexual restraint, frugality, delayed gratification—all of these have withered. Only the pursuit of affluence remains, more militant than ever, as a means to that nebulous American dream. But as with the Puritans, America's means have become an end. America's means will destroy the contemporary Americans' society more thoroughly and disastrously than the Puritans' means of work and frugality did theirs. The exhaustion of the environment will far exceed the damage done by concern for such worldly goods as fine cloth and

imported wood. But at least the Puritans were knowledgeable about their forebears; even if the Puritans vainly tried to cut their ties to the so-called Old World, they knew the assumptions and principles of their spiritual and intellectual lineage. In the world view that has come down from them, however, Reagan only dimly perceives the history of the dominant culture's world view and folk ideas. Mark Twain once said, in an ethnic slur that reveals America's xenophobia and exceptionalism, that it is a rare Frenchman indeed who knows the identity of his true father. In our own time, those who are unaware of their ideational forebears, those whose celebrations of their patrimony only reveal their ignorance of their intellectual family tree, are the real illegitimate children.

Notes

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Beyond Year Zero: The Pursuit of Peace Through War

JAMES J. MARTIN

Author's Note: In 1955 I was contacted and asked whether I would be interested in collaborating with Francis Neilson in a revision and expansion of his book The Makers of War, first published in 1950 and then out of print. The opportunity to work with so eminent a revisionist as Mr. Neilson, author of such milestones as How Diplomats Make War, Hate the Enemy of Peace, The Churchill Legend, and the five-volume The Tragedy of Europe, was accepted with alacrity. Much time was devoted to expanding his book, the revised edition of which was to be published under our joint authorship.

The somewhat enlarged revision, which included two new concluding chapters which would have been numbers XXI and XXII, written in their entirety by me, was submitted to Mr. Neilson's secretary, Phyllis Evans, late that same year. On 4 February 1956 Miss Evans wrote me:

I am now retyping the manuscript of The Makers of War, and am hoping to complete the job next week. Despite Mr. Neilson's aversion to footnotes, I am supplying the specific references for all of the original text, as you have done so thoroughly for your additions. Your work is magnificent, and the amount of labor you expended and your enthusiastic dedication to the cause impress me deeply.

The entire project was concluded on an amicable and satisfactory basis, but it was never published. Mr. Neilson, already suffering

from grave impediments to both sight and hearing, was actually at work on three other books (all of which were published eventually), and these literary projects resulted in the diversion which prevented him from getting around to the additional labors the reprinting of this book would have required.

The last of the two new concluding chapters written for the revised edition of *The Makers of War*, "The Pursuit of Peace Through War," is published here for the first time. It is presented as edited for publication in 1956, and no-post 1955 qualifications or sources are added anywhere, except in one instance, as indicated by brackets.

The decision to issue this material nearly thirty years later is partially influenced by purely bibliographic considerations, to place on the record a historical way of looking at things which largely was overlooked, ignored or suppressed when it was first produced, a decade after the end of the Second World War. The mid-1950s was not a time receptive to the approach found in this chapter, intended for a book which never came into existence. It was the fate of much revisionist writing in the score of years following the formal ending of hostilities in 1945.

There is nothing in it which this author would care to change now, about a generation after it was first written. The main criticism which might be entered at this time is that it is excessively moderate in the interpretative aspect, since the extensive revelations and admissions, and the documentary releases, which have occurred since 1955, support a somewhat stronger position than has been taken here.

If the tenor of this chapter seems unduly somber today, one should be reminded that the mid-1950s were not quite the light-hearted and jolly time that moderns enamored with nostalgic imaginations for those days think it was. Much of the land was still reeling from the desolate, dreary and depressing just-concluded Korean war (1950-53), fully as traumatic then to most Americans as the Vietnam war was to be a generation later. (Few are yet able to come to terms with the realities of the previous war on the fringes of East Asia, the Pacific War of 1941-45, which, still hailed so noisily and boastfully as such a great "victory," launched the train of incredible and breath-taking changes which are still profoundly sweeping America and the West. And in a major way it is responsible for disasters even more fundamental than those caused by Korea and Vietnam, which, after all, grew directly from the end of the Pacific War, and essentially were unsettled real estate problems left over from that war. When the self-serving and the self-promotion related to the war of 1941-45 ends, if it ever does, and a sober view of this conflict, its origins and consequences, takes place from a planetary instead of a local viewpoint, then maybe the American populace may come

around to an understanding of why the war ending in 1945 made the next two East Asian wars almost unavoidable. It will also make the Korean and Vietnam disasters more understandable to those who still cannot fathom why they were such failures, given that the first of this trio of East Asian conflicts was such an unqualified "triumph.") It may be well beyond the end of this century and into the next before Americans pay the full bill resulting from the three twentieth century wars in East Asia. But an inkling as to the stunning global revolution triggered in the Far East by the great mindless crusade of 1941-45 was beginning to sift through by the end of the first decade after V-J Day, and Korea had much to do with that.

The great historical dividing-line of our time is 6 August 1945. On this day the most senseless act of an unnecessary four year war was effected. Today, more than ten years after this fateful unleashing of the world's first atomic bomb, we are still living in the war's backwash, and the peace so solemnly promised us by the leaders of the West recedes before our grasp at an alarming rate. The wreckage of the ideals of this war lies about us in enormous heaps, revealing the utter lack of rational goals for which the Allied coalition fought; the impoverished motives of these powers were unmasked and laid open to the eyes of the world even sooner than they were after the debacle of 1914-1918. In addition, we have been graced with another "collective security" organization of far greater irrationality than the first, one which took but two years to rend it from top to bottom, instead of two decades. With what contemporary result?

The most obvious deficiency in today's world is the total absence of the noble and vacuous objectives which were announced to the world after the famous original "meeting at the summit" off the coast of Newfoundland, 8-14 August 1941. The war aims of the Anglo-American combine led by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, incorporated in the purely imaginative "Atlantic Charter," exist in realization nowhere on the planet. After four years of the most revolting massacre of life and destruction of property, followed by ten years of savage intermittent fighting on the fringe lands of Asia and Africa, is there a person so sanguine as to dare assert that the touted "Four Freedoms" are actually enjoyed anywhere? There has never been a time when the world knew more want and fear than now, and the vaunted civil liberties which were to appear on earth like flocks of gentle birds have vanished so thoroughly that the taut times of 1939 seem immeasurably more free by comparison. The world bristles with guns and men under arms, to the point that the world of the 1930s

seems comparably a time of military and naval de-emphasis. Military budgets tower over domestic populations, and the whole earth has become accustomed to the endless movement of men in uniform as a matter of course. The goods and travelers of the nations move at a crawl through incredible physical and psychological barriers at all the national frontiers, when compared with the relative freedom that prevailed a half century ago, while the thought of espionage and surprise atomic attack has made paranoia the most widely-prevalent state of mind the world over.

Still, the statesmen talk in a subdued manner about the desirability of peace, and at the same time prepare more resolutely for war. Their various peoples go about their tasks in a trance-like manner, so stunned by the enormity of what they have seen and heard and done these last fifteen years that the thought that they are now on the edge of radioactive oblivion drives them into unreality in the hope of escape. Their past conditioning nevertheless induces them even at this late hour to demand that no concessions be made in the interests of real peace, because the last time this was undertaken it was demolished by the war hawks as "appeasement." No more fateful word ever was so misapplied, and it remains today as the semantic albatross tied under the chins of the world's diplomats and heads of state, inhibiting even their most restrained gestures in the interests of holding back the chariots in our time.

We make such little progress toward a satisfactory peace because we suffer so grievously still from the results of vexations unleashed during our most recent crusade to exterminate political sin. The dramatic summations by William Henry Chamberlin in his *America's Second Crusade* and by Harry Elmer Barnes and George Lundberg in *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace* should not be missed by anyone who earnestly desires to know what the balance sheet looks like at this moment. Surely the biblical observation about the visitation of the sins of the fathers upon future generations was never more dramatically demonstrated than in our time, and contemporary trends hold out no hope that this process is bound to be interrupted for a substantial period of time to come. Instead of re-tracing our steps in an effort to restore the balance we have lost, we are beginning to make a system out of the lop-sided circumstances in which we have found ourselves since 1945. No peace prevails mainly because perpetual war on a limited scale has largely replaced peace as the ideal state of affairs under which men live their lives.

Can we profit at all from a close glance at the wartime, in the hope than we might see a glimmer of a rational formula or practical plan for an order of things superior to the one which the war

camp found so repulsive that it felt the resources of the whole globe needed to be devoted to its obliteration? There is scant gain indeed. With the exception of florid messianic promises, the wartime was saturated with the most primitive emotions. Hate of the enemy leaders and fervent hopes that their peoples suffer annihilation redounded through the wartime days. In America a veritable anti-Japanese race war was preached, which led not only to the frightening violations of the civil rights and liberties of its citizens of Japanese extraction, but the fighting of one of the most vicious wars in history in the Pacific. The apocalyptic atom bombing properly concludes this imbalance. Americans on the whole have not yet revived from this all-consuming hate campaign and the position papers and atrocity stories of the psychological war departments of all the "Allies," which partially explains the widespread confusion and paralysis of attitudes resulting from the changed postwar conditions demanding adjustment.

The indices to understanding the comprehensive hate of things Italian and German may be narrowed down to two: the triumphant whoop by Mr. Churchill upon hearing of the sickening murder of Mussolini by a Communist criminal, and a poll on London's streets taken by a London newspaper before D-Day, commented upon by two American reporters of the service newspaper *Stars and Stripes*. When queried: "If you could press a button and kill every German in the world, would you press it?" almost 50 percent of the British citizens "thought they would jump at the chance." (Quoted in "Bud" Hutton and "Andy" Rooney, *Conquerors' Peace*, p. 63.) Surely these incidents suggest that the newer methods of emotional engineering far surpassed the primitive ones of the First World War in effectiveness. It is little wonder that the frightened leaders have discovered that it is easier to extend the hate campaigns than to decondition a people so fundamentally affected by such Neanderthalic appeals. It is not surprising that the most devoted supporters and instigators of hostile feelings in the war have given up in despair with respect to the hope of peace in our time, and now trumpet for unceasing bloodshed in pursuit of their delirious dreams. We need cite only the hysteria of such self-appointed leaders of the new blood-drenched "liberals" in our land as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., with his callous and horrifying "log-jam" theory of war. According to this, using the analogy of a river log jam and dynamite, the affairs of men periodically get so inextricably tangled that a war periodically is needed to set things aright. A little further down the road to annihilation is the latest emanation of still another of the tribe of these "right-thinking" folk, Elmer Davis, the George Creel of America's second war of propaganda against its people. In his *Two Minutes Till Midnight*, he begs us to resign ourselves to the

inevitable—hydrogen bomb warfare—in the supreme effort to bring into the world the reign of righteousness and virtue that his most recently promoted planetary butchery somehow failed to flush out into the open. Mr. Davis' line that our only alternatives are world Communist slavery or atomic disintegration is the most dishonest fakery yet spawned by this bloody tribe. It does not appear that Mr. Davis learned a particle from the four brain-chilling reports of Dr. Ralph E. Lapp in the November 1954 and February, May, and June 1955 issues of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, on the now predictable effects of even a restricted hydrogen bomb war.

There is little to learn from what the academic camp as well has to say on this issue. Their books and other contributions grind along, proclaiming the unchanging message of the utter depravity of Hitler, Mussolini, and Japan, and the virtuousness of the combine they faced, with recent adjustments to cover their trail since the defection of Russia from the circles of the "peace-loving nations," of which the Soviet was a charter member just a short time ago. A new generation of historical camp-followers now preaches the necessity of World War Two and the virility of the United Nations, as a preceding one extolled World War One and the League. What we have passing as the history of the war is largely the collective value judgments of British- or Russian-inspired intellectuals frozen into a seeming finality.

Porter Sargent, morosely commenting in his *Getting US Into War* (p. 44) on the war which was rapidly coming up on America in 1941, concluded:

Propaganda has always been Britain's best paying export. There has always been a demand for it. Americans lap it up, pay for it, and derive a sense of morality, religious exaltation and self-righteousness after gobbling it down. It was five or six years after the first World War before our university professors began to feel the first pangs of pain from their gullible gluttony. So secret and unsuspected have been the methods this time that it may take even longer. They were not immunized but apparently left even more susceptible.

At the heights of the Harvard Faculty's hysteria for participating in the war, a student demonstration protesting the zeal of the draft-exempt academic elders for bloodshed took place in the Harvard Yard, one poster suggesting: "Send 50 Overage Professors to England." But the recommendation was ignored by the Administration, and the cloistered warriors remained all over the land to repeat the experiences of the fold of Clio two decades earlier, under the direction of George Creel's spiritual descendants. The part played by this battalion of editorial and microphone commandos in manufacturing belligerent psychology

remains to be chronicled. It is ironic and poetic justice that from the economic point of view, the interest-group whose purchasing power has suffered most in America from the inroads of the war-created inflation of the past fifteen years has been the professors, and no other interest group acclaimed the coming of the war with such rousing enthusiasm as this same academic element.

As we look back over the last two gory decades, and contemplate the public apathy of mass-killing which exists around the world, it appears fruitless to sum up what has happened to the moral sense of mankind. The actions of the armed forces of all belligerents under stress erase the possibility of creating clearly-defined categories of righteous and evil participants. After years of annihilating women and children in undefended cities, starvation blockades, shooting and torturing prisoners of war, and systematic political murder, there should not be much wonder that so much world opinion remains unimpressed with the dreadful possibilities inherent in atomic warfare. Nobody can be blamed for wilting under such an assault as we have witnessed, all carried out in the name of re-establishing political virtue in the world and the installation of various praiseworthy social and economic objectives.

There is certainly nothing that can be pointed to in the conduct of the Allies from beginning to end that merits substantial unqualified praise on the moral level. Anyone who examined closely the behavior of these Allies in victory between 1945 and 1948 saw how thin and shabby the Allied ethico-moral superiority protestations were. The savage and nauseating things described by the courageous British Leftist publisher Victor Gollancz in his books *Our Threatened Values* and *In Darkest Germany*, and the stirring volume by Freda Uteley, *The High Cost of Vengeance*, were sufficient to cancel out of consideration every scrap of lofty ethical and moral pretension of the war winners over the Nazis. These were books which the Allied policy-makers in Germany were surely sorry to see published. The admissions, some unconscious and inadvertent, in Hutton and Rooneys' *Conquerors' Peace* on the practices of the occupying Powers in the chopped-up zones of Germany, additionally document the absence of principled distinctions.

The robbery, rape, murder and insolent strong-arm tactics so commonly reported in the first few years of occupation cannot be separated from official policy which encouraged such attitudes. Most noteworthy are the infamous "Unconditional Surrender" and Morgenthau Plan policies; the consequences of these crackbrained schemes will be with us for many years to come, in addition to having furnished myriad headaches this past dozen years. One can hardly imagine a policy madness which would

have so reflected the goals of the professional anti-Germanism of Vansittart and Duff Cooper, even though Americans conceived them and with massive Soviet support largely carried them into such existence as they enjoyed.

The former was the logical extension of the Churchill-Duff Cooper-Vansittart sloganeering of 1940-44, when the Germans were being told incessantly that the war was to continue until Nazism was "extirpated." Just which Nazis were to be "extirpated," and how one was to recognize when "extirpation" was an accomplished fact, never was explained. Ultimately this fraud was abandoned and the outrageous "Black Record" program of comprehensive German extermination substituted. The Nazis were able to develop a tenacious and dogged resistance in Germany by pointing to the anti-German racialism of their righteous opponents. A Treaty of Berlin dictated by this trio and Roosevelt was threatened, which would make Versailles seem a feather bed by comparison. What this doctrine did to extend the war at least two more years, during which time most of the loss of life and destruction of property occurred, is already well known and hardly needs repetition here. All that followed was a lamentable hanging bee which got rid of most of the important Nazi leaders and the ones most likely to rock the Allies' boat by revealing what they knew was being suppressed.

But Germany was converted into a collection of smoking craters first by a bombing campaign which has been subsequently denounced as a failure insofar as its professed objectives were concerned by experts ranging from Harold Urey to Major General J.F.C. Fuller. Those among the Allies who acclaimed this enthusiastically as revenge, overlooked the real nature of the situation completely. Not only were they guilty of staggering proportional obtuseness, in which the return of a thousand tons of bombs for one was considered proper retaliation, but they also conveniently ignored that it was Hitler who had proposed that the bombing of undefended cities be outlawed. We call to mind Frederick J.P. Veale's conclusive study *Advance to Barbarism*, which places the responsibility for the bombing of civilian populations where it properly belongs, upon the British Air Ministry.

But this was not revealed until after the incredible pulverization of urban Germany was completed topped off by the mass terror bombing of the undefended cultural center of Dresden on 13 February 1945, causing a quarter of a million casualties in a single day. The survivors elsewhere in the land were so stunned that they had little energy remaining to devote to noticing what Joseph Stalin, Harry Dexter White, and Henry Morgenthau, Jr. had contemplated as Germany's post-war "new look." The industrial and commercial pillaging of the land and its planned reduction to a

bleak cabbage-raising helotry has long been abandoned. But, despite all the optimistic talk and the banal "healing of the wounds," the aims of these three remain largely effected. Territorially, Germany has been partitioned, restructured and truncated, despite all the furious activity since 1948 to salvage the scraps remaining after the Russian vandal holiday.

What is the story elsewhere? Five years ago Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, in his *Defence of the West*, entitled a chapter "Were We Wise to Foster Resistance Movements?" His conclusion was definitely in the negative. These largely-Communist and criminal-dominated enterprises have created as many political nightmares for the parliamentary democracies as Red China and Russia combined. Working under the full approval of the Western Allies, these sinister gatherings made such inroads that they remain behind the political weakness and instability of France and Italy to this day. The part they played in converting Yugoslavia into a Communist state is formidable. The ghoulish gloating of Churchill over the butchering of Mussolini and the rushed "trial" and execution of Laval have carried a big political price tag. In France we should not forget the 125,000 brutal political murders committed by the criminal-infested Maquis and other "resistance" elements during the years Germany was being given the Carthaginian treatment. This has been effectively described by Sisley Huddleston in his *France: The Tragic Years* and the novel *Terreur* 1944. The similar proscription in Italy has not received the attention it deserves, and an account of this shameful episode is badly needed. [It finally appeared in 1959, with the publication of Luigi Villari's *The Liberation of Italy*. —JJM, 1984]

And what of the behavior of the "democratic" Czechs? For sheer ferocity is there anything that matches the barbarous treatment accorded their German minorities after the glorious "liberation," as described for us in the symposium headed by Roger Baldwin titled *The Land of the Dead* and in Jurgen Thorwald's *Flight In the Winter*? Lidice pales into insignificance compared to this gout of primitive savagery.

Nor are the Russians to escape mention in this bleak saga without reference to their systematic elimination in Poland of elements considered incapable of incorporation within a Communist order. The account of the massacre of Polish officers in Joseph Mackiewicz's *The Katyn Wood Murders* and the thick volumes of incriminating evidence compiled in the United States Senate reports on this event emphasize why this incredible atrocity was not successfully pinned on the Nazis at the time of the Nuremberg war crimes trials. The grisly humor of the Communists in trying to bluff their gullible democratic Allies on this point is probably the high-water mark for wartime cynicism.

Stalin's cold-blooded plans for a similar but far larger slaughter in Germany failed to obtain the approval of both his partners "at the summit," largely due to Churchill's obdurate resistance to the idea of shooting prisoners of war as a policy. Western commentators such as Dorothy Thompson have been inclined to cast too many huzzas in Sir Winston's direction for this stand, forgetting his description of Germany as a nation of 65 million "all killable." What a mockery this was to make out of his protestations, when he stood by in silence as Stalin ordered the execution of all German prisoners who had previously been members of the German Communist Party! There is little better evidence to indicate that the Soviet considered Communists the world over as loyal subjects of the Kremlin first and citizens of their own lands second. The crowning insult, and the total erasure of Churchill's plea that British entry into the war was primarily due to the pledge to preserve the integrity of Poland, occurred when he again kept his tongue while in full possession of proof during the war that the Russians had murdered the cream of Poland's officers, 15,000 in number, after taking them prisoner. But it stands to Roosevelt's perpetual discredit that he showed great enthusiasm for the casually-suggested monstrosity at both the Teheran and Yalta conferences, while Sir Winston at least had the temporary decency to object to such criminal savagery.

There is little doubt that the worst political blunder committed by the Allies was the decision to atom-bomb Japan, even after possessing full knowledge that this nation was beaten and seeking surrender terms which did not strip them bare of all self-respect. The one which rivals it closely is the hanging of the German and Japanese leaders after the trumped-up trials at Nuremberg, Manila, and Tokyo. The aftermath of these judicial farces has led to a formidable defensive and apologetic literature written mostly by citizens of the nations which sat in judgment on their enemies and consigned them to the gallows. Nothing done by the Allies through out the war so closely followed the Russian Communists' doctrine of political biology: the obliteration of all elements of the enemy elite considered incapable of assimilation into the order of the winners. Contrary to the fevered opinions of the camp-follower legalists, who still strive in the most unconvincing manner to justify these juridical assassinations and to sell them to the home front populations as novel departures in international law, they were no newer than the systematic executions by Assurbanipal and the other Old Testament Assyrian terrors.

For sheer dramatic irony it is difficult to surpass the comment by Charles Duff in his *A New Handbook on Hanging* (p. 126) on the circumstances immediately preceding the killing of these German military and political personages:

Forever memorable in the proud annals of execution will be the Great Hangings at Nuremberg in the Year of Grace 1946. Eleven leaders of the Nazi movement who had been tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity sat down one October evening (23rd) to their Last Supper of canned American-German sausage and cold cuts with potato salad, bread and tea. The same evening the cinema of the Court of Justice announced next day's screen attraction, which had been well chosen for the occasion. It was "Deadline for Murder."

Nearly a dozen brave books have appeared since 1948 demolishing the validity of the contentions of the Allied judges. Montgomery Belgium's *Victors' Justice*; Lord Maurice Hankey's *Politics, Trials and Errors*; Captain Russell Grenfell's *Unconditional Hatred*; the previously mentioned volumes of Freda Utley and Frederick J.P. Veale; Viscount Maugham's *UNO and War Crimes*; R.T. Paget's *Manstein: His Campaigns and His Trial*, and the logical crusher by A. Frank Reel, *The Case of General Yamashita*, make the sickly justifications of the courts' trained seals sound unbearably unconvincing. Nevertheless, these lynchings under the cloak of legality were the logical conclusion of the wartime crusade, and followed through with hardly a pause where their predecessors had faltered after their vainglorious "Hang the Kaiser" rabblousing. But the fat now is in the fire for sure. These trials have made it a crime to lose, and in the future we may expect the most exaggerated recourse to martial paraphernalia on the part of all belligerent leaders in desperate efforts to avoid defeat and an ignominious end on the victor's gallows. There is little doubt but that the sobering after-effects of these war crimes trials have reached upon the military leadership of the whole world, and upon the West in particular. The "United Nations" war in Korea partially illustrated what we may take to be customary procedure in future wars: both sides rapidly compiled lists of "war criminals" in anticipation of victory and another morality pageant to be played before another planetary audience on new scaffolds. The stalemate result undoubtedly was a bitter disappointment to those who were fired with the righteous zeal of Nuremberg and Manila, even though the now-hostile sides had been joint participants at these former spectacles.

If the Allies wished world approval of their case, they should not have so lightly betrayed the principles and traditions of vaunted Anglo-Saxon juridical and legal practice. We frown on courts where the judges have already made up their minds on the guilt of the accused and are in partnership with the accusers. We disapprove of courts which refuse the accused the right to present evidence on their own behalf because it might undermine the case of the accusers, and ignore the fact that the accusers have been

guilty of the identical things they charged against the accused. Why did the Allies abandon honest pursuit of justice and conduct a trial along the line of Soviet Communist "purge" farces, where the trial is simply advertising for the case against already-sentenced persons? Something nearer the value system the West was supposed to be defending in this frightful bloodbath might have been established if the winners had created a court staffed by judges exclusively from *neutrals* and who tried the winners for their "war crimes" as well.

Charges against the "Axis" leaders (was there ever really an "Axis"?) for such offenses as collective punishments and "enslaving" the laborers of adjacent lands overlooked the monstrous acts of the Russian ally of more comprehensive scope in these departments. And do not documents prove that even while the Allies were considering such charges against the Germans, hundreds of thousands of Germans were being shipped to Russia as involuntary labor with full approval of the other nations? In the decade since the war ended in the West, we have seen impressive evidence of British and French callousness toward the matter of collective punishment. British asperity toward recalcitrant Asians and Africans in Malaya and Kenya proves without a doubt the willingness of England to employ such practices when it is profitable to do so. There is no record of Mr. Churchill condemning the actions in these two lands, actions which match anything on the German or Japanese dossier. Nor have there been any indignant protests among the articulate, who viewed the Nazi razing of Lidice as the crime of the century, at the repetition of this in the jungles of Asia and Africa under Christian British auspices, during these last three years. The press in England has reported these with a straight face, but the wells of moral protest seem to have run dry among those who had made moral protestation a veritable occupation when it involved the behavior of a formidable antagonist.

The ability which the French displayed in starting the tears of the world with their tales of woe in the recent war with Hitler rates very high in the annals of world propaganda history. Bailed out of their sagging descent toward fourth-rate status as a power by the American industrial and military machine, all former sentiments have been discarded while a desperate and losing battle for the maintenance of their colonial prestige in Asia and Africa goes on. Their austerity in handling Algerians, Tunisians and Moroccans fully matches any story told of German behavior in France during the Occupation. Morally the two accounts are precisely equal. As for the Indo-China debacle, one cannot break off his attention to this theater before reading the incredible tale of the campaign against the civilian population as told by the young

French parachute trooper Philippe de Pirey in his *Operation Waste*.

But, once more we have fallen for the propaganda stunts which paint the violence of the favored side in the most favorable hues, while that of the antagonists, as J.M. Read has pointed out in *Atrocity Propaganda*, is denounced as the blackest behavior to the credit of a sub-group of *homo sapiens*. Unfortunately, there has been no long recuperative period after this great war as there was beginning in 1919. No comprehensive decontamination process has been possible anywhere, and the continuation of war in cold, hot and lukewarm forms this past decade has also served the purpose of hardening into permanency the propaganda which accompanied the global assault on Hitler, Mussolini, and Japan. No lessening of the pressure to believe has converted the world's masses into even more compliant believers. It is incorrect to speak of the contemporary generation as skeptics and scoffers; Eric Hoffer's *The True Believer* accurately describes the current world as one desperately anxious to believe, and to follow such beliefs even to annihilation. Underlining this is their patient support of the vast war machines and economies today in the hope that in this way the peace they have been denied will eventuate.

That Stalin was able to get control of nearly a third of Europe beyond his pre-war frontiers, and establish the Russian policy of recalcitrancy and contumely which has sparked the last rancorous decade, is due almost entirely to Roosevelt and Churchill. When it comes to the political blunders of modern times, none surpasses that of the former and his adviser Harry Hopkins in confidently predicting that the Communists would be amenable to a world settlement which would find the same old post-Versailles Anglo-Franco-American combine dictating all fundamental world policies, with Russian collaboration. It was with such blithe hopes that the destruction of Europe was so lightly undertaken. Sir Winston's change of heart was too late. Although he hypocritically announced late in 1944 that the war was "no longer an ideological war" as he and the ponderous Allied propaganda factories had proclaimed it even before it began, there was faint hope that any successful salvage of the situation was then possible. The real issue was not sudden Communist perfidy but repeated and unpardonable Anglo-American misjudgment of Communism.

It is hard to reconcile Mr. Churchill's belatedly discovered and asserted suspicion of the Soviets with the way in which the war was prosecuted in the last ten months. Of course, the launching of the Cold War in March 1946 signified a relatively rapid policy-somersault on the part of the "Democratic Leader," but his assertions to the press in the spring of 1955 that he had authorized the stockpiling of German arms for possible reissue to the soldiers of

his hated enemy should Russian advances into the West continue, aroused wry smiles of incredulity. The Potsdam agreement unfortunately is on the record, and its specific provisions dismiss any feeble gestures on the part of Sir Winston to ensconce himself further as an omniscient sleuth when it came to divining the intents of things Russian. The editor of *The Economist* in an article published on 11 August 1945 made probably the most realistic contemporary resume of this whole deplorable settlement:

The conviction that the peace proposed at Potsdam is a thoroughly bad peace is not based on any sentimental softening towards Germany. It is based on the belief that the system proposed is in the fullest sense unworkable. It offers no hope of ultimate German reconciliation. It offers little hope of the Allies maintaining its cumbrous controls beyond the first years of peace. Its methods of reparations reinforce autarky in Russia and consummate the ruin not only of Germany, but of Europe. Above all, it has in it not a single constructive idea, not a single hopeful perspective for the post-war world. At the end of a mighty war fought to defeat Hitlerism, the Allies are making a Hitlerian peace. This is the real measure of their failure.

The remarkable disintegration of the United Nations Organization as the cureall for the world's conflicting national interests is the most impressive evidence of the basic defectiveness of design in the postwar plans of the Allied victors. Like its direct ancestor it was little more than a gathering of the most powerful conquerors and several levels of satellites, as exclusive as its predecessor. The defeated nations are not in it yet, and there exists little evidence that they will be admitted in the near future. Little wonder that much of the perpetual debate is so unrealistic. The two great-power concentrations whose wheeling and dealing has occupied most of the UN's time since 1945 are the consequences which indicate the transparency of the great statesmen who in the majesty of their wisdom imagined that another diplomatic Potemkin-village such as the League was all the world needed to bring about peace. And the military alliances of the West—NATO, SEATO, and the like—are the best proof of the fundamental lack of faith of the West in their own creature. The futile wars fought in Korea and Indo-China since 1945 add emphasis to the contention that the UN is mainly an instrument for the encouragement and spreading of wars rather than a device for their prevention or limitation. So after all the disparagement and ridicule, we are back to conferences, agreements, alliances, understandings, balances of power and conciliatory gatherings in the hope of reconciling conflicting national interests. How protagonists can claim with a straight face that the organization has inhibited fighting anywhere is dissimulation beyond compare.

It is these contemporary attempts to find a common meeting ground with Communism that illustrate best of all the sheer lunacy of the war. They undermine completely the argument that fighting Hitler to the end was a moral necessity on the grounds that such a sinner and such an evil program could not be permitted to survive. The most pathetic spectacle of all has been Mr. Churchill's groping for peace in his declining days, after a lifetime of unbroken devotion to solving his problems and those of Britain in generous baths of hot lead, steel and blood. After all his thunder-words and belligerency comes the interlude, at the conclusion of his career, of sweetness and reconciliation. Are we to thank the hydrogen bomb for this, rather than an intellectual conversion to the machinery of peace? For those of us who have watched him for five decades, and in particular the period since the Bolshevik revolution, it is the paradox of the century that Sir Winston should end his political days as the champion of a policy of peace with an element, the Soviet Union, of which he has been one of the most vitriolic critics, even though he found it possible to swallow his scruples and accept them as allies not a very great time ago. In just what way do the Soviets exceed the Nazis in moral rectitude? Are we to believe that the guiding consideration in seeking this understanding is the vast material power of this potential adversary in still another war? If not, Sir Winston concludes his career as a statesman in complete absurdity. The editorialist (Sir Oswald Mosley) in the May 1955 issue of *The European* has summed it up most succinctly:

... none can deny—least of all Sir Winston Churchill—that the Soviet leaders in undoubted fact have committed crimes against humanity which have surpassed anything even suggested against the Nazi leaders.

So Churchill's moral desire for peace today removes his last moral excuse for war yesterday. No one can say that peace with Nazi Germany was morally impossible while he clambers up the "throne of skulls" to seek peace with the Soviet "monsters" at yet another vodka banquet.

He returns to the true tradition of British policy which sought peace and the interests of the country without requiring any certificate of domestic virtue from the other side. He is right to seek peace today; he would have been still more right to seek peace yesterday.

That we are now deep in a stage of world affairs best described by George Orwell is a conclusion that is nearly impossible to reject. In his novel 1984 the three power agglomerations now glaring at one another and the motivations easily recognizable today have been laid down with implacable literary skill. One should not miss the remarkable summaries of this situation in Harry Elmer

Barnes' *The Struggle Against the Historical Blackout*, Chapter 10, titled "Orwellian Warfare," of Veale's *Advance to Barbarism*, and the symposium *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*. Orwell's analysis is the fruit of a fairly long intellectual tradition which begins with Bakunin, and courses along through Wacław Machajski, Max Nomad and James Burnham. The latter's *The Managerial Revolution* first brought this thesis to a large public, but it was already fully developed. The capture of the machinery of the modern state by the new intellectual "managerial" elite, using the working class as camouflage, describes in brief the main argument. The entrenchment of this new managerial elite in power by utilization of the strategy of endless but limited global war is the subject of Orwell's brilliant *tour de force*. The chances for peace and comity in the world appear grim and dark in view of this set of circumstances. But it may be that the mind-shrinking potential of fission warfare may intervene and bring the world back to sanity; the speech of General MacArthur in Los Angeles in January 1955 is a straw in the wind which suggests a way out. A more summary condemnation of the present managerial war trends has never issued from the lips of anyone, let alone from those of a person whose whole life has been spent in military proclivities.

Still again, the chief reason for the failure to break out of this new circle of death may be that people have lost interest in foreign affairs, and although still living in the cloud-castles created for them by propaganda, have woven a fact-proof screen about themselves out of sheer distrust of their representatives. One's intelligence can stand just so much blunting by war censorship edicts and palpably misleading news and informational fare. This accounts in large part for the widespread apathy and state of torpor, regardless how pressing the issues of the day are. Our war-time project which sought to batter down the moral conditioning which looked upon the taking of life with disfavor was a rousing success. Resistance to this has been largely obliterated, a fact which can be verified by attendance at moving picture theaters where war pictures and news reels are shown. A sober, ruminating audience accepts scenes of obliteration bombing, napalm, and flame-thrower incendiaryism and automatic weapon massacres with hardly a flicker of reaction. Do we really think that this kind of psychological conditioning is going to be lightly brushed away by the application of the new post-war fad of juke-box religion? No, perhaps we still face the necessity of paying a fabulous price beyond what already has been paid. Another war may find us grazing the possibility of racial annihilation.

We are again at the stage which the world was in twenty years ago. Will we act any wiser this time, or will the counsels of the makers of war again prevail and the bloody burden once more be

taken up by the world's peoples? We cannot approach this new situation as complacently as a large part of the spectators did in 1935. The new weapons urge us to seek a just settlement, and eliminate the gnawing grievances which clamor for equitable assessment. We simply cannot afford anymore the heavy-handed obtuseness which precipitated 1914 and 1939. The time to begin a realistic re-education in the ways that wars are made is already long overdue.

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'The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry': An Exchange

W.D. RUBINSTEIN
WALTER N. SANNING
ARTHUR R. BUTZ

Editor's Note: Earlier this year Mr. John Bennett, head of the Australian Civil Liberties Union, sent a copy of Walter N. Sanning's 1983 book *The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry* to Dr. W.D. Rubinstein of the School of Social Sciences at Deakin University, Victoria, Australia. Professor Rubinstein has been a leading Australian critic of revisionist books on the "Holocaust." He gave Mr. Bennett his reactions to the Sanning book in a letter, which Mr. Bennett circulated in revisionist circles, soliciting comment. We herewith print the Rubinstein letter, followed by letters in reaction to it by Walter N. Sanning and Arthur R. Butz.

Professor W.D. Rubinstein to John Bennett, ca. 15 February 1984:

Dear Mr. Bennett,

Thank you for letting me see Sanning's book, which I attach. I would like to purchase a copy in due course. I have not, because of the pressure of other work, gone over the whole text in great detail, but I think the following remarks would still stand after a more detailed reading:

1) Sanning's thesis is that there were many fewer Jews in Europe in 1939, and many more in Europe (or ex-European Jews elsewhere) in 1945 than previous historians have maintained, and that any decrease in European Jewish numbers between 1939 and

1945 was due to a continuation of previous unfavorable demographic patterns, emigration, 'normal' wartime losses, and one new factor not found in previous works of this type, the mass murder of Jews by *Stalin*. Sanning claims that Stalin murdered at least 600,000 former Polish Jews (p. 106). Sanning denies that a Nazi Holocaust occurred, in common with other neo-Nazi writers.

2) Sanning appears to be a competent and expert historical demographer and, to give him credit, has studied all of the sources. However, his whole work is permeated by willful sleight-of-hand and distortion, and with the possible exception of one part of his discussion, is just as historically worthless as other works of this sort.

Two points are crucial to Sanning's discussion. The first is that the number of Polish Jews was not 3.2-3.3 million in 1939 as is generally maintained, but about 2.6 million, due to an excess of deaths over births and large-scale emigration, especially by younger males. This is demographically quite incredible, apart from the fact that it is not based upon adequate sources. There is not the slightest evidence of any such widescale emigration, and one might ask: where did these Jews emigrate to? Anyone who knows the extreme difficulties faced by wealthy and educated German Jews in emigrating between 1933 and 1939 will realize the implausibility that large numbers of impoverished Polish Jews migrated elsewhere during this period.

The second key point is that very substantial numbers of Polish Jews were moved to the eastern parts of the Soviet Union in 1939. For this, there is not one shred of compelling evidence, and Sanning cannot really decide whether Stalin *rescued* these Polish Jews or *murdered* 600,000 of them! As I believe I wrote you before, this whole argument is irrelevant if there was no Nazi Holocaust, but such is life.

Notice too, that after all of Sanning's sleight-of-hand over numbers, all of it misleading, he is *still* unable to account for 600,000 'missing' Polish Jews except by claiming they were murdered (by Stalin). Doesn't this strike you as giving the whole game away?

3) I do not have Butz's work at hand, but Sanning's work contradicts Butz's on a number of interesting matters:

a) Butz, as I remember, claims that no Hungarian Jews were deported; Sanning states (pp. 141-2) that 100,000 (or more) were deported to Germany.

b) Butz claims that there may be 9 million Jews in the U.S. at present. Doubtless because such a figure is preposterous, Sanning puts the number at 6.6 million.

c) Butz claims that the Zionist-Communist international con-

spiracy were responsible for concocting the 'Holocaust myth'. Sanning claims that Stalin murdered 600,000 Jews.

4) Sanning does not examine the historical evidence for the Nazi Holocaust, but evidently dismisses it as fiction. Yet he unhesitatingly accepts the fact that Stalin murdered 600,000 Polish Jews. I would regard the historical evidence that the Nazis murdered between 5-6 million European Jews as about 10,000 times stronger than Sanning's claim about Stalin and the evidence he presents for it, yet, to fit his theories, he accepts the Stalin claim and rejects 'normal' history.

There are many many other similar points which readily occur to me, but which, frankly, it is a waste of my time to canvass. Like Butz's work, Sanning's book is a monument of misdirected energy and is without merit or interest except to students of contemporary anti-semitism.

Finally, the clipping you sent about Polish Jews in Australia, regardless of its source, is a wild exaggeration. It will send you the correct figures when I have a chance to look at the Census data.

Yours sincerely,
(Dr) W.D. Rubinstein

Walter N. Sanning to John Bennett, 8 March 1984:

Dear Mr. Bennett,

A few days ago I received a copy of Dr. Rubinstein's letter to you criticizing *The Dissolution* as a book "permeated by willful sleight-of-hand and distortion" and "as historically worthless" at the same time charging me with "neo-Nazism" and "anti-Semitism." Possibly, one must expect this kind of denunciation if one presents facts contrary to the views of the established power structure and its most influential special interest group.

I assume that Dr. Rubinstein knows the difference between "emigration" and "immigration." He refers to "the extreme difficulties faced by wealthy and educated German Jews in emigrating between 1933 and 1939 . . ." However, the difficulty was on the immigration side as a number of Western countries did not welcome Jewish immigration. Dr. Rubinstein knows this and I suppose that is what he meant, but he creates the wrong impression that Germany prevented them from leaving the country.

Not in a single instance does Dr. Rubinstein try to disprove or refute the conclusions, facts or evidence contained in *The Dissolution*. He calls the figure of only 2.6 million Polish Jews in 1939 "demographically quite incredible, apart from the fact that it is not based upon adequate sources." He goes on: "There is not the

slightest evidence of any such widescale emigration and one might ask: where did these Jews emigrate to?"

Is he joking? Either he overlooked or he chose to overlook the evidence I presented for such widescale emigration. Examples: (a) the testimony of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long before a congressional committee to the effect that the U.S.A. admitted about 580,000 refugees until 1943—most of them Jews; (b) the large immigration in Palestine in the Thirties and early Forties (almost 300,000), (c) the huge Jewish population increases in Latin America (almost 200,000) and Western Europe until the war (over 100,000). It is precisely because I anticipated charges like those of Dr. Rubinstein that I based by analysis almost exclusively on Allied, Zionist and pro-Zionist West German sources. If he believes that the evidence given by the wartime U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, the Institute of Jewish Affairs, the American Jewish Year Book, official census publications or the pro-Zionist Institute for Contemporary History in Munich and other similar sources is inadequate, then he should explain what he considers adequate. In Germany at any rate, the Holocaust-enthralled courts have used the latter institute's testimony as *prima facie* evidence.

Dr. Rubinstein's question "where did these Jews emigrate to?" is brazen indeed. *The Dissolution* has been very specific on this (Chapter Seven) and I can only take this remark as another example of a thoroughly dishonest approach.

His assertion that "there is not one shred of compelling evidence [that] very substantial numbers of Polish Jews were moved to the eastern parts of the Soviet Union in 1939" is absolutely correct. Trouble is, I never claimed that: I referred to the year 1940. The evidence presented (Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Institute of Jewish Affairs, Gerald Reitlinger, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Encyclopaedia Judaica, David Bergelson, American Jewish Year Book, Herschel Weinrauch, Rabbi Aaron Pechenick, Shachne Epstein, Committee for Jewish Refugees from Concentration Camps, etc.) is overwhelming. Dr. Rubinstein neither refers to this evidence nor does he explain why it should not be accepted; he chooses simply to deny its existence. But then, I can't blame him considering how easy it is to be charged with "anti-Semitism" these days.

I am afraid that I also have to dampen somewhat his obvious delight in having found what he believes are contradictions between Prof. Butz's work and mine.

However, it is just not true that Prof. Butz "claims that no Hungarian Jews were deported," nor is it true that I stated that 100,000 or more were deported. What Prof. Butz said was that

some deportations were going on between March and October 1944 and, again, that in October 1944 between 35,000 and 45,000 were actually deported to Germany for labor. My own reference to this episode was that the IRC report mentioned only 60,000 scheduled to be deported and that nowhere do we find any trace whatever that this number was exceeded or attained. I went on to say that "in this analysis we will assume that . . . the total number of deported Jews from Hungary reached 100,000 which is probably much too high" (p. 140). It is difficult to believe that Dr. Rubinstein's false charges are just the result of gross negligence.

Dr. Rubinstein's further claim of a contradiction between Prof. Butz and my work regarding the number of Jews in the United States is just as baseless. Prof. Butz stated "I really have no idea how many Jews there are in the U.S. . . . As far as I know, the correct figure could easily be 9,000,000." In other words, Prof. Butz did not claim 9 million Jews for the U.S.A.; he merely stated a personal view while admitting that he does not know. Where is the contradiction?

There are more misrepresentations and false charges I could cite, but I think that the above is quite sufficient to show the total failure of this representative of "normal" history to fend off the blow which *The Dissolution* has delivered to some of the basic tenets of the Holocaust story.

If "incredible" and "inadequate" is all he can say to counter my arguments, his case must be weak indeed. If he feels that he can resort to crude falsehoods just to make up for non-existent differences between Prof. Butz and myself, can one believe that he would tell us the truth in as abstruse and lucrative an affair as the so-called Holocaust?

Dr. Rubinstein deplored the fact that I did not examine "the historical evidence for the Nazi Holocaust." Well, I haven't done so for good reason. First, there are plenty of excellent Revisionist works available examining "the historical evidence" (Butz, Faurisson, Rassinier, Staeglich) to name just a few, and, unfortunately for people like Dr. Rubinstein, they found this evidence wanting. Secondly, my objective was to examine the statistical demographic facts and the specific historical frame pertaining to just one aspect of recent Jewish History: The demographic development of eastern European Jewry.

I kept *The Dissolution* as free of emotion as possible and I hoped to contribute thereby to a genuine discussion of the premises underlying the genocide charge. It seems, though, that this is not possible. One should think that academics would owe it to their self-esteem to argue objectively and impassionately rather than to resort to slander, name-calling, misrepresentations and outright

lies. Hopefully, Dr. Rubinstein is just an exception. His total disregard for the truth is further proof, if any was needed, of the Holocaust story's lack of substance.

My very best regards,
Walter N. Sanning

Professor Arthur R. Butz to Thomas J. Marcellus, 18 April 1984:

Dear Mr. Marcellus:

Thank you for sending me the copy of Dr. W.D. Rubinstein's recent letter to John Bennett, criticizing Walter Sanning's *Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry*. I have the following comments on the Rubinstein letter, which you can publish in the *JHR* or newsletter if you wish.

Dr. Rubinstein, of Deakin University in Australia, is best known now for his recent book *The Left, the Right and the Jews*, whose thesis is that Jews constitute a new social, economic and political elite in the West and as such have been moving to the right politically. The book contains a scorning notice of revisionism, with which his public scrapes started in 1979, when he attempted to convince Australian libraries not to allow my *Hoax of the Twentieth Century* to become available to readers (*Australian Library Journal*, 6 July 1979, p. 162).

I was almost incredulous at some of Rubinstein's remarks, especially where he seemed to be saying that there were no significant emigrations of Jews from Germany or Poland during the Thirties, or that "there is not one shred of compelling evidence" that "substantial numbers" of Polish Jews were deported to the interior of the Soviet Union. Such wild remarks make one wonder if any of the writings of this supposed expert on Jewry can be read with credence. However, I shall not redundantly try to cover the ground that Sanning has in his excellent rebuttal of Rubinstein.

Rather I shall remark on a respect in which Rubinstein's criticism is valid, although trifling and anticipated in the Foreword I contributed to the Sanning book. To oversimplify, Sanning argued at one point, on the basis of his documentation, that 750,000 Polish Jews were deported by the Soviets, that the conditions attending the relocation were severe, that about 150,000 returned, and that the most plausible explanation for the discrepancy is that 600,000 died from the severe conditions. While that is possible, I am not convinced. Sanning's argument can be disputed at several points. This is one of those instances of a Sanning estimate that can be "challenged on some plausible grounds," as I wrote in the Foreword. You should be prepared in the future for the raising of other valid points of disputation.

Sanning undertook one of the most difficult tasks I can imagine. For example the specific question of about how many Polish Jews perished in the Soviet Union will never be answered to the general satisfaction of all reasonable inquirers. If Sanning should be faulted, however, it is not for the "willful sleight-of-hand and distortion" of Rubinstein's curses but for underestimating the difficulty of the task he set for himself. Nevertheless, in Sanning's book "the treatment has been carried . . . about as far as it can be," as I wrote in the Foreword. Even Rubinstein implicitly concedes real value for the book by remarking that Sanning "has studied all of the sources." The implication is that one can learn the identity of these sources in *Dissolution*.

To address Rubinstein's comments on my work, he considers "preposterous" my belief that the number of U.S. Jews "could as easily be 9,000,000", and presumably also my associated claim that "there must be at least 4,000,000 in the New York City area alone" (p. 17 of *Hoax*). While at no point claiming to possess accurate figures, I gave background considerations which made such speculations reasonable. The "New York City area" is not, I admit, precisely defined, but I think it could fairly be taken to be the area from which people might feasibly commute to jobs in Manhattan; that would include e.g. Philadelphia and the densely populated parts of Connecticut. Such speculations, so inharmonious with the six million Jews supposed to be in the U.S.A., are not confined to revisionist historians. An article in the *New York Times* of 2 January 1981 on Gaucher's disease (which like Tay-Sachs strikes mainly Jews), clearly based on demographic data of some sort, remarked that "about half of this country's estimated eight million Jews live in the New York metropolitan area."

The Rubinstein letter is a contribution to its subject only in its unintended implications. The only serious weakness he found in the Sanning book is one that any work of such objectives will have. The rest of Rubinstein's remarks are empty railing.

Sincerely,
Arthur R. Butz

REVIEW ARTICLE

Why The Goyim?

L.A. ROLLINS

WHY THE JEWS? THE REASON FOR ANTISEMITISM by Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, 238pp, \$14.95, ISBN 0-671-45270-3.

Jews have suffered, and Christians have suffered. Mankind has suffered. There is no group with a monopoly on suffering, and no human beings which have experienced hate and hostility more than any other. I must say, however, that it is my impression that Jewish history has been taught with a whine and a whimper rather than with a straight-forward acknowledgement that man practices his inhumanity on his fellow human beings. . . .

—Rabbi Richard E. Singer, Highland Park, Illinois, Lakeside Congregation. Quoted by Alfred Lilienthal, *The Zionist Connection*. (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1978), p. 401.

In *Why the Jews?*, Dennis Prager and Joseph Telushkin perform a disingenuous duet of whining and whimpering. The basic premise of the book, which I dispute, is that (p. 17) "Hatred of the Jew has been humanity's great hatred. While hatred of other groups has always existed, no hatred has been as universal, as deep, or as permanent as antisemitism."

But all of Prager and Telushkins' arguments in support of their assertion of the "uniqueness" of Jew-hatred are rendered at best inconclusive by a fundamental defect in their discussion. This defect is their failure to acknowledge the reality of another form of hatred that has been as universal, deep and permanent as Jew-hatred. I'm talking about Goy-hatred.

Space limitations preclude my documenting the phenomenon of Goy-hatred in the detail that I would like to. So interested readers are referred to my book *A History of Anti-Gentilism*, forthcoming from Random House—when Hell freezes over. But right now I will quote just one piece of Jewish testimony concerning Goy-hatred. Writing under the name "Avner," a former member of LEHI, also known as the Stern Gang, a Jewish terrorist organization in Mandatory Palestine, described his joining the group:

Tsfoni handed us each a heavy revolver and said in a harsh voice which immediately acquainted us with the spirit of the adventure we were embarking on:

"No pity for the Goys."

I experienced an inner surge of emotion. It was years since I had heard this word. It was never used in the kibboutz because there was no place for it in Marxist terminology. For the European Jew, the term is not necessarily one of abuse. It is the way in which it is said which gives it its character. For the Lehi, on the other hand, an Englishman would always be a filthy Goy, who could be killed for this reason alone, but if one in particular was necessary—the Polish pogrom and the Hitler camps. Later, I saw this biological hatred appear in the course of operations, as in the case of the eighteen-year-old Sabra who, after having fired a burst of submachine-gun fire point-blank at a policeman, instead of running away, lingered a long while battering the already cooling body with the butt of his weapon. (*Memoirs of an Assassin: Confessions of a Stern Gang Killer* [New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959], p. 78.)

In the course of this review, I will present some additional evidence of the existence of Goy-hatred throughout Jewish history.

Their failure to acknowledge the reality of Goy-hatred is not the only defect in Prager and Telushkins' discussion of the alleged uniqueness of Jew-hatred. Another defect is their penchant for magnifying the extent of Jew-hatred by promiscuously labeling as Jew-hatred (or "antisemitism") any opinion concerning Jews that they find troublesome, and by endorsing false or exaggerated Jewish accusations against the Goyim.

As an example of their promiscuous use of the "antisemitism" label, consider this statement (p. 17), intended to illustrate the allegedly unique nature of Jew-hatred: "Jews who live in non-Jewish societies have been accused of having dual loyalties, and

Jews who live in the Jewish state have been condemned as 'racists.' " But inasmuch as it is true that some Jews who live in "non-Jewish" societies do have dual loyalties, and some Jews who live in the Jewish state are racists, saying so does not necessarily indicate Jew-hatred.

Prager and Telushkins' endorsement of false or exaggerated Jewish accusations against the Goyim is well illustrated by their discussion (pp. 18-19) of various alleged attempts to annihilate the Jewish people:

The basic source of ancient Jewish history, the Bible, depicts two attempts to destroy the Jewish people, the attempt by Pharaoh and the Egyptians (*Exodus* 1:15-22) and that of Haman and the Persians (*Book of Esther*). While it is true that the historicity of these biblical accounts has not been proven or disproven by nonbiblical sources, few would dispute the supposition that in ancient times attempts were made to destroy the Jews. Indeed the first record reference to Jews in non-Jewish sources, the Merneptah stele, written by an Egyptian king about 1220 B.C.E., states "Israel is no more." Jewish writings from the earliest times until the present are replete with references to attempts by non-Jews to destroy the Jewish people. *Psalms* 83:5 describes the enemies of the Jews as proponents of genocide: "Come, and let us cut them off from being a nation, that the Name of Israel may no more be remembered." Just how precarious Jews have viewed their survival is reflected in a statement from the ancient and still recited Passover Haggadah: "In every generation they rise against us in order to annihilate us."

On two occasions in the last 350 years annihilation campaigns have been waged against the Jews: the Chmelnitzky massacres in Eastern Europe in 1648-49, and the Nazi destruction of Jews throughout Europe between 1939-1945.

... In both instances all Jews, including infants, were targeted for murder; the general populace nearly always joined in the attacks; and the torture and degradation of Jews were an integral part of the murderers' procedures.

Contrary to Prager and Telushkin, nonbiblical sources do disprove the historicity of the biblical account of Haman's alleged plot to annihilate the Jews of Persia. Theodore H. Gaster, a scholar of religions and civilizations of the Near East, has written:

Scholars have long since pointed out that the story of Esther, as related in the Bible, is simply a piece of romantic fiction and cannot possibly represent historical fact. None of the Persian kings called Xerxes had a wife named Esther, and none had a vizier named Haman. What is more, the whole story of Ahasuerus' marrying a Jewish maiden is factually preposterous, for we happen to know from the Greek historian Herodotus and from other sources that the Persian king was permitted to marry only into one of the seven leading families of the realm, and the pedigree of the bride was

therefore submitted to the most searching examination. (*Festivals of the Jewish Year: A Modern Interpretation and Guide*, 2nd printing [New York: William Morrow, 1972], pp. 215-216.)

(Parenthetically I will point out that if, as Prager and Telushkin claim, biblical accounts of attempts to destroy the Jewish people are evidence of the depth of Jew-hatred, then, by the same token, the biblical account (*Book of Joshua*) of how "the children of Israel," led by Joshua, "utterly destroyed" the inhabitants of Jericho, Ai, Makedah, Libnah, Lachish, Eglon, Hebron, Debir and Hazor must be evidence of the depth of Goy-hatred. Maybe that is why Prager and Telushkin do not mention Joshua or his perhaps mythical massacres.)

The Chmelnitzky massacres of the 1640s did, in fact, occur, with Poles and Germans among the victims, not only Jews. But, contrary to Prager and Telushkin's claim that "... all Jews, including infants, were targeted for murder . . .," Paul E. Grosser and Edwin G. Halperin have said:

The roving bands of [Cossack] rebels allowed only those who converted to the Greek Orthodox faith to survive. Jews living in the Kiev area fled to the Tatar camps and surrendered. (As a rule the Tartars refrained from killing them but rather sold them into slavery in Turkey where there was an excellent chance of being purchased by their Turkish coreligionists.) (*Anti-Semitism: The Causes and Effects of a Prejudice* [Secaucus, N.J.: Citadel Press, 1979], p. 180.)

Prager and Telushkin's claim that "... all Jews, including infants, were targeted for murder . . ." during "the Nazi Holocaust" has been convincingly disputed by a number of writers. Rather than open up that particular subject in this review, I will refer readers especially to the works on this question by Arthur Butz and Robert Faurisson.*

At least some of the five alleged attempts to annihilate the Jewish people specifically mentioned by Prager and Telushkin are totally or partially fictional. But even if all five were completely factual, that would not make true the Passover Haggadah's

*Arthur R. Butz, *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century*, 5th ed. (Torrance, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review, 1983). This is the expanded edition which includes, as appendices, the essays "The International 'Holocaust' Controversy" and "Context and Perspective in the 'Holocaust' Controversy." Robert Faurisson, "The Mechanics of Gassing," *Journal of Historical Review* Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1980), pp. 23-30; "Confessions of SS Men Who Were at Auschwitz," *JHR* Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1981), pp. 103-36; "The Gas Chambers of Auschwitz Appear to be Physically Inconceivable," *JHR* Vol. 2, No. 4 (Winter 1981), pp. 311-17; "The Gas Chambers: Truth or Lie?," *JHR* Vol. 2, No. 4 (Winter 1981), pp. 319-73. The most complete exposition of Faurisson's views is, of course, found in his books and those of his supporters which have been published in France: Serge Thion [with Robert Faurisson], *Vérité historique ou vérité politique? Le dossier de l'affaire*

defamatory accusation against the Goyim: "In every generation they rise against us in order to annihilate us."

Why, then, do Prager and Telushkin cite the Passover Hag-gadah's defamation of the Goyim as evidence of the depth of Jew-hatred, when, if it is evidence of anything, it must be evidence of Goy-hatred? After all, they treat false and defamatory accusations against the Jews as evidence of Jew-hatred. But by the same token, false and defamatory accusations against the Goyim can with equal justification be viewed as evidence of Goy-hatred. So if Prager and Telushkin are right to interpret anti-Jewish libels as evidence of Jew-hatred, then their own endorsement of various anti-Gentile libels must be evidence of their own virulent, violent Goy-hatred.

The main point of *Why the Jews?* is to present Prager and Telushkins' explanation of Jew-hatred. They reject various explanations that have been proposed, including (p. 20) "economic factors, the need for scapegoats, ethnic hatred, xenophobia, resentment of Jewish affluence and professional success, and religious bigotry." They assert that none of these things provides an ultimate or universal explanation of Jew-hatred. And they assume there must be such an ultimate, universal explanation. Why must there be? They say (p. 21): "Antisemitism has existed too long and in too many disparate cultures to ignore the problem of ultimate cause and/or to claim that new or indigenous factors are responsible every time it erupts." But to deny that there is any ultimate, universal cause of Jew-hatred is not necessarily to imply that "new and indigenous factors are responsible every time it erupts." To prove their point, Prager and Telushkin must prove that new and indigenous factors are *never* responsible for Jew-hatred. This they have not done.

Nevertheless, Prager and Telushkin proceed to endorse "the age-old Jewish understanding of antisemitism," which they express (*ibid.*) thusly: "Throughout their history Jews have regarded Jew-hatred as an inevitable consequence of their Jewishness." Or, as they also put it (p. 22): "The ultimate cause of antisemitism is

Faurisson: *La question des chambres à gas* (Paris: La Vieille Taupe, 1980); Faurisson, *Mémoire en défense contre ceux qui m'accusent de falsifier l'Histoire* (Paris: La Vieille Taupe, 1981); *Réponse à Pierre Vidal-Naquet*, 2nd ed. (Paris: La Vieille Taupe, 1983); Jean-Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Eric Delcroix, Claude Karnoouh, Vincent Monteil, and Jean-Louis Tristani, *Intolérable Intolérance* (Paris: Editions de La Différence, 1981); Anon., *De L'Exploitation dans les camps à l'exploitation des camps: Une mise au point de "La Guerre sociale," supplément au numéro 3* (Paris: La Guerre sociale, 1981); "Le Citoyen," *L'incroyable Affaire Faurisson: Les petits suppléments au Guide des droits des victimes* No. 1 (Paris: La Vieille Taupe, 1982). See also: Andrea Chersi (ed.), *Il caso Faurisson* (Castenedolo, Italy: Andrea Chersi, 1982), and Anon., *Note rassineriane (con appendice sulla persecuzione giudiziaria di R. Faurisson)* (Rome: Estratto da L'Internazionalista, 1982).

that which made Jews Jewish—Judaism.” But if, as they assert, Judaism is the cause of Jew-hatred, then what (or who) is the cause of Judaism?

In any case, Prager and Telushkin specify (pp. 22-23) four reasons why Judaism has caused Jew-hatred: 1) the Jews’ allegiance to “God, Torah, and Israel” has been regarded by “non-Jews (often correctly) as challenging the validity of the non-Jews’ god(s), law(s), and/or national allegiance”; 2) the Jewish mission “to perfect the world under the rule of God” and the Jews’ consequent practice of making “moral” demands upon others “has constantly been a source of tension between Jews and non-Jews”; 3) “Judaism has also held from the earliest time that the Jews were chosen by God to achieve the mission of perfecting the world”; and 4) “As a result of the Jews’ commitment to Judaism, they have led higher quality lives than their non-Jewish neighbors in almost every society in which they have lived,” a fact which “has challenged non-Jews and provoked profound envy and hostility.” “For these reasons,” say Prager and Telushkin (p. 24), “Jews have always seen antisemitism as the somewhat inevitable and often quite rational, though of course immoral, response to Judaism.”

In Chapter Two, “Antisemitism: The Hatred of Judaism and Its Challenge,” Prager and Telushkin elaborate upon the first two of the four reasons why, they say, Judaism causes Jew-hatred. They state (p. 27): “Judaism consists of three components: God, Torah (laws and teachings), and Israel (Jewish nationhood). Throughout Jewish history, the Jews’ affirmation of one or more of these components has challenged, often threatened, the gods, laws, and nationalism of non-Jews among whom the Jews have lived.”

Jewish monotheism has challenged the validity of worshipping any god but Yahweh. As Prager and Telushkin explain (pp. 27-28):

In the ancient world, every nation but the Jews worshiped its own gods and acknowledged the legitimacy of others’ gods. The Jews declared that the gods of the non-Jews were nonsense: “They have mouths but cannot speak, eyes but cannot see, ears but cannot hear . . .” (*Psalms* 115:5-6). There is but one God and He had revealed himself to mankind through the Jews. One need not be a theologian or historian to understand why these doctrines bred massive anti-Jewish resentment.

True enough. But Prager and Telushkin seem to overlook something. While Jewish monotheism challenges the legitimacy of any god but Yahweh, every other form of religion (and every form of irreligion) similarly challenges the legitimacy of Jewish monotheism. While Goyim have felt their religions threatened by Judaism, Jews have also felt Judaism threatened by other religions (or irreligions). Just as Goyim have hated Jews for this reason, so have Jews hated Goyim. Prager and Telushkin cite (p. 105) as a

manifestation of Jew-hatred a ruling of the Synod of Elvira in 306 A.D. that Jews and Christians were not permitted to eat together. But in an interview in *The Jerusalem Post International Edition* (26 February-3 March 1984, p. 22), the Sephardic and Ashkenazic Chief Rabbis of Israel, discussing Christian missionaries, "... stressed that it was forbidden for Jews to have anything to do with such people." And the Chief Rabbis' stated attitude is relatively moderate. According to Norman Kempster, in the *Los Angeles Times* (18 March 1984, p. 1), "Amid the religious graffiti covering the walls of Mea Shearim, the home neighborhood of Israel's most militantly Orthodox Jews, someone has plastered dozens of copies of a handbill with the jarring message: 'Death to the Missionaries.'" Kempster also reports: "Within the last six months, the meeting place of a Christian congregation in Jerusalem was set on fire and Christian worshippers by the Sea of Galilee were showered with stones, including a potentially lethal seven pound chunk of concrete that injured a woman seriously enough to send her to a hospital." All of which is further evidence that Prager and Telushkins' whining and whimpering about the alleged uniqueness of Jew-hatred is simply so much kosher baloney.

According to Prager and Telushkin, the Jews, via their "ethical monotheism," have challenged the values of their neighbors. They quote (p. 28) the Reverend Edward H. Flannery: "It was Judaism that brought the concept of a God-given universal moral law into the world. . . ." But, they say (*ibid.*), "The world to which the Jews have introduced God and His moral demands has always resented this challenge." And they conclude (*ibid.*): "A basic element of antisemitism is, therefore, a rebellion against the thou shalt and thou shalt not introduced by the Jews in the name of a supreme moral authority."

Though Prager and Telushkin have provided no proof of this, there may be some truth to it. Perhaps some Goyim do resent the challenge of Jewish "morality." But in any case, some Goyim do not resent it. They simply reject it as a hoax, a camouflage for the advancement of Jewish interests. And such "amoralism" need not mean hatred of Jews. It may simply mean a refusal to be manipulated by Jewish moralizers such as Prager and Telushkin.

Prager and Telushkin discuss resentment of Jewish "morality." They do not discuss resentment of Jewish "immorality." The Ten Commandments include the commandment that thou shalt not steal. But have Jews always felt bound by this commandment in their relations with Goyim? In *The Jerusalem Post International Edition* (25-31 March 1984, p. 14), Dr. Reuven Hammer, of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, writes: "When the Romans complained to Rabban Gamaliel that Jewish law was

most praiseworthy except for the fact that it permitted theft from non-Jews, he promptly made an enactment forbidding it." Thus, prior to Gamliel's amendment, the prohibition against stealing was interpreted so as to allow stealing from *Goyim*. It is only natural that *Goyim* would have resented such "immorality" towards them.

This may have been one reason why some Romans accused the Jews of hating mankind. Prager and Telushkin mention this pagan "antisemitic" allegation a number of times, but they never deign to refute it. Nor do they ever mention that Jewish law once permitted theft from *Goyim*. Why, though, *did* Jewish law allow this, if not due to hatred of the *Goyim*?

According to Prager and Telushkin, Jews constitute not only a religion, but also a nation. Although attempts have been made to eliminate nationhood from Judaism, they insist (pp. 35-36) that "Judaism cannot survive without nationhood, since without this component it is by definition not Judaism but a new religion." And, for some reason, they assume that Judaism (as defined by them) must survive rather than be replaced by any such new religion.

Jewish nationhood, however, renders the patriotism of Jews outside Israel suspect in the eyes of their neighbors. But Prager and Telushkin say that such suspicions are unfounded. They deny (pp. 38-39) that Jews outside Israel have a "dual loyalty": "Jews who affirm the national component of Judaism, both in fact and Jewish legal obligation (*dina dimalkhuta dina*, the law of the land is the law according to the Talmud) live as every other good citizen in accordance with the constitution and laws of the country in which they reside, presuming, of course, that the government is not a dictatorship and does not pass immoral laws."

But, as a matter of "fact," this is mere assertion. Prager and Telushkin make no attempt whatever to refute any of the specific allegations about "dual loyalty" that have been made by anti-Zionists, in some cases Jewish anti-Zionists. (See, for example, "Dual Loyalty," Chapter Four of Alfred Lilienthal's *The Other Side of the Coin* [New York: Devin-Adair, 1965].)

As to the matter of "Jewish legal obligation," Prager and Telushkins' qualification creates a loophole wider than the Mississippi River. Specifically *what sort of laws* would they consider "immoral"? Who knows? Within the pages of their book, "morality" and "immorality" are completely nebulous terms, with no clear-cut meaning.

Chapter Three is devoted to "The Chosen People Idea as a Cause of Antisemitism." Prager and Telushkin assert that the Jewish belief that they are "the Chosen People" has caused anti-Jewish feelings ever since *Goyim* became aware of it. They say (p. 42):

"Reactions to the Jewish belief in chosenness have been often so negative that some Jews have actually called for elimination of this belief from Judaism. . . ." But they insist that "chosenness is an integral belief of Judaism" and proceed to "explain" (p. 43) the belief in order to give their readers "a proper understanding of the doctrine."

Jewish chosenness has always meant that Jews have believed themselves chosen by God to spread ethical monotheism to the world and to live as a moral "light unto the nations" (*Isaiah* 49:6). All other meanings imputed to Jewish chosenness are non-Jewish.

The Hebrew Bible, where the concept originates in its entirety, neither states nor implies that chosenness means Jewish superiority or privilege.

Apparently the following passage in my King James Version of the Bible is a mistranslation:

The LORD shall establish thee an holy people unto himself, as he hath sworn unto thee, if thou shalt keep the commandments of the LORD thy God, and walk in his ways.

And all people of the earth shall see that thou art called by the name of the LORD; and they shall be afraid of thee.

And the LORD shall make thee plenteous in goods, in the fruit of thy body, and in the fruit of thy cattle, and in the fruit of thy ground, in the land which the LORD swore unto thy fathers to give thee.

The LORD shall open unto thee his good treasure, the heavens to give the rain unto thy land in his season, and to bless all the work of thy hand; and thou shalt lend unto many nations, and thou shalt not borrow.

And the LORD shall make thee the head, and not the tail; and thou shalt be above only, and thou shalt not be beneath; if that thou shalt hearken unto the commandments of the LORD thy God, which I command thee this day, to observe them and to do them. . . . (*Deuteronomy* 28:9-13)

Of course, there are other passages of a similar nature in the Bible. And the Bible is not the only Jewish source in which Jewish chosenness has meant superiority or privilege. In "Meta-Myth: The Diaspora and Israel," Rabbi Jacob B. Agus has written:

It is axiomatic in *Kabbalistic* writings that the higher souls of Jewish people are derived from the divine *pleroma*—the realm of *Sefirot*—whereas the souls of all other nations are derived from the "shells." Rabbi Hayim Vital does not exempt converts from this rule (*Aitz Hayim* 7, 10, 7) (*Aitz Hadaat, Bemidbar*). The "Tanya" of Rav Shneur Zalman was written for the general public. Its view of Gentile souls is in Chapter 6. The *Zohar* follows the same line, save that in the *Midrash Haneelam*, we note a certain effort to account for this difference. Before Adam sinned, he possessed the higher soul; after his sin, only his animal soul remained. Thereafter, the divine soul

comes only to those who are preoccupied with Torah, entering the body of the Jewish male at age 13 (*Zohar Hodosh, Bereshit 18b-19a, Midrash Hane'elam*). (Etan Levine [ed.], *Diaspora: Exile and the Jewish Condition* [New York: Jason Aronson, 1983], p. 139.)

So much for Prager and Telushkins' insistence (p. 203) that, historically, "The Jews saw their superiority as an existential fact, not a theological premise. . . ." In fact, to this very day some Jews continue to hold the views mentioned by Rabbi Agus. This very day, it so happens, I received the 30 March 1984 issue of the *B'nai B'rith Messenger*, in which columnist Gershon Winkler criticizes such views. Winkler's column, entitled "The Goy," begins: "I've heard this once too often: If a shopkeeper unknowingly gives you back too much change for your purchase, you must return the money to him only if he is Jewish. This, too, I've heard once too often: A non-Jew has an 'animal' soul, not a 'Godly' soul like that of a Jew."

To judge from Prager and Telushkins' discussion of Jewish chosenness, the "ethical monotheism" that they espouse does not require them to tell the truth. Or perhaps "God" simply made a mistake in choosing Prager and Telushkin to be a light unto the nations?

Why the Jews? is more than an exercise in whining and whimpering; it also contains its share of bragging and boasting. Thus, Chapter Four concerns "The Higher Quality of Jewish Life as a Cause of Anti-semitism." According to Prager and Telushkin (p. 46), "In nearly every society in which Jews have lived for the past two thousand years, they have been better educated, more sober, more charitable with one another, committed far fewer violent crimes, and had a considerably more stable family life than their non-Jewish neighbors."

There may be a good deal of truth in these claims, but even so I dispute the assumption that this means that (p. 47) "... Jews generally have led higher quality lives. . . ." Prager and Telushkin go so far as to assert (p. 56) that "The higher quality of Jewish life is objectively verifiable." But at best they have objectively verified only that Jewish life has generally been of higher quality in terms of a handful of specific criteria of evaluation. And these particular criteria are not the only ones by which the quality of a life, or a peoples' collective life, may be evaluated. Jews may have generally been more sober, but have they generally had more fun? Jews may have generally committed far fewer violent crimes, but have they generally committed fewer non-violent crimes, such as fraud and embezzlement? Perhaps Jews have generally been better educated, but have they generally been more physically fit, healthier or more athletically accomplished? If Prager and Telushkin wish to demonstrate the objectively higher quality of Jewish life, then they

must demonstrate the higher quality of Jewish life in every respect.

In proclaiming the higher quality of Jewish life, Prager and Telushkin focus on certain positive aspects of Jewish life, never acknowledging that they might have any negative aspects to complicate the simple picture painted. This despite the fact that their book is largely devoted to whining and whimpering about how Judaism has caused Jews to be victims of the greatest hatred in history, almost always suffering from discrimination, persecution, violence, murder or annihilation campaigns, and so on. But if, as Prager and Telushkin assert, Jew-hatred is the inevitable consequence of Judaism, then why don't they take into account Jew-hatred and all its manifestations when calculating the overall quality of Jewish life?

Part Two of *Why the Jews?* is supposed to "document the thesis that Judaism, with its distinctiveness and moral challenge, is at the root of Jew-hatred." (p. 81) But this it does not do. It merely presents yet another one-sided account of Jewish history, bewailing hatred of the Jews and ignoring hatred of the Goyim.

For example, in Chapter Seven, "Antisemitism in the Ancient World," Prager and Telushkin tell us (p. 85):

In 167 B.C.E., the first recorded antisemitic persecution in the postbiblical period took place. The Hellenic ruler of Syria and Palestine, Antiochus Epiphanes, incited in part by certain assimilated Jews, attempted to destroy Judaism, which he correctly perceived as the basis of the Jewish opposition to his leadership. Owing to their religious beliefs, the Jews rejected Antiochus' claim to being the "god manifest" ("Epiphanes" in Greek). Consequently, according to the biblical Apocrypha, Antiochus sent an emissary to Judea "in order to force the Jews to transgress the laws of their fathers and not to live according to God's commandments." (*Maccabees II* 6:11). He renamed the Holy Temple in Jerusalem after Zeus Olympus, prohibited the observance of the Sabbath and circumcision, and forced the Jews to participate in the festival procession in honor of Dionysus.

Such measures sparked the Maccabean revolt, which eventually led to Judean independence from Syrian rule. As George W. Robnett has commented:

What Antiochus Epiphanes did to the Jews in pressing Hellenism upon them is the kind of thing the Jews have capitalized down through the centuries as "oppression"—and since realism shows that most human problems are two-way streets, it is interesting to contrast the disposition of Antiochus with a Jewish leader just a few years afterwards. John Hyrcanus (of the Jewish Hasmonean-Maccabean line) came to power in Judea in 135 B.C. (under the new freedom won by the revolt). He conquered the small country of Edom to the south and (according to Graetz) gave the inhabitants

(Idumeans) "the choice between acceptance of Judaism or exile." They accepted Judaism in order to keep their homes. (*Zionist Rape of the Holy Land* [Pasadena, Calif.: Crown City Publishing Co., rev. ed. 1976], p. 386.)

Prager and Telushkin do not even mention the Maccabean revolt, let alone John Hyrcanus and his forcible conversion of the Idumeans to Judaism. But if Antiochus Epiphanes' actions show that he hated the Jews, then by the same token John Hyrcanus' actions must show that he hated the Idumeans. In which case: Why the Idumeans?

In Chapter Nine, "Islamic Antisemitism," Prager and Telushkin quote (p. 128) French-Jewish novelist Albert Memmi's characterization of the status of Jews under Islam in the 20th century: "Roughly speaking and in the best of cases, the Jew is protected like a dog which is part of man's property, but if he raises his head or acts like a man, then he must be beaten so that he will always remember his status." But even if this characterization is accurate, there is a parallel in the attitude of Orthodox Jewish settlers toward Arabs in the West Bank. In *The Fateful Triangle* (Boston: South End Press, 1983), Noam Chomsky discusses an article by Yedidia Segal in the 3 September 1982 issue of *Nekudah*, the journal of the religious West Bank settlers. According to Chomsky (p. 124):

The scholarly author cites passages from the Talmud explaining that God is sorry that he created the Ishmaelites, and that Gentiles are "a people like a donkey." The law concerning "conquered" peoples is explicit, he argues, quoting Maimonides on how they must "serve" their Jewish conquerors and be "degraded and low" and "must not raise their heads in Israel but must be conquered beneath their hand . . . with complete submission."

According to Prager and Telushkin (p. 128), "It is the Jews' refusal to accept this subordination [to Moslems] that is at the heart of the Arab-Muslim hatred for Israel." If so, however, then by the same token the Arabs' refusal to accept such subordination to Jews must be at the heart of the Jewish-Israeli hatred for Arabs.

In Chapter Fourteen, Prager and Telushkin ask the musical question, "What Is to Be Done?" Or, in other words (p. 179): "What, if anything can Jews do to eradicate, diminish, or at the very least, individually avoid antisemitism?"

They say (p. 182) that assimilation, defined as "ceasing to be a Jew," is "... a rational and viable way to escape antisemitism for individuals, not to the Jewish people as a whole. Many Jews will never assimilate, which alone invalidates assimilation as a solution to antisemitism."

Thus, Prager and Telushkin are looking for a *total* (final?) "solu-

tion to antisemitism." Further more (pp. 181-82): "A solution to antisemitism must by definition include the survival of Jewry, just as a solution to an illness must by definition include the survival of the patient. We seek solutions to antisemitism which enable Jews to live as Jews." But if, as they assert elsewhere in the book, Jew-hatred is an inevitable response to Judaism, then how can there be any total "solution to antisemitism" which enables Jews to live as Jews? The only possibility that comes to mind is the elimination of all "non-Jews," one way or another.

Prager and Telushkin do not, in fact, advocate such a solution. Instead, after showing that some other solutions (Zionism, seeking converts, fighting "antisemitism" a la the ADL) are not total solutions, they announce (p. 191) the following "solution to antisemitism": "... if the goal is to put an end to antisemitism, then Jews must also attempt to influence the moral values of non-Jews so that no aspect of Judaism any longer threatens the non-Jews' values." What does this mean in practical terms? Here's the closet that they come to answering this question (*ibid.*): "Jews must therefore resume their original task of spreading ethical monotheism. . . . This means in essence that the Jews must make the world aware of two basic principles: ethics need God, and God's major demand is ethics."

But Prager and Telushkin don't tell us how they are going to get the world to accept "ethical monotheism." Furthermore, they don't clearly explain how such acceptance of "ethical monotheism" will necessarily end "antisemitism." After all, there have been many Christian and Moslem "ethical monotheists" who nevertheless, in Prager and Telushkin's opinion, have been "antisemites." I suggest the Prager and Telushkin's "solution to antisemitism" is as illusory as their "God" and his commandments.

If a "solution to antisemitism" is in fact possible, its discovery will require a more honest consideration of the problem than Prager and Telushkin have given it. This means, among other things, that the problem of Jew-hatred cannot be divorced from the problems of Goy-hatred. If there is to be a solution to the former problem, there must be a solution to the latter problem as well. So rather than devoting themselves exclusively to whining and whimpering "Why the Jews?," I suggest that Prager and Telushkin finally begin to ask themselves: "Why the Goyim?"

Thrusting the Stake into Lemkin's Bleeding Heart

SAMUEL E. KONKIN III

THE MAN WHO INVENTED 'GENOCIDE': THE PUBLIC CAREER AND CONSEQUENCES OF RAPHAEL LEMKIN by James J. Martin. Torrance, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review, 1984, 360pp, \$15.95 Hb, \$9.95 Pb, ISBN 0-939484-17-X (Hb), 0-939484-14-5 (Pb).

Until a historical revisionist conference of three years ago, I had never heard of Raphael Lemkin. It did not surprise me that no one else I knew had heard of him either. What significance could this unbelievably obscure academic lounge-lizard of decades ago have for us in the middle 1980s?

James J. Martin, commonly saddled with the title "Dean of the Revisionist Historians," kicks open the tomb of this long-dead neologist to explore the vampiric bite he put on this world's languages. Lemkin's corpse turns out to be little able to withstand the strong light.

In 1943, as an act of pro-Allied academic war propaganda, this long-term floating statist spliced together a Greek prefix and a Latin suffix to coin the word which would be incanted on behalf of hyperstatism for the next 40 years. The term was the Aladdin's Lamp which held together a cloud of fog oft-confused for a powerful djinn and so worshipped in the halls of the United Nations, half the world's parliaments, and a near majority of the United States Senate.

Raphael Lemkin minted the word "genocide."

There is something of a shock of heightened awareness in the discovery that this political household word was tossed off to encode a wartime propaganda charge by a freelance civil servant on behalf of a doomed government-in-exile and on the payroll of a power-elite think tank. There was no word for race-killing before Lemkin and 1943. However *did* we manage without it? Think—try!—of a major international intervention or call for intervention since 1945 which did not involve a charge of genocide.

Raphael Lemkin himself was a stupefying uninteresting person, nowhere near a Master of Evil, and that unavoidable fact gives Martin's book its only real problem in readability. After the introduction, Martin spends the opening chapter on Raphael Lemkin, the man. The most incorruptible of historians, Martin refuses to liven up this bureaucrat's biography. Indeed, when our curiosity may threaten to be aroused by hints that Lemkin may have been a Czarist draft dodger or a Polish partisan, Martin dampens such unwarranted stimulation with assurances of probable banality.

What is known of Raphael Lemkin, the man? He received doctorates in philosophy from the Universities of Heidelberg and Lvov; we draw a blank on his earlier education or activities during World War I. He went to work at the Court of Appeals in Warsaw as a secretary, becoming public prosecutor in 1925. He was remarkably unaffected by the political and antisemitic clashes in the new Polish state. He moved up to Secretary to the Commission of the Laws of the Polish Republic in 1929.

Lemkin avoided the antisemitic pogroms and riots in Poland in 1931—well before the National Socialist victory in Germany—and in 1933 represented Poland at the League of Nations' Fifth International Conference for the Unification of Criminal Law. Dropping out of overt statism in 1935, Lemkin spent the years prior to World War II writing legal books, including a collaboration on the *Polish Penal Code of 1932* with an American lawyer and Duke University Law professor.

After the German-Soviet invasion of September 1939, Lemkin claimed he was a civilian guerrilla in the Polish forests for six months. He claimed that his large family was killed by the Germans. Later he changed that to the Russians—a more probable claim given the territorial division.

Lemkin then managed to traverse Lithuania (occupied by the USSR), the Soviet Union, and cross the Baltic Sea patrolled by German and Russian Navies, ending up in Sweden where he lectured at Stockholm University on foreign exchange and international banking laws.

In 1941 he travelled through the USSR, Japan, and Canada to

North Carolina to meet with his Duke University collaborator. After floating around American wartime bureaucracies, as "advisor" and "consultant," he lectured at the School of Military Government in Charlottesville. On 15 November 1943, Lemkin completed his major tome, which received a foreword from George A. Finch of the Carnegie Foundation, and was published by Columbia University Press in November 1944.

The book was *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress*. It received rave reviews in the *New York Herald Tribune Book Review*, the *New York Times*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and London's *Times Literary Supplement*. "Genocide" entered the English language with the massed support of the Allied Establishment.

Concentrated Revisionism

When James Martin slips off to supply "Some Missing Historical Background" (Chapter Two—a third of the book), *The Man Who Invented 'Genocide'* takes off. For this chapter is nothing less than a summary of Martin's libertarian-revisionist views of the Second World War—its causes, covert acts and concealed counter-acts, hidden responsibilities, and unbelievable levels of macro-hypocrisy.

For the libertarian and the hardcore revisionist, this chapter is the highlight of the book and a valuable booklet on its own. To give just a *partial* list of what Martin covers in passing or in detail:

- Soviet versus Zionist socialism: the split among Jews (p. 30).
- Origins of Jewish fascism: Vladimir Jabotinsky, the Revisionist Zionists, and Irgun Z'vai Leumi (p. 31).
- Irgun recruitment aided by Hitler and antisemitic Rumania, Hungary, and Poland (p. 32).
- Polish antisemitic rioting exceeding National Socialist German persecution (pp. 33-37), including the flight of Jews from Poland to Germany and how this led to Kristallnacht (p. 37).
- Massive Jewish exodus from Germany and Poland in 1940, leaving few to be "exterminated" (p. 38).
- Origins of charges against the Germans of Jewish extermination, including contradictory claims from the beginning (pp. 39-44).
- Lemkin's sources for the genocide charge (p. 44).
- Respectable challenges to the atrocity charges in 1942 (p. 46).
- Contradictions as to whether Jews were removed to the USSR or executed (p. 47).

- The Maidanek Camp "liberation" of 1944, the first "gas and ovens" claims (pp. 48-51).
- Campaign for the extermination of *Germans* (not just Nazis) by Allied agents (pp. 54-56).
- Who really ran the Resistance, how much they resisted, and how this early "terrorism" resulted in stiff German repression (pp. 57-60).
- Soviet wartime execution of Jews (p. 65).
- The Katyn Forest massacre of the Polish officer corps, "probably the only genuine mass atrocity of World War Two which was accompanied by evidence" (pp. 66-70).
- Anglo-American sell-out of the Polish state on whose behalf the war was started (p. 69).
- Reinhold Niebuhr's fear that Stalin would *restrain* Allied dismemberment of Germany (p. 72).
- The first "war crimes trials" before Nuremberg (pp. 75-76).
- Babi Yar, an atrocity? by whom? for what reasons? (pp. 77-79).
- Rex Stout and his Writers War Board of German-lynchers (p. 83).
- Lord Vansittart, the ultra-Germanophobe (p. 91).
- Communist-Gaullist Civil War in France with the German retreat (p. 98).
- Who really ran the concentration camps in Germany, who selected victims and fillers of the worst jobs (pp. 107-13).

The cumulative effect of this condensed war history is to confirm that the definitive revisionist history of the Second World War has yet to be written. Whoever does it will have an excellent outline in Martin's second chapter. One can only hope Martin himself can finally be enticed, cajoled, bribed, dragooned, or otherwise encouraged to write the revisionist history of World War II.

The Book and its Effect

James Martin returns to Raphael Lemkin with a brief chapter criticizing the organization and writing of *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. He points out that it appears to have been stitched together by a committee and then builds a case for this assertion. Martin not only blows away Lemkin's weak case for putting Germany on trial under International Law but, in fact, turns the table: the case seems firm *against the partisans and guerrillas* as violators

of the Hague Conventions of 1899 (first article), and even Vice Department of the Army Field Manual FM27-18, Chapter 3, Section 1.

Perhaps the only departure from fulsome praise for Martin's masterwork must arise, for a libertarian, in considering his long discussion of the guerrilla struggle against German control to make his case that the Allies practiced blatant hypocrisy. What the libertarian longs for is some acceptance or endorsement of the anti-statist struggle of *maquis*-types. True, Martin sticks firmly to the topic of German war and "war crimes" guilt and relative lack thereof, but it would not be amiss for an anarchist to slip in a pat on the back for rebels free of statism; one thinks of Murray Rothbard's deft manipulation in that regard, in his works.

As the account stands, alas, Dr. Martin sounds as if he finds uniformed, flag-waving statist belligerence preferable to *ad hoc* civilian resistance, a most unlikely position for an individualist anarchist of Stirnerite leanings.

Although "genocide" is a relatively small topic in Lemkin's *Axis Rule* and, as Martin observes, appears to have been patched in late, it is what makes the book significant and what gave Raphael Lemkin his Warhollian 15 minutes of fame. For those of us who have taken the word "genocide" for granted since birth, only astonishment can be registered at how confused and imprecise the concept is and always was.

Martin spends Chapter Four, the center of his book, on his analysis of the origin and evolution of the term. Surely the modern reader would be surprised to find out that genocide-*qua*-crime is *in opposition to violation-of-Human-Rights*? That only groups can commit it against groups and *individuals* are not held responsible? That the originator was so desperate for historical examples that he focused on the massacre of 600 Assyrian Christians by Iraq in 1933—a dubious event that the indefatigable Dr. Martin revises for good measure?

Lemkin's problem—writing during World War II—was obvious. The best examples of acts of "genocide" happened to have been committed by the *Allies*. Martin points out how the British treatment of the Irish and the American treatment of North American Indians fit Lemkin's strict definition best; also the Soviet movement of Volga Germans and the American forced-dispossession of American Japanese.

The "genocide" man, Raphael Lemkin, was in fact only *incidentally* interested in massacre. Genocide was and is the destruction of a collective entity of people—including by *peaceful assimilation*. No libertarian needs further stimulation to imagine the irrationality of grouping enticements for voluntary cultural change with "gas chambers," "ovens," and firing squads. Raphael Lemkin lived up to such libertarian imaginings immediately, accusing the

German occupiers of imposing pornography, alcohol and gambling on Poles as acts of genocide (p. 156).

Those needing exhaustive treatment of the built-in abuse in this muddled term are welcome to dwell in this section; the reviewer moves on.

The Selling of Genocide

In spite of the considerable difficulty it faced in just defining the collectivist pseudoconcept of genocide, the new United Nations drew up a Convention (treaty) on this crime for its member nations to sign. Raphael Lemkin hung around the lounges, corridors, meeting rooms and press section of the UN from its first General Assembly of January 1946 and drafted the resolution for the Convention which passed in December. It took two years of debate and Lemkin was appointed to a committee of three to draft the final Convention. On 9 December 1948, the Assembly unanimously accepted the Convention; five Soviet-proposed amendments were defeated.

The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials popularized the use of the term "genocide," but, as Martin shows through the rest of the book, there was never to be another trial quite like that, nor any attempt at enforcement of the Convention. From 1949 onward the Genocide Convention, the confused concept it criminalized, and the career of Raphael Lemkin all declined.

The sixth chapter of *The Man Who Invented 'Genocide'* chronicles the ratifications of the treaty by member nations and the battle in the United States leading to its ultimate defeat. It begins with a treat for total-revisionists, particularly libertarians: Martin's view of the world ruling class and its foreign policy (p. 195). It is tempting to quote it entirely here in order to blow away the lingering anti-Communist crusader hangovers among libertarians, but let this suffice as an appetizer:

The "West" faced about as much of a threat to their economic power from Communism as the world of the Industrial Revolution even in its early decades faced from a system no further along than stone hatchets. They had put down the real threats to their power in destroying the Italo-German-Japanese revolutionary upstarts, whose incredible energy and organizing genius, even considering their considerable handicaps, must have thrown a serious fright into many of their antagonists in the struggle of 1939-45, especially when they thought about the future.

Raphael Lemkin joined the Cold War to accuse the USSR, now the major target with the Axis demise, of genocide. President Harry S. Truman submitted the Genocide Convention to the U.S. Senate for ratification on 16 June 1949. The usual lobbies lined up

on the usual sides. On 5 July, Norway and Ethiopia fought over who was the first to ratify.

But in America one non-political group turned out to be the nemesis of genocide ratification: the American Bar Association. Try as it might, it could not reconcile the words of the treaty with any rational conception of law nor, in particular, harmonize it with the Constitutional protection of U.S. citizens. On 8 September, the ABA condemned "the mass killing of innocent people" but rejected the treaty.

Martin details blow-by-blow the fight over U.S. ratification, particularly in the Senate Subcommittee hearings. The Korean War interrupted the Administration's attempt to ratify it as a weapon against the Reds, but the treaty continued to get delayed to death. Meanwhile, by 12 January 1951, the minimum twenty countries had ratified it and it went into "effect." As mentioned, no indictment has yet occurred under the Convention. The four nations to put the Convention over the top were France, Haiti, Costa Rica—and South Korea. On 20 July 1951, Nationalist China ratified and it and South Korea promptly charged the People's Republic of China.

While the Cold War liberals championed the Genocide Convention as a weapon in the anti-Communist arsenal, the American Old Right, in its last gasp, offered the Bricker Amendment requiring validating legislation from state legislatures before Executive Agreements could become binding on a state's citizens. The internationalist Eisenhower Administration, as a trade-off with the Bricker isolationists, tabled the Genocide Convention indefinitely.

On 3 May 1954, with the Korean War safely over and U.S. ratification unlikely, the USSR ratified in a no-press-allowed ceremony at the UN. Ratified, that is, with some reservations. American ethnics from seven countries under Soviet domination promptly charged the USSR with the new crime. The UN acted not.

Raphael Lemkin died on 28 August 1959; Great Britain had not yet ratified his Genocide Convention nor, to this day, has the United States of America.

Martin's seventh chapter adds a "postscript": a blow-by-blow account of the 1970 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee hearings. Britain had at long last ratified the Convention on 30 January of that year and President Richard Nixon renewed the request for ratification on 19 February. Interestingly enough, another U.S. war was then being fought—in Viet Nam. (Today there is another move on to ratify the treaty, just as yet another Imperial war cranks up in Central America.)

Martin Nails the Coffin

James J. Martin concludes perceptively: "... over 40 years after Raphael Lemkin invented the word 'genocide,' most people who have heard it think they know what it means. The overwhelming majority of them are mistaken; they do not."

Summing up the mass of condensed—but well-presented—data in *The Man Who Invented 'Genocide'* is a monumental task in itself—as this reviewer has sorely learned—but Martin carries it off deftly. Reading his Conclusion chapter provides a *precis* of the book's contents. Libertarian and Revisionist anthologists to come should consider this section worth including. The appendices add to the overwhelming feeling of a complete treatment of the topic, though it would surely be a crime greater than any well-defined genocide to demand that the reader wade through the reproductions of the UN publication "The Crime of Genocide," Senator Sam Ervin's Statement to the 1970 Senate hearings (Ervin, the hero of Watergate, torpedoed that floating of ratification), and Senate Bill S.3155.

The book deserves far more outreach than it will likely receive—with an obscure title and a small and mostly-reviled publisher. Martin has anyway driven the stake through the heart of Lemkin's corpse. That a toothpick would have sufficed to keep this pseudomoralistic/pseudolegalistic vampire down forever can only increase our admiration for Martin's achievement.

Book Reviews

THE WAR BETWEEN THE GENERALS by David Irving. New York: Congdon and Weed (distributed by St. Martin's Press), 1981, 446pp, \$9.95 Pb, ISBN 0-312-92921-8.

OVERLORD: D-DAY AND THE BATTLE FOR NORMANDY by Max Hastings. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, 368pp, \$17.95, ISBN 0-671-46029-3.

Reviewed by Charles Lutton

David Irving first gained the attention of serious students of history in 1963 with the publication of his first book, *The Destruction of Dresden*. Since then he has written nearly a dozen other books and translated three more from the German. In the process he has established himself (oh, Professor Gerhard Weinberg isn't going to like this) as perhaps the world's leading authority on Hitler and certainly one of the premier historians of the European Theater of the Second World War.

Having written a number of critically acclaimed studies dealing with aspects of the war on the German side, Irving decided to delve inside the Allied high command. As he points out in the prologue to *The War Between the Generals*, at the conclusion of the war, General Eisenhower tried to place a lid on information relating to the internal conflicts that had raged among the Western Allies. Though some leaks occurred after the war, it was only after wartime documents were declassified and the heirs of deceased leaders released diaries and other personal records that it became possible to gain a fuller understanding of the antagonisms that festered among the British and American commanders during the last year of the war—from the invasion of Normandy to VE-Day.

Two main strategic issues provided sources of contention. The first was whether or not the Normandy landing should take place at all. Churchill was opposed to it, arguing instead for a drive into the Balkans. The British also argued unsuccessfully against the American proposal for an invasion of southern France—ANVIL—which they viewed as a wasteful dispersal of forces.

Once the Allies were secured in Normandy, the strategic debate shifted to the question of broad-versus-narrow-front attack against

Germany. Montgomery and Patton wanted to launch a single decisive thrust into the heart of the Reich, preferably toward the north, which would likely have resulted in Anglo-American occupation of Berlin. Eisenhower again prevailed, the Allies taking almost a year cautiously to advance across a broad front, costing them thousands of unnecessary casualties and leaving the Soviets in control of central Germany.

Many generals, both British and American, found fault with Eisenhower's "broad front" strategy. On 17 November 1944, Montgomery wrote to Sir Alan Brooke: "The Directives he issues . . . have no relation to the practical necessities of the battle. . . . He has never commanded anything before in his whole career; now, for the first time, he has elected to take direct command of very large-scale operations and he does not know how to do it." At a Chiefs of Staff meeting a week later, Brooke remarked: "Eisenhower, though supposed to be running the land battle, is on the golf links at Rheims—entirely detached and taking practically no part in the running of the war." Patton considered his commander in chief "nothing but a popinjay, a stuffed doll."

As if Eisenhower's misdirection of military operations was not enough, a New York newspaper leaked word of the infamous "Morgenthau Plan"—an outline for a draconian postwar occupation policy for Germany. In the summer of 1944, the U.S. War Department drew up a draft calling for a rather mild postwar occupation policy. Irving reveals that a certain Col. B. Bernstein of SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) purloined a copy of the draft and, "bypassing regular army channels," sent a copy to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, who "was outraged by the leniency of the War Department approach." Secretary of War Henry Stimson opposed Morgenthau's Carthaginian occupation program but, as Stimson said, "the Semites" carried the day, with Roosevelt and Churchill approving the Morgenthau Plan on 15 September 1944. Once the Germans got wind of the Morgenthau Plan, it confirmed what the "Unconditional Surrender" announcement of 1943 had already suggested, namely, that defeat by either the Soviets or the Anglo-Americans would lead to the utter destruction of Germany and the German people. Irving points out that, following the disclosure of the Morgenthau Plan, "German resistance, already stiffening, became desperate. The death toll among Allied soldiers increased."

As time goes on and the archives open more of their files to the scrutiny of researchers, we will be revising our view of the German occupation of France and conditions there following "liberation." John Eisenhower, the General's son, reported: "I saw absolutely no evidence of German abuse of the population. . . . The attitude of the French was sobering indeed. Instead of bursting

with enthusiasm they seemed not only indifferent but sullen. There was considerable cause for wondering whether these people wished to be " 'liberated.' " General Eisenhower's British aide conceded that "The people looked well-fed and the children healthy and well-dressed." And Sir Alan Brooke, the British Army Chief of Staff, observed: "The French population did not seem in any way pleased to see us arrive as a victorious army to liberate France. They had been quite content as they were and we were bringing war and desolation to their country." Referring to the French town of Carentan, Montgomery wrote to Brooke: "I see SHAEF communique said yesterday that the town had been liberated. Actually, it has been completely flattened and there is hardly a house intact; all the civilians have fled. It is a queer sort of liberation." Irving explains that "French folk saw only the Allied battleships and bombers and tanks pounding their towns into ruins. In a reflexive act of self-preservation, many of them seized arms to aid Rommel's army against the death-dealing newcomers."

In sharp contrast with the picture long held up to us of American GIs being welcomed by a grateful French populace, Irving is one of several historians who are casting new light on these events. It seems that far from acting like Boy Scouts out on a mission of mercy, American soldiers terrorized many of the people they were supposed to be liberating from the clutches of the nasty Nazis. As Irving informs his readers: "An ordeal began for the French who stayed behind in Normandy to welcome their liberators. They were liable to be vandalized, robbed, raped, murdered. Indeed, the behavior of GIs throughout liberated Europe was causing apprehension in Washington. The Joint Chiefs reviewed a report from Rome too that conditions now were worse than when the Germans had been there." Following a visit to Caen, B.H. Liddell Hart, the famous British military strategist and historian, pointed out that "Most Frenchmen speak of the correctness of the German Army's behavior. They seem particularly impressed that German soldiers were shot for incivility to women and compare this with the American troops' bad behavior towards women." According to an official U.S. Army report, "Unfortunately most of these undisciplined acts were caused by colored troops."

German resistance continued on into the Fall and "the discipline of even some of the finest U.S. units was cracking," including the famous 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. On 5 November 1944, Eisenhower's driver and girl friend, Kay Summersby, recorded: "General Betts reports that disciplinary conditions in the army are becoming bad. Many cases of rape, murder, and pillage are causing complaints by the French, Dutch, etc." A

month later, General Leroy Lutes remarked: "The French now grumble that the Americans are a more drunken and disorderly lot than the Germans and hope to see the day when they are liberated from the Americans." Lutes discovered that the Allied propaganda which portrayed the Germans as brutes was untrue: "I am informed the Germans did not loot either residences, stores, or museums. In fact the people claimed that they were meticulously treated by the Army of Occupation." By the end of the war, over 450 GIs were sentenced to death by courts-martial, nearly all for having committed nonmilitary offenses like rape and murder.

The indefatigable Irving has also turned up more information about General Charles DeGaulle. He discloses that to help pave the way for his intended return, anti-Gaullist resistants and independents in France were betrayed to the Gestapo—while in French North Africa, in the wake of the Allied landings there in 1942, Gaullists jailed and executed Frenchmen who had assisted the Anglo-American forces. Later, on the eve of D-Day, DeGaulle insisted that a sentence be removed from Eisenhower's invasion broadcast to the French people. The sentence read: "When France is liberated from her oppressors, you yourselves will choose your representatives, and the government under which you wish to live." Irving goes on to describe conditions following D-Day, characterizing the "liberation" of France a "witch-hunt" which "turned into a winter of long-knives. In Belgium, too, the Resistance, founded and nourished by the Allies, had turned into a Frankenstein creature which they had trouble in controlling."

The "Malmedy Massacre" is revealed by Irving to be a hoax invented by wartime sensation-mongers. During the Battle of the Bulge, a unit of the 1st Panzer Division killed over 80 GIs during a fire fight. The American dead were laid out in rows in the snow, but the Germans were forced to withdraw from Malmedy before the dead soldiers were buried. Allied propagandists blew this event up into a major atrocity story, claiming that the Americans had been taken prisoner and then lined up and shot. Several Germans were tried after the war for their participation in this "war crime."

Turning to the other side, Irving does authenticate several instances of German POWs being executed in cold blood by Allied troops. Irving cites Patton, who wrote in his diary on 4 January 1945: "The Eleventh Armored is very green and took unnecessary losses to no effect. There were also some unfortunate incidents in the shooting of prisoners. I hope we can conceal this."

Irving goes beyond a review of the strategic debates that went on among the Allied generals and a re-examination of significant events. He also reveals the private opinions various leading characters had about each other and discloses often interesting

tidbits about their personal lives. (One shrill Irving critic, Professor John Lukacs, has taken especial umbrage over some of Irving's revelations, accusing the British historian, in the pages of the *New York Times Book Review*, of trying "to rehabilitate Hitler. . . . He not only tells his readers that Hitler was an able man . . . but tries to convince them that he was a man morally superior to his opponents." Apparently it is fully permissible to write—and speculate—about the private lives of Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, et al., but not "cricket" to do the same when writing about the victors of World War II, who were, never forget, engaged in a great "Crusade in Europe.")

One of the most colorful American generals of the war was George S. Patton; Irving spices his narrative with anecdotes about him, as well as others. Patton came to take a jaundiced view of some of the people for whose "liberation" from Axis tyranny Americans were being killed. After spending some months fighting in the Mediterranean Theater, Patton "told his staff that he could not understand how the Arabs could share their hovels with animals. Arriving in Sicily, he added that he could not understand how the animals could live with Sicilians in their yards." By the end of the war Patton was expressing serious doubts about the results of the conflict. In a letter to his wife, he confessed: "Berlin gave me the blues. We have destroyed what could have been a good race and we [are] about to replace them with Mongolian savages." And in another letter, Patton admitted: "The stuff in the papers about fraternization is all wet. . . . All that sort of writing is done by Jews to get revenge. Actually, the Germans are the only decent people left in Europe. . . . I prefer the Germans. So do our cousins [the British]." After touring refugee camps he came to see Jews as "lower than animals."

Patton and Montgomery considered the Soviets to be a serious menace. Both felt it best to carry the war into Russia in 1945, while the Anglo-American ground and air forces were mobilized and on the Continent, rather than wait for some crisis to emerge in the future. Patton was confident that he could be in Moscow within months.

Napoleon once observed that "History is a lie agreed upon." David Irving has made a career out of exposing agreed upon lies. By forcing his readers—among them members of the academic community—to revise their views of epochal events, Irving has contributed to the re-evaluation of our past that is so necessary for the building of a better future.

* * * * *

This past Spring marked the 40th anniversary of D-Day—the invasion of Normandy by the Western Allies. President Reagan made the nightly news on 6 June, when he visited Omaha Beach, retracing some of the steps taken by American troops on that same date in 1944. Local papers interviewed aging veterans, who tried to recall what it was like to wade ashore in the face of machine gun and artillery fire. To the average citizen of the United States—and Great Britain—D-Day remains one of the greatest military successes in history.

Many years ago the distinguished British military strategist and historian, B.H. Liddell Hart, pointed out that “there has been too much glorification of the [Normandy] campaign and too little objective investigation.” Were he alive today, Sir Basil would likely view with approval the account of D-Day written by Max Hastings. A British historian who previously authored a noteworthy treatment of the British bombing campaign during World War II* and co-authored what is widely regarded as the best of the recent spate of books on the Falklands War, Hastings has based his conclusions about the invasion of Hitler’s “Fortress Europe” in large part on recently declassified military records made available in London and Washington D.C., as well as interviews with both Allied and German survivors of the Normandy battles. Unlike some of the other titles on this topic that appeared this year, Hastings’ volume is no mere reworking of the scores of previously published books. His findings clearly contradict those earlier works which portrayed D-Day and the subsequent battles as triumphs of Anglo-American military prowess and heroism. Among his major discoveries are:

- The Allies made slow progress and the fighting was hard and bloody.** Few American infantry units arrived at the battlefield “with a grasp of basic tactics—a failure for which many men paid with their lives.”

*See this reviewer’s appraisal of Hastings’ book *Bomber Command*, contained in the essay “Death From on High,” *Journal of Historical Review* Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 1980), pp. 247-54.

**Consider that it took the Germans approximately six weeks to conquer Holland, Belgium, France, and drive the British off the European continent in the period May–June 1940, despite the fact that their opponents enjoyed numerical superiority in both men and war materiale, and even qualitative superiority in some types of tanks. Four years later, the Germans were badly outnumbered, while the Allies held command of the air and had almost unlimited supplies and uninterrupted supply lines. Yet it took the Allies over eleven months from the time they landed at Normandy to subdue Germany, and this snail-like advance took place against a Wehrmacht that was forced to concentrate its best remaining forces against the invading Soviets in the East.

- With the exception of artillery, German military equipment often far exceeded the quality of U.S. and British models. This was especially true in the case of tanks and anti-tank weapons. There were almost countless instances of a few Germans, supported by a handful of Panther and Tiger tanks, repulsing large numbers of Allied troops, inflicting heavy losses.

- The lack of Anglo-American military success came against a Wehrmacht that had already sustained frightful losses on the Eastern Front and in the Mediterranean. "The Russians made a decisive contribution to the Western war by destroying the best of the German army, killing some two million men. . . . It remains astounding that after three years of devastating losses in the east and the relentless bombing of Hitler's industries, Germany could still produce and equip an army in the west capable of causing the gravest difficulties to the best that Britain and America could throw into the war."

- The Allied declaration of "Unconditional Surrender" was a key factor motivating German soldiers to fight on to the bitter end: ". . . they believed that defeat in Normandy, and beyond that defeat in Europe, would inaugurate a new dark age for Germany, a ghastly destiny for the German people."

- Despite the traditional portrayal of the French civilian population welcoming the Allied troops with open arms, the reality was in fact often the opposite. As a former British trooper informed the author, most of the French were sullen and acted as if they did not care very much if they were "liberated" at all. Hastings explains: "It was not remarkable that so many French families were shocked and appalled by the cost of liberation to their own homes, which if anything were looted more thoroughly by the Allied than the German armies."

- The legend that the Germans alone were guilty of shooting captured enemy soldiers is also challenged: "Much has been made of the shooting of prisoners—most notoriously, Canadian prisoners—by 12th SS Panzer and other German units in Normandy. Yet it must be said that propaganda has distorted the balance of guilt. Among scores of Allied witnesses interviewed for this narrative, almost every one had direct knowledge or even experience of the shooting of German prisoners during the campaign. . . . Many British and American units shot SS prisoners routinely, which explained, as much as the fanatical resistance that the SS so often offered, why so few appeared in POW cages."

- In his conclusion, the author reminds the reader that "it has been the central theme of this book that the inescapable reality of the battle for Normandy was that whenever Allied troops met Germans on anything like equal terms, the Germans nearly always

prevailed." This was because "The Allies in Normandy faced the finest fighting army of the war, one of the greatest the world has ever seen. This is a simple truth that some soldiers and writers have been reluctant to acknowledge."

Then why did the Germans lose the campaign? The main reason is that they were simply overwhelmed by the Allies' vast superiority in men and equipment. After all, Germany and her feeble allies fought against the combined resources of the United States, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the overseas possessions of France and the Netherlands. Germany's undoubted *qualitative superiority* had its limits. Secondly, decisions made by the German high command were often faulty. They were hampered by the poor state of German military intelligence in the West, as well as by some of the directives of Adolf Hitler—who by 1944 was far from being the same man who had overseen the astonishing German military triumphs of 1939–1942.*

Hastings has written an absorbing account of the decisive campaign on the Western Front during World War II. He overturns a host of long-held views, leaving the reader with a more balanced understanding of that conflict.

*Hitler apparently suffered from Parkinson's Disease, a condition aggravated by the mismedication prescribed by his chief physician, Professor Theo Morell. On Hitler's health and its implications for his decision making, see: Werner Maser, *Hitler: Legend, Myth, and Reality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); Percy Ernst Schramm, *Hitler: The Man and the Military Leader* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), and David Irving, *The Secret Diaries of Hitler's Doctor* (New York: Macmillan, 1983).

DOENITZ: THE LAST FUEHRER by Peter Padfield. New York: Harper and Row, 1984, 523pp, \$25.00, ISBN 0-06-015264-8.

Reviewed by H. Keith Thompson

In an appearance on a book-talk show on BBC radio, the author was asked why he had written this book. He replied that it was written at the suggestion of his agent. That is perhaps a clue to the author's motive in slapping together this garbled, hostile rehash of long-discredited British war propaganda. It draws heavily on British naval archives and the writings of Doenitz himself, evidencing in its course the usual British ability to twist facts according to their own nationalistic propaganda views.

The entire first 91 pages of the work are taken up with the early training and family background of Doenitz, and his experiences in World War I as a youthful naval junior officer and ultimately submarine commander. This is based largely on books written by Admiral Doenitz and from a few interviews with unsuspecting members of his surviving family who were not let in on the fact that they were being cynically used for a third-rate hatchet job on their relative. The author attempts an apology for this on page xi of the "Acknowledgements." A clue as to what was on the author's mind may be found in the conclusion to the first chapter, on page 91: "So ended Germany's first bid for world power, and Karl Doenitz's career as an Imperial naval officer. But for both the attitudes were too ingrained to be altered even by the bitter shock of defeat."

The author takes the standard British view that while it was fine and perfectly proper to blockade Germany and the European continent with the large British fleet for the purpose of starving the population, it was inhumane and wrong for the Germans to employ the use of unrestricted submarine warfare in order to counter this. The whole thrust of this argument is simply British propaganda. Their allies engaged in unrestricted submarine warfare at will, particularly the Americans—as attested by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz at Nuremberg.

The author is openly anti-American, as most of the British are. On page 237 he writes: "It is not realized how much the U.S. Navy, like the German, gained expansionary wind from jealousy of the Royal Navy, shading naturally in more aggressive U.S. naval officers into active dislike of the arrogant pretensions and imperial manner of British naval officers. Whether Admiral Ernest J. King, the U.S. C-in-C, was actively anti-British is not for debate here, but his attitude was undoubtedly that he was not going to play second string to the Royal Navy as the U.S. Navy had in the First World War, and as Patrick Beesley puts it in his study of

British operational intelligence, neither he nor his staff had anything to learn from 'a bunch of limeys'." Nowhere does author Padfield care to concede that in two world wars, the U.S. entered, against its own interests and over the objections of a considerable percentage of its population, in order to save the collective hide of the British.

In his discussion of the Doenitz government which followed the death of Hitler, the author goes out of his way to try to demonstrate that Doenitz was more friendly to Heinrich Himmler than the Doenitz memoirs indicate. Padfield writes (page 409): "Whatever they said to each other it was not the short interview Doenitz described; they talked through the night while in the canteen the adjutants drank quantities of Hennessy brandy together." On page 423, Padfield guesses that "probably Doenitz felt he owed him loyalty from their relationship in better days," and states that Doenitz arranged for Himmler and all the SS personnel in attendance upon the Doenitz government to "'dive for cover in the Wehrmacht.'" Padfield's source for this is none other than Rudolf Hoess, former commandant of Auschwitz, who soon thereafter was made a prisoner of the Communists and whose every statement has been found suspect by later historians.

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg is disposed of very summarily by the author, who relies almost entirely on IMT documents and the statements of Albert Speer. Virtually everything written or said by Speer is, to put it mildly, open to question. The man was a type commonly known about any police headquarters. After a crime, he would be prompt to arrive and deliver a full and fulsome confession. Speer was prepared to dicker for anything, and would deliver up any of his former comrades for a smile from the Allies. That is how he saved his neck. The writings of Speer can be ranked with those of Hoess, sometimes colorful and interesting but hardly of legal—or historical—weight.

Padfield prints, on his concluding page (491), the text of a supposed letter of Doenitz to the *Times* of London, allegedly dictated in 1971 and "to be opened and published after his death." The letter urges British, French and German unity, cites Russia and Communism as the true enemy, and mentions the German "struggle against Hebrews!" Heretofore unpublished and supposedly in possession of the *Times*, this letter is probably a forgery. Although he could have agreed with its sentiments, Doenitz would not have written such a letter in English or in such a manner. No reproduction of the letter itself appears in the Padfield book. Grand Admiral Doenitz had little command of English and would have written in German, as he could presume that the *Times* had excellent facilities to translate it. Nor would he have trusted the *Times* to

handle the letter as he wished in any case. This is another example of how Padfield, in his typically sloppy approach to research, leaves things up in the air.

Padfield devotes considerable attention (pages 489 and following) to what he terms the "failure of the efforts made on his [Doenitz's] behalf with the Federal Government and with the former allied powers to clear his name. The campaign flickered for the last time in 1976 with the publication of *Doenitz at Nuremberg, a reappraisal*. It was not a reappraisal; no new evidence was produced." The author does not understand the meaning of the term "reappraise"; perhaps he needs a refresher course in basic English as well as one in historical method. A reappraisal requires no "new evidence," merely a re-examination of the old. And new evidence was, anyway, indeed produced, demonstrating irrefutably the unfitness of the Nuremberg tribunal and certain of its members; this evidence accrues to the benefit of not only Doenitz but all the defendants in that sorry proceeding. Padfield is no doubt piqued at the efforts of some high-ranking English officers on behalf of Admiral Doenitz, particularly Admiral of the Fleet the Rt. Hon. Earl of Cork and Orrery, and Field Marshal Lord Henry Maitland Wilson of Libya. Wilson states outright that "...there were no breaches of International Maritime Law by the Axis Powers reported to me... the Nuremberg Trials were staged as a political stunt." The Earl of Cork and Orrery, himself a participant in the Norway campaign of 1940, holds that "As regards the legality of these trials, is there any question but that judged by previous standards, they were illegal? ... To try high ranking military officers on such a charge as 'planning aggressive warfare,' or because malpractices occurred in the area of their command, and to inflict heavy sentences upon individuals for doing what was their obvious duty to their country to do, to me savours more of vengeance than justice." One hears nothing of this sort from Padfield, who hides from his reader any mention of this material. The English newspaper *Birmingham Post*, reviewing a book by Doenitz on 9 May 1959, held that "From it emerges a picture of an upright, non-political naval officer with brilliant and original ideas on the employment of U-boats as destroyers of shipping. A man who might have won the war for Germany if he had been given the three hundred U-boats for which he asked. ... Sadly, Doenitz quotes Nelson: 'Only numbers can annihilate.' He never had the numbers."

Because author Padfield never saw the second edition of *Doenitz at Nuremberg*, published by the Institute for Historical Review, he never read the evaluation therein of Tom C. Clark, Attorney General at the time of the Nuremberg trials and later a Justice of the United States Supreme Court: "These learned minds

[the contributors to *Doenitz at Nuremberg*] not only isolate the Nuremberg 'principle,' placing it in the right perspective, but at the same time cite the able and devoted Admiral as a victim of the precept. I hail this anthology as required reading for all who are interested in equal justice under law for the defeated as well as the victorious." But Padfield, who doesn't like Americans anyway, would find this "overstated." Perhaps he would prefer the obituary of Doenitz in the German magazine *Der Spiegel* (Nos. 1-2, 1981), which states: "And 30 years later there have united 254 Generals, Admirals and Marshals of the Western world in a book [*Doenitz at Nuremberg: A Re-Appraisal*] to laud Doenitz as a soldier and as a man in a way never before accorded to any German . . ."

Peter Padfield's book, *Doenitz: The Last Fuehrer*, will cost you \$25.00 for no reason that I can see. It is a cheap production, not only internally but also in physical terms. Its dust jacket states that it is "the first biography" of Doenitz. Even that is wrong, as at least two appeared in Germany before Padfield's. Unless you feel the need of a heavy dose of castor oil in the form of snivelling British propaganda, save your money and pass this piece of trash by.

DER ZWEITE WELTKRIEG: URSACHEN UND ANLASS [THE SECOND WORLD WAR: ORIGINS AND CAUSES] by Georg Franz-Willing. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel Verlag, 1979, 310pp, DM 29.50, ISBN 3-8061-0960-5.

Reviewed by Russ Granata

It is no secret that the bombardment of Germans has merely changed in form and intensity since the 1940s. Moscow and Washington both have seen to it that the whole world, not just "East" and "West" Germany, keeps getting a steady barrage of anti-German/anti-Nazi incendiary missiles. By the year 1983, the German people especially were being overwhelmed by waves of electronic media, as well as avalanches of paper, called "volkspaedagogischen Bemuehungen"—"public educational efforts." The reason: the 50th anniversary of what is termed "der Machtergreifung," the power-seizure of 1933. The themes: Hitler, National Socialism, the Third Reich, the Second World War. One thing all these "public education" endeavors had in common was that they were presentations from the 1945 victors' perspectives against the German people—this people not only firebombed, truncated and divided, but for all these years still without a formal peace treaty, and still militarily occupied in *toto* by foreign forces, some from the East, some from the West.

The post-1945 bombardment about the Third Reich and the war via the victors' media, in America as well as in Germany, has been boringly repetitious. We do, after all, know how it comes out, who the "winners" were—and are, and who has to carry the blame. In the meantime, however, has come by fits and starts a refreshing, if yet relatively unsung, free spirit of debate within a movement of historical revisionism. This impetus toward debate and open inquiry, though often obstructed and victimized by organized suppression, nevertheless continues courageously to proceed throughout the world, as though it was inevitably willed, or at least somehow forced, by history. In the vanguard of this most worthy contemporary development are those relative few heroic historians from Germany of the latter half of the twentieth century. Georg Franz-Willing is one of these honored few.

Unlike many other contemporary German historians, whose interpretations of recent history are merely themes played upon the victors' harps, Georg Franz-Willing in *Der Zweite Weltkrieg: Ursachen und Anlass* lays bare the victors' culpability both in the war of 1914 and its horrendous aftermath, and in the war of 1939 and thereafter. It is no surprise that the general "established" press in occupied Germany, still dominated by a regrettable and false collective guilt complex, has given his book the silent treatment. In spite of the suppression of this book, however, reviews of previous works of the author have been given; Armin Moehler wrote a piece on him which was allowed to appear in Germany's respected *Criticon* (No. 75, of January-February 1983). Franz-Willing indeed is—or was—a name to be reckoned with in West German historiography as it treats the Hitler era. His books on the early years of the National Socialist movement, *Ursprung der Hitlerbewegung 1919–1922*, *Krisenjahr der Hitlerbewegung*, and *Putsch und Verbotszeit der Hitlerbewegung 1923–1925*, have attained critical respect and lasting places in all serious bibliographies.

In the present volume, Franz-Willing describes World War II as an extension of Anglo-American anti-German Great War policy; he refers to the era of the world wars as a "second Thirty Years War" within the unfoldment of the West. Both world wars are seen as comprising essentially a single, unitary conflict: phases of a global revolution deriving from the crises caused by modernization and industrialization in the West. The British Empire, as traditional dominating economic world power, saw its position threatened by a rising and united Germany. Although Britain was able to maintain economic control right after World War I, it was unable to stop the social changes—some revolutionary, some evolutionary—which were sweeping the continent, uncorked by that great conflict but long-simmering. Franz-Willing sees Great Britain and its daughter nation, the United States of America, as

essentially representing the liberalistic, capitalistic, and reactionary forces against the new order(s) of the twentieth century. The Russian Revolution and the rise of Fascism were struggles to find a place in a changing social order.

The author presents a vast panorama of the ideological, political, and economic power-struggles which, like Fates in a Greek tragedy, seemed inevitably to invoke the gods of war. He evades neither the "Guilt Question" of the Second World War nor the Jewish Question—within and without Germany—which latter he shows as having a most fateful place in the drama. Great pro-Zionist and Jewish influence in America is demonstrated to have contributed to the clearing of the warpath. While taking the devious Roosevelt-Churchill axis to task, he devotes a full page to photographs of Chaim Weizmann, Felix Frankfurter, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Bernard Baruch, focusing on this Jewish quartet prominently in his chapter revealing the forces that impelled America's economic and military intervention into what had theretofore been a limited and essentially European affair.

Finding Germany *not* singularly guilty as charged, either in the first or the second phase of the "second Thirty Years War," Franz-Willing by his archival and secondary research unravels the many devious and quite consequential discussions on the "good guys" side which managed to plunge the world into a contest for power which is still going on. Like David L. Hoggan, among other fellow historians whom he cites, the author finds Hitler striving to continue the remarkable and essentially bloodless pre-1939 effort to revise Versailles, but being refused peaceful accomodation and finally forced into a war he did not desire or plan. In Franz-Willing's view, the conflict engendered thereby is not in fact over; the world revolution continues, allies-then now foes, some contending parties of today *created* by 1945, the many attendant struggles sometimes flaring into full and frightening view, sometimes masked and subtle, withal perilous.

As an honest and objective explication of the background to and circumstances surrounding the great flare-up of 1939-45, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg: Ursachen und Anlass* serves very well indeed as an introduction to what historian Charles A. Beard aptly called the world's—for it is hardly now just the West's—"new and dangerous age."

UPRISING! ONE NATION'S NIGHTMARE: HUNGARY 1956 by David Irving. London, Sydney, Auckland, Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1981, 628pp, £ 13.50, ISBN 0-340-18313-6.

Reviewed by Charles Lutton

No less a figure than A.J.P. Taylor has described British historian David Irving as "a patient researcher of unrivalled industry and success." Since the publication of his book *The Destruction of Dresden* in 1963, Irving has written or translated over a dozen books, a number of which have been bestsellers in several countries. Visit any well-stocked bookstore in the United States and you are likely to find at least one or two Irving titles in the "history" or "military" sections. With millions of readers worldwide, who eagerly anticipate the next results of his often amazingly productive research efforts, it is not going too far to state that the appearance of a new book by David Irving constitutes a publishing "event."

Irving has done well for himself—his London flat is located in a posh area near the U.S. Embassy off Grosvenor Square—and certainly for his agent and publishers. So, when his study of the 1956 Hungarian revolt was published in Britain in Spring 1981 by the distinguished house of Hodder & Stoughton, with publication as well in France, and serialization in the large-circulation West German weekly *Der Spiegel*, it was right to assume that *Uprising!* would shortly appear in this country. But going on four years since it hit bookstores in Western Europe, *Uprising!* has yet to find an American publisher. There are clearly people here who do not want their fellow Americans to read this book. We shall soon see why.

It has been nearly thirty years since the people of Hungary rose up against the vicious Communist regime that had been imposed on them by Stalin. During the Second World War, thousands of Hungarians fought and died fighting the Russians on the Eastern Front. "Liberation" from the "Fascists"* took place in typical Soviet style: over 600,000 Hungarian males were deported as slave laborers to the USSR while, as Irving points out, "for many of Hungary's beautiful and lissom girls the first useful Russian phrase was one that anguished parents taught them: 'I've got syphilis and TB.' Workers grimly joked that their country had now known three disasters—their defeat by the Tartars, their conquest by the Turks, and their liberation by the Russians."

As we know, at Yalta in 1945 that champion of universal

*The Soviets invariably refer to "Fascists" or "Hitlerites"—never to "National Socialists"; these national socialists have some real problems with that term.

brotherhood and democracy, Joseph Stalin, affirmed with his fellow champions Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." Elections did take place in Hungary in November of that year, with the local Communists and Social Democrats obtaining only seventeen per cent of the votes. (The people of Hungary had not forgotten the short-lived Communist regime led by Béla Kun ["Cohen"] that had drenched the country in blood before being overthrown by popular forces in 1919.) Failure at the polls in 1945 did not faze the Reds, who set about to undermine the Hungarian Republic. After all, as the author reminds his readers, "the whole Communist advance is based on conspiracy and intrigue, and Party members relish and revel in it." By the end of 1947, the Communists, backed by Stalin's Red Army, aborted the fledgling Republic.

To run his Hungarian satrapy, Stalin picked one Miklos Rákosi (born "Roth"), described by Irving as an "ugly Jewish dwarf" who had "the tact of a Kosher butcher." Irving, not one to fear an awkward truth, discovered that the Communist regime and its terror machinery was viewed by the Hungarian people—and, it turns out, the U.S. State Department—as being almost entirely in the hands of Jews. A "Jewish Quartet" ruled the country: Rákosi, Ernest Gerő (born "Ernst Singer"), Michael Farkas ("Wolf") the defense minister, and Joseph Révai, minister of propaganda. The AVH, dreaded Hungarian equivalent of the NKVD, was headed by a creature who went under the name of Gabor Peter, but had been born as "Benjamin Auschpitz." Peter (sic) staffed the AVH with fellow Jews. Irving points out that "The regime's high Jewish profile caused deep resentment." He cites the work of an American sociologist, Jay Schulman, who interviewed many Hungarian refugees after the events of 1956 and found that "the Communist leaders were perceived as Jews by almost 100 percent of the people we have seen."

It is this sort of information—what the distinguished American revisionist historian James J. Martin has dubbed "inconvenient history"—that has probably delayed publication of this fascinating book in the United States. For, after years of painstaking research including the use of the testimonies of refugees taken by the CIA and State Department and deposited in American university libraries, interviews with survivors (even including the Soviet general who commanded the 1956 intervention), and diaries of diplomats and journalists who were on the scene, Irving concludes that the 1956 Hungarian uprising was a largely spontaneous revolt against what was viewed as a Jewish dictatorship. Inconvenient history *indeed*.

Contrary to the often self-serving claims of some refugees,

among them ex-Communists living comfortably in the West, as well as many "academics," Irving does not feel that Hungary's intellectuals and "liberal" Marxists played much of a role in bringing down the rotten Communist regime in 1956. Rather, he sees the compelling events as having been generated and carried out by workers and peasants, with university students taking the first step toward a rising on 15 October 1956, when three thousand students voted to leave the Communist youth organization. "The rebellion," Irving writes, then "spread like a medieval plague, only thousands of time faster."

What started with student demonstrations got out of hand, and Rákosi's "Jewish camarilla" completely lost control of events. Imre Nagy, non-Jewish, an old-line Communist who had spent the war in Moscow, became prime minister—for the second time—during the hectic days of October-November, 1956. Nagy called for free elections. The AVH was officially abolished, and the citizens killed all the secret police operatives they could lay their hands on. In Irving's words: "The real criminals had long ago donned false uniforms and escaped, leaving the small-fry for the lynching parties; often blameless recruits who had had no part in the decade of spectacular crimes of their superiors. . . . The mob rage was primeval, primitive, and brutal. It was the closest that the uprising came to an anti-Semitic pogrom, as the largely Jewish AVH officials were mercilessly winkled out of the boltholes where they had fled." On 1 November 1956, Nagy announced that Hungary was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact and would follow a course of neutrality in world affairs.

For the Hungarian revolt to have succeeded, assistance was needed from the West. Unfortunately, the events in Hungary coincided with the Suez Crisis. Britain and France were tied up in the Middle East. The United States, whose CIA-sponsored Radio Free Europe had encouraged the Hungarians to resist their Soviet masters, could have warned the USSR to stay out. Instead, the U.S. reacted timidly with what Irving characterizes as "vintage Eisenhower eyewash unlikely to chill the blood of any Soviet commander." Eisenhower went so far as to state that the U.S. was not "looking for new allies in Eastern Europe." Khrushchev viewed this response as a green light to take decisive action free of American interference. Soviet soldiers were mobilized and sent in to quash the Hungarians. Irving explains that "President Eisenhower's renewed disclaimer of any strategic interest in the satellite nations barely drew an appreciative belch from him [Khrushchev] now he knew that he could risk everything to recover Hungary without in effect risking anything."

Many of the invading Soviet troops did not even realize that they were attacking Hungary; their impression was that they were

headed toward Berlin to fight Fascists. Among them were Russians who "had hungry faces, and the slant eyes and Mongol cheekbones of troops from Soviet Asia. These young men in dark grey coats were killers and sadists . . ." The Western powers did nothing while the Kremlin set about the task of reestablishing Communism in Hungary.

Uprising! is vintage Irving. Once again, the conclusions he draws after years of diligent research challenge critics to revise long-accepted interpretations. But the book does more than re-tell a chapter of mid- twentieth century history. The fact that in the self-proclaimed "land of the free," where people are supposed to enjoy a "free press" and "freedom of expression," this important book has yet to appear in print, is a powerful reminder of just how hollow this great republic is and in what genuine peril we live today.

National Socialism and Fascism: Recent Books in Brief

The Revisionist Historians and German War Guilt by Warren B. Morris. Brooklyn: Revisionist Press, 1977. 141 pp. \$69.95. Objective, analytical study of the foundations of revisionist historiography relating to Germany and its roles in the Second World War. Includes discussions of A.J.P. Taylor, David L. Hoggan, Harry Elmer Barnes, Paul Rassinier, Arthur R. Butz. Extensive notes and bibliography.

Explaining Hitler's Germany: Historians and the Third Reich by John Hiden and John Farquharson. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1983. 190pp. \$19.95. The most up-to-date and comprehensive treatment of how historians have viewed, and changed views of, the Third Reich over the years. Much emphasis on recent German scholarship, West and East. Nearly exhaustive bibliography.

The Nazi Question: An Essay on the Interpretations of National Socialism 1922-1975 by Pierre Aycoberry. New York: Pantheon Books, 1981. 257pp. \$6.95 pb. A history of the history of Nazism, as interpreted through 50 years by the Nazis themselves, their sympathizers, the Left, social scientists and historians of all stripes and particular disciplines. Much of the focus is on Nazism as a peculiar political/psychosocial/cultural phenomenon.

Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich by Joseph W. Bendersky. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. 280pp. \$25.00. First major treatment in English of the German political philosopher who formulated the "Law of Political Plenum," within his overarching construction "Concept of the Political." Schmitt is seen as having played a leading role in formulating the politico-legal ethos used to justify the revolutionary Nazi regime—this despite his own abiding preference for the "conservative" label.

National Socialist Ideology: Concepts and Ideas by James B. Whisker. Greensboro, N.C.: WUN Press, 1979. 72pp. \$3.95 pb. Concise but wide-ranging introduction to Nazi ideology, featuring a lengthy analytical essay and a varied selection of readings from Nazi literature. Most of the readings are newly translated by the author, from sources not usually featured in collections of this type.

The Social, Political, and Religious Thought of Alfred Rosenberg: An Interpretive Essay by James B. Whisker. Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1982. 141pp. \$5.95 pb. An exposition and analysis of the views of the leading Nazi Party philosopher, who was hanged at

Nuremberg in 1946. Traces the evolution of Rosenberg's thought as expressed in his several major works, and presents a comprehensive overview of his contemporaries and precursors in the fields of scientific racialism and Nordicism theology.

The Myth of the Twentieth Century by Alfred Rosenberg. Torrance, Calif.: Noontide Press, 1982. 454pp. \$15.00. First English-language edition, unexpurgated, of this fundamental work of Nazi philosophy. Contains a preface by Prof. Peter H. Peel, an introduction by Prof. James B. Whisker, and Rosenberg's own preface to the third (1931) German edition, replying to the early critics.

When Nazi Dreams Come True: The Third Reich's Internal Struggle Over the Future of Europe After a German Victory by Robert Edwin Herzstein. London: Sphere/Abacus, 1982. 302pp. \$8.95 pb. Based largely on heretofore-unexamined sources, including private and ministerial records and a wide range of Nazi and collaborationist periodicals. Details the conflict within the Nazi hierarchy between pan-German and pan-European thinkers and planners; holds that pan-European propaganda and professions of faith generally increased in direct proportion to the likelihood of a German defeat.

To the Heart of Asia: The Life of Sven Hedin by George Kish. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1984. 260pp. \$16.50. Biography of the great, part-Jewish, Swedish explorer and author who knew and admired Hitler, and whose 1943 book *Amerika im Kampf der Kontinente* made a great impression on the Fuehrer. Includes a full discussion of Hedin's relations with Nazi leaders, his ventures into pro-German diplomacy, and what this augured for him after the war.

Berlin Alert: The Memoirs and Reports of Truman Smith edited by Robert Hessen. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984. 195pp. \$19.95. First publication of the personal and official papers of the U.S. military attache in Berlin who was one of the earliest American observers of the rise to power of Hitler—and who in the 1930s reported candidly on Germany's growing military potential. Colonel Smith was ultimately accused, along with his friends Charles Lindbergh and Lawrence Dennis, of being a Nazi sympathizer.

The Nightmare Years 1930–1940 by William L. Shirer. Boston: Little, Brown, 1984. 654pp. \$22.50. The second volume, covering the Nazi period which made him famous, of the correspondent's autobiography, "Twentieth Century Journey." Contains much material republished verbatim—though not identified as such—from his earlier books.

Who's Who in Nazi Germany by Robert Wistrich. New York: Macmillan, 1982. 359pp. \$17.75. Reference work of 350 entries described by the author as "the first comprehensive Who's Who on the subject to be written in any language." (It is not; Erich Stockhorst's *Fuenftausend Koepfe: Wer war Was im Dritten Reich* was published in 1967, and contains some 4,650 more entries.) Of some use as a basic source for English-language readers,

but should be approached with caution, given some factual errors and the author's anti-Nazi bias.

Leaders and Personalities of the Third Reich: Their Biographies, Portraits, and Autographs by Charles Hamilton. San Jose, Calif.: R. James Bender Publishing, 1984. 480pp. \$24.95. The best "Who's Who" available in English, of interest not only to scholars but to autograph and document collectors. Contains in addition to biographical data some 880 photos/documents/autographs. 55 pages are devoted to Hitler alone, including a valuable section on Hitler forgeries. A second volume, dealing mainly with military figures, is promised in 1985.

The Hitler Movement: A Modern Millenarian Revolution by James M. Rhodes. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. 253pp. \$14.95. Holds that Nazism, arising out of the mass-calamity of World War I with its "revelation" and promise of salvation to the Germans, was a modern, secular version of the apocalyptic-millenarian religious movements of the Middle Ages. The author contends that it is a great mistake for historians not to take Nazi "mythic" self-interpretations very seriously indeed.

Nazism: A Historical and Comparative Analysis of National Socialism by George L. Mosse. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978. 134pp. \$5.95. A distillation of the views of one of the leading social historians of Nazism, as recorded in this wide-ranging interview with Michael Ledeen, who sets the stage with a 14-page introduction to Mosse's work and influence as an interpreter of modern Europe.

Hitler's World View: A Blueprint for Power by Eberhard Jaeckel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981. 140pp. \$6.95 pb. Current edition of the influential 1972 work which overthrew the venerable myth that Hitler never held any real philosophical convictions—was just an opportunist interested only in power for its own sake. Shows via careful examination of Hitler's words and actions that, whatever one might think of it, the Fuehrer did hold and hold to a consistent and internally-logical world view in which he believed deeply.

Hitler's Secret Book by Adolf Hitler. Introduction by Telford Taylor. New York: Grove Press, 1983. 230pp. \$7.95 pb. Most recent edition of the semi-sequel to *Mein Kampf*, dealing mainly with concrete questions of long-term foreign policy, which Hitler wrote in 1928 but never allowed to be published. This translation was originally published in 1961.

Hitler's "Mein Kampf" in Britain and America: A Publishing History 1930-39 by James J. Barnes and Patience P. Barnes. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 101pp. \$19.95. An investigation into the labyrinthian saga of Hitler's famous book as it was presented to English-speaking audiences in the 1930s. Deals with the various translation and publication efforts from the abridged British 1933 version (*My Battle*) through pirated productions (including a tabloid "anti-Hitler version") to the well-known James Murphy, New School for Social Research, and Ralph Manheim translations.

Hitler in Vienna 1907-1913: Clues to the Future by J. Sydney Jones. 350pp. \$19.95. Careful study of Hitler's youth, based on some sources not exploited by previous researchers. It is as much a general biography of Viennese cultural and intellectual life during this time as of its stated subject; captures well the *milieu* surrounding Hitler during his formative years.

The Memoirs of Bridget Hitler edited by Michael Unger. London: Duckworth, 1979. 192pp. \$9.95. First publication of the largely-spurious memoirs of the English wife of Hitler's half-brother, Alois. The memoirs reposed for many years in the New York Public Library as a typescript ("My Brother-in-Law Adolf"), and describe a mythical 1913 visit by young Hitler to England.

Ein Andere Hitler: Erlebnisse, Gespraechе, Reflexionen (A Different Hitler: Experiences, Conversations, Reflections) by Hermann Giesler. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel Verlag, 1977. 527pp. DM 46.00. The memoirs of Hitler's "other architect," responsible for some of the great public building projects planned for the New Reich. Avoids the guilt-ridden apologetics, responsibility-shiftings, and recriminations characteristic of Albert Speer's memoirs; frankly pro-Hitler.

Hitler's Personal Security by Peter Hoffman. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979. 321pp. \$15.00. Meticulous study of the means and methods used to protect the life of the Fuehrer, his residences/offices, and entourage, from the time of his entry into political prominence to the last days. Based in large part on the files of the agencies responsible for security. Many maps, photos, diagrams.

Hitler's Secret Life: The Mysteries of the Eagles Nest by Glenn B. Infield. New York: Stein and Day, 1981. 317pp. \$2.95 pb. Sensationalistic, unreliable account by a contemporary master-chronicler of Third Reich gossip. Much use made of patently spurious sources, including material from the "archives" of Nuremberg trial judge Michael Mussmano—the author's predecessor in producing "history" of this sort.

The Medical Casebook of Adolf Hitler by Leonard L. Heston and Renate Heston. Introduction by Albert Speer. New York: Stein and Day/Scarborough, 1982. 184pp. \$9.95 pb. Careful, detailed reconstruction of the state of Hitler's health over the years, approached in terms of Hitler as just another patient for whose patient-history all available evidence is gathered and evaluated. Little extraneous discussion: the authors stick to their subject—the result being probably the definitive study.

The Secret Diaries of Hitler's Doctor by David Irving. New York: Macmillan, 1983. 310pp. \$16.95. The notes made by Hitler's chief attendant physician, Dr. Theo Morell, transcribed and translated by David Irving, who provides a lengthy introduction and extensive commentary throughout. This book has renewed discussion over Morell's unorthodox treatments and their effect on Hitler's performance as statesman and warlord.

Hitler: The Survival Myth by Donald M. McKale. New York: Stein and Day, 1981. 270pp. \$14.95. A meticulous cataloging—and debunking—of just about every “Hitler is alive” story of the past 40 years, of both the patently ridiculous and more logically presentable varieties. Includes a thorough analysis of the official, politically motivated, Soviet story-changing and backtracking in mid-1945.

Munich 1923: The Inside Story of Hitler's First Grab for Power by John Dornberg. New York: Harper and Row, 1982. 385pp. \$18.95. Most recent account of Hitler's ill-fated attempt to “Putsch” himself into power. Provides a good account of the whole city of Munich and what it was going through politically and socially, as well as the story of the Nazis' would-be revolution.

1933: Die Nationale Erhebung (1933: The National Rising) by Georg Franz-Willing. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel Verlag, 1982. 340pp. DM 29.80 pb. Unbiased history of the decisive year of the Nazis' capture and consolidation of power. Shows just how tenuous at first was the hold of the Nazi Party on the reins of government, even after passage in the Reichstag of the crucial Enabling Act. Concludes that Hitler's party could finally become supreme in the state only because it was, indeed, the organized will of the people.

Aus Deutscher Sicht: Erlebte Zeitgeschichte (From the German View: The Experience of Recent History) by Hans-Juergen Evert. Berg am See: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1980. 386pp. DM 30.00 pb. A general scholarly treatment of the course of German history from Versailles to Potsdam and its aftermath. Written from a nationalistic perspective, sympathetic to National Socialism.

Guernica: Greuelpropaganda oder Kriegsverbrechen? (Guernica: Atrocity Propaganda or War Crime?) by Adolf von Thadden. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel Verlag, 1982. 160pp. DM 22.50. Holds that the popular view of the Spanish Civil War bombing of Guernica by the Germans is largely based on myth, not fact. Sees the liberal/Stalinist propaganda line about Guernica as a precursory case-study of the greater anti-German atrocity stories to come.

Guernica! Guernica! Diplomacy, Propaganda, and the Press by Herbert R. Southworth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. 552pp. \$37.50. The most scholarly and generally-informative study of the Guernica bombing as a continuing problem in fact-sifting and propagandistic exploitation. Extensive use of press accounts and examination of foreign-correspondent behavior and motivations.

Mut zur Wahrheit: Beitrage zur Geschichte unserer Zeit (Courage Towards the Truth: Contributions to the History of Our Time) by Helmut Suendermann. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel Verlag, 1981. 256pp. DM 28.00. A collection of the author's most important revisionist essays and reviews, 1951–72, some previously unpublished, many appearing originally in such periodicals as *Nation Europa* and *Deutsche Wochen-*

Zeitung. Suendermann was Deputy Reich Press Chief during the war, and after it a leading revisionist publisher and author.

Germany and the Two World Wars by Andreas Hillgruber. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981. 120pp. \$7.95 pb. An encapsulation of the conclusions reached by one of West Germany's foremost historians of the problem of continuity and change in German foreign policy in this century. Presents the major arguments of his *Hitlers Strategie: Politik und Kriegfuehrung 1940* and *Der Zenit des Zweiten Weltkrieges: Juli 1941*, as well as his colleague Klaus Hildebrand's influential *Vom Reich zum Weltreich*.

Den Sieg Verspielt: Musste Deutschland den Zweiten Weltkrieg verlieren? (The Lost Victory: Did Germany Have to Lose the Second World War?) by Max Kluever. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel Verlag, 1983. 340pp. DM 36.00. Considers all factors—economic, military, strategic, social—bearing on the question asked in the subtitle. Particularly treats the importance of the forces of treason, sabotage and resistance, often ignored in such examinations. Concludes that Germany's total defeat was by no means inevitable.

Bedingungslose Kapitulation: Inferno in Deutschland 1945 (Unconditional Surrender: Inferno in Germany 1945) by Franz Kurowski. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel Verlag, 1983. 384pp. DM 39.80 pb. General history, from a revisionist perspective, of the events surrounding the capitulation of Germany, including the aftermath of occupation, forced expulsion, reeducation, denazification, forced repatriation, and war crimes trials.

Regierung Doenitz: Die letzten Tage des Dritten Reiches (The Doenitz Government: The Last Days of the Third Reich) by Walter Luedde-Neurath. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel Verlag, 1980. 208pp. DM 24.80. Latest edition of the classic 1950 study of Doenitz's short-lived successor government, by a Doenitz naval aide who participated in the events he describes. This edition is supplemented with selections from Doenitz's personal diary of the period.

Grossadmiral Karl Doenitz: Vom U-Bootkommandanten zum Staatsoberhaupt (Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz: From U-Boat Commander to Head of State) by Karl Alman. Berg am See: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1983. 256pp. DM 29.80. Sympathetic biography of Hitler's successor as Reich President, covering the Second World War years in great depth and ending with Doenitz's release from Spandau prison in 1956.

Doenitz at Nuremberg: A Re-Appraisal edited by H.K. Thompson, Jr., and Henry Strutz. Torrance, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review, 1983. 200pp. \$5.00 pb. Revised, expanded edition of this collection of testimonials from over 400 world figures in government, the judiciary, the law, the military, diplomacy, scholarship, philosophy, and the arts, condemning the Nuremberg war crimes proceedings and betokening support for Grand Admiral Doenitz as a man unjustly maligned in law and in history.

Guenther Prien: *Der "Wolf" und sein Admiral* (Guenther Prien: *The "Wolf" and His Admiral*) by Karl Alman. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel Verlag, 1981. 320pp. DM 19.80 pb. Biography of the legendary U-Boat commander who provided one of the great dramatic exploits in the war at sea: the sinking of the "unsinkable" British battleship *Royal Oak* in harbor at Scapa Flow. Traces in detail all of Prien's hunting expeditions, and his relationship with Admiral Doenitz.

Germany Reborn by Hermann Goering. Torrance, Calif.: Noontide Press, 1983. 67pp. \$4.00 pb. New translation of Goering's 1934 memoir-history (*Aufbau einer Nation*) of the Nazi movement's struggle for power from the earliest days. A fundamental document of Nazism as seen by one of its leaders. Introduction by the translator, Prof. James B. Whisker.

The Murder of Rudolf Hess by W. Hugh Thomas. New York: Harper and Row, 1979. 224pp. \$9.95. A British doctor who examined Spandau's famous prisoner #7 in the early 1970s here makes the claim that the man held at Nuremberg and in Spandau has all along been an impersonator, set up by the Nazis to make the flight to England after the real Hess was murdered. The book does not really resolve the many questions attendant to such an extraordinary thesis.

Rudolf Hess: Der Deutsche Martyr (Rudolf Hess: *The German Martyr*) by Robert H. Drechsler. Vienna: Verlag des "Vereines zur Foerderung Volkstreuen Schrifttums in Oesterreich," 1979. 383pp. DM 30.00 pb. A comprehensive selection of documents from Nuremberg and Spandau accompanies this biography, sympathetic to both Hess and National Socialism.

Final Entries 1945: The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels edited by Hugh Trevor-Roper. New York: Putnam's, 1978. 368pp. \$14.95. First publication of the last-days diaries of the Reich propaganda minister, providing a unique look at life in high official Berlin as a world went up in flames. Includes some photo reproductions of original pages of the transcriptions.

The Goebbels Diaries 1939-1941 edited by Fred Taylor. New York: Putnam's, 1983. 490pp. \$17.95. Diary selections from the years of victory, providing much insight into both "pure" propaganda and official Nazi cultural policy. The copies of the transcription-sheets came to the publisher from the Eastern bloc; entries relating to the Nazi-Soviet pact are missing.

Finale Furioso: Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende (Finale Furioso: *With Goebbels to the End*) by Wilfred von Oven. Tuebingen: Grabert Verlag, 1979. 670pp. DM 39.80. Current edition of the memoirs of one of Goebbels' principal aides in the propaganda ministry. Transcends the basics of an "I was there" account, providing intelligent philosophical reflections on the meaning of the war and Germany's loss.

Magda Goebbels: The First Lady of the Third Reich by Hans-Otto Meissner. New York: Dial Press, 1980. 288pp. \$14.95. First biography of Joseph Goebbels' influential wife, written by longtime Reich State

Secretary Otto Meissner's son, who knew both well. A full chronicle of the often stormy relationship which ended in a double-suicide in the Reich Chancellery bunker.

The Secretary: Martin Bormann—The Man Who Manipulated Hitler by Jochen von Lang. New York: Random House, 1979. 430pp. \$15.95. Most complete and scholarly account of the life of one of the most powerful men around Hitler, by a West German journalist who spent 10 years on the research, and was largely responsible for the forensic investigation which finally determined that Bormann had indeed died in Berlin in 1945.

Martin Bormann: Nazi in Exile by Paul Manning. Secaucus, N.J.: Lyle Stuart, 1981. 302pp. \$14.95. Latest variation on the Bormann-is-alive-and-well-and-behaving-terribly theme. Claims that Bormann became an advisor to Argentine dictator Juan Peron, and personally engineered the postwar German economic rebirth. No source notes, no bibliography.

Walter Reder: Der Gefangene von Gaeta (Walter Reder: The Prisoner of Gaeta) by Robert H. Drechsler. Vienna: Verlag die Leuchtkugel Robert H. Drechsler, 1977. 192pp. DM 25.00 pb. A documentation and narrative history of the four-decades-long ordeal of Major Walter Reder, still held prisoner in the Italian fortress of Gaeta for being convicted of "war crimes" in the execution of a group of communist partisans in German-held Italy in 1944.

Hasso von Manteuffel: Panzerkampf im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Hasso von Manteuffel: Panzer-Struggle in the Second World War) by Joachim von Schaulen. Berg am See: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1983. 280pp. DM 29.80. A study of the military leadership of one of the most tenacious of German tank generals, particularly famed—and respected by his opponents—for his role in slowing up the Western advance into Germany in 1944–45.

Operation Valkyrie: The German Generals' Plot Against Hitler by Pierre Galante. New York: Harper and Row, 1981. 299pp. \$15.95. New treatment of the 20 July bomb plot, its genesis and aftermath. Based largely on the personal archives and recollections of General Adolf Heusinger, operations chief of the general staff 1940–44 and a leading figure in the treason conspiracy.

Albert Speer: The End of a Myth by Matthias Schmidt. New York: St. Martin's, 1984. 288pp. \$14.95. Very critical examination, from an anti-Nazi perspective, of Albert Speer's veracity as a memoirist and chronicler of the Third Reich. Holds that Speer after the war assiduously promoted a view of himself which amounted to a clever lie, and concludes that he was a shameless opportunist at every stage of his life; after 1945 he just changed sides and told lies about his former regime and his role in it.

Infiltration: How Heinrich Himmler Schemed to Build an SS Industrial Empire by Albert Speer. New York: Macmillan, 1981. 384pp. \$15.95. Speer's last book, based on extensive archival research in addition to his

own experience. Describes Himmler's plan to develop the SS into a vast financial/industrial "state within a state." Although Speer hardly intends it, the net effect of his research—which demonstrates just how important concentration camp labor was to Himmler's plans—is to reinforce revisionist conclusions about the non-existence of an "extermination policy."

The SS: Alibi of a Nation by Gerald Reitlinger. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981. 502pp. \$17.50. Re-issue of the 1957 standard work describing the internal workings and political infighting of the SS, with a new foreword by Martin Gilbert.

Secrets of the SS by Glenn B. Infield. New York: Stein and Day, 1984. 271pp. \$3.50 pb. The author, in typical fashion, mixes in just enough established fact with his vivid collection of gossip, rumor, innuendo, and outright invention, as to enable this basically silly volume to have at least just the hint of the reflection of the gloss of the veneer of scholarship.

Reinhard Heydrich: A Biography by Guenther Deschner. New York: Stein and Day, 1981. 351pp. \$18.95. Well-researched biography of the SD chief of the SS. The author exhibits an unusual ambivalence, amounting to a much-qualified revisionism, in discussing Heydrich's own ambivalent attitudes in his roles as Reich Protector of Bohemia-Moravia and key administrator trying to formulate a coherent and consistent Reich policy toward the Jews.

Eichmann Interrogated edited by Jochen von Lang. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983. 240pp. \$19.95. A selection (stated to be about ten percent) from the transcripts of Eichmann's supposed pre-trial interrogation testimony, as given by him in Israel between 29 May 1960 and 11 April 1961, to Israeli Captain Avner Less.

Ich, Adolf Eichmann: Ein Historischer Zeugenbericht (I, Adolf Eichmann: A Historical Witness-Account) edited by Rudolf Aschenauer. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel Verlag, 1980. 550pp. DM 36.00. Controversial book purporting to be the memoirs of Eichmann obtained by the editor in their original form through Eichmann's widow. Contains extensive commentary and analysis by the editor, a major revisionist historian and former defense lawyer in several war crimes trials.

Krieg ohne Grenzen: Der Partisanenkampf gegen Deutschland 1939–1945 (War Without Frontiers: The Partisan Struggle Against Germany 1939–1945) by Rudolf Aschenauer. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel Verlag, 1983. Landmark study of an aspect of World War II in Europe that has remained largely unexplored in English-language literature. This book deals not only with the partisans' activities, but also the Germans' desperate countermeasures—seen by the author as providing the victors with a convenient peg on which to hang "extermination" allegations.

Hitler and the Final Solution by Gerald Fleming. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. 272pp. \$15.95. Direct, hard-driving attack on David Irving's thesis that Hitler did not know of exterminations of Jews. At-

tempts to reverse Irving and "set the record straight" for all time by proving that Hitler did indeed order an extermination program. The attempt fails, however, to bring forth what Irving has always demanded of his critics: a single piece of paper from the war years (not postwar) showing that Hitler even knew about such a thing.

Hitler, Germans, and the "Jewish Question" by Sarah Gordon. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 412pp. \$40.00 hb. \$14.50 pb. A study of German politics and society, 1870-1945, with reference to the Jewish question. The focus is mainly on the Weimar and Nazi years. Not about the "Holocaust" *per se*—though there are many assertions about it, all drawn from secondary sources.

Hitler's Death Camps: The Sanity of Madness by Konnilyn G. Feig. New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1981. 423pp. \$19.95. Based almost exclusively on secondary literature, this book attempts to provide an overview of the Nazi internment system, on a camp-by-camp basis. Lurid assertions, now generally accepted as false, about "extermination" camps on German soil are uncritically repeated. Not for the squeamish or intelligent.

The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry by Walter N. Sanning. Torrance, Calif.: Institute for Historical Review, 1983. 239pp. \$12.00 hb. \$8.00 pb. First scientific demographic study of the movements and fates of Eastern European Jews in the twentieth century. Highlights the constant processes of declining birthrate and extensive emigration, particularly during and after the Second World War. Throws doubt on "Holocaust" extermination claims.

Vor dem Tribunal der Sieger: Gesetzlose Justiz in Nuernberg (Before the Victors' Tribunal: Lawless Justice in Nuremberg) by Hildegard Fritzsche. Preussisch Oldendorf: Verlag K.W. Schuetz, 1981. 336pp. DM 24.00. Revisionist examination of the International Military Tribunal. Scathingly critical of the prosecution and judges, as well as the whole mentality behind the very concept of the trial, which would never have been set up but for the "victors' flush" that caused a wholesale casting-aside of venerable legal principle.

Justice at Nuremberg by Robert E. Conot. New York: Harper and Row, 1983. 593pp. \$22.50. General history, largely uncritical, of the International Military Tribunal. Based as much upon the prosecution's pre-trial interrogation records as on the proceedings or documentary evidences themselves, with the resultant bias such an approach would entail. Essentially a Brief for the Prosecution.

The Nuremberg Trial by Anne Tusa and John Tusa. New York: Atheneum, 1984. 600pp. \$22.50. Latest overview of the IMT proceedings, much more thoroughly researched than the Conot book. Considers the many criticisms of the trial concept and course that have been made over the years, though ultimately ends up vindicating the trial as something that the victors just "had to" do to get the war out of their systems.

The Nazi Era 1919-1945: A Selected Bibliography of Published Works from the Early Roots to 1980 compiled by Helen Kehr and Janet Langmaid. London: Mansell, 1982. 618pp. £ 30.00. Multi-language guide of great scope and authority, though does not pretend to be exhaustive. Includes a bibliography of bibliographies, and listings of published documentary collections.

Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship by A. James Gregor. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. 427pp. \$27.50 hb. \$9.75 pb. The political scientist who has emerged as America's foremost revisionist interpreter of Fascism here expands upon and extends the lines of inquiry of his previous works (*Contemporary Radical Ideologies*, *The Ideology of Fascism*, *The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics*, *Interpretations of Fascism*) to present a detailed analysis of Italian Fascism in power. He sees Mussolini's state as a prototypical developmental revolutionary regime—arising ideologically out of the "crisis of classical Marxism" with its "heresy" of nationalistic revolutionary syndicalism. A comparison of the Fascist mobilization of Italy—the rapid, forced industrialization and modernization of an economically "delayed" country—with the Bolshevikization of Russia at the same time via similar means and under similar conditions, leads to the conclusion that all developmental revolutionary regimes must in fact be both intensely nationalist and socialist. Gregor's vindication of the social science concept of totalitarianism is a unique one: accomplished without the usual unctuous moralizing, and with arguments not likely to please doctrinaire interpreters of Fascism of either Left or Right persuasion.

Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism by A. James Gregor. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. 271pp. \$28.50. A major re-examination of the development of Mussolini's thought, thoroughly debunking the notion that Mussolini was just an opportunistic seeker-after-power, with no real ideological convictions or program. Traced in great detail is the young radical's evolution from anti-nationalist Marxist to fervently nationalist syndicalist, as his political genius combined the ideas of such as Sorel, Pareto, Mosca, Michels, Gentile, Malaparte, and Prezzolini into a mass-mobilizing belief system which swept away all competing revolutionary factions and has confused and consternated doctrinaire Marxists to this day. Contrary to the Marxists' persistent and wishful declarations that Mussolini's belief-system never really existed, Gregor shows him as "an astute political thinker whose beliefs were as intelligent and coherent as any revolutionary of the twentieth century" and whose movement's "intellectual credentials were as compelling as any."

Mussolini by Anthony James Joes. New York: Franklin Watts, 1982. 405pp. \$18.95. A full-scale biography of the revolutionary intellectual turned Duce, by a leading interpreter of Fascism in the revisionist vein. Not sparing in criticisms, the work is nevertheless devoid of condemnatory zeal and not at all shy about describing matter-of-factly the many social, cultural, economic, and foreign policy accomplishments of the Fascist regime, the genuine idealism and intellectual grounding of

Mussolini's program, and the broad support it enjoyed from the Italian people. It is seen to be strange that the Mussolini of the 1920s and early '30s, so widely admired and praised even in the world liberal press as the savior of his country, institutor of needed reforms and developer of a workable "alternate way" transcending both Bolshevism and Reaction, could so quickly and so blithely be painted over as an inhuman monster or buffoon. This biography is essentially a careful restoration-job, scraping away the propaganda coloration to reveal a much more objective, truthful picture of the man and his era.

Mussolini by Dennis Mack Smith. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981. 429pp. £ 12.95. A standard (i.e., disparaging) biography, by a well-known liberal historian of modern Italy who has been adamant in conducting rear-guard actions against the advances of Mussolini/Fascist revisionism that have been a feature of the past twenty years. In essence this is a much more sophisticated—and, certainly, more factually accurate—version of the "Sawdust Caesar" anti-Mussolini tracts of the war-time era. The author knows his sources well, and is a meticulous researcher, but ultimately this study adds nothing to our knowledge of the subject.

Mussolini Unleashed: 1939–1941 by MacGregor Knox. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 385pp. \$19.95. Ground-breaking revisionist study of Mussolini's foreign policy and war aims. Rejects the interpretation of the Duce as a bluffing, clownish and inconsistent opportunist hitching a desperate ride on Hitler's fast-moving war train only out of fear of being "left out" in the share of spoils. Mussolini emerges as neither a poor second-relation to Hitler in policy aims nor a "traditional" Italian statesman striving (even if unsuccessfully) to maintain a delicate, status-quo balance between the Western and Germanic powers. Rather, he consistently sought supremacy and empire for Italy in the Mediterranean, and the stunning Nazi victories of 1940, far from "pushing" him into a stance not really desired, "unleashed" him to attempt accomplishment of formidable goals he had always had in mind.

The First Duce: D'Annunzio at Fiume by Michael Ledeen. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. 225pp. \$15.00. Descriptive and interpretive study of Gabriele D'Annunzio's 16-month popular dictatorship, 1919-20, in the Italian-claimed North Adriatic city of Fiume. The romantic-mythic leadership exploits of the flamboyant poet/war-hero/dictator are seen as contributing greatly to the style, if not the substance, of Mussolini's later dictatorship over Italy. D'Annunzio's ability to unite (for a time) under his banner the many competing factions and ideological currents in Fiume demonstrated a drastic and revolutionary form of "consensus politics" whose lesson was not lost on later leaders working in a larger context. The turbulent Fiume of post-World War I is seen as a microcosm of the continuing turbulence and political possibilities of our own time.

The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism by David D. Roberts. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1979. 440pp.

\$30.00. A meticulous tracing and analysis of the contributions of revolutionary syndicalism to the development of Italian Fascist ideology, politics, and practice-in-power—demonstrating just how much Fascism owed to the revolutionary Left. Particular attention is paid to the ideas and influence of Georges Sorel, erstwhile Marxist turned prophet of nationalist socialism and the “myth” of violence and action.

Fascism: An Informal Introduction to Its Theory and Practice by Renzo De Felice. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976. 128pp. \$5.95 hb. \$3.95 pb. An interview with De Felice conducted by Michael Ledeen. Provides a concise but wide-ranging introduction to the thought of the controversial University of Rome historian, author of a monumental six-volume biography of Mussolini and editor of the Mussolini-D'Annunzio correspondence. Discussed are De Felice's political and historical analyses of Fascism in all its stages, and the controversy his work has stirred up by virtue of its decided departure from longstanding “consensus” (including Marxist) interpretations. The paperback Italian edition of this book was the number-one bestseller in that country for a year—very unusual for a work of this kind. Doubtless contributing to the interest in it was the Marxist and popular-press characterization of De Felice as a closet “neo-Fascist.”

Interpretations of Fascism by Renzo De Felice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977. 248pp. \$14.95. De Felice's own comprehensive review of his predecessors and contemporaries—and critics—in the study of Fascism. He extends the scope of inquiry here beyond the Italian case to consider “generic” European Fascism and all its schools of interpretation through 50 years, including the Marxist, conservative, Catholic, totalitarian, social science, and psychosocial constructs.

Fascism in the Contemporary World: Ideology, Evolution, Resurgence by Anthony James Joes. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. 238pp. \$17.50. Not a work about contemporary “neo-nazi” movements, but a comparative historical/political study of certain nationalistic and socialistic regimes-in-power today—“the first attempt to systematically link fascist ideology and practice in Europe to that in the Third World.” Follows much of the approach of A. James Gregor (who contributes the Foreword) in positing the developing nations as seed-grounds for Fascism; no matter that these developmental, hurrying-to-modernize Third World regimes might call themselves “Marxist” (and be so called by both Western and Eastern Bloc commentators), they actually have much more in common with the Italian Fascist than the Marxist tradition. The author states bluntly that “Fascism is on the rise in the contemporary world.”

Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, Jan Peter Myklebust. Bergen-Oslo-Tromsø: Universitetsforlaget, 1980. U.S. distributor: Columbia University Press. 893pp. \$39.95. Massive compilation of original research, much of it quantitative, from more than two dozen researchers of Fascism's appeal and its ultimate satisfaction or non-satisfaction of that appeal, among all population groups in all European countries. Social science, psychological, economic, and demographic approaches predominate.

Fascism in Europe 1919-1945 by R.A.H. Robinson. London: The Historical Association, 1981. 45pp. \$3.95 pb. Basic introductory booklet providing an overview of the history, belief systems, and leaders of the various European Fascisms, and an exposure to varied interpretations of the place of Fascism and its attendant phenomena in European history.

Reappraisals of Fascism edited by Henry A. Turner, Jr. New York: Franklin Watts, 1975. 238pp. \$5.95 pb. A selection of essays representing some of the main currents of theory thrust up by the 1960s-'70s reawakening of scholarly interest in—and debate over—Fascism. One section is devoted to analyses of the interpretation of West German historian Ernst Nolte, whose *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche* (1963; *Three Faces of Fascism*, 1966) has contributed markedly and lastingly to all serious discussions of the subject. Although many different viewpoints and approaches are featured in this anthology, there are none of the Marxist persuasion—since, in the words of the editor, "It proved impossible to find even one interpretation from that point of view of a quality comparable to that of the contributions published here."

Fascism by Alan Cassels. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975. 401pp. \$7.95 pb. One of the more useful and provocative surveys of European Fascism, expanding on the author's classic 1969 essay, "Janus: The Two Faces of Fascism." Surveying all European nations, but concentrating on the two—distinct—"prototypes" of Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, Cassels posits a dichotomy between Fascisms in fully-modernized and in less-developed countries. The core ethos of German National Socialism, inheriting an advanced industrialized nation of the highest order, involved a fundamental rejection of modernism (though not of its technics), and a yearning for the return to a purer, uncorrupted and simpler *volkisch* past. Italian Fascism, on the other hand, arising in a comparatively backward country, proudly placed itself in the forefront of "modern movement" progressivism and positivism. The dichotomy of "backward-looking" vs. "forward-looking" Fascisms is extended to include other European variants, including Sir Oswald Mosley's movement in Britain (placed in the former category). Cassels does not, however, discard the concept of a "generic" Fascism. He rather vindicates it by holding that all Fascisms shared the wellspring of desire for a renewal of social cohesion in societies that had become atomized—and shared as well the radical compulsion to sweep away the reigning establishments of pluralistic liberal capitalism and Marxism, manifestations both of despised materialism.

Fascism: Comparison and Definition by Stanley G. Payne. Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980. 234pp. \$6.95 pb. The most rigorous and systematic work to review, define, compare, and contrast all theoretical approaches to the historical/political "problem" of Fascism, "the only major new ideology of the twentieth century." Country-by-country and theory-by-theory comparative analyses lead to the conclusion that no one interpretative "system" can properly explain the phenomenon of Fascism—despite the numerous such systems that have been devised (often for political purposes); an "either/or" approach, such as the Marxist, won't do and is in fact misleading. There was no absolute, shared

single cause or generic phenomenon to which all the various Fascisms can be reduced; at the same time, however, a view of different Fascist regimes and movements which ignores their very real similarities, both in ideological and situational terms, is also inappropriate. As a "touchstone" for definition of what Fascism is and what it is not—a key question, given the widespread contemporary abuse of the term "Fascist," often hurled about with little or no concern for definitional rigor—the author presents a descriptive typology positing certain characteristics making up a "Fascist minimum." The outstanding feature of this book is its clarity and objectivity in treating a subject all too often wrapped up in myth and polemics.

Fascist Intellectual: Drieu La Rochelle by Robert Soucy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. 400pp. \$37.50. First biography in English of the famous French Fascist thinker, author of *L'Europe contre les patries*, *Le Français d'Europe* and the classic *Chronique Politique 1934–1942*. Treats Drieu's entire career from his formative experiences in the First World War to his early advocacy of a united Europe, support of Jacques Doriot's *Parti Populaire Français*, feuds with Robert Brasillach, editorship of the collaborationist *Nouvelle Revue Française*, and despairing suicide in 1945.

Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, The Modernist as Fascist by Fredric Jameson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. 200pp. \$18.95. Essentially a literary treatment of the avant-garde British prose stylist, but with the focus on his romantic, anti-democratic political views. Analyzes not only his "protofascist" fiction, but his ostentatiously "shocking" books on politics and society, such as *The Art of Being Ruled*, *Blasting and Bombardiering*, *Left Wings Over Europe*, *Hitler*, and *The Jews: Are They Human?* Despite his public turn away from admiration for Hitler in the late '30s, Wyndham Lewis is seen as having held throughout his life a peculiar Fascist "temperament."

Deliberate Regression: The Disastrous History of Romantic Individualism in Thought and Art, from Jean-Jacques Rousseau to Twentieth Century Fascism by Robert Harbison. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980. 264pp. \$15.00. The author of this study of art and society did not create the category "Romantic Individualism," but he does manage here to divest it of all real meaning or usefulness by indiscriminately lumping together under its rubric any artistic expressions of the past 200 years that he happens not to like. What he doesn't like are, for instance, paintings and sculptures of human beings that bear some resemblance to human beings. Quite beyond the pale are any representations that dare proclaim beauty in the human form or in human works, and express such traits as heroism, idealism, and nobility. Hence his zealous anti-"fascist" condemnation, in chapters entitled "Tribe and Race" and "Millenium," of both the Nazi and Soviet realist/neo-classicist schools of art and architecture. The author's strident intolerance betrays, perhaps, a lurking would-be Zhdanov in reverse; he has written a book full of intellectual sound and fury, signifying stupidity.

—*Précis* by Keith Stimely

LIFE



BERLIN'S BOMBER
AIR MARSHAL HARRIS

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His Master's Voice: Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Travers Harris, 1892–1984

“**B**omber” Harris died on 5 April of this year, at the age of 91. As Air Officer Commanding in Chief Bomber Command from February 1942 until the end of the Second World War, he was in charge of Britain’s massive “area bombing” campaign directed against German cities. At least half a million German civilians were killed in these raids. And over 58,000 British air crew members died while flying in massed concentrations of heavy bombers—nearly the same number of fatalities suffered by British junior army officers during the First World War. The British jurist and historian, F.J.P. Veale, considered this “an even more calamitous loss since the standard of health and intelligence required for the men of Bomber Command was far higher than that of the junior officers who served in the trenches in France twenty years before.”

English by birth, Harris spent part of his youth in Rhodesia. After joining the British Army, he transferred to the Royal Flying Corps, which was redesignated the Royal Air Force in 1919. He commanded bomber and transport squadrons in Britain and the Mideast and by 1938 was Air Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan. The next year he took command of No. 5 Bomber Group in Britain, which post he held until 22 February, 1942, when he was entrusted with the direction of Bomber Command.

Harris took command of Britain’s strategic bombing effort when the new four-engine heavy bombers were beginning to roll out of the factories. The Lancasters and Halifaxes were the principle delivery vehicles employed to drop thousands of tons of bombs on German cities.

Britain, like the other combatants, had attempted precision bombing of military targets early in the war. The 1941 British “Butt Report,” dealing with the effectiveness of bombing, found that only 30 percent of the bombers arrived within five miles of their targets, and in the Ruhr only 10 percent. Unable to engage in precision bombing, Harris advocated and instituted “area bombing.” This technique required the assembly of very large numbers

of bombers, which would then drench whole metropolitan areas with high explosives and incendiaries. The aircraft were directed toward the center of a given city, since they were unable to strike selectively military targets. It was presumed that amid all the destruction wrought some targets of military significance would be demolished. During the process of hitting a city, factory workers and other civilians would, of course, be killed and wounded, with thousands more "de-housed." Harris and other advocates of area bombing argued that such a bombing campaign would bring the war to a relatively swift end, by doing massive material and morale damage to the enemy.

Harris launched the first of his famous "Thousand Plane" raids against Cologne on 30 May 1942. While much favorable publicity was generated, the actual military results were exaggerated. For the year 1942, German armament production increased 50 percent overall, with aircraft output way up and oil, Germany's weakest link, hardly touched. This armament increase came despite the intensification of the British and American bombing campaign.

Area bombing continued. On 12 August 1943, Harris wrote to Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal: "It is my firm belief that we are on the verge of a final showdown in the bombing war. . . . I am certain that given average weather and concentration on the main job, we can push Germany over by bombing this year." He followed up this prediction with another in January 1944, declaring that if he were only permitted to stay the course, his bombing campaign would drive Germany to "a state of devastation in which surrender is inevitable" by April 1st of that year.

Even as Harris was forecasting imminent victory through bombing, Bomber Command was fighting for its life over the skies of Germany. From November 1943 to March 1944, the RAF conducted the air Battle of Berlin. During this campaign the British lost 1,047 bombers, with a further 1,682 damaged—many beyond repair. The last blow came with the catastrophic Nuremberg raid of 30 March 1944, when the British suffered the loss of 94 bombers and another 71 damaged, out of 795 sent out that night. The severe losses in men and aircraft placed the future of Harris' massed night attacks in doubt. But his command was given a reprieve when he was ordered, over his vigorous protests, to switch to operations directed against the French rail network, in order to assist the forthcoming cross-Channel invasion at Normandy.

Throughout the Summer of 1944, Harris called for the resumption of massed attacks against German cities. He even threatened to resign when given a directive, dated 25 September 1944, recommending that Bomber Command concentrate against oil and communications targets. On 27 January 1945 Harris was explicitly in-

structed to resume terror attacks against the German civilian population. This led to the notorious mid-February raids on Dresden, by then overflowing with refugees from the Red Terror in the East.

Harris was certainly one of the dominant military figures of the Second World War. However, the bombing campaign he had directed became an unpopular topic—especially among politicians—after the war. Harris left his post in September 1945, never to be given another military command by the British. He was the only top British military commander not given a peerage at the end of the war, and Bomber Command was denied a separate campaign medal and separate church monuments. Members of the Royal Family turned down invitations to its reunions. The British Government even refused to permit Harris to consult official records when writing his war memoirs. For many years after the war he worked in private business in South Africa.

It is noteworthy that Harris' civilian superiors largely succeeded in escaping responsibility in the public mind for the policy of bombing German cities instead of concentrating on military targets. The decision to bomb cities for morale effect was made long before Harris became Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command. The official minutes (quoting participants in the third person) of the War Cabinet meeting of 28 October 1940 reveal that Churchill said:

... whilst we should adhere to the rule that our objectives should be military targets, at the same time the civilian population around the target areas must be made to feel the weight of the war. He regarded this as a somewhat broader interpretation of our present policy, and not as any fundamental change. No public announcement on the subject should be made. The Italians and, according to recent reports, the inhabitants of Berlin, would not stand up to bombing attacks with the same fortitude as the people of this country. (Public Records Office—Kew, file PRO 65/6 War Cab 280 (40), 30 October 1940.)

On 14 February 1942, a week prior to Harris' new appointment taking effect, the British Cabinet issued a new directive to Bomber Command that ordered the bombing campaign to "be focused on the morale of the enemy civilian population and in particular the industrial workers." That was to be Bomber Command's "primary object." "Thus," as B.H. Liddell Hart observed, "terrorization became without reservation the definite policy of the British Government, although still disguised in answer to Parliamentary questions." After all, as Churchill remarked, "There are 65 million Germans—all of them killable."

Reflecting on the terror bombing campaign, the famous British military strategist and historian, General J.F.C. Fuller, felt that

"Bomber" Harris was symptomatic of a general decline in British character and morality: "With the disappearance of the gentleman—the man of honour and principle—as the backbone of the ruling class in England, political power rapidly passed into the hands of demagogues, who by playing upon the emotions and ignorance of the masses, created a permanent war psychosis. To these men, political necessity justified every means, and in war-time, military necessity did likewise."

Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris was truly a man of his times.

—Charles Lutton

An Interview with Hellmut Diwald

TRUTH-SEEKING HISTORIOGRAPHY

Editor's Note: The following is taken from the Austrian student periodical *Die Aula* (No. 3, 1980, pp. 9-10), A-8010 Graz, Merangasse 13, Austria. Professor Hellmut Diwald, distinguished professor of history at the Friedrich-Alexander University in Erlangen, West Germany, became a figure of some considerable controversy in academic and press circles with the publication in 1978 of his book *Geschichte der Deutschen* (Frankfurt, Berlin, Vienna: Propylaen Verlag). This general history of the German people from the tenth century A.D., published by a thoroughly respectable and venerable firm, engendered by virtue of its treatment of certain themes of Third Reich/World War II history an immediate and massive backlash—with the ultimate result that the first edition was officially withdrawn, and a new version released with certain offending passages changed. These passages occurred on pp. 164-65, and dealt in fairly general terms with the treatment of the Jews by Germany in World War II. Diwald wrote, among other things, that "Since the capitulation in 1945, 'Auschwitz' has also served as the main vehicle in a campaign to reduce the German people to complete moral degradation. . . . Countless works have been published and claims made since 1945 which cannot be proven and which cynically add to the infamy. The most horrible events of modern times have been exploited through the use of distortions, deceptions and exaggerations. . . . Thus, the victorious Allies claimed the ex-

istence of 'extermination camps' of which there was not a single one in Germany. For years visitors to the Dachau concentration camp were shown 'gas chambers' where as many as 25,000 Jews were allegedly killed daily by the SS. Actually the rooms displayed were dummy chambers which the U.S. military had forced imprisoned SS men to build after the capitulation. . . . The deportation of the Jews took place as part of a general forced-labor program for the war industry. . . . During the war Jewish emigration was no longer possible and the expression 'total solution' or 'final solution' was coined to refer to the policy whereby all Jews were to be segregated from the German population, removed from central Europe, evacuated to the East, and relocated in new ghettos. This plan was outlined by Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the Reich Security Main Office on 24 June 1940. The central questions about what actually happened in the subsequent years still remain unclear despite all of the literature."^{*}

(*Die Aula* questions are in boldface, Diwald's answers following.)

Die Aula: The best way to introduce a short discussion of the book *Geschichte der Deutschen* is with a remark by David Irving made during a lecture given at the "Seminar for a Free Mass Media" in Kassel, West Germany. Irving began his presentation by pointing out how remarkable it is that it takes an Englishman to correct historical distortions relating to Germany's role in the Second World War. That should more appropriately be the job of a German historian.

Such a historian has now come forward. As should be expected in contemporary, semi-colonial, Germany, his work has caused an echo-effect in the mass media; the responses have ranged, depending on the particular respondents, from naked hatred to a breath of relief. The sense of relief is due to the fact that the ice finally seems to have broken and an objective, un-emotional discussion of events become possible.

The established practice of "overcoming" the past brought about the forced revision of the first edition of *Geschichte der Deutschen* and must likewise sooner or later lead to an attack on the entire work. But the practice should not condemn whole generations of Germans to political ignorance and stupefaction due to their receiving a distorted sense of history. The "mess"

^{*}A complete translation of Diwald's remarks in this section ("The Final Solution") of his book was presented in *The Journal of Historical Review* Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 1982), pp. 35-37. The book was reviewed in *JHR* Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1980), pp. 81-87.

which has occurred should prove quite enough for a while. Besides, the real circumstances of the case should be clear to any German interested in history and educated in the traditional sense.

Nobody can object to calling things by their correct names. Insofar as they were inconsistent with international law and do contribute to a "moral mortgage" against the German people of today and their descendants, the Erlangen historian Hellmut Diwald makes appropriate and frequent criticisms of the decisions and policies of the Third Reich. That is as it should be. However, and in the name of the German people, Diwald condemns the criticisms which go beyond those limits. This is his good right as a scholar and as a historian of contemporary history. It is also his duty as a patriot and member of this very self-critical people, the Germans.

During an interview in December 1978 with Bavarian Broadcasting, you stated that you would not agree to any changes made by the Propylaen publishing house in your attention-getting book, "Geschichte der Deutschen." Since then a second edition has appeared in which pages 164 and 165 have been changed. It is being said that a forthcoming new edition of the book will be significantly "reworked." What circumstances induced you to revise the book?

I still stand today by the same position, in that I don't take back a word of what I've written in my book *Geschichte der Deutschen*. That also includes the two pages which were substituted in the new edition. I have merely taken out a few remarks, which are nevertheless fundamentally correct, because I haven't the slightest intention of providing [new] material which can be misused for consciously false claims. I still maintain that the theme of "German crimes" has been used since 1945 in order to defame the Germans. Moreover, central questions in this regard still remain unexplained. I have rejected any further revisions.

You mean, then, that the revisions do not change the substance but rather were made only for the purpose of clarification?

It is a fact that at Bergen-Belsen concentration camp the memorial plaque still refers to 50,000 victims whereas in reality there were 7,000—most of whom died during the final months of the war as a result of epidemics and malnutrition. The usual response to that observation is to argue that the number is not what is important.

Golo Mann called your book "The most monstrous since 1945" written in this field.

Concentration camps are not the issue. Many contemporary historians hold that if we discuss history *this way* [that is, in a revisionist way], the work of 20 years is brought into question. An effort was thus made to take the book completely off the market. The whole affair involved important issues of criminal and civil law. I had to consider carefully those issues. It would have been unwise to push the matter and thereby jeopardize the entire book.

Have you had difficulties with your colleagues?

My colleagues can be divided into three types. One person opposes me, another remains silent, and a third comes to me, shakes my hand and merely says: "Keep your chin up." A historian cannot be concerned primarily with popularly desirable pedagogical values, but rather with what is tenable. The first consideration must be to clarify the facts of the matter. Morally desirable considerations are secondary. Science recognizes no rules which engender limitations on objective truth. "Truth" means the greatest possible striving for the ideal of truth. Today, the field of contemporary history is limited to a few basic convictions which cannot be challenged or, in other words, cannot be discussed.

Do you mean that in the same sense as did the former Rector of the University of Tuebingen, Prof. Eschenburg, who declared: "Whoever questions Germany's exclusive guilt for the Second World War destroys the foundation of post-war politics" or, similarly, the statement by David Irving that many contemporary German historians make it easy for themselves by copying from each other's work?

Yes.

What has been and is the response among students?

Among the students who know me, nothing has changed at all. A mob once organized a meeting in Erlangen. Posters in February announced the meeting. A colleague asked me to participate in a discussion since the students had many questions. I agreed. Things got very emotional although the meeting went well on stage. But it was as if I was speaking to a wall. There was no basis for understanding. I was sharply attacked, although hardly anyone knew the book. The students got their information only from the newspaper and from the article in *Spiegel*.

Your book is important for Austria. In the introduction, you speak of the existence of three republics in which Germans live, one of which is in Austria. How do you see the themes of state, nation, and folk in regards to Austria?

The principle of the right of self-determination must remain preeminent. Furthermore, in view of the political realities which have emerged, one must remain thoughtful when considering the situation of the German nation. It is a fact that the German people were denied the right to self-determination after the First World War and that ten million Germans remained excluded.

In 1952 Stalin proposed a peace treaty whereby Germany would be reunified and militarily neutral. The English newspaper "The Observer" recently [1980] reported that Brezhnev would be prepared to accept a similar arrangement. Do you see any chance for reunification along these lines?

Yes. There are certain constants in politics. We should keep that in mind—even if the government in Bonn does not. However, our constitutional mandate to work for reunification must take precedence. Consistent with the unity of Germany, an independent policy must be followed which, above all, is oriented neither toward the West nor the East. Such a policy could make a valuable contribution to peace. The Federal Republic of Germany should not promote the foreign policy of the U.S.A. and neither should the "German Democratic Republic" promote the foreign policy of the USSR. The danger that a reunited Germany—or, we might say, a rump Germany joined in a single state—could be Bolshevized, does not exist. There is nothing the Russians would like less than to have such a powerful formation *within* their own sphere of influence. On the other hand, [reunification] would eliminate the greatest source of turmoil in Europe—that is, a divided Germany—and thereby relieve both the United States and the Soviet Union. *The initiative for this will certainly come not from the United States, but from the Soviet Union.* The Soviets are much better practitioners of *Realpolitik* than are the politicians of the U.S.A.

Is the "Ostpolitik" of the Bonn Government a suitable vehicle?

No. The Russians view the current [1980] Bonn policy as a lesser evil because the rigidity of the previous CDU [Christian Democratic] government and its absolute Western orientation excluded any political flexibility.

In other words, all of the Bonn parties have failed?

Yes. Austria is way ahead in this regard. Austria would be a realistic model.

Albert Speer and the 'Holocaust'

Albert Speer may ultimately be best remembered as the only high German wartime official to be "rehabilitated" during his lifetime and even profit handsomely from his once-powerful position. The one-time Hitler confidant and Reich Armaments Minister escaped the hangman's noose at Nuremberg by adopting an unusual defense strategy. While maintaining that he personally knew nothing of a Jewish extermination program during the war, he nevertheless declared himself guilty for having worked diligently for a regime he belatedly considered evil.

After serving a 20-year prison sentence at Spandau, the democratic mass media showered praise on the "repentent Nazi" for his sometimes subtle but always fervent condemnations of the Hitler regime. His contrite memoirs, published in America as *Inside the Third Reich*, were highly acclaimed and sold very profitably throughout the world.

Until his death in 1981, Speer repeatedly insisted that he did not know of any extermination program or gassings during the war. In an obliging May 1977 letter to the Executive Director of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, he stated: "... I would give something to be able to state clearly that Hitler ordered the killing of the Jews in my presence. Neither am I in a position to testify to the exact number of Jews killed."

(This statement, incidentally and interestingly, provided yet another opportunity for "Nazi hunter" Simon Wiesenthal to bleat out one of his big lies. In a notarized statement dated 4 May 1981, referring to Speer's letter quoted above, Wiesenthal declared: "Albert Speer, a former friend of Hitler and minister of his government, made a statement for the court in Johannesburg. He declared under oath that Hitler often spoke about the murdering of Jews and that as far as he knows, gasifications [gassings] of Jews took place." How Simon Wiesenthal gets that out of what Speer actually wrote is a question best reserved for professional students of the "Nazi hunting" psyche.)

Speer's position was remarkable because, if a wartime policy to exterminate the Jews had actually existed, almost no one would have been in a better position to have known about it. As Reich Armaments Minister, he was responsible for the continental mobilization of all available resources, including critically-needed Jewish workers. That millions of Jews could have been killed at a wartime industrial center as important as Auschwitz and elsewhere without Speer's knowledge simply defies belief.

—Mark Weber

Uproar in Clio's Library

THE CASE OF DR. DAVID ABRAHAM AND
"THE COLLAPSE OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC"

A lengthy page-one, six column article in the Sunday, 23 December 1984 *New York Times* (Colin Campbell, "History and Ethics: A Dispute," pp. 1, 35) brought to the attention of the general public for the first time the facts about a controversy within the halls of mainstream historical scholarship that has proceeded with mounting bitterness for almost two years—and will receive fresh impetus early in 1985 with the publication of major articles/rebuttals/counter-rebuttals in the historical journals *Central European History* and *German Quarterly of Social and Economic History*. The case has already drawn in dozens of professional historians (among them some of the most prominent names in the historiography of modern Germany), been publicized in the *American Historical Review*, and resulted in a formal protest to the American Historical Association's committee on professional affairs. It involves nothing less than charges of massive scholarly fraud, distortion, fabrication and lying, in a book about the fall of the Weimar Republic and the financial sources of the Nazis' rise to power. It has caused a number of historians to question publicly what has become of standards of scholarship, verification, and ethics in their profession. And it has raised the question whether a closer examination of other texts of modern history might yield results as disconcerting as have come up in this case.

The charges revolve around Dr. David Abraham, whose book *The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political Economy and Crisis* was published by Princeton University Press in June 1981. Dr. Abraham is currently an untenured professor at Princeton. (His application for tenure has been turned down, although his employment was extended for another year.) The book grew out of his 1977 Ph.D. dissertation for the University of Chicago. Submitting it to Princeton for publication in 1979, he revised it somewhat after it was sent around to two scholars for a reading—a standard practice. One of those scholars, Prof. Gerald Feldman of the University of California at Berkeley, adjudged the revised version "vastly improved" and "very sound."

Initial reviews of the book were favorable or respectful. Its thesis was the neo-Marxist one that German Big Business as a group sought to sabotage the late Weimar state by supporting Hitler and the Nazis, the faction they saw as best representing their economic interests, especially in the face of a rising threat

from the Left. This thesis—Nazism or “generic” Fascism as anti-proletarian reaction, the last resort and tool of monopoly capitalism—is an old one, stated many times over the years in such well-known works as Arthur Rosenberg’s *Der Faschismus als Massenbewegung*, Daniel Guérin’s *Fascism and Big Business*, Robert Brady’s *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism*, R. Palme Dutt’s *Fascism and Social Revolution*, and, perhaps the most sophisticated example, Franz Neumann’s *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*. Known as the “classical Marxian interpretation” of Fascism, it retains, in its numerous variations, many adherents on the Left today. In support of his variant, Abraham cited and quoted from many primary sources which seemed to show just how ardently pro-Nazi and anti-Weimar, for their own narrow ends, were some of Germany’s most important business and financial leaders.

It was when Abraham’s quotations and sources were subjected to a searching look, however, that serious questions began to be raised. Prof. Henry A. Turner, Jr., of Yale, whose own book *German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler* was published by Oxford University Press in January 1985, took the lead in checking out Abraham’s scholarship. Turner had reviewed the book for the *Political Science Quarterly* in October 1982, focusing there on a critique, not of its veracity as to sources, but of its analytic logic and what he saw as an over-reliance on dogmatic Marxist theories about Nazism. (Turner is one of those scholars who reject the Marxian analysis as politically-motivated, narrow, and unsupported, ignoring the broader “populist” appeal of the Nazis and the importance of the anti-capitalist element and attraction in their ideology.) Commenting later that had Dr. Abraham’s quotations all been accurate, he would have had to tear up a chapter of his own work-in-progress, Dr. Turner set to examining those quotations and their sources.

What he found so shocked and angered him that he sent communications to colleagues in America and Europe warning them that the Abraham book was, as he put it in one cover-letter, a “far-rago of misinformation.” With his letters went photocopies of Abraham’s page 320, which directly quoted a 1932 exchange of letters between Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, former president of the Reichsbank, and Paul Reusch, a heavy-industry leader, seeming to show not only a heretofore-undocumented high degree of sympathy for the Nazis, but plans actively to assist them to power. With this page Dr. Turner sent copies of the original referenced letters of Schacht and Reuss. The comparison revealed that Abraham had invented out of thin air whole sentences, phrases, and sentiments in his “quotes.” This was but one example. In a letter to Abraham, Turner charged several other misquotations,

misdatings, and, most importantly, misattributions of documents dating from around Christmas 1930 that were a key part of Abraham's supposed documentation of pro-Nazi business machinations. Turner circulated this letter to other historians, and composed a letter to the *American Historical Review* which challenged Abraham to prove that certain documents relating to that Christmas 1930 period "exist now or ever existed." He pointed out that a book and a journal article cited by Abraham were nonexistent. The letter, together with Abraham's reply, was published in the October 1983 issue.

In his reply, Dr. Abraham developed the defense that he has hewed to ever since: while conceding a number of errors and a degree of carelessness, due partly to the pressure of time in preparing the book, he had not deliberately invented anything; there was no intent to defraud. But Dr. Turner in fact was charging that there obviously was such an intent; such discrepancies as he had found between Abraham's versions of things and what the documents actually said could not be explained away as mere "mistakes." It was Turner's insistent voicing of this charge that led a number of scholars to come down against him for being too vehement about it all. These, conceding that Turner had a case against Abraham on points of fact, criticized him nevertheless for concluding that Abraham was a faker—as opposed to just a sloppy researcher. And they raised questions about Turner's ethics in so quickly and publicly making his charges. Some even speculated openly that Turner's motivation in discrediting the Abraham book was to drum up interest in and support for his own forthcoming book with the opposite thesis. These considerations formed the basis for a protest by several scholars, among them Carl Schorske of Princeton and President Hanna Grey of the University of Chicago, to the American Historical Association. Early in January 1985, the AHA's professional affairs committee declined to act on this protest, holding in effect that the time-honored academic system of open professional criticism and exchange should be allowed to run its course.

Dr. Turner was not at all without allies in making the case against Dr. Abraham. One supporter was Dr. Gerald Feldman—the same Gerald Feldman who had reviewed the book for Princeton before publication. After looking into the work much deeper, he now said that it seemed "a terrible, terrible distortion of the documents," and readily admitted being embarrassed by his initial recommendation. One development that particularly infuriated him was that Abraham had picked up some scholarly supporters who were minimizing his errors (by calling them just "errors") and attacking Dr. Turner for his efforts at exposure. Said Feldman: "Everywhere you went, people were say-

ing that Turner was operating for political and personal reasons." He was disturbed that Abraham's appalling scholarship could be condoned or excused by his peers—and that those peers could engage in a sustained attack on the man largely responsible for directing the light of day onto such scholarship, an attack which called that man, in effect, a victimizer. In a letter to colleagues, Feldman expressed his shock at the sympathetic portrayal of Abraham in some quarters as "a victim of something other than his own sloppiness, incompetence, tendentiousness, and untruthfulness."

A former graduate student of Feldman's, Dr. Ulrich Nocken of the University of Dusseldorf, had meanwhile been spending much time in the same archives consulted by Abraham. He found numerous further errors, inventions, and distortions, and composed a lengthy indictment against the author of *The Collapse of the Weimar Republic*. Of the 70 footnotes he had checked, only four were "unobjectionable." (It is this review which appears in the current issue of *German Quarterly of Social and Economic History*.) The Nocken report, circulated in manuscript, sufficed to change the minds of some who had initially been supportive of Abraham. Among these was Prof. Gordon A. Craig of Stanford—perhaps the "dean" of American scholars of modern Germany. Craig's original "instinct," he told the *New York Times*, was to be lenient, since some mistakes and the temptation to "strain the evidence" are not uncommon in younger scholars. But Craig's "instincts after reading Dr. Nocken's piece told him the errors went beyond carelessness."

One criticism levelled at Dr. Abraham has been that the "misinformation" in his book begins with its very dedication: "For my parents, who at Auschwitz and elsewhere suffered the worst consequences of what I can only write about." His parents happen to be alive. Abraham condemns as "contemptible" the charge that by "worst consequences" he meant to suggest that they had been killed—"even apart from the question whether death was the worst horror Auschwitz could inflict."

Since the controversy over his scholarship began, Abraham has been turned down for jobs at the University of Texas, the University of California at Santa Cruz, the Catholic University of America, and the University of Tel Aviv—this last for the post of director of the Wiener Library, a major resource center on anti-Semitism and the Nazi era. In reaction to that prospect, Dr. Feldman remarked that handing David Abraham a research library would have been "like putting Dracula in charge of a blood bank."

The Abraham controversy dominated the end-of-year convention of the American Historical Association, held in Chicago.

Time magazine, reporting on the affair in its issue of 14 January 1985 ("Stormy Weather in Academe," p. 59), quoted AHA Executive Director Samuel Gammon as saying that "It's almost impossible to get involved and be neutral." Another AHA official, not speaking for attribution, said: "I feel an immense sadness. We have not shown our best face to the world." Abraham himself was at the convention, defending his reputation against the charges of fraud—and continuing to claim that his book's thesis is essentially sound. His admitted mistakes "do not distort reality," he said. "The truth, the argument, wasn't based on the errors. Like all historians, I interpreted a mass of material in a way that is most truthful."

Dr. Feldman will present the case against Dr. Abraham in a 40-page article in the Spring 1985 issue of *Central European History*. That issue will also contain Abraham's lengthy response, a reply to that response by Feldman, and a reply to the reply by Abraham. Where the case will go from there is an open question. It has certainly shaken up enough historians already. Dr. Feldman, for one, is stunned that there could remain defenders of Abraham, who persist in trivializing his errors. He and others on his side had earlier raised volatile charges of a "cover-up" and "academic Watergate" engaged in by the Abraham partisans. Now Feldman wonders whether a "revolution" in historiography is not taking place: historical documents must be treated as practically "sacred." If they are not so treated, and errors like Abraham's are or become common, "We should be put out of business."

—Keith Stimely

Percy L. Greaves, Jr., 1906–1984

Veteran Pearl Harbor revisionist and IHR Editorial Advisory Committee member Percy L. Greaves, Jr., died of cancer on 13 August 1984, 11 days short of what would have been his 78th birthday. A highlight of Mr. Greaves's long and distinguished career in both the private and public sectors was his service as Chief of Minority Staff for the 1945-46 Joint Congressional Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Prior to this, in 1943-45, he was Research Director of the Republican National Committee. A frequent contributor to *The Journal of Historical Review*, he authored most of the Winter 1983-84 special JHR issue entitled

"Pearl Harbor: Revisionism Renewed." Mr. Greaves was a much sought-after speaker on historical and economic subjects; his presentation at the IHR's Third International Revisionist Conference (1981) in Los Angeles, "Pearl Harbor: 40 Years On," capped that weekend event.

Since 1944 Percy Greaves had relentlessly pursued clarification of the facts about the Pearl Harbor attack. At the time of his death he was putting the finishing touches on a volume, *The Real Infamy of Pearl Harbor*, which would have been the definitive summation of his decades of research. He was perhaps more qualified than any other man to speak and write with authority on the Washington events contributing to the attack, a point made by historian Harry Elmer Barnes in his introduction to Mr. Greaves's chapter "The Pearl Harbor Investigations" in Barnes's classic 1953 anthology *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace*. More recently, historian John Toland noted, in his best-selling *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath*, Mr. Greaves's "outstanding" aid in researching that book, calling him "an invaluable living source" on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Greaves was a free market economist for *U.S. News* (the forerunner of *U.S. News and World Report*), and authored several books on economics, including *Understanding the Dollar Crisis* and *Mises Made Easier: A Glossary for Ludwig von Mises' "Human Action"*. A long-time associate and friend of Ludwig von Mises, he served as Armstrong Professor of Economics with Mises at the University of Plano, Texas. He was also a seminar speaker and discussion leader with the Foundation for Economic Education at Irvington-on-Hudson, New York.

Survived by two sons, a daughter, six grandsons, and his wife, Bettina, Percy Greaves was a tough, tireless advocate of the truth about Pearl Harbor, as well as an enduring friend of the IHR. He will be sorely missed.

—Tom Marcellus

Austin J. App, 1902–1984

One of the titanic figures of postwar revisionist historiography, Professor Austin J. App, died of kidney failure on 4 May 1984. A well-established author and scholar of English literature at the outbreak of World War II, Dr. App was soon appalled at the human suffering and political disaster caused by that “unnecessary conflict,” and for the next four decades he was in the very forefront of those courageous scholars who, often in the face of severe academic and press hostility, sought to determine the historical truth about the war, and to publicize that truth far and wide. His engaging and candid 1977 *Autobiography* was subtitled *German-American Voice for Truth and Justice*. This he certainly was, right to the end. His career as historical scholar and publicist, as recounted in his memoir and manifest in his many publications, is in essence the story from its very beginnings of the fight for the historical truth about the European war of 1939-45, and for a postwar political justice predicated upon recognition of that truth.

Austin App was born on 24 May 1902 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the son of August App, an immigrant from Wuerttemberg, Germany, and Katharina Obermaier, originally from Niederpoering, Lower Bavaria. He spent most of his youth on the family farm outside Milwaukee, learning about the world through voracious reading and, equally important for an impressionable and intelligent young man, through close observation of the life of animals. A lesson he gleaned from his youth on the farm is worth repeating. After an anecdote about two large rival rock roosters, who continually fought each other—and only each other—for months on end, one finally succumbing to the other in bloody resolution, App remarked that this “taught me something about individuals and nations”:

Why did they fight each other? Because one was less democratic than the other? Or because they did not understand each other? Or could not communicate? Did the final victor fight to make the world safe for democracy? Or to end all wars? Humbug and hypocrisy. They fought each other because of rivalry, because of power politics. That is the truth of it. In World War I the U.S. finally turned on Germany rather than Russia or England, because Germany was, not more wrong, but more strong. In World War II it turned on Hitler, not on Stalin, for the same reason. On every count Stalin was a barbarian, compared to Hitler. Any attempt to equate our intervention against the third Reich with crusadism or idealism is a calculated swindle against the people.

That bloody duel of these two mighty roosters also disqualified for me another myth in the relations of men and nations. It is a myth

dear to Americans, namely, that persons and nations fight because they do not know each other well enough, because they do not speak the same language, they do not live contiguous enough. Utter hogwash. These two roosters were of the same breed, crowed the same way, had the same friends—and fought each other to the death. So did the North and the South in the Civil War. We fought two wars against our English cousins—same language, same customs; and two with our next nearest of kin, the Germans, whose language is a cognate of English, and whom we knew and understood best of all peoples in the world after those of the British Isles. We were twice allies of the Russians, whom we do not understand at all and who are the least contiguous to us. If we have not yet fought Ireland, it is not because we understand the Irish, but because they have not yet challenged our supremacy of the sea! One could in fact be cynical and say human nature is intrinsically so inclined to evil that the better they know each other the more likely they are to fight—and the more bitterly: civil wars are notoriously the most brutal. And since their premature liberation from colonialism, the Africans—for example, in the Congo and in Nigeria—have killed more fellow Africans in a few decades than the European Christian colonizers killed in several hundred years! Had the American government lived by the lesson of what the farmyard has taught me, both world wars would have been avoided—and future generations would have been spared a lot of hypocritical balderdash inflicted on the world as history. (*Autobiography*, pp. 30, 32.)

After attending public and parochial schools, he entered St. Francis Seminary near Milwaukee, where he received a liberal classical education, graduating in 1921, and returning to the "Major Seminary" there to obtain his B.A. degree in 1923. He entered graduate school at the Catholic University, Washington D.C., receiving his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in English literature. His doctoral dissertation of 1929, *Lancelot in English Literature*, was published to critical acclaim and became a standard of the literature; it was republished in 1965 by Haskell House of New York, seeing wide use as a college text.

After a period of travelling widely in Central and Western Europe during the trouble-fraught first years of the Depression, Dr. App settled down to teaching posts at Catholic University, Basselin College and Sisters College. He wrote prolifically, his human-interest, literary, and religious articles and book reviews appearing in such publications as *Catholic Educational Review*, *Commonweal*, *Sign Magazine*, *Magnificat*, *Catholic World*, and the *Washington Post*. He co-founded the monthly literary review, *Best Sellers*. From 1934 to 1942 he taught at St. Thomas College, University of Scranton, in Scranton, Pennsylvania. He received the university's Faculty Gold Medal in 1939 as "outstanding educator of men."

Entering the U.S. Army in 1942, he served briefly in the Corps of Engineers before being released to work in private industry. After a period of teaching at Dominican College, St. Mary's of the Woods, in Columbus, Ohio, he secured a professorship at Incarnate Word College in San Antonio, Texas, where he taught from 1944 to 1948.

It was while in San Antonio, learning about the wreckage of Europe caused by the American-Soviet invasion and those two allies' obscene occupation policies, that Dr. App really began his "second career" as a contemporary historian and *samizdat* publisher of an age of calamity. All through the war he had, in fact—and in spite of the danger, acute within a nation at war, of stern official disfavor—kept up a steady barrage of letters to newspapers, magazines, and public figures, expressing his frank opinions about the origins of the war and the need for a negotiated peace with Germany. In the Spring of 1946, sickened by the Potsdam-sanctioned policy of mass-expulsion of the Eastern Germans, and particularly shocked by the terrible atrocities visited upon helpless German women in the East by the conquering Red hordes, App self-published his first pamphlet, the ten-page *Ravishing the Women of Conquered Europe*. Its success was immediate and unexpected; orders came in by the thousands, periodicals far and wide picked it up, it was translated into four languages—all this with the "advertising" being almost solely by word-of-mouth. Additionally, invitations by the dozens came to App to speak in front of patriotic groups. There seemed to exist a genuine thirst on the part of a considerable segment of the American public for knowledge of a situation, exposure to a viewpoint, about which the mainline press, by-and-large, was keeping silent. In July 1946 he published the 24-page *Slave-Laboring German Prisoners of War*, and at the end of the year collected 13 original and republished articles and speeches in the book *History's Most Terrifying Peace*, the first major work to bring to the attention of significant numbers of Americans the facts about the Carthaginian treatment being meted out to conquered Germany, by the West as well as the East. The book had to be reprinted only two months after the original press run.

Austin App had touched a nerve. In those dismal postwar years, an America punch-drunk with, and already beginning to feel dubious about, the massed "victory" whoops of the established media, badly needed a corrective balance. This lone scholar in San Antonio found himself supplying a goodly part of it, in his crusade on behalf of the "impolite truths"—therefore very interesting ones—about the real, morally and politically bankrupt, results of that war. So it was that Austin App supplemented, quite independently, the efforts of the group of scholars then clustered

around historians Charles A. Beard and Harry Elmer Barnes, who were embarking on their own ambitious revisionist "program" to write the true history of the war. Whereas that effort, in its early stages, tended to focus on the diplomatic history of the war's origins, App's emphasis was—and largely remained for thirty years—on the unholy trinity of what might be called the "peace crimes" of the victors who had smashed Europe: the *Morgenthau Plan* for the utter despoilment and pastoralization of Germany (officially disclaimed but largely enacted for two years under the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1067); the *Expulsions* of the German-ethnics of Eastern Europe, and all the atrocities attendant to this massively inhumane action; the *Deportations* back to Stalinist "care" of the millions of anti-Communist Russians and East Europeans who had fought on the Germans' side. More than any other single man in America, Austin App as writer and speaker was responsible for bringing to the attention of his countrymen these three great crimes against Western civilization and elemental humanity. For this alone he will always be remembered.

App had actually touched more than one brand of nerve. Upon his path-breaking publication efforts, he became a favorite target of such loudmouthed smear-terrorists as Walter Winchell, George Seldes, Drew Pearson, the Anti-Defamation League, and assorted ADL front-groups like the Committee for the Prevention of World War III. ("World War III" being the imminent "next Nazi attempt at world conquest." This in 1946-47, of course.) He was smeared and hounded as an anti-semite, anti-American, and pro-Nazi. Commenting on one particularly vicious—and wildly inaccurate—propaganda diatribe against App, the eminent columnist Westbrook Pegler wrote:

Dr. App's writing which caused this explosion was a protest against the ravishment of German, Austrian, and Hungarian women by the conquering armies. The Society for the Prevention of World War III . . . does not appear to deny the truth of Doctor App's charge nor even to deplore the crimes alleged. . . . However the anonymous powers who put out that issue of the Bulletin thought it well nigh seditious of Doctor App to reveal enmity toward Soviet Russia.

Brushing aside the epithets, and welcoming the support that came to him from many Americans, App continued both his revisionist activities and his academic career as professor of literature. In 1948 he accepted a professorship at LaSalle College, Philadelphia, where he remained until his retirement in 1968.

Throughout the 1950s, '60s, and '70s, Dr. App kept a schedule that would wear out less committed men. In addition to teaching, he continued to publish his own books and pamphlets on political/historical topics, and had several literary and human-

interest books published by other houses. He wrote more than a thousand articles, columns, and book reviews for such publications as *Social Justice Review*, *Nord Amerika*, the *Philadelphia Gazette-Democrat*, the *Manchester (N.H.) Union Leader*, the *Cleveland Waechter und Anzeiger*, *Western Destiny*, *American Mercury*, *Common Sense*, *ABN Correspondence*, *Conservative Viewpoint*, *Amerika: The Ukrainian Catholic Daily*, *Ukrainian Quarterly*, *Deutsche-Amerikaner*, *Reason*, *Deutsche National-Zeitung*, *Nation Europa*, and *Voice of Americans of German Descent*. He was National Chairman of the last-named publication's parent group, the Federation of American Citizens of German Descent, from 1960 to 1966, after which he was permanent National Honorary Chairman. He was also Chairman, for ten years, of the Pastorius Unit of the Steuben Society, Philadelphia, a longtime honorary member of the German-American National Congress (D.A.N.K.), and Chairman for several years of the Greater Philadelphia Captive Nations Committee.

Austin App never failed to champion, whenever and however he could, the cause of the millions of dispossessed Sudeten, Silesian, and other Eastern German expellees. In his frequent trips to Germany he spoke regularly at many of the giant Expellee mass-rallies held yearly in Cologne, Munich, and elsewhere, becoming well-known to patriotic Germans as their principal, quite tireless, American friend and advocate. For his years of scholarship and public relations activity, he was awarded in 1975 the "European Freedom Prize" of 10,000-DM by the German Peoples' Union. The prize was presented in Munich by Dr. Gerhard Frey, editor of the *Deutsche National-Zeitung*.

Dr. App was a member of the Editorial Advisory Committee of *The Journal of Historical Review* from its inception. His last major speech in America was "The Holocaust Put in Perspective," delivered at the first International Revisionist Conference sponsored by the Institute for Historical Review, held in Los Angeles over Labor Day, 1979. The speech was published in Vol. 1, No. 1 of the *JHR* (Spring 1980). In his last years Dr. App several times expressed his satisfaction at the fact that he was able to witness the contemporary worldwide explosion of accomplishment and interest in revisionist studies of all aspects of the Second World War. Those now engaged in this work owe him, as one of the handful of pioneers in a field where pioneering entailed great risk and therefore great courage, their most heartfelt respect, admiration, and gratitude. He was a fighter and a champion in the cause of truth.

—Keith Stimely

AUSTIN J. APP'S
PRINCIPAL REVISIONIST BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

- Ravishing the Women of Conquered Europe.* San Antonio: Author, 1946. (10pp.)
- The Big Three Deportation Crime.* San Antonio: Author, 1946. (4pp.)
- Slave-Laboring German Prisoners of War.* San Antonio: Author, 1946. (24pp.)
- History's Most Terrifying Peace.* San Antonio: Author, 1946, 1947; Takoma Park, Md.: Boniface Press, 1970. (110pp.)
- Morgenthau Era Letters.* Takoma Park, Md.: Boniface Press, 1966, 1974. (128pp.)
- Red Genocide in a German Village.* Takoma Park, Md.: Boniface Press, 1970, 1976. (6pp.)
- The Bombing Atrocity of Dresden.* Takoma Park, Md.: Boniface Press, 1970. (6pp.)
- The Six Million Swindle.* Takoma Park, Md.: Boniface Press, 1973, 1976. (40pp.)
- A Straight Look at the Third Reich.* Takoma Park, Md.: Boniface Press, 1974. (60pp.)
- The Rooseveltian Concentration Camps for Japanese-Americans.* Takoma Park, Md.: Boniface Press, 1974. (8pp.)
- Anti-Semitism: A Phoney Bogey.* Takoma Park, Md.: Boniface Press, 1974. (8pp.)
- The Curse of Anglo-American Power Politics.* Takoma Park, Md.: Boniface Press, 1974. (6pp.)
- Footnote on President Ford's Visit to Auschwitz.* Takoma Park, Md.: Boniface Press, 1975. (4pp.)
- The Curse of Anti-Anti-Semitism.* Takoma Park, Md.: Boniface Press, 1976. (66pp.)
- Autobiography: German-American Voice for Truth and Justice.* Takoma Park, Md.: Boniface Press, 1977. (308pp.)
- "Holocaust": Sneak Attack on Christianity.* Reedy, W. Va.: Liberty Bell, 1978. (8pp.)
- Hitler-Himmler Order on Jews Uncovered.* Reedy, W. Va.: Liberty Bell, 1978. (6pp.)

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The Sudeten-German Tragedy. Takoma Park, Md.: Boniface Press, 1979. (84pp.)

About the Contributors

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CHARLES LUTTON holds degrees in International Relations (B.A., M.A.) and a Ph.D. in History. He teaches courses on the political and military history of the twentieth century at several leading policy think-tanks, and has been published in many scholarly and popular journals.

JAMES J. MARTIN received his Ph.D. in History from the University of Michigan in 1949. He is the author of *Men Against the State*, *American Liberalism and World Politics 1931-1941*, *Revisionist Viewpoints*, *The Saga of Hog Island*, and *The Man Who Invented 'Genocide'*. His long teaching career included posts at Northern Illinois University (DeKalb), San Francisco State College, Deep Springs College, and Rampart College.

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This special issue of *THE JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL REVIEW* includes issues Two, Three and Four of Volume Five, 1984. There is a reason for this. At approximately midnight on the Fourth of July last, the business office and warehouse of the publisher were burned to the ground by arson. Lost in the gutted ruins were the manuscripts and galley proofs destined to be the regular 1984 quarterly issues. These issues thus had to be produced all over again, essentially from scratch—a formidable task that ultimately took more than six months.

What you see before you could be called the “Phoenix” issue of *THE JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL REVIEW* as it has quite literally risen from the ashes. Regrettably, more than \$300,000 worth of historical books, documents, files and equipment were not so fortunate.

This effort to incinerate the assets of the world’s leading publisher of revisionist historical literature was largely successful.

The attempt to break the spirits of those who staff and serve this organization and its goals, however, was not.

Normal issuance of *THE JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL REVIEW* on a quarterly basis will resume with the Spring 1985 issue (Volume Six, Number One).

We appreciate your forbearance and look forward enthusiastically to serving you through this publication in the months and years to come.

The Publisher